Immigration Policy in Europe Amid Multiculturalism Crisis
Arastu Habibbayli

Life in a Tent... The Unending Plight of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon
Samar el Kadi

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Displacement, Refugees and Migration

in the Caucasus and Eurasia

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Editors' Note

Every day, all over the world, some people have to make one of the most difficult decisions of their lives - to leave their homes in search of a better life. The reasons these people leave their homes (or home countries) are varied and often very complex. Most of them are forced to move to improve their economic situation and to escape poverty, to save their lives as a result of armed conflicts and civil wars, to escape human rights abuses and even death. Their journey is always full of uncertainly, danger and fear and there is every possibility that they will not reach their destination. Some face detention or deportation back when they arrive. Vulnerable and unprotected, they face daily racism, xenophobia, and discrimination in their "new homes".

This edition of *Caucasus International* is dedicated to analysis of the displacement, refugee and migration issues in both Asia and Europe - the one of the most acute and sensitive issues of the modern world. The number of people forced to flee their homes across the world has exceeded 50 million for the first time since the Second World War, an exponential rise that is stretching host countries and aid organizations to breaking point, according to figures released by UNHCR.[1] This massive increase was driven mainly by the war in Syria, which, in the beginning of 2015, had forced 3 million people into becoming refugees and made 6.5 million internally displaced.[2] Major new displacement was also seen in Africa – notably in the Central African Republic and South Sudan. The continuing conflict in Libya is also contributing to the increase in the number of displaced people. Another conflict on the edge of Europe, in Ukraine, is also a factor in the world's current refugee crises, which, since the annexation of Crimea and the start of the conflict in Donbas, has made over one million people leave their homes and become refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). The crises of protracted displacement of refugees and IDPs in other parts of the post-Soviet area also remain unresolved. Hundreds of thousands of people from Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and most importantly, from Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan are deprived of their right to return to their homes and are forced to exist in precarious living conditions.

1 UNCHR, World Refugee Day: Global forced displacement tops 50 million for first time in post-World War II era, unchr.org, June 20, 2014, http://www.unhcr.org/53a155bc6.html

2 UNCHR, Syria Regional Refugee Response, unchr.org, http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php

The current issue of *Caucasus International* contains seven articles on displacement, refugee, migration and multiculturalism issues, providing perspectives from authors of different countries and backgrounds. It also contains two commentaries, two journalistic covers and one colloquy. In our *Book review* and *Caucasus Under Review* sections, the readers will find reviews of the recently published books that focus on international politics, as well as of those focused on the region of the South Caucasus.

One of the first and major issues touched upon in the current issue is the failure of multiculturalism, with migrant and refugee treatment in Europe as an important feature of this phenomenon. Here, Dr. Arastu Habibbayli, Deputy Head of Foreign Relations Department of the Administration of the President of Azerbaijan Republic comprehensively examines immigration policies in Europe amid the crisis of multiculturalism. Dr. Habibbayli suggests that due to significant migrant population and because of the migrants' importance for the growth of the European economy, multiculturalism "is not an option but rather a necessity" for European countries. According to many politicians, scholars, publicists and religious figures in the West, the prevailing view develops though, that the multiculturalism has failed in Europe. Faced with the economic crisis, the European countries tend to further tighten their immigration policies, which, in this current key chapter of history, has become the litmus test for the whole Europe. In his commentary, Brendan Cole, London based broadcaster on Middle East addresses contemporary refugee issues and the crisis of multiculturalism in the European Union. The author reports about the EU's reluctance to take in Syrian refugees and how human consequences of this vast exodus of refugees have raised questions over the responsibility of the international community toward the millions affected. He underlines that public statements made by European politicians about the rise of Islamism in Europe and anti-immigration protests seen in certain European countries over the last few months, put values of multiculturalism under doubt, as well as raise a question of hypocrisy in the EU, given the gap between its professed concern for those fleeing violence and the help it actually offers. Another *CI* author, Namig Abbasov, former SAM intern and currently a student in the United Kingdom, uses the UK as a case study to examine whether multiculturalism has

failed in this key European country. Mr. Abbasov argues that what has failed is not "the multiculturalism itself, but rather the understanding of it in the UK, due to the powerful negative discourse around the term embedded in multicultural policies." He believes that the arguments denying multiculturalism lack empirical evidence, and that those arguments have been strongly influenced by the negative discourse around the idea of multiculturalism, rather than by everyday realities.

One of the major issues examined in the current edition is the refugee and IDP crises in Syria, with the latter being one of the key reasons why refugee and displacement issues were placed firmly on top of the international community's humanitarian agenda. Secretary of the Turkish Studies Chair of the National University of La Plata Ariel González Levaggi expands on Turkey's policy towards the Syrian refugee crisis, where he notes that Turkey tries to address the issue via the two-pronged approach, combining national security concerns with democratic internationalism. A researcher and NGO worker dealing with Syrian refugee issues Zümrüt Sönmez sheds light on challenges faced by IDPs from Syria, based on facts and personal observations, where she provides recommendations for the international community. Underlining the harsh life conditions of Syrian IDPs and their continuing deterioration, Mrs. Sönmez attempts to demonstrate the importance of the role of international NGOs in improving the situation for IDPs. Constanze Letsch, who is *The Guardian*'s Turkey correspondent, writes about the growing Syrian refugee crisis in Turkey and the disaster of international inaction, calling the situation "stranded and trapped". Letsch states that dismal international response to the crisis is pushing the increasing numbers of Syrians to risk their lives, fleeing the country via dangerous and ever diversifying human trafficking routes.

There are two journalistic covers in the current issue of *CI* dedicated to the life of Syrian refugees in the neighboring countries. Samar El Kadi, a Red Cross Spokeswoman in Lebanon, reports for *CI* from Bekaa valley in east Lebanon. While trying to cast light on "unending plight of Syrian refugees in Lebanon", El Kadi asks "what is it like for the Syrian refugees who are spending years of their lives in poorly equipped tents in miserable conditions?" and notes that as the humanitarian assistance on which they have been relying runs out and the tolerance of their hosts wears thin, their living conditions have dramatically deteriorated. Salwa Amor, a British-Syrian journalist and documentary filmmaker, also reports for *CI* about Syrian refugees, where she argues that 2014 was a

year when 10 million Syrians became an insignificant statistic. She compares Europe's response to the post-WWII refugee crisis and the current Syrian crisis – the second worst crisis of its kind, and notes that Europe has advanced in many ways, however, for victims of displacement around the world, Europe has yet to move on from the WWII mentality, which was characterized by indifference.

Another sensitive topic that the current edition tries to shed the light on is certainly the largest issue of its kind in the whole post-Soviet area, which is the problem of refugees and internally displaced persons in Azerbaijan. Acting Head of the Regional Security Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan Tofig Musayev analyses the scope of internal displacement in Azerbaijan and its causes and consequences from the international law perspective. Mr. Musayev comprehensively examines the international documents that refer to the problem of internal displacement in Azerbaijan, its causes and consequences, and the rights of the uprooted population, and concludes that "the lack of agreement on political issues cannot be used as a pretext to prevent the return of the IDPs to their homes and properties and that the de-occupation of Azerbaijani territories should, in no way, be considered or introduced as a compromise, and used as a bargaining chip in the conflict settlement process". Another piece related to refugee and IDP problems in Azerbaijan is a commentary provided by Member of the Board of the Azerbaijani Community of Nagorno-Karabakh Region of the Republic of Azerbaijan, MP Rovshan Rzayev. He notes that Azerbaijan has experienced one of the harshest refugee and IDP crises of modern times, which made about 13 percent of the country's population to live lives of refugees and IDPs. According to Mr. Rzayev, the only way to truly heal those wounds inflicted by the war, occupation, massacres and ethnic cleansing is through the resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, with peace being established in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the community returned to their native lands and homes.

CI editors also discussed Azerbaijan's refugee and IDP related issues with the Chairman of the Democracy and Human Rights Committee, MP Chingiz Ganizade. In the colloquy, Ganizade answered our questions regarding the historical background of the deportation of Azerbaijanis by Armenian authorities, the international response to Azerbaijan's refugee and IDP problems, and the humanitarian policy of the Azerbaijani state towards the refugees and IDPs. The MP touched on the mass human rights violations

against the refugees and IDPs.

As part of the current issue, we also decided to look at the role of mobility and border security as a factor in the EU-Azerbaijan relations. Michela Ceccorulli, a Research Fellow at both the Scuola Superiore Sant' Anna and the University of Bologna, specifically examined mobility and border related concerns as one of the key topics in relations between the European Union and Azerbaijan. In her analysis, Dr. Ceccorulli stresses, that Azerbaijan has become a crucial ally for the European Union for its strategic location, reliability in their energy partnership, as well as for the country's membership in the Eastern Neighborhood programme. While relations between the EU and Azerbaijan have rapidly expanded over recent years, the author argues that without a clear regional vision of the EU for the South Caucasus or its proper coordination of the trans-border issues, further development of relations will be impeded.

Finally, we recommend our readers to familiarize themselves with a comprehensive review of the Henry Kissinger's most recent book, *World Order* and a few reviews of the recently published books on the South Caucasus.

We sincerely hope that the current issue will give our readership food for thought and discussions. Enjoy your reading!

Sincerely,
CI Team

Immigration Policy in Europe Amid Multiculturalism Crisis

Arastu Habibbayli*

The majority of European countries host significant immigrant communities, and as such, multiculturalism is not an option but rather a necessity for them. However, as many political leaders, scholars, publicists and religious figures have emphasized, multiculturalism has failed in Europe. Despite the fact that Europe's demographic crisis means that migrants are vital for future growth, Europe is overlooking the moral values of its new citizens and concentrating solely on Western values. While Western democratic principles are being tested by the current economic crisis, European countries are tightening their immigration policies, contributing to the further erosion of multicultural values. In this key chapter of our history, these current developments will be a litmus test for Europe and the humanity in general.

* Dr. Arastu Habibbayli is a Deputy Head of Foreign Relations Department of the Administration of the President of Azerbaijan Republic

Early 2015 saw the emergence of a series of faultlines in cross-cultural relations. As mosques were set ablaze in Switzerland and Germany and rallies were held against the Muslims, Western societies have become divided. Protests are staged by those who oppose the migrants on the one hand, and by advocates of peaceful coexistence with representatives of different cultures on the other. While Western societies are split on the subject of multicultural tolerance, the position of the political establishments are, regrettably, unequivocal.

It is no secret that in recent years, political leaders, scholars, publicists and religious figures have made statements on the failure of multiculturalism. This failure is attributed to rejection of Western values by the labor migrants, particularly from the Muslim countries, who were once welcomed, in line with the migration policies of the Western European countries.

Thus many European countries considered as immigrant nations – where immigrants account for at least 10% of their population - are merely attempting to assimilate migrants of different cultures and faiths to European society.

Nevertheless, it is evident that Western percepetions of tolerance and multiculturalism are based on the imposition of their own values upon others. Thus many European countries considered as immigrant nations – where immigrants account for at least 10% of their population - are merely attempting to assimilate migrants of different cultures and faiths to European society. That is to say, multiculturalism is conceived as the dominance of Western values and as an unremarkable component of the mosaic composition of Western society. This, in turn, threatens the fate of the multiculturalism for Europe's population, which in fact is comprised of representatives of various cultures and peoples. In reality, the overwhelming majority of the European countries are immigrant nations - and as such, multiculturalism is not an option but a necessity.

Indeed, there are quite a few people in academic circles who contest this thesis. Vladimir Malakhov, a fellow at the Philosophy Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences poses the question, "How can there be multiculturalism in France? This is a state that recognizes no "ethnic groups" and merely grants citizenship".[1] This is why it is meaningless to talk about the existence of multiculturalism in such countries as France, let alone to debate the

1 Владимир Малахов *(*22 декабря 2011 *) После мультикультурализма: Европа и ее иммигранты*, Polit.ru, available at: http://polit.ru/article/2012/01/27/malakhov/ (accessed 28 January 2015)

crisis of multiculturalism.

Western civilization in the face of new challenges

In the wake of the massive death toll of WWII, Western European countries sought to increase their economic capacity by importing cheap migrant labor from the colonial nations. Rapid economic growth in the post-war era exceeded increase of available domestic labor force volumes by several times. Europe's aging population together with the abundance of cheap labor in the neighboring regions led European nations to encourage labor migration from their former colonies.

The vast majority of Europe's labor migrants are Muslim. Migrants from Africa's non-Muslim countries and from India, were still committed to their cultural values. Therefore, from the 1950s, France, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and other Western European countries saw the emergence of a new, non-Christian generation that defied Western values. For comparison, the Muslim population of Europe in the 1950s stood at 800,000; in 2010 this figure reached 44 million.[2]

Thus, Europe is now facing two major challenges. Firstly, the centuries-old notion of national identity was challenged by the influx of migrants, and Europe encountered new lifestyles. Second, the migration of Muslims to European countries brought different value systems to Europe.

According to Eurostat, the natural growth of the population in the European Union in the years 2010-2060 is projected at 16 million people, while the number of migrant is projected to peak at 86 million people during the same period – 17 % of the overall population.

With regard to the first challenge it must be noted that the majority of European countries today are immigrant nations, meaning that migrants account for at least 10% of the population. Given that Europe is experiencing a demographic crisis, this trend will only accelerate. According to Eurostat, the natural growth of the population in the European Union in the years 2010-2060 is projected at 16 million people, while the number of migrant is projected to peak at 86 million people during the same period – 17 % of the overall population.[3] The growth of the migrant population in Europe is

2 Pew Research Center (27 January 2011) The Future of the Global Muslim Population, available at: http://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/the-future-of-the-global-muslim-population/ (accessed: 18 January 2015)

3 Eurotate (2014) *Natural growth of the population in the European Union,* Available at: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache (accessed 15 January 2015)

substantial, owing to the immigration flow of the previous years, mixed marriages and higher birth rates among migrants[4].

There is an important distinction between the European multicultural model and other Western versions. Unlike the "Old continent", Western societies established in the countries of the new world (Canada, Australia, New Zealand) do not see a crisis on the horizon; on the contrary, they are viewed by most experts as success stories. The main distinguishing feature is that the formation of the national identity in the new world countries coincided with an era of migration during which European migrants dominated the scene. In Europe, however, formation of the national identity took centuries earlier, and as a consequence, the new inhabitants of the Old Continent have experienced difficulties in integrating. Given that the migrants are not in a dominant position in society, assimilation appears to be the aim of the European model.

Although the proportion of migrants varies by country, the general approach remains unchanged. France, for instance, has a particularly high proportion of migrants. According to the 2008 data of the French Statistics Insitute (INSEE), 19% of the population (12 million people) has either been born abroad or has at least one migrant parent (first and second generation migrants). The research revealed that some 40% of children born between 2006 and 2008 have at least one migrant grandparent.[5]

The proportion of migrants in the United Kingdom is also rising steadily. According to rough estimates, the UK's population is likely to reach 77.1 million by 2051 and 85.7 million by 2081, and 24 million of those – i.e. one third of the population - will be of non-British origin.[6] Similarly, in countries such as Germany, Italy, Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands, migrants account for over 10% of the population.[7] From the perspective of ethnic and cultural backgrounds, these migrants represent rather different values. As well as migrants from Islamic cultures, Indians,

4 ibid

5 Catherine Borrel et Bertrand Lhommeau (2010), *Être né en France d'un parent immigré, INSEE,* available at: http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?reg_id=0&ref_id=ip1287 (accessed: 29 January 2014)

6 Coleman D. A. Projections of the Ethnic Minority Populations of the United Kingdom 2006-2056 // Population and Development Review 36(3), September 2010. P.441

7 ibid

Chinese, and Vietnamese also preserve their values within the local populations in Europe.

This challenge may appear not so immediate for the countries with a young population. However, the aging populations in most of the leading European nations and the decline in the number of working age citizens precludes Europe's rejection of the multicultural ideology. For example, according to one study, in 50 years time, Europe's biggest economy – Germany will see its population shrink by 10 million, down to 72 million people. Moreover, while the proportion of people over 65 was 20.5% in 2012, by 2062 this figure is projected at 30.1%.[8] Therefore, for Germany, reliance on migrant labor is unavoidable.

However, the aging populations in most of the leading European nations and the decline in the number of working age citizens precludes Europe's rejection of the multicultural ideology.

For the European countries that are experiencing a demographic crisis, the migrants are vital for future growth. In the meantime, Europe is overlooking the moral values of its new citizens and concentrating solely on the Western values. In the eyes of the West, the newcomers must be the component of a homogenous society, with their behavior and ethic norms discarded as incompatible with Western values. Nonetheless, time is showing that migrants who were encouraged to come to Europe to provide cheap labor have been inclined to preserve their values. Occasional disrespect towards Europe's new residents feeds radical sentiments, leading to the hardening of migration policies.

History demonstrates that it is centered solely on Western cultural and religious values, European society cannot offer a universal value system. Those who contend that multiculturalism has failed solely because migrants rejected Western values seem to have forgotten that several centuries ago, the cultural diversity of the indigenous population of the newly discovered continents and of the slaves imported from Africa was not only rejected but obliterated. This viewpoint fails to account for a multitude of reasons for the crisis of multiculturalism.

8 Arastu Habibbeyli (02 July 2014) *Western Multiculturalism Upon Crisis: New Challenges, Dilemmas (Article I),* New Times, available at: http://newtimes.az/en/relations/2870/ (accessed 28 January 2015)

Europe's fear of turning Muslim

The fact that Muslims constitute the vast majority of the migrants arriving in Europe gives rise to another challenge. However, Europe regards this not so much as a challenge, but rather as a threat to its system of values and its future in general. Western civilization attached great importance to religious values; for many centuries, Christianity has served as the nucleus of the Western value system. And from the religious standpoint, Islam has historically been the arch rival of Western ideology. Buddhism, on the other hand, with its foundations in the Far East, was located far away from the "Old Continent", and thus was unable to consolidate its presence there.

Jews, notably, were persecuted in Europe for centuries, with Jews subject to forced expulsion at several points in history. It was not until the early 19th century that they were finally accepted as equal citizens. However, antisemitism returned with a vengeance when Europe experienced harsh economic crises in 1930s and war between 1939-45 (WWII). One of the gravest crimes in the history of humanity - the Holocaust - saw the systematic, bureaucratic, state-sponsored persecution and murder of six million Jews by the Nazi regime and its collaborators. This took place in the very heart of the European continent, based on the idea of the racial superiority of some nations over others.

Islam-West relations were more aggravated and bloody clashes occurred as one side would gain advantage over the other. The most bloodiest endeavors of the Europeans, being the bearers of Christianity, against the Islamic world, were the crusades.

Throughout history, it twice happened that Europe was exposed directly to Islam. The first time was in the aftermath of the establishment of Cordoba Caliphate, and the second time was when European territories, extending all the way to Vienna, were incorporated into the sphere of influence of the Ottoman Empire. In both cases, Europe showed religious intolerance towards the Muslims in the wake of the collapse of the empires. Religious persecution of the Muslims in Spain and the Balkans and the annihilation of the Islamic cultural legacy exemplifies historical Western approaches to Islam.

Today the situation has changed. For the first time in history, Islam is not an alien religion in Europe, but the one followed by a significant minority. The West is encountering Islam once again, with Muslim migrants arriving from Turkey, North Africa and former colonies of the Near and the Middle East. At present, Europe faces the possibility of a Muslim future for itself. Labor migrants are not arriving through invasion; they are becoming part of fabric of society. Under such circumstances, Europe will not be able to fend off this wave of Islam with conventional means.

For the first time in history, Islam is not an alien religion in Europe, but the one followed by a significant minority.

According to researchers, due to the influx of migrants and traditionally high birth rates in migrant communities, an estimate 20% of Europe's population could be Muslim by 2050.[9] Some argue that the West and Islam cannot coexist. Democracy or sharia law; freedom or Islam – these are suggested as major dilemmas for European society. Still, it is a reality that the Islamic values are already a choice for part of Europe's population. In the absence of a tolerant approach to this reality, and unless Islam gains its place in the system of Western values, Europe's fate will be in jeopardy.

The number of practicing Muslims in Europe, the popularization of Islam as a religion, and the demographic growth rate among Muslims are seen by some as threats to the future of the Western society. As a result, Islam is viewed with deep suspicion by some in the West. The biggest challenge for Western-style multiculturalism is the fear that minorities will one day become majority. According to a survey conducted by Eurobarometer, 39% of respondents in the European Union believe that discrimination based on religious beliefs is widespread. This figure stands at 66% in France, 60% in Belgium, 51% in the Netherlands and 51% in the United Kingdom.[10]

As a result, Islam is viewed with deep suspicion by some in the West. The biggest challenge for Western-style multiculturalism is the fear that minorities will one day become majority.

9 Adrian Michaels, (08 August 2009) *Muslim Europe: the demographic time bomb transforming our continent*, The Telegraph, available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/5994047/Muslim-Europe-the-demographic-time-bomb-transforming-our-continent.html (accessed: 27 January 2015)

10 Eurobarometer (November 2012) Discrimination in The EU In 2012, Special Eurobarometer 393, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_393_en.pdf (accessed: 30 January 2015)

However, the fate of the multiculturalism in Europe depends on the dialogue between Christianity and Islam, and the coexistence of religious and secular values.

However, the fate of the multiculturalism in Europe depends on the dialogue between Christianity and Islam, and the coexistence of religious and secular values. This is the only solution. It is only in a tolerant society that multiculturalism can mutually enrich cultures and foster values that unite different peoples.

Westen democratic principles: Tested by the economic crisis

The global economic recession has damaged the multicultural values of the West. In the countries where the economic crisis has been felt more severely, for instance in terms of high unemployment, attitudes towards newcomers are more aggressive. The French newspaper "Le Parisien Dimanche" conducted a survey among the French on a referendum to impose restrictions on the free movement of migrants; 60% of respondents favored quota restrictions for migrants.

Soaring unemployment and weakening social benefits, against the backdrop of surging migration, is testing the resilience of the Western multicultural values and tolerance.

Soaring unemployment and weakening social benefits, against the backdrop of surging migration, is testing the resilience of the Western multicultural values and tolerance. The inability of migrants to incorporate themselves into the universal Western lifestyle – together with the leniency of the European legislation on migration, is perceived as a major reason for the failure of multiculturalism. In the meantime, this course of events has fuelled the rise of far-right political parties, and heightened racist and chauvinist rhetoric.

Migrants, who were once welcomed and whose influx was encouraged by European nations, are now being treated contrary to universal values of justice, democracy and human rights, purportedly to preserve the Western identity. The present political approach to the issue of migration is regressive in terms of democratic principles, but Europe's political leaders appear happy to resort to this policy.

Encouraging labor migration for economic reasons, and then subjecting migrants to discrimination, contravenes the values of multiculturalism. If the loss of national and moral values is considered a victory for multiculturalism, then it invalidates any

discourse on tolerance. We believe that the crisis of multiculturalism is the result of a misguided policy pursued by Western policymakers. It seems that the Western tolerant posture towards multiculturalism had simply collapsed under the weight of the economic crisis.

Encouraging labor migration for economic reasons, and then subjecting migrants to discrimination, contravenes the values of multiculturalism.

Multiculturalism and immigration policy

The role of European immigration policy in the current crisis is often debated. In this discussion, Western versus non-Western philosophies of life and history are key topics.

One of the likely reasons for the volatility of today's multicultural society is that multiculturalism was initially considered based on perceptions of historical ethnic minorities. Subsequently, however, European officials began to call for the integration of labor migrants with common cultural values. This policy fell short of expectations. Regardless of the European officials' views that migrants were there temporarily, the policy failed to convey the reality.

It was in Europe that for the first time, migrants were held as equal to traditional ethnic minorities. Thus the leading nations in this respect - Sweden and Netherlands - launched measures for protection of migrant minorities in the early 1970s and 1980s respectively. The state allocated funds for projects such as native language education, support for native language media outlets and cultural events. Of course, this only involved a limited circle of socially engaged migrants. But as the number of migrants spiraled upwards and they opted to adhere to their own values, the governments abandoned this strategy.

Eventually, both countries began to backtrack in legislative terms in the early 1990s. In Sweden, the law protecting the rights of migrants and holding them equal to traditional minorities (Samis and Finns) was amended.[11] The Netherlands terminated its minority assistance program in 1983.[12]

There are still a number of countries that have imposed strict

11 Saininen M. "The Swedish Model as an Institutional Framework for Immigrant Membership Rights//Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. 1999. Vol.25

12 Entzinger H.. The Rise and Fall ofMulticulturalism: The Case of the Netherlands, Joppke C., Morawska E. (red.), Toward Assimilation and Citizenship, Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan. 2003

immigration controls and experience no problems with multiculturalism. Japan's experience can be suggested as a successful model. Its immigration legislation is fairly conservative. Obtaining citizenship in the country is associated with a complex process. There are stricts standards by which the number of labor migrants is regulated, leaving no room for political maneuvering. For that reason the Chinese, Koreans and Brazilian residents encounter no discrimination or problems.

At the crossroads between West and East, North and South, Christianity and Islam, and between different civilizations and cultures, Azerbaijan's experience attests to the perpetual nature of multiculturalism.

In Azerbaijan, multiculturalism is recognized as a way of life, and it is one of the few places where multiculturalism is not challenged by populist statements by the politicians or campaigns by radical nationalist groups. At the crossroads between West and East, North and South, Christianity and Islam, and between different civilizations and cultures, Azerbaijan's experience attests to the perpetual nature of multiculturalism. "Multicultural state – common society" represents a successful formula for multiculturalism in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan, a predominantly Muslim country, is also home to several other ethnic and religious groups, including Christian and Jewish communities. Respect and tolerance for national and religious minorities has played a vital role in the development of the country from antiquity to modernity. Representatives of all minorities have been present in the Azerbaijani government since independence, and the rights of minorities has been also recognized in the constitution and other national legal instruments. It is no surprise that Azerbaijan is amongst the world's most tolerant societies and certainly ranks among the top of the Muslim-majority nations of the world.[13]

In his speech at the opening of the Second Baku International Humanitarian Forum, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev said, "Multiculturalism is our way of life. Although it is a relatively new concept, multiculturalism has been part of our people's life for centuries. For centuries, representatives of different religions and nationalities have lived in Azerbaijan like one family".[14] The principal condition for thriving multicultural-

13 Arye Gut (22 January 2015) *Azerbaijan: Tolerance and multiculturalism*, Congress Blog, available at: http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/230293-azerbaijan-tolerance-and-multiculturalism (accessed: 01 february 2015)

14 Azərbaycan Prezidentinin Rəsmi internet səhifəsi rəsmi internet səhifəsi (04 oktyabr 2012) *İkinci Bakı Beynəlxalq Humanitar Forumun açılış mərasimində İlham Əliyevin nitqi*, available at: http://www.president.az/articles/6390/print (accessed: 29 January 2015)

ism is the coexistence of universal and national ideas, and the preservation of national identity encompassed by a system of multicultural values. In order to further foster values of multiculturalism, in 2014, the government established two institutions that solidified the country's role as a model for ethnic and religious tolerance. The position of State Counsellor on Multiculturalism, Interethnic and Religious Affairs was created, and the Baku International Center of Multiculturalism was launched. This new center immediately began to build on Baku's role in advancing intercultural, inter-religious and inter-ethnic dialogue and humanitarian programming.

Hence, the failure of the Western experience does not denote stagnation or demise of multiculturalism in general. Many successful examples around the world demonstrate that people of different ethnic and religious backgrounds are capable of moving forward while preserving their identity and demonstrating mutual respect. Multiculturalism must be recognized not as an ideology that aims to assimilate the differences, but rather a daily way of life that in many cases has endured for centuries.

Conclusion

Even though the notion of multiculturalism was originally introduced in the West, it is now facing a serious crisis in Europe, with emerging negative attitudes towards ethno-religious and cultural minorities. This has resulted in statements by political leaders, scholars, publicists and religious figures on the failure of multiculturalism. However, the recognition of the peaceful coexistence of different civilizations and cultures and mutual enrichment as a way of life - is the only light at the end of the tunnel for humanity. An ideology that is aimed at creating a standard criteria for our values has already collapsed under its own weight. That said, efforts by new Europe to determine its future can be considered within several categories.

However, the recognition of the peaceful coexistence of different civilizations and cultures and mutual enrichment as a way of life - is the only light at the end of the tunnel for humanity.

The first is assimilation through integration. Instead of ensuring the integration of migrants in the host country, the primary objective of Europe's multiculturalism policy continues to be the isolation of migrants from the political life and their assimilation.

For example, in Germany, the ultimate aim of the multiculturalism policy is not to ensure the integration of migrants and subsequent generations in the German society, but to make sure that they end up isolated and return to their home countries, owing to linguistic, cultural and other barriers. Vladimir Malakhov of the Philosophy Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences believes that, "Multiculturalism efforts in Germany pursues segregation rather than integration."[15]

The second is acceptance of second generation immigrants to the cultural-social-political life of the country. The policy of the Italian government can be seen as an example. It was no coincidence that Italy's former Prime Minister Romano Prodi said, "By welcoming immigrants we have gained vast resources. We must continue on the road of integration. The next generation of immigrants must become the next generation of Italians".[16]

The third is the promotion of cosmopolitan values on the global scale. The West endeavors to sell its values globally as a universal idea. This phase can be seen as an effort to transform the Western model into a universal value system. This means that exposing migrants to the Western values commences whilst they are still in their home countries, prior to their migration to Europe.

By doing so, the West believes that the problems faced by migrants within the European society can be overcome through global-scale cosmopolitan values that defy national-cultural mindsets. Today, the process of globalization is being steered towards the identification of a universal model of cultural values. The key feature of this emerging trend is that the Western culture is not satisfied by dictating its own cultural values; it also controls the process of the creation of value criteria for other cultures.

The fourth is a rigorous migration policy. Switzerland's referendum on the restriction of migrant flow to the European Union through a labor force quota in Febuary 2014 signalled a new

15 Владимир Малахов (13 декабря2012) *Мультикультурализм в Западной Европе: по ту сторону риторики,* Российский Совет По Международным Делам, available at:. http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=1155#top (accessed: 25 January 2015)

16 Arastu Habibbeyli (04 July 2014) *Western Multiculturalism Upon Crisis: New Challenges, Dilemmas (Article II),* New Times, available at: http://newtimes.az/en/relations/2873 (accessed: 28 January 2015

trend. It symbolized the mood regarding the restriction of migration - not just from outside, but also within the European nations.

Thus, nowadays, European countries are seeking a solution to the multiculturalism crisis through the promotion of cosmopolitan values that neglect cultural, social, and religious particularities. This approach will serve as a litmus test for the West and the humanity in general.

Assessing the Role of Mobility and Border Security in EU-Azerbaijan Relations: How Far Can They Go?

Michela Ceccorulli*

In recent years, challenges such as international terrorism, transnational organized crime and illegal immigration have rendered mobility and border security top priorities and issues for cooperation among international actors. This article looks specifically at mobility and related border concerns as key topics in relations between the European Union and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan has become a crucial ally for the European Union for multiple reasons. First, it is located in a strategic position, at the crossroads between East and West; second, it has recently become a key actor in the energy game, proposing itself as an alternative and reliable source of energy; third, it is member of the Eastern Neighborhood, where regional stability has direct bearing upon the EU's security. By outlining the ways in which these challenges may also be potentially disruptive for Azerbaijan's national interests and overall security, the article considers the extent of existing cooperation on mobility and border security, up until the recent signature of the Mobility Partnership (2013). While relations have rapidly expanded over recent years, the article concludes that without a clear regional vision of the EU or proper coordination on these transborder issues, further development will be impeded.

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International terrorism, transnational organized crime and illegal migration are recognized as key challenges in the evolving global landscape. It is undisputed that regional and international coordination is crucial in combating these transborder security challenges. For this reason, bilateral and multilateral dialogue has reached an unprecedented level, creating a common platform for discussions among actors. The discourse has witnessed divergent and even opposing conceptions of the security landscape.

The EU's approach reflects the prevailing dynamic in international politics, namely the flattening of national borders and the erosion of the distinction between internal and external dynamics and politics.

Like other international actors, the European Union (EU) has over the last decades been developing strategies to tackle these issues, aware that its peculiar institutional features and its modality of external projection place it in a uniquely vulnerable position. It is highly likely that these challenges entail serious repercussions for member states. The EU's approach reflects the prevailing dynamic in international politics, namely the flattening of national borders and the erosion of the distinction between internal and external dynamics and politics. This is especially marked in the EU's peripheral areas. The calculus is that the EU could achieve security if its neighborhood is effectively able to control and manage a series of security challenges. Based on this reasoning, the EU has created multiple frameworks of cooperation with non-member states.

This work considers the place of mobility and border security cooperation in relations between the European Union and Azerbaijan. The country has revealed itself to be crucial partner for the EU for multiple reasons. First, it is a fundamental corridor connecting the East and West; second, it has recently become a key actor for European energy needs, representing a viable alternative to traditional routes and suppliers and a reliable partner; third, developments in the region where Azerbaijan is located have direct bearing upon the EU's security.

Against this background, this article proceeds as follows: it builds on two EU policy frameworks that in recent decades have not only developed significantly and acquired increased relevance, but have gained complementarity to the extent that they are now heavily intertwined in terms of policy implementation: the Common Security and Defence Policy and the Home Affairs pillar. Insights from both frameworks help explain why mobility

and border security have become key issues in the EU's external relations and how Azerbaijan has entered this picture. Hence, the article delves into how mobility and border security are of special importance to the European Union's external relations and how this understanding has been reflected in the key documents of EU's security: the European Security Strategy and the Internal Security Strategy. Then, the article looks at Azerbaijan, pointing out that mobility and border security have also become important priorities for this South Caucasus country, and analyzes why this has occurred and why these priorities are likely to endure. Finally, the article examines the relevant frameworks for cooperation between the European Union and Azerbaijan, and underlines that the signature of the Mobility Partnership clearly emphasizes the importance of mobility in the relationship. The conclusion provides some reflections on the challenges before the current cooperation.

New challenges and the erosion of the internal-external divide in Europe

Over the years the European Union has become an international actor with its own institutional peculiarities and a distinguished mode of external projection. Not a state, nor a supranational actor, it has been perceived as a model of integration and a successful attempt at the peaceful settlement of longstanding disputes. Notwithstanding the recent years of economic turmoil, its huge internal market represents a major attraction for external actors. Its population, its geographical scope and the presence of a substantial number of G8 members make it an influential actor in the international landscape and a key security provider.

And yet some of its unique features are now undermining its security: among others, the creation of an area of freedom, justice and security with the related permeability of internal borders among states achieved through the Schengen Agreement of 1985 (implemented in 1995). The objective was to increase the movement of persons within the Union while increasing their protection: issues for cooperation were the common management of external borders, immigration and the fight against crime – terrorism, trafficking in people and narcotics and organized crime in general which entailed judicial cooperation and

The objective was to increase the movement of persons within the Union while increasing their protection: issues for cooperation were the common management of external borders, immigration and the fight against oranized crime – terrorism, trafficking in people and narcotics

police cooperation, among others. Along with clear internal repercussions, the area of freedom, security and justice also directly affected relations with other peripheral states, primarily through the process of enlargement. The area, it was stated, was part of the Community *acquis*. Thus for countries applying for membership, there were measures envisaged to harmonize laws and practices, especially in the areas of border management, the fight against crime and the acceptance of the Schengen *acquis*.

While the European Union was increasingly aware of the positive effects of increased mobility, related factors raised the importance of enhancing mobility in a security context. First, the rapid pace of globalization; the increased connectedness of world dynamics favored the diffusion and propagation of challenges at a speed hitherto unknown. Distant phenomena could travel easily thanks to better systems of transport and accessible technologies, while criminal actors were able to establish multiple and diffuse nets across different territories, which raises the second point. The very nature of these challenges benefited from the globalization dynamics. New 'transnational' phenomena were able to cross national borders with ease, exploiting the growing connectedness and increased opportunities for movement. Almost every actor in the international landscape recognizes that terrorism, irregular immigration and transnational crime significantly disrupt national societies, as well as undermine traditional sovereign prerogatives. Third, given the increased permeability of internal borders and expanded opportunities for mobility, these challenges are of particular relevance for the European Union. Fourth, the EU's most successful foreign policy tool, the enlargement process, has brought it very close to sometimes unstable and little known contexts. The dismantling of the Soviet structures has limited the capacity of the former republics to manage mobility and tackle security challenges that exploit structural weaknesses and the lack of regional cooperation resulting from unresolved conflicts. As a consequence, the post-Soviet space is vulnerable to the proliferation of these challenges, and some of the post-Soviet countries act as a corridor for their transmission.

Both the increasing importance of new transnational challenges and the role of the post-Soviet space as a crucible of potential threats to the EU have been recognized in the European Security

Strategy of 2003.[1] The document makes clear that in the post-Cold War era, borders are increasingly open and internal and external aspects of security are increasingly connected. Two out of five key threats identified by the EU, terrorism and organized crime, are directly related to mobility and border security. As for terrorism, the European Union recognizes that 'terrorist movements are increasingly well-resourced, connected by electronic networks';[2] organized crime is a primary threat to the Union, and its external dimension is quite evident: 'cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons' and links with terrorism are all related challenges.[3] Weak capacity of states and regional conflicts are further threats identified by the Union, and provide fertile contexts for these challenges. Moreover, such environments have also a direct impact on the probability of displacement of persons and outflows of refugees. The EU states that 'our task is to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations'.[4] It is explicitly recognized that the Union should increase its cooperation and engagement with South Caucasus as a neighboring area. In 2003 a Special Representative for the South Caucasus was appointed; in 2008 a delegation office opened in Baku.

The EU Internal Security Strategy adopted in 2010[5] outlines the main security challenges as perceived by the European Union, and particularly emphasizes the proper management of borders as the best strategy for combating cross-border challenges. It also underlines how internal security cannot be achieved in isolation from the rest of the world. It is this specific recognition that has led the Union to include international cooperation as a building block of the Home Affairs pillar, which has introduced mobility and border security issues within the frame of European external relations and policies. With a specific reference to the South Caucasus, the EU states that manage-

The EU Internal Security Strategy adopted in 2010 outlines the main security challenges as perceived by the European Union, and emphasizes in particular the proper management of borders as the best strategy for combating cross-border challenges.

1 European Union (2003) *A secure Europe in a better world. European Security Strategy*. Brussels, 12 December.

2 *Ibid*. p. 3.

3 *Ibid*. p. 3.

4 *Ibid*., p. 8.

5 European Commission (2010) *The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five Steps towards a more secure Europe*. COM(2010) 673 final. Brussels, 22 November.

ment of migration and combating criminal activities are among the priority areas for cooperation between the Union and the regional countries, as well as for the financial and technical assistance.[6] The 2009 Eastern Partnership initiative, the framework that deepens bilateral, multilateral and regional relations with neighbors to the East, has established mobility as one of its four aims and envisages bilateral cooperation on justice and security issues as fundamental element of the country-level Association Agreements. Within the thematic platform 'democracy, good governance and stability', created within the frame of the Eastern Partnership, expert panels have been established on inter alia integrated border management (also a flagship initiative); migration and asylum; the fight against corruption; improved justice and security cooperation.

New security challenges and Azerbaijan

In 2007 Azerbaijan has delivered its 'National Security Concept', providing information on the security environment, the national interest, threats to national security and main directions of the national security policy.[7] The document makes clear that because of its geographical position, Azerbaijan is particularly vulnerable to transnational threats such as international terrorism, illegal immigration, transnational organized crime and human and drug trafficking. It also lost control over part of its borders at the result the Armenian occupation of 20 per cent of Azerbaijan's territory.[8]

Azerbaijan recognizes 'actions undermining the ability of the state to ensure the rule of law, maintenance of the public order and the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms'[9] as threats to its national security. These actions encompass terrorism, transnational organized crime and regional conflicts producing massive outflows of refugees and paving the way for illegal activities. The massive number of displaced persons is one of the top priorities of the Government: around a million IDPs and

6 See European Commission (2014) *Southern Caucasus*. Home Affairs Department. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/international-affairs/southern-caucasus/index_en.htm. (accessed: 22 November 2014).

7 National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan, approved by instruction n°2198 of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan on 23 May 2007.

8 *Ibid*, p. 18.

9 *Ibid*., p. 5.

refugees is on consequence of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Drug trafficking is a major issue for Azerbaijan, as it is located on important transit routes for narcotics: Iran-Azerbaijan; Nagorno-Karabakh-Iran-Azerbaijan; Iran-Azerbaijan-Russia-Japan and Iran-Azerbaijan-Georgia-Europe.[10] The country has also repeatedly reported concerns on possible infiltrations by terrorist groups inspired by Islamic fundamentalism (both Al-Qaida and Iran-sponsored groups).[11]

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Azerbaijan has recognized illegal immigration as a security threat and more broadly as a threat to national interests,[12] especially given the potential links to multiple forms of organized crime.[13] National laws on the struggle against terrorism and human trafficking have been approved,[14] and international conventions signed.[15] Strengthening border security is thus fundamental and for this purpose Azerbaijan has created the State Border Service, modifying its militarized structure into a law enforcement agency. Concurrently, given the issue of increased mobility, a State Migration Service has been created to implement the State Migration Policy for the forecasting, regulation and appropriate governance of migration, while a single Migration Code entered into force in 2013 to provide consistency across the whole body of legislation concerning migration.[16] Cooperation with border countries on the management of migration is also recognized as a key issue.

Strengthening border security is thus fundamental and for this purpose Azerbaijan has created the State Border Service, modifying its militarized structure into a law enforcement agency.

Indeed, cooperation with other actors on border security such as

10 Ministry of National Security of Azerbaijan Republic (2014) *Combating Organised Crime*. Available at: http://www.mns.gov.az/en/pages/47-123.html (Accessed: 14 November 2014).

11 The Economist (2008) *Azerbaijan. Country Profile 2008*. The Economist Intelligence Unit, London.

12 Makili-Aliyev, K. (2012) 'Eastern Partnership and Border Security: Perspectives of Azerbaijan', in Frappi, C. and Pashayeva, G. (eds.) *The EU Eastern Partnership: Common Framework or Wider Opportunity?EU-Azerbaijani Perspectives on Cooperation.* Milano: Egea, pp. 157-171.

13 Ministry of National Security of Azerbaijan (2014) *Combating organized crime*. Available at:http://www.mns.gov.az/en/pages/47-124.html (accessed 1 December 2014).

14 Ministry of National Security of Azerbaijan Republic, Laws. Available at: http://www.mns.gov.az/en/pages/72-74.html (accessed 10 December 2014).

15 Makili-Aliev, K., p. 162.

16 Aliyev, A. (2013) 'The legal framework on migration and asylum –Azerbaijan-', in Bara A. et al. (ed.) *Regional Migration Report: South Caucasus*. European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Migration Policy Centre, Fiesole: European University Institute. The document provides a detailed picture of Azerbaijan's legislation on migration and asylum.

NATO, the EU and the International Organization for Migration among others is part and parcel of a broader strategy aimed at capacity building.[17] It is in this sense that developments in relations with the European Union should be examined. As one author points out, the new migration policy of Azerbaijan is connected to the fulfillment of EU commitments.[18]

Increasing mobility in a secure environment: the European Union and Azerbaijan

Cooperation between Azerbaijan and the European Union on mobility and border security is only a single facet of a larger attempt to establish a durable and consistent relationship with the country and the regional context in which it is located.

Formal relations began in 1999, with the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, but it was only when Azerbaijan started to participate in the Neighbourhood Policy that cooperation assumed a more structured pattern.

Formal relations began in 1999, with the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, but it was only when Azerbaijan started to participate in the Neighbourhood Policy that cooperation assumed a more structured pattern. In fact, until then the European Union's interest in the region was mainly confined to the humanitarian situation concerning the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.[19] While not offering the opportunity of membership, the Neighbourhood Policy still offered significant benefits through the harmonization of the national political and economic legislation with EU standards. Within this framework an Action Plan was elaborated in 2006, defining nine priorities for cooperation: among these, one specifically referred to the strengthening of cooperation on Justice, Security and Liberty affairs, included the border management.[20] Central in this field of cooperation was the creation of an 'Integrated Border Management' strategy, envisaging the coordination of all agencies and authorities involved in border security and in trade facilitation for the set up of an effective and integrated system to manage borders and keep them open but secure. Furthermore, the European Union encouraged the opening of a

17 National Security Concept of the Republic of Azerbaijan, p. 19.

18 Rumyansev, S. (2013) 'A new immigration policy in Azerbaijan', in Bara A. et al. (ed.) *Regional Migration Report: South Caucasus*. European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Migration Policy Centre, Fiesole: European University Institute.

19 European Commission (2005) *European Neighbourhood Policy, Recommendations for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and for Egypt and Lebanon*. COM (2005) 72 final. Brussels, 2 March.

20 European Commission (2006) *Proposal for a Council Decision*. COM (2006) 637 final. Brussels, 26 October.

dialogue on increased mobility but also on the readmission of illegal migrants; the implementation of European and international conventions on organized crime, trafficking in human beings and financing of terrorist activities; improvement of relations with border countries and a regional dialogue on broader topic.

'Capacity-building' and approximation to EU standards were the catchwords summarizing the strategy and the objective of the EU-Azerbaijan cooperation: to help the country improve its ability to monitor, control and manage borders unilaterally but also in cooperation with regional countries. The provision of equipment, information exchange, sharing of best practices, training activities, tailored programs and coordination with International Organizations were the practical elements of this strategy.[21]

In the same vein as other countries of the Eastern Neighbourhood, in 2009 the European Union and Azerbaijan signed an upgraded framework, collecting all initiatives under a single framework and paving the way for deeper relations: the Eastern Partnership. Under this new heading, mobility and security are treated as two sides of the same coin: on the one hand mobility is promoted through visa facilitation and possible liberalization; on the other hand the capacity to control borders has to be increased so that mobility is promoted in a secure environment. In 2010 negotiations were opened for the signing of an Association Agreement that would increase the political nature of the relationship between the two actors. In 2011 the Commission proposed the opening of negotiations on short-term visa facilitation and the readmission of irregular migrants.

Under this new heading, mobility and security are treated as two sides of the same coin: on the one hand mobility is promoted through visa facilitation and possible liberalization; on the other hand the capacity to control borders has to be increased so that mobility is promoted in a secure environment.

In recent years improvement of cooperation in the field of legislative reforms has been noticeable, especially in relation to borders and inter-agencies cooperation, where harmonization with EU standards has been especially apparent.[22] Azerbaijan has striven to develop its institutional capabilities to build an effective

21 European Commission (2006) *Azerbaijan. Country Strategy Paper, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 2007-2013*. The EU has financed discussion fora such as the Budapest process, the Prague Process, the Söderköping process and the Black Sea Synergy. It has also worked out programs with international organizations on organized crime and specifically against the trafficking in human beings (with ILO; ICMPD and OSCE); and on improving protection performance (with the UNHCR). Of relevance is the project 'Supporting Integrated border Management systems in the South Caucasus (SCIBM) in cooperation with the UNDP and addressed to Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia.

22 Makili-Aliyev, K., p. 161.

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and inclusive Integrated Border Management. Reforms have also been enacted in immigration legislation, starting from the recognition of illegal inflows as a security concern and a general challenge to the national interest.[23]

In the 2013 report on progress in the implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Azerbaijan, the European Commission explains that dialogue has been intense and 2013 has been a decisive year in bilateral relations.[24] Azerbaijan has participated to the 2011-2013 Integrated Border Management Flagship Initiative training project within the Eastern Partnership framework and has been engaged in two assessment missions funded by the European Union in preparation for a joint Azerbaijan-Georgia Green Border Project. Additionally, the State Border Service has installed new portal monitors at the Ganja international airport. Importantly, April 2013 has seen the signature of a Working Arrangement between FRONTEX, the European agency for the coordination of operations at the external border of the European Union and the State Border Service on information exchange, risk analysis, training and R&D in border management and border control.[25] Demarcation of regional borders has seen important steps forward: the demarcation process began with Russia and Georgia. A new migration code based on European and international practices and legislation is in force since August 1 2013. Azerbaijan has also improved protections for asylum and refugees by participating in the Asylum System Quality Initiative in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus. Efforts have been undertaken in adopting new legislation on law enforcement.

Azerbaijan has also improved protections for asylum and refugees by participating in the Asylum System Quality Initiative in Eastern Europe and South Caucasus. Efforts have been undertaken in adopting new legislation on law enforcement.

The 2013 Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius saw the signature of the visa facilitation Agreement and the Mobility Partnership between the EU and Azerbaijan. The eight member states participating the Partnership are Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, France, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. In the words of the former Home Affairs Commissioner

23 *Ibid*., p. 161.

24 European Commission (2013) *Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Azerbaijan Progress in 2013 and recommendations for action*. SWD (2014), 70 final. Brussels, 27 March.

25 *bid*., p. 16.

Malmström, 'Thanks to dialogue and specific cooperation, we can better ensure the joint and responsible management of migration in the interests of the Union, Azerbaijan and the migrants themselves'.[26] With the visa agreement, entering the EU will be cheaper and faster. The aim of the Partnership is to identify possible new areas of cooperation, to pursue cooperation via existing platforms, and to establish objectives so that people can move easily but in a secure environment. Azerbaijan's ability to manage legal and labor migration (circular and temporary migration included) will be improved through tailored measures; attention will be also devoted to the protection of asylum seekers and refugees, to prevent and combat irregular immigration and related activities such as smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings, and to link migration and mobility with development opportunities. In April 2014 a readmission agreement was signed between the EU and Azerbaijan.

Conclusion

Development of relations between the European Union and Azerbaijan has significantly expanded in recent years. Aside from widely discussed issues, such as energy cooperation, mobility and border security are key areas in which relations are important, affecting both partners.

Given the significance of the topic for both actors, there is much more that could be achieved. Some of the limitations are characteristic for the European Union. The 'security' interpretation often applied to irregular flows has meant that the bilateral track has been the more developed one, while regional cooperation has often been put on the back burner. Indeed, the overall EU strategy for the South Caucasus as a region remains patchy and incomplete, a consequence of both the limited knowledge and attention devoted to the region thus far, as well as the problematic geopolitical situation that has reduced the space for a more interventionist attitude by the European Union.

However, given their transnational nature, mobility and border security should be primarily addressed at the regional level. The flow of persons across borders and the transnational character

26 European Commission (2013) *Mobility Partnership Signed between the EU and Azerbaijan*. Press Release. Brussels, 5 December.

of new security challenges require multilateral and coordinated answers. Against this background, upgrading national legislation and building capacities to better manage borders could be insufficient. The open demarcation issue alluded to in the article is only one of the impediments to a concerted regional strategy. Some of Azerbaijan's borders are closed and others are not under the full control of the country due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and occupation of 20 percent of its terrytories. Hence, regional cooperation is all the more problematic. The paradoxical situation is that both territorial issues (relations with other states) and non-territorial ones (which may affect internal security) are top on the agenda: but working on them simultaneously is not feasible. Instead, tackling the first ones would pave the way for better coordination on the second set of challenges, offering a more comprehensive type of cooperation with the European Union.

Forced Humanitarianism: Turkey's Syrian Policy and the Refugee Issue*

Ariel González Levaggi*

The Middle East faces complex and overlapping turbulences. The Civil War in Syria and the emergence of Islamic State have radically changed the geo-strategic environment. In recent years, Turkish foreign policy has faced two major tests in relation to this new situation: a large wave of Syrian refugees and the threat of Islamic State in southeast border areas. Since the start of the Syrian Civil War, Turkey has to deal with an increasing volume of refugees, while the emergence of the Islamic State increased the number of Syrian and Iraqi citizens seeking protection in Turkish territories, in addition to the deterioration of the regional security environment. Ankara has tried to navigate the troubled waters of the Syrian crisis via a two-pronged approach, combining national security concerns with democratic internationalism. One of the highlights of Turkish Internationalism has been growing humanitarian assistance for Syrian refugees, which brings Turkey to a prominent position in terms of humanitarian aid delivery. In this paper, I will discuss the concept of "forced humanitarianism" to explain the intersection with the Syrian Crisis in Turkish foreign policy.

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Along with the Arab Revolutions, the Syrian Civil War has been the most significant destabilizing factor of the regional order of the Middle East since the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq. [1] The Arab Revolutions, or Arab Spring, significantly changed the domestic priorities of the Arab countries facing popular demands for change. Four years on, the fallout of the Arab Spring has entailed a series of traumatic experiences such as ousting of Morsi government in Egypt, the civil war in Libya followed by the NATO's military intervention, and finally the civil war in Syria. The only light in the region is the Tunisian experience. The regional order of the Middle East substantially changed after the Arab Spring, but has changed even more in the wake of the Syrian civil war.

The Syrian civil war is not only a domestic but also a regional conflict. In the last decades, the main regional geostrategic competition has been between Iran and Saudi Arabia: the core of the Middle Eastern 'Great Game'.

The Syrian civil war is not only a domestic but a regional conflict. In the last decades, the main regional geostrategic competition has been between Iran and Saudi Arabia: the core of the Middle Eastern 'Great Game'.[2] However, the Syrian case transformed the soft power rivalry into hard power rivalry. Saudi Arabia saw itself as Iran's ideological and strategic rival in the region-wide confrontation, seeking to pull in the other Arab states to counter Iranian influence, and lobbying against Western concessions to Tehran on regional security and nuclear matters[3]. On the other hand, Iran is trying to avoid Saudi Arabia's strategic encirclement by strengthening its regional allies – especially Assad regime in Syria – and bargaining with the West without relinquishing its nuclear plan. The Syrian civil war has transformed this regional competition into a regional proxy war.

The consequences of Syria's civil war have been catastrophic. Between March 2011 and the end of 2014, more than 200.000 individuals – combatants and civilians – have been killed;[4] there are more than 3 million refugees in border countries; 7.6 million

1 Öniş, Z. (2014) 'Turkey and the Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of Middle Power Influence in a Turbulent Middle East', *Mediterranean Politics*, 19 (2), p. 4.

2 Mabon, S. (2014) 'The Middle Eastern 'Great Game'', *FPC Briefing*. Available at: http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/1555.pdf (Accessed: 5 January 2015).

3 Hokayem, E. (2014) 'Iran, the Gulf States and the Syrian Civil War', *Adelphi Series*, 54 (447-448), p. 51-52.

4 New York Times (2015) *Syria Deaths Hit New High in 2014, Observer Group Says*. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/02/world/middleeast/syrian-civil-war-2014-deadliest-so-far.html (Accessed: 5 January 2015).

displaced within Syria; and 3.2 million Syrian refugees abroad.[5] The country is deeply divided, with different areas being under control of various armed groups. The increasing radicalization of the Syrian opposition with the emergence of Al-Nusra Front, the Islamic States and other minor religious armed groups pose further threats. Neighboring countries such as Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq face increasing national security threats as a consequence.

Humanitarian aid has been a common, natural response to the humanitarian disaster of the Syrian's civil war. Turkey has been affected significantly in terms of national security, but has risen as one of the main donors of humanitarian help with regard to Syrian refugees. In this paper, I will evaluate Ankara's Syrian policy, arguing that Turkey has addressed the Syrian crisis with a two-pronged approach that combines national security concerns and democratic internationalism. The interplay between self-interest and liberalism explain why Turkey has moved from "humanitarian diplomacy" towards "forced humanitarianism".

Turkey's foreign policy in the Syrian civil war

The Arab Revolutions were the turning point in the Turkish Regional Policy in the Middle East in general and Syria in particular.

The Arab Revolutions were the turning point in the Turkish Regional Policy in the Middle East in general and Syria in particular. The cooperative "virtuous regional cycle" - in which greater border security and growing economic interdependence between Turkey and its neighbors were mutually reinforcing each other – have been replaced by a more competitive approach wherein the promotion and spread of normative democratic principles along with national security interests are the main foreign policy aims in the context of an unstable and highly changeable regional environment.[6]

The 2002-2011 period was a golden age for the relationship between Turkey and Syria, characterized by regular high-level visits and increasing trade and investments, which contributed positively to regional stability. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) government developed a multidimensional perspective toward Middle East, increasing the links and developing ef-

5 UNPFA (2014) Regional Situation Report for Syria Crisis, p. 1. Available at: http://syria.unocha.org/sites/default/files/UNFPA%20Regional%20SitRep%201%20-%2030%20November%202014%20%20%23%2027.pdf (Accessed: 5 January 2015).

6 Öniş, Z. (2014) 'Turkey and the Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of Middle Power Influence in a Turbulent Middle East', *Mediterranean Politics*, 19 (2), p. 4.

forts in order to build friendly and cooperative relations with the Middle Eastern countries and to play a more active role in the region's politics.[7] This approach was presented as the "zero problems with neighbors" strategy, a soft power based foreign policy that was aimed to establish a peaceful and cooperative regional order.

The main achievement of this period was the Free Trade Agreement signed in December 2004 during the first official visit of Recep Tayyib Erdoğan as a Prime Minister.[8] Other key events included the visit by Turkish President Necdet Sezer to Lebanon in 2005 after the death of the former Lebanese Prime Minister, Rafik Hariri[9], the mediation of Ankara in the peace negotiations between Israel and Syria, the establishment of the High Level Strategic Cooperation Council (HLSCC) during President Assad's visit to Turkey in September 2009, the Visa Exemption Agreement and, finally the implementation of the Free Trade Agreement that brought commercial, logistical, tourism, and investment benefits for both sides.

However, the radicalization of the popular demands and the brutal repressions by Assad's Security Forces caused Ankara to change its approach, seeking instead to convince Assad to take political decisions on behalf of popular demands.

When the crisis broke out in Syria, Turkey was initially cautious. However, the radicalization of the popular demands and the brutal repressions by Assad's Security Forces caused Ankara to change its approach, seeking instead to convince Assad to take political decisions on behalf of popular demands. These recommendations were however, ignored.

There is little official data available on the initial phases of the Syrian civil war, but since early months of 2011, the situation has gradually deteriorated. At the end of 2011, an official political opposition group – the Syrian National Council – and an armed wing – the Free Syrian Army – took a stand against the Assad regime. In May 2011, the Prime Minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, warned that Assad's army was violating basic standards of humanitarian law, and committing atrocities.[10]

7 Kanat, K. (2010) 'AK Party's Foreign Policy: Is Turkey Turning Away from the West?', *Insight Turkey*, 12(1), p. 210

8 Moubayed, S. (2008) 'Turkish-Syrian Relations: The Erdoğan Legacy', *SETA Policy Brief*, 25, p. 3.

9 Hinnebusch, R. and Tur, O. (eds.) (2013) *Turkey-Syria Relations: Between Enmity and Amity*, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, p. 2.

10 The Jerusalem Post (2011) 'Erdogan: Syrian troops barbaric, 'don't behave like humans'', Avail-

The start of the Arab Spring at the end of 2010 was an unexpected development for Turkey. Ahmed Davutoğlu identified this process as a political "earthquake" in the Middle East.[11] Ankara had to rethink its "zero problems with neighbors" strategy, which entailed a combined approach to cooperative security relations and economic interdependence.[12] However, the changes in the Turkish regional foreign policy were not due to sectarianism in foreign policy[13], Davutoğlu's "pan-Islamist" views,[14] or the exportation of Turkey as a model of democracy and Islam.[15] The main cause of the shift in Ankara's policy was the change brought by the Arab Revolutions. The Arab Revolutions forced the Turkish foreign policy to take on a new role in the "new" Middle East. The implications for Turkish foreign policy were serious. Turkey did not have the enough capabilities to be an active actor beyond its role as a model of democracy in a Muslim society.

Since the Syrian conflict broke out, Ankara has developed a two-pronged policy by combining national security concerns with norm-based principles aimed at promoting democratic norms.[16] In sum, Turkey seeks to present itself as a model of democracy and a regional power while at the same time taking into account addressing national security concerns posed by the ongoing Syrian crisis. The normative approach takes a long-term view, emphasizing the gradual development of democracy and popular legitimacy. Crisis management efforts are central to reordering the regional and global environment. As Davutoğlu has stated, "our long-term vision will inspire our crisis management

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able at http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Erdogan-Syrian-troops-barbaric-dont-behave-like-humans (Accessed: 5 January 2015).

11 Davutoğlu, A. (2013) 'Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy: objectives, challenges and prospects', *Nationalities Papers*, 41 (6), p. 866.

12 Davutoğlu, A. (2013) 'Turkey's Zero-Problems Foreign Policy', *Foreign Policy*, Available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/05/20/turkeys_zero_problems_foreign_policy(Accessed: 5 January 2015).

13 Edelman, E., Cornell, S., Lobel, A. and Makovsky, M. (2013) 'The Roots of Turkish Conduct: Understanding the Evolution of Turkish Policy in the Middle East', National Security Program - Foreign Policy Project, Bipartisan Policy Center. Available at: http://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/publications/1312BPC.pdf (Accessed: 3 January 2015).

14 Ozkan, B. (2014) 'Turkey, Davutoglu and the Idea of Pan-Islamism', *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy*, 56 (4), pp. 119-140.

15 Samaan, J (2013) 'The Rise and Fall of the "Turkish Model" in Middle East', *Turkish Policy Quartely*, 12 (3), pp. 61-69.

16 Onis, Ziya (2012) Turkey and the Arab spring: between ethics and self-interest. *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 14 (1), p. 6.

efforts and help shape the course of developments in our regional and global neighborhoods. At the regional level, our vision is a regional order that is built on representative political systems reflecting the legitimate demands of the people where regional states are fully integrated to each other around the core values of democracy and true economic interdependence".[17]

However, the "self-interested", realist approach has been shaped by the security concerns of the Syrian civil war, managing the unintended consequences, and the empowerment of the Syrian opposition. The security situation has rapidly deteriorated in the southern provinces since the start of the civil war in Syria. The emergence of ISIS and the reemergence of the Kurdish issue, the traditional threat to the Turkish Republic since the 1980s, have only exacerbated the situation.

The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) has created a high risk situation in terms of national security. Originally from Iraq, ISIS entered the Syrian civil war and began displacing and absorbing segments of Islamist groups such as Al-Nusra. They crossed the Iraqi-Syrian border and occupied vast areas in western Iraq and eastern Syria, taking control of checkpoints along the Syrian border with Turkey. This move has enabled them to control and exploit economically strategic enclaves like refineries and oil fields, which endow ISIS with important logistical capacities along with renewed funding to buy military equipment.[18] The Islamic State is a revisionist power in the region that is challenging the geographical principles of the modern Middle East based on the Sykes-Picot Agreement, trying to present itself as the Caliphate.

From the perspective of national security and self-preservation, the Syrian crisis poses a threat to Ankara. In February 2013, a bomb exploded at the Turkish-Syrian border crossing in Cilvegözü. Three months later, in the town of Reyhanlı, Hatay, a car bomb exploded, causing more than 50 deaths and injuries.[19] Re-

17 Davutoğlu, A. (2012) 'Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy and Regional Political structuring', *Turkey Policy Brief Series*, TEPAV/ IPLI, 3, p. 5.

18 *Cfr.* Basallote, A. and Gonzalez, A. (2015) 'Limitando la amenaza: Turquía y Jordania frente al Estado Islámico', *Reportes CEMOAN*, Centro de Estudios de Medio Oriente y África del Norte (Costa Rica), 16.

19 Doğruel, F. and Karakoç, J. (2013) 'The Regional Repercussions of Turkey-Syria Relations' ATINER Conference Paper Series, 539, p. 10.

cently, the battle of Kobanē in northern Syria, next to the Turkish-Syrian border, has epitomized the struggle between Kurdish fighters and ISIS.[20] The presence of ISIS has also affected Turkey's relations with the West, due to the lack of support from the United States and Europe for Turkey's position toward the Assad regime, and the increasing pressure on Turkey to participate in the International Coalition against ISIS. In sum, ISIS has not only been a threat to Turkish security but it has also influenced perceptions of Turkey as a reliable in the West.[21]

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Forced humanitarianism: Between urgency and good will

Until August 2014, Turkey spent more than USD 4.5 billion on Syrian refugees, while Turkish NGOs allocated USD 635 million in financial support. Foreign support during this period remained at USD 233 million.[22] According to the UNHCR and the Turkish government, Turkey was host to the world's largest community of Syrian refugees by the end of 2014. Turkey is not only a place where refugees are settling, but also a transit point to Europe.[23] It is worth to mention that Turkey has some experience in dealing with waves of immigration: Bulgarian immigration to Turkey in 1989; asylum seekers and refugees from Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq in the 70's, 80's and 90's; illegal migrants transited via human trafficking.[24]

The number of refugees has significantly increased since the outbreak of the civil war in Syria. In April 2011, the country began to receive the first wave of refugees (8,000 in total), and built the first refugee camp in Altınözü, in the province of Hatay. A year later, this number increased to 170,000 registered refugees, and

20 Hurriyet Daily News (2014) 'Turkish police clash with Kobane protesters near Syria border'. Available at: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/video-turkish-police-clash-with-kobane-protesters-near-syria-border.aspx?pageID=238&nID=75120&NewsCatID=341 (Accessed: 5 January 2015).

21 The Guardian (2014) 'Can Turkey under Erdoğan any longer be deemed a reliable western ally?'. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/15/turkey-erdogan-western-ally (Accessed: 5 January 2015).

22 Erdoğan, M. (2014) 'Syrian in Turkey: Social Acceptance and Integration Research', Haceteppe University Migration and Politics Research Center, p. 15

23 *Cfr*: Düvell, F., (2013) 'Turkey, the Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Changing Dynamics of Transit Migration', *IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2013*, pp. 278-281.

24 Mourenza, A. and Ortega, I. (2014) 'Syrians go home: the challenge of the refugee influx from the Syrian civil war in Turkey', *"Guest and Aliens": Re- Configuring new Mobilities in the Eastern Mediterranean post 2011 - with a special focus on Syrian refugees*, Institut Français d'Etudes Anatoliennes, p. 3

by the end of 2013, there were a total of 560,000 displaced Syrians.[25] That year Turkey became one of the largest providers of humanitarian assistance worldwide, contributing USD 1.6 billion of international aid.[26] This sudden increase in numbers is a direct consequence of the Syrian crisis and of the assistance to Syrian refugees inside Turkey.[27]

The humanitarian response to the refugee crisis has been the responsibility of the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) under the Turkish government. AFAD has estimated the country's Syrian population at 1.7 million.[28] In November 2014, Interior Minister Efkan Ala told the Turkish Parliament's Budget Commission that there were 1,617,110 refugees in the country.[29] According to Ahmet İçduygu, an expert on the refugee crisis, official and unofficial figures reveal that there are between 1.3 and 1.6 million Syrian refugees in Turkey. Of these, one quarter are living in 22 refugee camps, while the rest are "urban refugees".[30] As of November 2014, the largest number of urban refugees were located in İstanbul (330,000), Gaziantep (220,000), Hatay (190,000), Şanlıurfa (170,000), Mardin (70,000), Adana (50,000), Kilis (49,000) and Mersin (45,000), respectively.[31] In sum, Turkey hosts a Syrian refugee population that actually represents around 2% of its population.

In dealing with this unexpected influx of migrants, Ankara has formulated a new strategy. "Temporary Protection Status" was initially conferred on refugees from Syria in October 2011, guaranteeing all Syrian residents (including Palestinian residents in

25 Interview with Prof. Dr. Ahmet Içduygu, Director of Migration Research Program (MiReKoç), Koç University, 13/11/2014.

26 In the 2003-2013 period, the largest recipients of Turkish aid have been Syria (US$980 million), Somalia (US$48 million) and the West Bank and Gaza Strip (US$9 million).

27 Global Humanitarian Assistance (2014) 'GHA Report 2014', p. 28. Available at: http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/GHA-Report-2014-interactive.pdf (Accessed: 5 January 2015).

28 Hogg, J. and Afanasieva, D. (2015) 'In winter freeze, Turkey clears capital of Syrian shanty towns', Reuters. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/09/us-turkey-refugees-idUSKBN0KI1RR20150109 (Accessed: 10 January 2015).

29 Cetingulec, T. (2014) 'Turkey registers Syrian refugees', Al-Monitor. Available at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/12/turkey-syria-refugees-profiled.html (Accessed: 10 January 2015).

30 Interview with Prof. Dr. Ahmet Içduygu, Director of Migration Research Program (MiReKoç), Koç University, 13/11/2014.

31 Orhan, O. and Gündoğar, S. (2015) 'Effects of the Syrian Refugees on Turkey', ORSAM/TESEV, 195, p.15. Available at: http://www.tesev.org.tr/assets/publications/file/09012015103629.pdf (Accessed: 11 January 2015).

Syria) access to Turkish territory and its basic services.[32] The principles of the Temporary Protection Status include an open border policy, no forcible returns, registration with the Turkish authorities, and support inside the borders of the camp displacing the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other international institutions that are part of this process in other cases.[33] The Temporary Protection Status itself synthesizes national security concerns with the humanitarian approach; in this particular case, what can be understood as a forced humanitarianism.

Temporary Protection Status" was initially conferred on refugees from Syria in October 2011, guaranteeing all Syrian residents (including Palestinian residents in Syria) access to Turkish territory and its basic services.

Officially, Turkey has presented its humanitarian policy as an example of the new type of Turkish soft power embodied in the form of "humanitarian diplomacy". This new strategy can be explained as "the use of international law and the humanitarian imperative as complementary levers to facilitate the delivery of assistance or to promote the protection of civilians in a complex political emergency".[34] This kind of diplomacy has its roots in a liberal understanding of international politics in which the protection of the individual human rights has prevalence over the state sovereignty principles. Turkey presents its humanitarian approach as a liberal, norm-based, internationalist foreign policy. At the same time, Ankara's humanitarianism combines liberal and Islamic values. That is even clearer in the selection of humanitarian priorities such as Syria, Palestine, Somalia and Afghanistan, among others. Beyond these priorities, Turkey has been active in more than 100 countries in 2013, ranging from Asia to Africa, the Middle East to Europe and Latin America to the Far East.[35]

Davutoğlu identifies four dimensions of Turkish humanitarian diplomacy: an open visa policy, a human-oriented political vision, multifaceted and multi-channeled approach, and finally, a global

32 Mourenza, A. and Ortega, I. (2014) 'Syrians go home: the challenge of the refugee influx from the Syrian civil war in Turkey', *International Conference "Guest and Aliens": Re- Configuring new Mobilities in the Eastern Mediterranean post 2011 - with a special focus on Syrian refugees*, Institut Français d'Etudes Anatoliennes, p. 11.

33 Özden, S. (2013) 'Syrian Refugees in Turkey', *Migration Policy Centre (MPC) Research Report*, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at European University Institute, 5, p. 5.

34 Regnier, P. (2011) 'The emerging concept of humanitarian diplomacy: identification of a community of practice and prospects for international recognition', *International Review of the Red Cross*, 93 (884), p. 1216.

35 Haşimi, C. (2014) 'Turkey's Humanitarian Diplomacy and Development Cooperation', *Insight Turkey*, 16(1), p. 129

projection, especially within the UN system. These dimensions are based on a general humanitarian approach that tries to find solutions to crises in the close neighborhood, within the frame of universal goals embracing the humanity as a whole.[36] Ethical foreign policy is important to the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and the humanitarian activism of Turkey partly reflects a concern for justice.[37] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Presidency for Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA), and the Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD) are the main public institutional actors, while NGOs such as the Humanitarian Aid Foundation (İHH), Lighthouse Foundation, Cansuyu Organization and etc. These NGOs work closely with the government, and their role has increased in the last few years in parallel with the "humanitarian diplomacy".

However, when the humanitarian situation affects its sovereign, territorial integrity or appears as a threat to public security, the concept of humanitarian diplomacy becomes increasingly complex, albeit well intentioned.

The concept of "humanitarian diplomacy" is easily applied as an ideal in areas where Turkey does not have vital national security interests at stake, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, Afghanistan or even Palestine. However, when the humanitarian situation affects its sovereign, territorial integrity or appears as a threat to public security, the concept of humanitarian diplomacy becomes increasingly complex, albeit well intentioned. In these cases, a humanitarian approach is not sought but rather required by the regional environment. This is the case with the humanitarian tragedy in Syria. Turkey was forced to act in response to the impact of the Syrian civil war and therefore, it is more accurate to define Turkey's approach towards Syria as a case of "forced humanitarianism" rather than "humanitarian diplomacy".

"Forced humanitarianism" is a direct consequence of a humanitarian disaster in a neighboring country. Facing this kind of tragedy so nearby entails two challenges. On the one hand, there is a need to provide help to the victims, but at the same time, it is also necessary to develop measures to avoid the spillover of the conflict. Consequently, national security interests and humanitarian concerns coexist in tension. Turkey is in the middle of this difficult situation. The civil war in Syria forced Turkey to improve its

36 Davutoğlu, A. (2013) 'Turkey's humanitarian diplomacy: objectives, challenges and prospects', *Nationalities Papers*, 41 (6), p. 866-468

37 Bayer, R. Keyman F. (2012) 'Turkey: An Emerging Hub of Globalization and Internationalist Humanitarian Actor?', *Globalizations*, 9(1), p. 85.

humanitarian profile and, at the same time, to take action to avoid the spread of the Syrian conflict into its southern territories.

The concept of "forced humanitarianism" enables us to understand the interplay between the ethical-normative Turkish foreign policy and the threats entailed by the regional security environment, which puts Turkey's vital national interests at risk. However, Turkey is not alone in this situation. There are similar cases, such as Jordan`s policy towards the Palestinian refugees after 1948, or the Dominican Republic's position after the crisis in Haiti. The concept of forced humanitarianism does not detract from the real efforts behind Turkish humanitarian diplomacy; rather it helps us to understand the objective determinants beyond the ethical considerations.

Conclusion

Turkey has sought to position itself as a major regional player, taking Syria as a test case. Ankara has not only placed itself as a model of inspiration but it has also tried to play an active role.[38] The Middle East is facing a traditional realist security dilemma, even if Turkey has tried to export democratic norms and economic interdependence by supporting a peaceful regional order. The consequences of the Syrian civil war for the region and Turkey's high-profile opposition to the Assad regime have undermined Turkey's position not only among its neighboring countries, but have also destabilized its own interests along with its international image.[39] Syria is a hard case for Turkish foreign policy. While it is a successful example of foreign policy activism and assertiveness of soft power, it has also been the main focus of criticism in terms of Ankara's Middle East policy in the aftermath of the Arab Revolutions. The Syrian civil war has generated a humanitarian disaster. Turkey has responded by developing a policy based on humanitarian diplomacy that also takes into account the national security rooted in the increasing risks of the regional situation. Ankara's two-pronged Syrian policy is clearly seen in the refugee problem. This has transformed the concept of "humanitarian diplomacy", based on normative and ethical standards, into a "forced humanitarianism", a mixed account of humanitarian urgency driven by the need to defend public security.

38 *Cfr.* Ertuğrul, D. (2012) 'A Test for Turkey's Foreign Policy: The Syria Crisis', *TESEV Foreign Policy Program*, Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation.

39 Öniş, Z. (2014) 'Turkey and the Arab Revolutions: Boundaries of Middle Power Influence in a Turbulent Middle East', *Mediterranean Politics*, 19 (2), p.10.

Internal Displacement in Azerbaijan: Its Causes and Consequences. What the International Community Can and Must Do?

Tofig Musayev*

At the end of 1987, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia (Armenian SSR) began to lay claim to the territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous oblast (NKAO) of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan SSR). Nationalistic demands marked the beginning of the assaults on the Azerbaijanis in both the NKAO and Armenia itself, soon leading to their expulsion. Shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 and the international recognition of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, armed hostilities and Armenian attacks against areas within Azerbaijan intensified. As a result, a significant part of Azerbaijan's territory, including Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent districts, were occupied by Armenia; thousands of people were killed or injured; hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijani citizens were forced to leave their homes. The UN Security Council and other international organizations have addressed the problem on a number of occasions. Since 1992 the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe has engaged in efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement of the conflict under the aegis of its 11-country Minsk Group, currently under the co-chairmanship of France, the Russian Federation and the United States. The Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group have proposed a set of core principles and elements, which, in their opinion, should form the basis for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. The elements underlying the proposal of the mediators include, inter alia, the liberation of the occupied territories and the right of return for all internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees. The article examines the international documents that refer to the problem of internal displacement in Azerbaijan, its causes and consequences, and the rights of the uprooted population. It also raises the question of whether the right to return is a human right or a privilege of belligerents. The article concludes that the lack of agreement on political issues cannot be used as a pretext to prevent the return of IDPs to their homes and properties and that the de-occupation of Azerbaijani territories can in no way be considered or introduced as a compromise, and used as a bargaining chip in the conflict settlement process.

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Essential facts

At the end of 1987, the Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia (Armenian SSR), with the blessing and support of the influential members of its diaspora, overtly laid claim to the territory of the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous *oblast* (NKAO) of the Soviet Socialist Republic of Azerbaijan (Azerbaijan SSR). Those claims marked the beginning of the assaults on the Azerbaijanis in both the NKAO and Armenia itself, leading to their expulsion from the area.

Contrary to the Soviet Constitution, which guaranteed the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of the Union Republics,[1] both the Armenian SSR and members of the Armenian community of the NKAO adopted a number of decisions to institute the process of unilateral secession of the autonomous *oblast* from Azerbaijan. Those decisions were aimed at achieving either the incorporation of the NKAO into the Armenian SSR or the establishment of an independent entity. Under Soviet rule, all such decisions were declared null and void by the competent Soviet Union authorities. On 26 November 1991, pursuant to an Act adopted by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the autonomous status of the *oblast* was revoked.[2] Accordingly, Azerbaijan gained its indpendence based on the same territory and boundaries that it had within the USSR and that included the former NKAO.

However, towards the end of the Soviet era, nationalist aspirations in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh resurfaced with renewed force.[3] Shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 and the international recognition of both Armenia and Azerbaijan, armed hostilities and Armenian attacks against areas within Azerbaijan intensified. As a result, a significant part of Azerbaijan's territory, including Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent districts came under Armenian occupation; thousands of people were killed or injured; hundreds of thou-

1 According to Article 78 of the USSR Constitution, the territory of a Union Republic could not be altered without its consent, and the borders between Union Republics could be altered by mutual agreement of the Republics concerned, subject to approval by the USSR.

2 Bulletin of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Azerbaijan (1991), No. 24, pp. 77-78.

3 *Profiles in displacement: Azerbaijan*. Report of the Representative of the UN Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/79/Add.1 (1999), para. 22, p. 8.

sands of Azerbaijani citizens were forced to leave their homes in the occupied areas.

Since 1992, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (formerly CSCE) has been engaged in efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement of the conflict under the aegis of its 11-country Minsk Group, currently under the co-chairmanship of France, the Russian Federation and the United States. Meanwhile, the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group have proposed a set of core principles and elements, which, in their opinion, should form the basis for a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. The elements underlying the proposal of the mediators include, *inter alia*, the liberation of the occupied territories and the return of all internally displaced persons and refugees back to their homes.

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Violation of the prohibition on the use of force

The Charter of the United Nations proclaims that one of the founding purposes of the organization is the maintenance of international peace and security. To that end, the Charter commits to taking effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and the bringing about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, of adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.[4]

Pursuant to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN Charter, States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter.

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The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Na-

4 Charter of the United Nations (1945). New York: United Nations Department of Public Information (2001), article 1, para. 1.

5 *Ibid.*

tions of 24 October 1970 stipulates that a "war of aggression constitutes a crime against the peace, for which there is responsibility under international law". In addition, under the Declaration, "[e]very State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the existing international boundaries of another State or as a means of solving international disputes, including territorial disputes and problems concerning frontiers of States".[6]

The 1970 Declaration's also concludes that the "territory of a State shall not be the object of military occupation resulting from the use of force in contravention of the provisions of the Charter" and, accordingly, that "[n]o territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be recognized as legal".[7] This position is also upheld in the Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations of 18 November 1987, which stipulates that "[n]either acquisition of territory resulting from the threat or use of force nor any occupation of territory resulting from the threat or use of force in contravention of international law will be recognized as legal acquisition or occupation".[8]

As the International Court of Justice established in its judgment in the *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua* case, principles relating to the use of force that have been incorporated in the UN Charter reflect customary international law. The same holds true for the Court's determination of the illegality of territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force.[9] This rule prohibiting the use of force is a conspicuous example of a peremptory norm of general international law (*jus cogens*), as defined in article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.[10] The sole exception to this rule is the

6 UN General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV). Resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session. Official records of the General Assembly, 25th session, Supplement No. 28 (A/8028), p. 153.

7 *Ibid.*

8 UN General Assembly resolution 42/22. Resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly at its forty second session. Official Records of the General Assembly, 42nd session, Supplement No. 41 (A/42/41), p. 403.

9 *Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua case (Nicaragua v. United States of America),* Judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports (1986), paras. 188 and 190; see also *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*. Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, ICJ Reports (2004), para. 87.

10 *Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties* (1969). For text, see Brownlie, I. (ed.) (2002) *Basic Documents in International Law*. 5th edn. Oxford, pp. 270-297, at p. 285. *See also Military and Para-*

right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter. As the International Court of Justice reaffirmed in its advisory opinion regarding the *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory*, "Article 51 of the Charter … recognizes the existence of an inherent right of self-defense in the case of armed attack by one State against another State".[11]

In 1993, the UN Security Council adopted four resolutions on the conflict in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, in which the Council reaffirmed the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory, condemned the occupation of the territories of Azerbaijan, reaffirmed respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and the inviolability of its international borders. It confirmed that the Nagorno-Karabakh region is part of Azerbaijan, and demanded the immediate, full and unconditional withdrawal of the occupying forces from all the occupied territories.[12] A series of Security Council presidential statements adopted between 1992 and 1995 and the documents of other international organizations are couched in the same terms.

In 1993, the UN Security Council adopted four resolutions on the conflict in and around the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, in which the Council reaffirmed the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory, condemned the occupation of the territories of Azerbaijan, reaffirmed respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and the inviolability of its international borders

There have been numerous instances of States trying to disguise their own role in the forcible seizure of the territory of another State, including by setting up puppet regimes in the occupied territories.[13] Such practice is evidenced in Armenia's policies in the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region that manifested, *inter alia*, in the establishment of the Yerevan-backed separatist regime there. At a certain stage, when Armenia's attempts to introduce the separatists as the area's sole representatives was a serious obstacle in the peace process, the President of the Minsk Group made an important clarification, stating that both the Armenians and Azerbaijanis of Nagorno-

military Activities in and against Nicaragua case (Nicaragua v. United States of America) (Merits), para. 190*; Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.* Annex to UN General Assembly resolution 56/83 of 12 December 2001, article 41, para. 2; Crawford, J. (2012) *Brownlie's Principles of Public International Law*. 8th edn. Oxford, pp. 594-597.

11 *Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,* op. cit., para. 139.

12 UN Security Council resolutions 822 (1993), 853 (1993), 874 (1993) and 884 (1993).

13 Roberts, A. 'Transformative military occupation: applying the laws of war and human rights'. Available at: http://www.iihl.org/iihl/Documents/roberts_militaryoccupation1.pdf (Accessed: 15 December 2014).

Karabakh are "interested parties" and equal.[14]

Internal displacement in Azerbaijan in the documents of international organizations

The scope of the international documents extends beyond mentioning the unlawful use of force and expressing support for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. There is also an explicit reference to serious violations of international humanitarian law committed during the conflict, including, in particular, the large-scale expulsion of civilians from occupied regions of Azerbaijan.

The fact that all Azerbaijanis were expelled from the occupied territories is well documented.[15] In its resolutions and presidential statements, the UN Security Council expressed grave concern about "the displacement of a large number of civilians in Azerbaijan and the serious humanitarian emergency in the region" and condemned the "attacks on civilians and bombardment of inhabited areas."

In its resolution 48/114 of 23 March 1994, entitled "Emergency international assistance to refugees and displaced persons in Azerbaijan", the UN General Assembly expressed grave concern at the continuing deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Azerbaijan owing to the displacement of large numbers of civilians and noted with alarm "that the number of refugees and displaced persons in Azerbaijan has recently exceeded one million".

The UN General Assembly adopted three resolutions in connection with the conflict, with many more that refer, *inter alia*, to the humanitarian aspect of the conflict. In its resolution 48/114 of 23 March 1994, entitled, "Emergency international assistance to refugees and displaced persons in Azerbaijan", the Assembly expressed grave concern about the continuing deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Azerbaijan owing to the displacement of large numbers of civilians and noted with alarm "that the number of refugees and displaced persons in Azerbaijan has recently exceeded one million".[16] On 14 March 2008, the General Assembly adopted resolution 62/243 on the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, which reaffirmed the inalienable right of the population expelled from the occupied territories to return to their homes.[17]

14 CSCE Communication No. 279, Prague, 15 September 1992, p. 3.

15 *Report on the international legal rights of the Azerbaijani internally displaced persons1 and the Republic of Armenia's responsibility*, UN doc. A/66/787-S/2012/289 (2012), para. 48, p. 14.

16 Operative para. 2. See also the official records of the 85th plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly, 20 December 1993, UN doc. A/48/PV.85, p. 6.

17 *Ibid.,* operative para. 3.

The UN Secretary-General has also addressed the conflict and its various aspects in his relevant reports to the General Assembly and the Security Council. Among these are the report pursuant to the statement by the President of the Security Council in connection with the situation relating to Nagorno-Karabakh[18] and the report on the emergency international assistance to refugees and displaced persons in Azerbaijan.[19] The Representatives of the UN Secretary-General on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Francis M. Deng and Walter Kälin, who visited Azerbaijan to study the situation of internally displaced persons in the country, stated in their reports that "Azerbaijan has one of the largest displaced populations in the world" and stressed "the right of internally displaced persons to return voluntarily to their former homes in safety and dignity".[20]

In its resolution of 20 May 2010 on the need for an EU strategy for the South Caucasus, the European Parliament expressed its serious concern "that hundreds of thousands of refugees and IDPs who fled their homes during or in connection with the Nagorno-Karabakh war remain displaced and denied their rights, including the right to return, property rights and the right to personal security" and called "on all parties to unambiguously and unconditionally recognize these rights, the need for their prompt realization and for a prompt solution to this problem that respects the principles of international law".

The European Union, through its executive and parliamentary institutions, has repeatedly expressed its position on the conflict, condemning the use of force and deploring the sufferings inflicted on populations and the loss of human life resulting from the fighting. On 22 May 1992, following the seizure by Armenian forces of Shusha and Lachyn, the European Community and its member States condemned "any action against territorial integrity or designated to achieve political goals by force, including the driving out of civilian populations" as contraventions of CSCE principles and commitments.[21] On 3 September 1993, the Community and its member States condemned the offensives by Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh and their deeper and deeper incursions into the territory of Azerbaijan. They noted with regret that "such actions are extending the area of armed conflict to encompass more and more of Azerbaijani territory and are creating a very serious refugee problem in Azerbaijan".[22]

18 UN doc. S/25600 (1993).

19 UN doc. A/49/380 (1994).

20 UN doc. E/CN.4/1999/79/Add.1 (1999), para. 1, p. 2. and A/HRC/8/6/Add.2 (2008), para. 7, p. 6, and p. 2.

21 European Political Cooperation, *Statement on Nagorno-Karabakh*. Brussels (1992), doc. P.61/92.

22 European Political Cooperation, *Statement on Nagorno-Karabakh*. Brussels (1993), doc. P.86/93.

In its resolution of 20 May 2010 on the need for an EU strategy for the South Caucasus, the European Parliament expressed its serious concern "that hundreds of thousands of refugees and IDPs who fled their homes during or in connection with the Nagorno-Karabakh war remain displaced and denied their rights, including the right to return, property rights and the right to personal security" and called "on all parties to unambiguously and unconditionally recognize these rights, the need for their prompt realization and for a prompt solution to this problem that respects the principles of international law".[23] In its resolutions adopted on 18 April 2012, the European Parliament, *inter alia*, recalled the commitments with regard to the realization by all internally displaced persons and refugees of their right to return to their home settlements and properties.[24]

The conflict has also been addressed on a number of occasions in the framework of the Council of Europe, involving the organization's Committee of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly.

Having considered the impact of the conflict on the civilian population in the area of combat operation, particularly the shocking massacre committed by the Armenian forces against the Azerbaijani civilians in the Khojaly town in February 1992, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in its declaration of 11 March 1992 expressed deep concern "about recent reports of indiscriminate killings and outrages", firmly condemned "the violence and attacks directed against the civilian populations in the Nagorno-Karabakh area of the Azerbaijan Republic" and underlined that "no solution imposed by force can be accepted by the international community".[25]

Among a number of resolutions and recommendations adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which are either devoted or refer to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan,[26] the main elements qualifying the nature of the

23 European Parliament, *Resolution on the need for an EU strategy for the South Caucasus* (2010), doc. (2009/2216(INI)), para. 8.

24 *Ibid*., para. 1 (b) and the European Parliament resolution of 18 April 2012 containing recommendations to the Council, the Commission and the European External Action Service, para. 1 (b).

25 A*dopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 March 1992 at the 471bis meeting of the Ministers' Deputies*.

26 See, e.g., Recommendation 1251 (1994) on the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, 10 November 1994; Recommendation 1570 (2002) 'Situation of refugees and displaced persons in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia'; Resolution 1497 (2006) 'Refugees and displaced persons in Armenia, Azerbaijan and

conflict have been reflected in the documents prepared by Terry Davis and David Atkinson, rapporteurs of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.[27] In its resolution 1416 (2005) of 25 January 2005, the Assembly noted particularly that "considerable parts of the territory of Azerbaijan are still occupied by Armenian forces" and that "the military action, and the widespread ethnic hostilities which preceded it, led to large-scale ethnic expulsion and the creation of mono-ethnic areas which resemble the terrible concept of ethnic cleansing". The Assembly reaffirmed "the right of displaced persons from the area of conflict to return to their homes safely and with dignity and stated that independence and secession of a regional territory from a state cannot be achieved "in the wake of an armed conflict leading to ethnic expulsion and the de facto annexation of such territory to another state".[28]

The right to return: A human right or a privilege of belligerents?

The commentary on customary international humanitarian law prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross notes that "displaced persons have a right to voluntary return in safety to their homes or places of habitual residence as soon as the reasons for their displacement cease to exist".[29] The right to return of internally displaced persons stems from several distinct sources. They include international humanitarian law, international human rights law, regional human rights law, including, in particular, the European Convention on Human Rights, and a range of resolutions, recommendations and declarations adopted by international organizations, which attest to the existence of State practice underlining the right of internally displaced persons to return to their homes.[30]

Thus, the occupied districts of Agdam, Kelbajar, Jebrail and Fizuli were methodically dismantled or destroyed. In her report on the visit to the countries of the South Caucasus at the end of October 1993, the Chairperson-in-Office of the CSCE Council, Baroness Margaretha af Ugglas, expressed concern about the unacceptable scorched earth policy practiced by the Armenian military forces.

Georgia'.

27 See the Report of the Political Affairs Committee to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, doc. 10364 of 29 November 2004.

28 See paras. 1-3.

29 Henckaerts, J.-M. and Doswald-Beck, L. (2005) *Customary International Humanitarian Law*, vol. I: Rules, Cambridge: ICRC, p. 468.

30 *Report on the international legal rights of the Azerbaijani internally displaced persons1 and the Republic of Armenia's responsibility*, op. cit., paras. 106-115, pp. 29-31.

Against this background, the policies and practices implemented by Armenia in the occupied territories demonstrate its intention to prevent the expelled populations from returning to their homes. Thus, the occupied districts of Agdam, Kelbajar, Jebrail and Fizuli were methodically dismantled or destroyed. In her report on the visit to the countries of the South Caucasus at the end of October 1993, the Chairperson-in-Office of the CSCE Council, Baroness Margaretha af Ugglas, expressed concern about the unacceptable scorched earth policy practiced by the Armenian military forces.[31] In addition, although the UN Security Council resolutions demanded unconditional and complete withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied territories and called for international agencies to assist the internally displaced persons to return to their homes, the districts where Armenians were not resident prior to the conflict are now depicted as part of "Artsakh" (the Armenian term for the occupied territories) on official Armenian maps. They are often referred to by Armenian officials as "liberated territories", rather than "occupied territories".[32]

Moreover, various kinds of activities in the occupied territories, in particular those affecting their demographic, social and cultural character, represent serious barriers to the possibility of reaching a negotiated settlement, the core elements of which are the liberation of the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and the realization by the forcibly displaced populations of their right to return. Thus, over the period that has passed since the beginning of the conflict, significant numbers of settlers have been encouraged to move into the occupied areas depopulated of their Azerbaijani inhabitants. Numerous reports, including the Armenian ones, testify to the intentional character of this practice.

Based on the findings of the mission, which documented the presence of settlers in those areas, the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, in their letter dated 2 March 2005 and addressed to the OSCE Permanent Council, discouraged any further settlement of the occupied territories of Azerbaijan by Armenia.

In January-February 2005, an OSCE fact-finding mission visited the occupied territories of Azerbaijan.[33] Based on the findings of the mission, which documented the presence of settlers in those areas, the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, in their letter dated 2 March 2005 and addressed to the OSCE Permanent Council, discouraged any further settlement of the occupied territories of

31 CSCE Communication No. 301, Prague (1993), p. 8.

32 International Crisis Group (2012), *Tackling Azerbaijan's IDP Burden*, p. 3.

33 See UN doc. A/59/747-S/2005/187 (2005), annex II.

Azerbaijan by Armenia. In view of the extensive preparations that would be required before the return of the refugees and internally displaced persons to their places of origin in these territories, the Co-Chairs recommended that "the relevant international agencies re-evaluate the needs and funding assessments in the region, *inter alia*, for the purpose of resettlement" of those moved into the occupied territories. They also urged the parties "to accelerate negotiations toward a political settlement in order, *inter alia*, to address the problem of the settlers and to avoid changes in the demographic structure of the region, which would make more difficult any future efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement". The Co-Chairs emphasized in this regard that "the longer [settlers] remain in the occupied territories, the deeper their roots and attachments to their present places of residence will become" and that "prolonged continuation of this situation could lead to a *fait accompli* that would seriously complicate the peace process".[34]

In October 2010, the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group conducted a field assessment mission in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan adjacent to its Nagorno-Karabakh region. The Co-Chairs were joined by the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office and his team, two experts from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and one member of the 2005 OSCE Minsk Group fact-finding mission. Following the visit, the mission submitted a report, which confirmed the continuation of actions affecting the demographic, social and cultural character of the occupied territories and involving, *inter alia*, the implantation of settlers, the extensive redrawing of administrative boundaries, and the changing of place names in those territories.[35] Based on the visual inspection during the mission and the information provided by the locals, the number of settlers transferred into the occupied seven districts of Azerbaijan surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh was roughly estimated by the mission to be 14,000 persons. Even this clear underestimate testifies to a more than tenfold increase in the number of Armenians in those areas in comparison with the pre-conflict period.

Consequently, the report of the field assessment mission made it clear that the recommendations of the 2005 OSCE Minsk Group

34 *Ibid*., annex I.

35 For more information, see UN doc. A/65/801–S/2011/208 (2011), annex.

The settlement of the conflict obviously remains a prerequisite to the return of IDPs and, in the absence of a sustainable solution and in the light of the regular incidents on the front line, the option of a large-scale return remains elusive. However, the lack of agreement on political issues cannot be used as a pretext to prevent the return of IDPs to their homes and properties.

fact-finding mission had been substantially disregarded and, consequently, nothing had been done to dismantle settlements or discourage other illegal activities in the occupied territories. In this regard, the mission called once again for the cessation of additional actions that would change the demographic, social, or cultural character of those territories, and make it impossible to reverse the status quo and achieve a peaceful settlement.

The settlement of the conflict obviously remains a prerequisite to return of IDPs to their homes and, in the absence of a sustainable solution and in the light of the regular incidents on the front line, the option of large-scale return remains elusive. However, the lack of agreement on political issues cannot be used as a pretext to prevent the return of IDPs to their homes and properties. The expulsion of the citizens of Azerbaijan; their inability to access their properties and possessions; the failure to enable their return to their homes; and the actions aimed at altering. the demographic, social and cultural character of the occupied territories depopulated of their Azerbaijani inhabitants: these constitute clear violations of the laws of armed conflict (international humanitarian law) and of international human rights law. Such violations give rise to a number of consequences. The primary consequence revolves around the responsibility of states under general international law and the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights.

A key element of state responsibility, and one particularly significant for the present purposes, is the obligation to cease violations, to offer appropriate assurances and guarantees that violations will not recur, and to provide full reparation for the injuries. Consequently, Armenia is under an obligation, in the first place, to end its occupation of the territories of Azerbaijan. It is clear that the implementation of that obligation, which would create the necessary pre-conditions for the return of Azerbaijani internally displaced persons, can in no way be considered or introduced as a compromise and, *a fortiori*, used as a bargaining chip in the conflict settlement process. As noted above, it is an established principle of general international law that no territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force shall be

recognized as legal. This understanding equally applies to individual rights and freedoms, the violation of which can in no way produce the outcome that was *ab initio* designed by the perpetrator and that would serve for its benefit.

It is therefore, critical that the international community intensifies its efforts to achieve the resolution of the conflict, and the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions demanding the withdrawal of occupying troops and supporting the return of displaced persons to their places of origin in safety and dignity. In the absence of political will and given the apparent disregard of international obligations, the concept of state responsibility acquires particular importance in relation to the long overdue breakthrough on conflict resolution.

A Life on the Edge: Syrian IDPs

Zümrüt Sönmez*

This article examines the challenges faced by internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Syria, based on facts and personal observations, and provides recommendations for the international community. IDPs are one of the most vulnerable groups of people in the current global context. Escaping from armed conflicts, generalized violence or human rights violations, IDPs leave their demolished houses or besieged towns, only to find themselves trapped within the borders of their home countries, unlike refugees who manage to cross an international border in order to take shelter in another country. Some Syrian IDPs have eventually settled in makeshift camps in the border areas after fleeing civil war. There are reportedly hundreds of thousands people living alongside the Turkish-Syrian border under very harsh conditions. Underlying these conditions and their continuing deterioration, this article attempts to demonstrate the importance of the role of international NGOs in improving the situation for IDPs.

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The United Nations Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement define internally displaced persons (IDPs) as 'persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border.'[1] According to the Geneva-based Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), there were 33.3 million internally displaced people in the world as of the end of 2013. The organization says the number of IDPs increased 16 percent compared with 2012, largely due to the ongoing crises in Syria and the Central African Republic (CAR), both of which the UN has accorded level-three status, the most serious.[2]

Internally displaced persons trapped in an ongoing conflict often face greater challenges than refugees, whose rights (to protection from abuse, exploitation or forced return, and to food and shelter, for instance) are recognized and well-defined within international law and treaties such as the Geneva Conventions.

Internally displaced persons trapped in an ongoing conflict often face greater challenges than refugees, whose rights (to protection from abuse, exploitation or forced return, and to food and shelter, for instance) are recognized and well-defined within international law and treaties such as the Geneva Conventions. There are no specific international legal instruments addressing the needs of IDPs, and general agreements are difficult to apply.[3] On the other hand, international assistance remains limited and unsustainable for a host of reasons, including security concerns, and hesitation by foreign donors to intervene in internal conflicts.

Since they are located within the borders of their home country, responsibility for the protection of IDPs rests first and foremost with national governments. However, the government might also be the cause of the forced displacement and it may not intervene in order to relieve the suffering, viewing the IDPs as "enemies of the state". As long as the conflict continues, the situation of IDPs will progressively deteriorate. In this regard, the role of the international community is significant both

1 Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (2004) *Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (Original English version).* United Nations.

2 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (May 2014) *Global Overview 2014: People internally displaced by conflict and violence.* Geneva: IDMC and Norwegian Refugee Council.

3 UNHCR (2007) *Internally Displaced People Q&A*. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/basics/BASICS/405ef8c64.pdf (Accessed: 25 December 2014).

for addressing the immediate necessities and generating longer term solutions.

Facts and observations about Syrian IDPs

Syria is seen as the largest internal displacement, crisis as well as one of the greatest refugee crises in the world. As of December 2014, nearly 300,000 people have been killed according to a report released by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights. Since the beginning of the crisis in 2011, millions of people have been forced to leave their homes and seek refuge elsewhere. They can be classified within three categories: (i) Refugees living in the camps; (ii) Those trying to survive outside the camps and (iii) IDPs within the country's borders.

Asylum seekers, refugees and immigrants who have been forced to leave their countries are entitled to protection in the countries where they have sought refuge. However, they encounter a host of challenges; internally displaced Syrians face serious hardship due to the lack of national and/or international protection. The current article focuses on the situation of the Syrian IDPs who have taken shelter along the Syrian side of the Turkish border.

According to November 2014 figures released by the IDMC, there are at least 7.6 million IDPs in Syria.[4] Also, the UN has recorded more than 12 million displaced and conflict-affected people inside the country.[5] Syrian IDPs, who fled their homes to avoid bombardments, raids and other types of assaults, have sought shelter in relatively safe places, mostly in the border regions. The majority of them are staying with relatives, while others are taking shelter in abandoned schools, mosques and factories in rural areas. While their initial escape was triggered by violence and insecurity, the challenges they now face are increasingly due to shortages. Consequently, IDPs end up in refugee camps in border regions, which are closer to distribution or access points for basic supplies. As the security situation continues to deteriorate, internal displacement is likely to rise.

Syrian IDPs, who fled their homes to avoid bombardments, raids and other types of assaults, have sought shelter in relatively safe places, mostly in the border regions.

4 IDMC (2014) *Syria IDP Figures Analysis.* Available at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/middle-east-and-north-africa/syria/figures-analysis (Accessed: 24 December 2014).

5 UNHCR (2014) *UN and partners launch major aid plans for Syria and region.* Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/54929c676.html (Accessed: 24 December 2014).

Internal displacement implies temporary relocation for the purpose of reaching safety and/or getting access to basic needs. Thus, the preference for Syrian IDPs is to stay with relatives, and/or to settle in urban areas, often relocating several different times. In this pattern, the tented camps in border areas emerge as the final option as the armed attacks and violence encroaches on living spaces. Having fled their home unprepared, without any belongings or identity cards or passports, and suffering severe physical and psychological traumas, displaced people are in a deeply vulnerable position, and in urgent need of humanitarian assistance and protection.

The most vulnerable IDPs are in opposition-held areas, which are not receiving the same degree of aid. The UN does not bring aid from across the Turkish border, insisting that it cannot do so without the regime's permission.

Their situation differs dramatically depending on whether people are living in regime or rebel-controlled areas. The most vulnerable IDPs are in opposition-held areas, which are not receiving the same degree of aid. The UN does not bring aid from across the Turkish border, insisting that it cannot do so without the regime's permission. Consequently, the IDPs are entirely dependent on aid from other International NGOs (INGOs), which are struggling due to the difficulties of conducting cross-border operations. These areas are also under threat of bombardment by the Syrian authorities. With no political solution in sight and due to the increasing lack of access to cross-border aid, many Syrians are at risk of a prolonged IDP situation.[6]

Turkey's border stretches out to northern Syria, which is currently under the control of opposition groups. The situation in the country's north determines refugee influxes into Turkey. The victims rush into Turkish borders when bombardments intensify in the north. Many of them want to cross the border, yet without any proper documentation or money and because of the circumstances, they end up stuck between the borders. Moreover, it is clear that hosting countries are not always prepared to receive such influxes.

In the wake of the ongoing security crisis, the reluctance and hesitation of the international community to work inside Syria means that the IDPs often lack even basic supplies. The images of muddy, ill-kept tented camps, of men and women struggling

6 Syria Deeply (2014) *Syria Is Now the World's Biggest IDP Crisis*. Available at: http://www.syriadeeply.org/articles/2014/05/5427/syria-worlds-biggest-idp-crisis/ (Accessed: 29 December 2014).

to take care of their families, of children waiting barefoot for a bowl of warm soup have become virtually commonplace – but we must not forget that these photographs depict one of the most tragic and chaotic humanitarian crises of our time.

Exemplary work of Turkish INGOs

As an NGO worker who has paid several visits to IDP camps along the Syrian side of the Turkish border, I can clearly state that their situation is the worst of all the other refugee groups. They are neither formally protected by the international community, nor recognized as IDPs by the Syrian regime. With the lack of a safe zone for civilians in the country, they are also under the threat of bombardment both by the regime and armed groups. IDP camps have been particularly targeted by artillery bombardments and airstrikes; some have experienced several attacks already. A UN commission of inquiry has reported grave violations of international humanitarian law in this regard.[7]

The role of international NGOs is of vital importance in terms of providing protection and care for the affected and vulnerable groups, especially when governments or international humanitarian bodies such as the UN have failed to intervene. There are a small number of international NGOs who work for victims inside the country. A number of international non-governmental relief organization working in Syria are Turkish INGOs and they are among the most effective independent non-governmental organizations, with very large scale cross border relief operations towards Syrian IDPs and victims in several war-torn cities of the country. The one of them, IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, which is among largest Turkish INGOs capable of reaching out to 136 countries and regions in five continents within the context of humanitarian relief, has focused most of its attention on Syria since the beginning of the crisis.

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Delivering aid to Syrian refugees in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan - shelter, nutrition, clothing and health care - IHH primarily targets victims inside Syria including IDPs and those living in besieged towns in coordination with Syrian non-governmental

7 UN High Commissioner For Human Rights (May 2012) *Periodic Update of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic.* UN Human Rights Council.

formations. Operating from the two coordination offices in Turkish border towns of Kilis and Reyhanlı, the foundation also cooperates with over 100 humanitarian aid organizations from 45 countries. Raising donations in cooperation with local and international NGOs, IHH has delivered 4800 aid trucks to date. These have been sent by IHH to various parts of Syria such as Damascus, Aleppo, Hama, Humus, Idlib, where clashes are ongoing.

Turkish INGOs' humanitarian work to support Syrian IDPs is shaped around the provision of basic necessities, which include shelter, food, clean water, and clothing, as well as medical, psychological and educational assistance. Hundreds of tents have been provided to people inside Syria, who were forced to flee their homes as a result of the ongoing crisis. Dozens of schools have been established in the IDP camps, while many others receive financial support. The Foundations has established bread production centers and mobile bakeries at campsites, and are also providing tens of bakeries with flour and diesel in Syria.

Along the Turkish-Syrian border, there are around 400,000 people living in more than a hundred makeshift camps, according to estimates.

Along the Turkish-Syrian border, there are around 400,000 people living in more than a hundred makeshift camps, according to estimates. The population density in the camps varies depending on the level of bombardments. People rush in to the border area when attacks intensify, but then often choose to return once the violence is subsided, due to the hardships of life in the camps. Most of the camps are run by Syrians, with some established by INGOs such as IHH, which have set up eighteen tented and container villages along the border, accommodating 50000 people. The camps that are set up and managed by international NGOs provide better conditions; the others struggle to cover the basic needs of the IDPs due to a lack of funding. A visit to the area reveals that the Syrian people living in overcrowded camps in dire conditions, with the sounds of airplanes flying above them.

Due to a lack of funding, insecurity, and political hesitation among international organizations, the infrastructure of IDP camps remains poor and the aid that reaches the people is unsustainable. The most obvious problem with the tented camps is that the tents are inadequate for either winter or summer conditions. Without winter clothes, shoes or boots, Syrian children are

freezing to death. IHH estimates that currently 150,000 Syrian children are battling against the cold, and epidemics in more than 100 campsites near the Turkish border. Seasonal conditions also stir up problems even during the summer as a result of water shortages, lack of hygiene and poor sanitation. International NGOs involved in cross border aid operation in Syria have launched a number of projects aimed at setting up prefabricated villages for the IDPs, yet the unsuitability of the land and funding gaps remain challenges, due to the high costs of such projects.

The Syrian population is composed of multiple different groups of people from different backgrounds, attitudes, and social classes, just like any other community in the world. They once lived in their own neighborhoods surrounded by family, relatives and neighbors. Now they live in camps with strangers, obliged to share living spaces including bathrooms and kitchens. The psychological and sociological costs of this experience are significant. Furthermore, Syrian children and youth - who are expected to contribute to the future of their country - have irregular access to schooling and little sense of stability or security. Despite the efforts of NGOs, an access to education is one of the greatest challenges for Syrian youth and it needs to be addressed immediately.

Additionally, since 2012, there has been a rise of allegations of abuse amongst young Syrian women and children who have taken shelter in neighboring countries or public campsites along the borders inside Syria. Already suffering due to the circumstances mentioned above, women and children are likely to be re-victimized given their vulnerable and traumatized situations. Widows and orphans, especially those who have been left alone without any familial protection, face greater danger of abuse; they require additional support from humanitarian groups. IHH is already taking care of 2500 Syrian orphans by providing financial and psychological support, and is also establishing container villages to cover the needs of those families. These initiatives are valuable examples of what is required in terms of prioritizing the protection of vulnerable groups of people in a war-stricken society.

Conclusion and recommendations

As the conflict in Syria drags on and the chance for return seems increasingly distant, the suffering of IDPs will continue. The refugee or displacement crisis can be solved only when the civil war is over, and the people can return home in safety. However, the complete destruction and demolition of infrastructure as a result of severe armed attacks as well as the protracted civil war means that Syrians face prolonged displacement.

Despite the urgent need for long term initiatives, sustained leadership, and commitment from a broad range of organizations and institutions, IDPs do not attract sufficient attention or funding from the international community. In the absence of such interventions, they are often unable to resolve their displacement crises, and have no prospects of rebuilding their lives or achieving a durable solution. On the other hand, the authorities in Damascus have deliberately impeded the international response in Syria, given that a number of foreign aid workers have been kidnapped in the north of the country.[8] It is clear that stronger will and collective pressure should be applied to the Syrian authorities in order to preserve basic human rights protection.

The Syrian conflict has spread beyond the regional borders and has become an international issue. In the wake of this mass immigration and humanitarian tragedy, the international community and national governments should take more responsibility to find an effective solution in order to ensure security and stability in the country. As an initial step to improve the current situation, a safe zone should be granted inside Syria for people to take shelter. Also, humanitarian corridors should be created for international NGOs to carry out relief operations, and for people to reach aid supplies. As stated, there are some international NGOs operating inside Syria who have already taken serious risks on the purpose of providing cross-border humanitarian assistance considering highly dangerous conditions. But their efforts are insufficient to address the large scale of needs in the country. Consequently, the international community must take a substantive action to provide funds for housing, food, healthcare, education and basic needs for IDPs in order to minimize their vulnerability, as well as to invest in the infrastructure of the campsites.

8 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) (May 2014) *Global Overview 2014: People internally displaced by conflict and violence.* Geneva: IDMC and Norwegian Refugee Council.

It is vital to generate permanent and sustainable funding as immediate as possible to cover the needs of Syrian IDPs and refugees, so they can have enough capabilities to rebuild their life.

Stranded and Trapped: The Growing Syrian Refugee Crisis in Turkey and the Disaster of International Inaction

Constanze Letsch*

This article discusses the Syrian refugee crisis triggered by the outbreak of conflict in Syria in March 2011, and its impact on neighbouring Turkey. Over 1.6 million Syrians are currently residing within Turkish borders, and Turkey, like other countries in the region, is beginning to reach the limits of its capacity. The article argues that Turkey's asylum policies as well as the dismal international response to the crisis are pushing increasing numbers of Syrians to risk their lives, fleeing the country via dangerous and ever diversifying human trafficking routes. Evidence has shown that the European response of tightening border controls and trying to deter migrants from reaching its shores by cancelling of maritime rescue operations is failing. This approach only pushes traffickers to use riskier methods, likely to result in more deaths of those trying to reach the safety of a third country. The international community urgently needs to rise to its responsibilities towards the Syrians fleeing violence in their country, both in order to prevent the humanitarian crisis from further spiraling out of control, and to alleviate the pressure on Turkey and other countries in the region.

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A steadily growing crisis

In almost four years war in Syria, over 3.6 million men, women and children have fled the ongoing violent conflict, persecution and threats of violence in their home country, hoping to find safety outside of Syria's borders.[1] The vast majority of those who have fled Syria since March 2011 have found refuge in five countries in the region - Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq and Egypt- who together host 97% of the total refugee population.[2] Resources and tolerance amongst the local populace have been stretched to breaking point by the large influx of Syrian refugees. The countries bordering Syria bear the brunt of the crisis, and are increasingly struggling to cope with what human rights groups call "one of the worst refugee crises that the world has seen in decades".

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Turkey alone hosts over 1.6 million Syrian refugees, almost half of those who have fled Syria since the war began in March 2011, and there is no end to the conflict in sight. According to the Turkish Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency (AFAD), around $5 billion dollars have been spent on Syrian refugees since the start of the crisis - a bill that Turkey has had to foot almost entirely on its own.[3] While it is true that the Turkish government refused any outside assistance at the beginning of the war in Syria for various political reasons, such as the unwillingness to cede control over refugee camps on Turkish soils to third parties, Ankara changed course in 2012 and joined the UN's Regional Response Plan. While this move made Turkey eligible for UN-raised funds, only 29% of the $497 million earmarked for Turkey had been received by the end of last year.[4] Turkish government officials have repeatedly asked the international community for assistance in dealing with what might soon grow into a serious social and political crisis at the national level.

But the response by the rest of the international community to

1 Amnesty International (2014) *Struggling to survive: Refugees from Syria in Turkey* Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR44/017/2014/en (Accessed: 28 December 2014).

2 *Ibid.*

3 Haberleriz.com (2014) *Suriyeli mülteciler için ne kadar para harcandı?* Available at: http://www.haberleriz.com/ekonomi/suriyeli-multeciler-icin-ne-kadar-para-harcandi-h12503.html (Accessed: 28 December 2014).

4 UNHCR (2014) *Syria Regional Response: Inter-agency Sharing Portal* Available at: http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224 (Accessed: 2 January 2015).

the Syrian refugee crisis has been dismal. In a recently published report, the human rights group Amnesty International declared it "an abject failure," calling it the "world's worst refugee crisis in a generation".[5] Furthermore, the Regional Response Plan drawn up by the UN remained underfunded by more than 40% at the end of 2014[6]. Similar funding shortfalls have forced the UN to reduce the amount of food supplies within Syria, where it is trying to alleviate the plight of 4.25 million people.[7] In December of last year, the World Food Programme (WFP) had to announce that it would stop supplying food to 1.7 million Syrians both inside and outside Syria because it was unable to raise the $64 million necessary to do so.[8] A last minute emergency fundraising campaign averted the crisis, but funding fatigue and inadequate funding commitments by donor countries will likely be a recurring issue that will impede sustainable and efficient help for displaced Syrians.

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The inadequate funding is only one way in which the international community is failing to address the Syrian refugee crisis. According to Amnesty International, only 1.7% of the total numbers of refugees from Syria have been offered sanctuary outside the region. Wealthier countries, including the Gulf States and members of the European Union (EU), are refusing to open their borders.[9]

Things are unlikely to improve. Amidst increasing atrocities and brutal human rights violations committed by both the al-Assad government and numerous armed factions fighting for dominance in Syria, people are continuing to flee.

Stretched to the limit

The countries that are hosting the largest numbers of refugees, such as Turkey, are beginning to reach their limits. The strain

5 Amnesty International (2014) *Struggling to survive: Refugees from Syria in Turkey* Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR44/017/2014/en (Accessed: 28 December 2014).

6 *Ibid.*

7 The Guardian (2014) *1.7m Syrian refugees face food crisis as UN funds dry up,* 1 December. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/01/syrian-refugees-food-crisis-un-world-programme (Accessed: 28 December 2014).

8 *Ibid.*

9 Amnesty International (2014) *Struggling to survive: Refugees from Syria in Turkey* Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR44/017/2014/en (Accessed: 28 December 2014).

The countries that are hosting the largest numbers of refugees, such as Turkey, are beginning to reach their limits. The strain on public services such as healthcare and schools is considerable, and in towns close to the Syrian border, where the number of Syrians sometimes exceeds that of the local population, tensions are on the rise.

on public services such as healthcare and schools is considerable, and in towns close to the Syrian border, where the number of Syrians sometimes exceeds that of the local population, tensions are on the rise. While Turkey officially maintains an open door policy, the rules for Syrians wishing to enter Turkey have been tightened considerably. Syrians who do not carry official passports are now routinely denied entry into the country. Exceptions are generally made for refugees who are severely wounded and cross the border in ambulances. However, according to recent reports from members of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), even those with injuries are now occasionally turned back at the border.[10] During the second half of 2014, after the Eid holiday following Ramadan, Turkey started to refuse entry and exit to anyone without a passport, even at some official border crossings, such as Reyhanli and Kilis, where Syrians had previously been allowed to cross with an identification card.[11]

These increasing restrictions are forcing desperate refugees to pay smugglers to help them across irregular, and often dangerous, crossing points. Long stretches along the border are currently manned by militants of the Islamic State (ISIL) on the Syrian side, and passing those checkpoints can prove extremely dangerous, as ISIL fighters sometimes stop people going to Turkey, which they deem an "apostate" country.[12]

Despite these serious shortfalls, Turkey has long been lauded for its swift response to the refugee crisis. About 220,000 Syrian refugees are living in 22 government-run camps where they are provided with food and basic services such as free healthcare and education. However, with the camps running at full capacity, the remaining 1.38 million – more than 85% - are living outside of the camps, often in cities and towns close to the Syrian border.[13] While the Turkish government aims to provide them with at least basic care, many are struggling to survive, with an increasing number of facing homelessness, illness and hunger. According to

10 Interview 10 October 2014, Yayladagi, Turkey.

11 Interview 11 October 2014, Reyhanli, Turkey and on 12 October 2014, Kilis, Turkey.

12 *Ibid.*

13 Amnesty International (2014) *Struggling to survive: Refugees from Syria in Turkey* Available at: http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/EUR44/017/2014/en (Accessed: 28 December 2014).

a recent study conducted by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), among Syrian refugees living outside refugee camps in the province of Hatay, 86% of families struggle with unemployment and the resulting lack of resources. Around 4% said that they did not have enough to eat.[14]

The rise of discontent in Turkey

On top of this, in many Turkish cities and towns bordering Syria, tensions are on the rise due to the increasing Syrian population. In some places, such as the Arabic-speaking town of Reyhanli in Hatay province and Kilis in Gaziantep province, the number of Syrians now exceeds the local population. In many of these cities house prices and rents have doubled - sometimes tripled - and many complain that Syrians, more vulnerable to exploitation, often work for much less than local employees. On the other hand, local shop and restaurant owners in cities like Reyhanli and Gaziantep have been complaining about the fierce – and sometimes untaxed – competition from Syrians who have opened businesses in their host country.

Another serious issue is the increase of child labour: according to the UNHCR, about half of the million Syrian refugees currently living in Turkey are children. Whereas more than 60% of children in refugee camps are enrolled in school, 73% of those outside the camps – the overwhelming majority of refugees – do not go to school. A recent UNICEF report estimates that one in ten Syrian refugee children is working, in agriculture, restaurants and shops, as mobile vendors or begging on the street.[15]

Local organizations such as the Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce have been rallying for clearer regulations concerning the employment of Syrians in Turkish businesses. In a report prepared in 2014, the Chamber suggests issuing temporary work permits and imposing a quota for the number of Syrians allowed to work in any Turkish business (specifically in relation to Turkish citizens).[16] According to Turkish media reports, the govern-

14 Milliyet (2015), *Suriyelilerin yüzde 4'ü aç*, 4 January. Available at: http://www.milliyet.com.tr/suriyelilerin-yuzde-4-u-ac-gundem-1993771/ (Accessed: 4 January 2015).

15 The Guardian (2014) *Syrian refugees trigger child labour boom in Turkey*, 2 September. http://www.theguardian.com/law/2014/sep/02/syria-refugees-child-labour-turkey (Accessed: 4 January 2015).

16 Interview with Eyüp Bartik, Head of the Gaziantep Chamber of Commerce, October 2014.

ment in Ankara is currently outlining a draft law on the rights of Syrian workers in Turkey.

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Thus far, Syrian refugees have spent four years as "guests" of Turkey, living under temporary protection. However, under the new measure passed by the Council of Ministers in October, they receive new identification cards that grant them a more secure status and free access to basic social services such as education and healthcare. However, Syrians in Turkey have not received official refugee status yet, which would entitle them to legal protection by the UN as well as to an array of benefits inside Turkey, such as housing, public relief and various social services.

But neither Turkey nor the other countries in the region bearing the brunt of this humanitarian catastrophe are able to deal with it on their own. Wealthy countries must rise to the challenge and accept a much larger number of refugees than they currently do.

International inaction

While the UNHCR's goal to resettle 30,000 refugees by the end of 2014 was met – and indeed slightly exceeded due to Germany's commitment to take in 20,000 Syrians - the agency's hope to resettle a further 130,000 in 2015 and 2016 currently seems a daunting goal. At a pledging conference held by the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNRA) in December 2014, 28 countries made firm commitments to accept 66,254 Syrian refugees, eventually bringing the total number of those resettled since the start of 2014 to over 100,000. However, even these pledges will be little more than a drop in the ocean, and insufficient to ease the pressure on the states that currently host the estimated 3.6 million displaced Syrians, 3.2 million of whom are registered with the UN. According to UN numbers, just under 191,000 refugees

17 The New York Times (2014) *Turkey Strengthens Rights of Syrian Refugees*, 29 December. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/30/world/europe/turkey-strengthens-rights-of-syrian-refugees.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias%3Ar%2C{%221%22%3A%22RI%3A8%22}&_r=0 (Accessed: 4 January 2015).

have been resettled since the start of the conflict in March 2011. However, speaking at the conference in December, António Guterres, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, said that at least 300,000 more Syrians will need to be resettled either for health reasons, or because they will be unable to return safely to Syria even if the civil war ends.[18] This number is likely to rise as the conflict rages on.

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For Syrians applying for resettlement to a third country while staying in Turkey, the country's outdated asylum laws – despite having been amended in 2013 – impose some complications. Despite being one of the original signatories to the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Turkey remains one of the countries that keeps a geographical limitation on the origins of the refugees it will accept. According to the legislation passed in 2013, only people who arrive from European countries are eligible for full refugee status, whereas those who arrive "as a result of events from outside European countries" will only be granted so-called "conditional refugee" status. The lifting of this geographical limitation has become a major condition for Turkey's EU membership, but negotiations have stalled since formal accession talks began in 2005.

Turkey's asylum laws leave non-European refugees in a legal limbo while they wait to be resettled in a third country by the UNHCR, a process that can often take many years. Applying for asylum in Turkey is equally impossible for those fleeing Syria, since such claims made from residents of the countries outside of Europe are not accepted under the current Turkish asylum law.

Given the immense strain on local public services and the general lack of legal employment opportunities for many Syrians in Turkey – and therefore the limited options for building a sustainable future –, it is understandable that they want to leave and be resettled elsewhere.

18 The New York Times (2014) *More Nations Pledge to U.N. to Resettle Syrian Refugees*, 9 December. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/10/world/middleeast/united-nations-wins-government-pledges-for-resettling-syrian-refugees.html?module=Search&mabReward=relbias&&_r=1 (Accessed: 4 January 2015).

Increasingly diverse and dangerous attempts to breach Fortress Europe

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The reluctance of wealthy nations to formally accept a higher number of refugees and the long waiting times for refugees to finally be resettled has given cause for alarm. An increasing number of Syrians are resorting to irregular – and often very dangerous – ways to reach a third country, and trafficking to Europe, especially via the Mediterranean, is on the rise.

According to newspaper reports, more than 45,000 migrants tried to reach Italy and Malta via the Mediterranean Sea in 2013, and 700 lost their lives doing so. In 2014, the number of those killed at sea rose dramatically: 3,224 people died trying to reach European shores, amongst them Syrians who had boarded trafficking vessels in Turkish ports.[19]

Some Syrian refugees said that it was relatively easy to make contact with traffickers, and that the main problem was finding the funds to pay them. According to one man, aged 29, from Idlib, the fee to reach Italy stood at $6,500 per person. He added that his family had only been able to find the money for his older brother, who had made the journey successfully and now runs a small Syrian restaurant in Brussels, Belgium. Boarding a small vessel in the Turkish coastal city of Mersin, he had been at sea for eight days. Many Syrians living in Turkey confirmed that they would risk the journey, if they were only able to raise the necessary funds.[20]

Traffickers have told journalists that they paid hefty bribes to border guards, police chiefs, immigration officers and consular staff of several European countries and Canada, in order to bring migrants across the sea. One smuggler claimed to work in direct cooperation with the Italian mafia, which, according to him, "controls all the Italian ports".[21]

19 The Guardian (2014) *Arab spring prompts biggest migrant wave since second world war*, 3 January. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2015/jan/03/arab-spring-migrant-wave-instability-war (Accessed: 4 January 2015).

20 Interview in Yayladagi, 4 August 2014.

21 The Telegraph (2014) *The international smuggling ring paying off Western border officials to bring refugees into Europe,*19 December. Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/11292208/The-international-smuggling-ring-paying-off-Western-border-officials-to-bring-refugees-into-Europe.html (Accessed: 28 December 2014).

European governments hope to deter migrants from choosing the maritime route simply by abandoning rescue missions, such as the Italian-run Operation Mare Nostrum, which carried out proactive search and rescue across 27,000 square miles of sea and was therefore able to save over 100,000 migrants from death at sea. Politicians feared that the prominent rescue scheme was a major reason that traffickers chose the Mediterranean route to reach Europe. However, last October's cancellation of Mare Nostrum, a one-year operation with a budget of $10.5 million, showed that the smuggling of migrants to Europe has not ceased.[22]

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In response to repeated demands from the Italian government, the European Union has now deployed the contracted EU border agency Frontex on a mission that does not focus on search and rescue like Mare Nostrum, but rather on border surveillance. This new operation – called Triton – only covers 30 miles off of the Italian coast and is supposed to intercept ships carrying migrants.[23]

But recent trafficking incidents show that smugglers are still finding ways to get close enough to the Italian shore to force coastguards to rescue the migrants. At the beginning of this year, coastguards had to intervene on behalf of a "ghost ship" – the cargo ship Ezadeen that had set sail from a Turkish port carrying an estimated 450 migrants, most of them Syrian refugees. It was abandoned in dangerous waters by its crew of traffickers just 40 nautical miles off the coast of Italy. Leonard Doyle, a spokesman for the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) told reporters that this tactic took "the smuggling game to a whole new level".[24]

The Ezadeen was the second "ghost ship" carrying migrants to Italy in less than a week. In late December, 800 people were rescued from the Blue Sky M, a Moldovan-registered Cargo vessel

22 The Guardian (2014) *Italy: end of ongoing sea rescue mission 'puts thousands at risk'*, 31 October. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/31/italy-sea-mission-thousands-risk (Accessed: 4 January 2015).

23 *Ibid.*

24 The Guardian (2015) *Smugglers abandon migrant ship off Italy in new tactic to force rescue.* Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/02/smugglers-abandon-migrant-ship-italy-ezadeen (Accessed: 4 January 2015).

after the Italian coast guard found it sailing without a crew approximately five miles off the Italian coast.[25]

Some European politicians are already calling for stronger deterrents than the cancellation of Mare Nostrum. Despite harsh criticism, the UK government decided to opt out of all Mediterranean rescue missions, saying that they encouraged migrants to risk trying to come to Europe.[26] However, the spiraling violence in Syria and elsewhere, as well as the rapidly increasing numbers of those who are dying at sea, is clear evidence that these arguments fail to respond to the reality on the ground.

Conclusion

The Syrian refugee crisis has become one of the worst humanitarian crises in decades. Analysts say that the conflicts that emerged from the so-called Arab Spring have triggered the biggest wave of migration since the Second World War. It becomes increasingly clear that neither Turkey, nor any of the other countries in the region that have had to bear the brunt of the refugee crisis, can shoulder the burden alone. Deterrents employed by wealthier states to prevent refugees from entering their territories – such as increasing border surveillance, the cancellation of maritime rescue missions and fences – are only increasing the risks for those fleeing violent conflict and trying to reach safety elsewhere. These mechanisms are not succeeding in stemming the flow of refugees. The international community urgently needs to step up and implement meaningful and serious policy changes that will allow for the resettlement of larger numbers of Syrian refugees. Resettlement processes should be more transparent and accessible, in order to reduce the long waiting times that sometimes stretch into years, robbing those affected of the possibility to build a sustainable future.

25 *Ibid.*

26 BBC (2014) *Mediterranean migrants: EU rescue policy criticised*. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30020496 (Accessed: at 2 January 2015).

The Crisis of Multiculturalism in the UK: Has it Failed?

Namig Abbasov*

The idea of multiculturalism has been hotly debated across the UK in recent years. This article addresses the question of whether multiculturalism has failed in Great Britain based on an assessment of both sides of the debate. Considerable arguments against multiculturalism have been submitted by both academics and political figures, stating its devastating impact on social cohesion, causing social segregation, and its incompatibility with the principles of liberal democracy. This essay argues the opposite: the primary argument in this essay is that what has failed is not multiculturalism itself, but rather the understanding of it, due to the powerful negative discourse around the term embedded in multicultural policies (MCPs). The article argues that there is an urgent need for the contextual development of multiculturalism, which can lead to a variety of views. It concludes that the arguments against multiculturalism lack empirical evidence, and those arguments have been strongly influenced by the negative discourse around the idea of multiculturalism, rather than its everyday realities.

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The concept of multiculturalism has been one the of most controversial issues in the UK since Prime Minster David Cameron gave a speech on the 'failure of the doctrine of state multiculturalism' at the Munich Security Summit 2011, following German Chancellor Angela Merkel's criticism of multiculturalism. His speech was a turning point in the multiculturalism discourse among both academics and state officials. In particular, the posited link between multiculturalism and the process of radicalization has challenged the effectiveness of multicultural polices, making the issue highly sensitive for both public and private stakeholders in multicultural policies.[1]

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Historically, the term multiculturalism has been integrated into state doctrine in order to deal with cultural differences within the wider society, in defense of recognition of cultural norms and values. This was inevitable as the UK became increasingly multiethnic after the Second World War, when the state experienced a massive wave of immigration. This multiethnic nature of British society compelled policy makers to turn to multicultural policies throughout the second half of 20th century.

The culmination of critiques of multicultural policies in both academic and political discourses heralded a new period labeled a 'crisis of multiculturalism'. Multiculturalism has been an inescapable part of political discourse in the UK since the very beginning of the 21st century.[2] Several major events, including the 9/11 and 7/7 bombings brought the effectiveness of multicultural policies into question. The wide range of criticism engendered substantial negative discourse, seen as a backlash against multiculturalism. The article addresses the question of whether multiculturalism has been success or a failure, through an overall evaluation of the arguments developed for and against multicultural policies.

The article is comprised of three parts. The first part discusses some of the definitions that have been developed by various authors and experts, providing a historical and contextual analysis of multiculturalism in the UK, including the challenges it has

1 BBC News (2011, February 5). *State multiculturalism has failed, says David Cameron*. Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994 (Accessed : 24 November, 2014).

2 Bhikhu Parekh (2000) *The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain*, London: Profile. p.5

confronted. The second part evaluates the ongoing backlash against multiculturalism. The debate on whether multiculturalism has failed is addressed in the final section.

Conceptual development: What is multiculturalism as a state policy?

Approaches to multicultural policies have consistently produced different views on the consequences those policies brought about, so that 'for some, it seems, multiculturalism is a battle cry, for others, a consensus position'.[3] Multicultural policies are a set of guidelines for the acknowledgement of the cultural values, norms and traditions possessed by ethnic and religious groups within the wider society.[4] It is particularly important to differentiate between the meanings attached to the term multiculturalism, since it is both 'state of affairs' and 'political programme'.[5] While the former is a situation in which a diverse society of different ethnic, cultural and religious groups is produced from multiculturalism, the latter usage of the term refers to the policies applied by the government in order to address the needs of a multicultural society. In sum, the understanding of multicultural policies has two facets: on one hand it entails tolerance for different ways of living, and on the other hand it is a 'demand for legal recognition of the rights of ethnic, racial, religious, or cultural groups'.[6] Multicultural policies in Great Britain have been implemented in a decentralized manner, by local governments without much intervention from the central authority. It is concluded by policymakers those policies should be incorporated within the state strategy in order to handle cultural differences, rather than making the building of a multicultural society as a goal of the state, since a multicultural construction is an inevitable outcome within the broader society. Put simply, while a multicultural society entails a situation where ethno-religious groups can enjoy their cultural values and norms, multicultural policies are programmed by the government in order to construct a multicultural society.[7]

3 Yack, B. (2002). Multiculturalism and the Political Theorists. *European Journal of Political Theory*, pp.106-119, p.108

4 Demireva, A., & Heath, N. (2013). Has multiculturalism failed in Britain? *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, pp.161-180, p. 161

5 Barry, B. (2001) Culture and Equality, Cambridge: Polity Press, p.22

6 Fukuyama, F. (2006) Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy, *Journal of Democracy*, 17(2), pp. 5-20, p.16

7 Rozanov , A. (2012)'The Crisis of Multiculturalism', in Rozanov , A. *3G: Globalistics, Global*

Despite some arguments to the contrary, multiculturalism cannot be understood as an entirely demographic issue, since it has deep political consequences due to the political participation of minorities living in a multicultural society.

Despite some arguments to the contrary, multiculturalism cannot be understood as an entirely demographic issue, since it has deep political consequences due to the political participation of minorities living in a multicultural society. In addition, the debate has promoted 'a soft tolerant' version of multiculturalism, in contrast to 'radical' multiculturalism. The former seeks to prevent the emergence of radical groups and social segregation.[8] Feminist critiques argue that multicultural policies permit some cultural norms that may violate women's rights in a multicultural society. Substantial critiques of multiculturalism, particularly, of those feminist scholars, have been labeled as 'post-multiculturalism' within the frame of the prevailing discourse.[9] Liberal critiques of multicultural policies have in particular had a strong impact on the further implementation of those policies.

Multicultural policies have been consistently attacked by mainstream liberals in the UK.

Multicultural policies have been consistently attacked by mainstream liberals in the UK. The foundational beliefs and assumptions behind multicultural policies have been strongly contested due to its perceived incompatibility with the principles of a liberal state particularly after the turn of the 21st century in response to several claims arguing that 'multiculturalists have won the day'.[10] This trend brought about a strong criticism of multicultural policies due its posited destruction of liberal societies.[11] In this view, pluralism within a liberal democracy is undermined by multicultural policies due to the denial of voluntary group memberships, multiple affiliations in the context of cross-cutting cleavages, which are preconditions for the construction of a plural society. The liberal criticism of multiculturalism holds the view that multicultural policies result in the exploitation of group rights, particularly of women, within a multicultural society. However, empirical scrutiny of multicultural policies indicates that many cultural rules, norms and traditions are neutral in nature: that is, they are not in

Studies, Globalization Studies: Scientific Digest. Moscow, MAKS Press, pp.33-37, p.33

8 Touraine, A. (2001)Many cultures, one citizenship, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 37(4), pp. 393–421, p. 393

9 Vertovec, S. (2010) "Towards post-multiculturalism? Changing communities, conditions and contexts of diversity" in *International Social Science Journal*, pp. 83-95.

10 Kymlicka, W. (1995) Multicultural Citizenship, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.113

11 Barry, B. (2001) Culture and Equality, Cambridge: Polity Press

conflict with principles of the liberal state such as freedom of religion and 'creedal neutrality'[12] in Great Britain.[13] Furthermore, it is also claimed that multicultural policies establish conditions whereby the values of the commanding clan or other cultural norms prevail and ultimately limit the freedoms and/or educational rights of the 'second class' groups.[14] Thus, multicultural policies produce an 'existence within the same society of a diversity of different cultures and communities' that has been harshly criticized by the liberal critics due to their perceived failures of promoting equality and justice.[15] The liberal criticism of multicultural policies in the UK led to substantial attacks from the public, and strongly influenced the approaches of the ruling parties to those policies. Consequently, the Labour government looked for the policies 'beyond multiculturalism' because of the perceived failure of multicultural policies. Finally, the critique of multicultural policies culminated during the Conservative government with David Cameron's speech arguing that those policies have failed.

However, empirical scrutiny of multicultural policies indicates that many cultural rules, norms and traditions are neutral in nature: that is, they are not in conflict with principles of the liberal state such as freedom of religion and 'creedal neutrality' in Great Britain.

Multiculturalism as a policy, therefore, it contributes to the development of a state 'at ease with the rich tapestry of human life and the desire amongst people to express their own identity in the manner they see fit'.[16] On the other hand, it is defined as a framework, that is, 'a formula for manufacturing conflict' where core principles of liberal democracy are challenged. In that vein, multiculturalism is seen as privileging 'what divides people at the expense of what unites them'.[17] In sum, the understanding of multiculturalism as both a philosophical idea and policy is twofold: a tool for recognition of cultural values and norms and a method of engendering social segregation and separate communities.[18]

In line with this, historically, Great Britain has always been a

12 Joppke, C. (2004) The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 55(2), pp. 237-257, p.240

13 Shachar, A. (2001) Multicultural Jurisdictions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

14 Howe, K. (1992) Liberal Democracy, Equal Educational Opportunity, and the Challenge of Multiculturalism, *American Educational Research Journal*, 29(3), pp. 455-470, p. 455

15 Turner, B. (2006) Citizenship and the Crisis of Multiculturalism, *Citizenship Studies*, 10(5), pp. 607-618, p.611

16 Bloor, K. (2010). *The Definitive Guide to Political Ideologies.* Author House. p. 272

17 Barry, B. (2001). *Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p.3

18 Ibid. Howarth, C. and E. Andreouli (n.d.) p. 4.

multi-ethnic country, long before the immigration of Asian groups. It is commonly accepted that the evolution of multi-ethnic societies in Great Britain occurred through three stages commencing at the end of 19th century, when the ethnic and cultural diversity was handled through the annulment of all cultural, religious and ethnic diversities through assimilating those groups in line with 'homogenous national norms'.[19].The norms and rules that are accepted unilaterally by the government within the national level in order to assimilate the different groups are called homogenous national norms. At the end of the Second World War, a wave of immigration made the Old Empire ethnically very diverse country, requiring the government to pursue some policies to address the ethnic diversity of the state.[20] Particularly, multiculturalism was adopted to counter the colonial model that had been established by Western powers in the exploitation of Third World states.[21]

At the end of the Second World War, a wave of immigration made the Old Empire ethnically very diverse country, requiring the government to pursue some policies to address the ethnic diversity of the state.

The second stage started with the development of a multilateral society, producing "integration plus" through the middle of the 20th century, when national norms were comprehended as heterogeneous rather homogenous. It was believed that a multicultural construction was possible, where immigrants could practice their cultural values and traditions and keep their identities. This change was due to an understanding that the groups' assimilation to a common national identity was impossible.[22] Subsequently, the incorporation of multicultural policies into local governance came to existence in the 1970s and 1980s and was finally accepted at the national level by the New Labour government in 1997.[23] During this time, multiculturalism was not without its opponents; the political right questioned its perceived successes.

Subsequently, the incorporation of multicultural policies into local governance came to existence in the 1970s and 1980s and was finally accepted at the national level by the New Labour government in 1997.

19 Grillo, R. (2007). An excess of alterity? Debating difference in a multicultural society. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 30(6), pp.979-998. p. 980

20 Panayi, P. (2004). The Evolution of Multiculturalism in Britain and Germany: An Historical Survey *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, 25(5-6), pp.466-480. p.468

21 Alain Touraine, Many cultures, one citizenship, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 37(4), pp. 393–2011, p. 393

22 Ibid. Grillo: p.981

23 Hadjetian, S. (2008). *Multiculturalism and Magic Realism? Between Fiction and Reality.* Regensburg : GRIN Verlag GmbH, p. 31

The third stage brought a new chapter in multiculturalism's history: the beginning of the 21st century strongly influenced by the 9/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks, which led to the 'crisis of multiculturalism' labeled as a *backlash*.[24] The initial roots of the current debate on multiculturalism began to penetrate every aspect of life as people became increasingly sensitized to the issues. One of the central worries regarding the practical functionality of multicultural policies is associated with the 'governability' of a multicultural body in which cultural diversity prevails.[25] Essentially, multicultural policies were blamed for destroying community cohesion in the British society.[26]. Thus, this third period represents the developments that led to the increasing critiques.

One of the central worries regarding the practical functionality of multicultural policies is associated with the 'governability' of a multicultural body in which cultural diversity prevails. Essentially, multicultural policies were blamed for destroying community cohesion in the British society.

In a nutshell, the multiculturalism experience of the UK has evolved through *three stages*, entering a period of crisis in the beginning of the 21st century, when it was proclaimed as the primary reason for the emergence of 'parallel societies' and 'intolerable subjects', despite insufficient empirical evidence for its failure.[27] It was during this time that a report on effects of multiculturalism claimed that different ways of living and exercising diverse values and traditions leads to the destruction of common goods that a society possess, such as 'cohesion', 'common values', 'common aims and objectives', 'common moral principles and codes of behavior'.[28]

Backlash against multiculturalism

The racial tensions in England's north started a new chapter in the critiques of multicultural policies as part of a state doctrine, shifting the state's political discourse toward social cohesion from multicultural policies, since it was believed that poor social cohesion was the primary reason for racial unrest.[29] A new wave of criticism brought about a backlash against multiculturalism, which deeply penetrated both academic and political discourse.

24 Lentin, A., & Titley, G. (2012). The crisis of 'multiculturalism' in Europe: Mediated minarets, intolerable subjects. *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 15(2), pp.123-138, p. 123

25 Ibid. Grillo: pp.980-981

26 Goodhart, D. (2006). Union Jacked. *Foreign Policy*, 158(2), p.88

27 Ibid. Lentin, A., & Titley, G: 123

28 Cantle, T. (2001). *Community Cohesion.* London: Home Office, p.13

29 Ibid. Cantle, T. p.10

The negative political discourse on multiculturalism culminated with Prime Minister David Cameron's speech, who stated: 'under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We've failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We've even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values'.

This period of crisis was described as the 'retreat of multiculturalism'[30] and the 'death of multiculturalism'[31] in academic discourse. The negative political discourse on multiculturalism culminated with Prime Minister David Cameron's speech, who stated: 'Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism, we have encouraged different cultures to live separate lives, apart from each other and apart from the mainstream. We've failed to provide a vision of society to which they feel they want to belong. We've even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values'.[32] The backlash trend has been demonstrated by intensified controls on immigration, the new citizenship tests, and policies drawn up by right-wing nationalist parties.

Four main arguments have been developed within this backlash against multiculturalism. The first challenge multiculturalism brought about is the groups' inability to *identify* with the broader society. It was argued that multicultural policies undermine identity construction in line with the mainstream society, as they lock groups in local identities through practice of cultural norms and values contrary to those of the mainstream society. Parallel lives bring about the identification challenge as the groups in separate communities fail to identify with the broader society leading to the emergence of radicalization. Furthermore, social inequality risks being ignored due to the collective approach of multicultural policies to group identities and rights, abandoning individual autonomy, and failing to address issues of social equality among communities.

The second set of arguments against multiculturalism centers around the devastating impact on *social cohesion and the rise of segregation*. The opportunity cost of according greater recognition to the different groups within a nation entails reduced emphasis on national solidarity.[33] Multicultural policies are

30 Joppke, C. (2004) The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 55(2), pp. 237-257

31 Allen, C. (2007) Down with Multiculturalism, Book-burning and Fatwas, The discourse of the 'death' of multiculturalism, *Culture and Religion: An Interdisciplinary Journal,* 8(2), pp. 125-138

32 Ibid. BBC News.

33 Wolfe, A., & Jytte, K. (1997). Identity Politics and the Welfare State . *Social Philosophy and Policy*,

projected to cement separate communities where they will bond social capital instead of bridging it, whereby cultural standards and norms contrary to the values of broader society will be conserved, fostering segregation within the whole society. Opponents of multiculturalism attacked faith schools, accusing them of causing segregation by teaching different religious beliefs to children, who grew up with different ideas and perceptions, which in turn, puts the future of the state at risk. Multiculturalism has also been portrayed as a 'mosaic' because of its religious aspects which segregate the wider society.[34] Therefore, it is asserted that multicultural policies indirectly promote antagonism and mistrust within the overall society, since those policies foster "parallel lives" by differentiating those groups from the broader society through preservation of distinct cultural norms and values (for instance, early marriage). Furthermore, there are fears about the generational persistence of ethnic values and norms within the separate communities consolidating segregation through future generations.[35]

Therefore, it is asserted that multicultural policies indirectly promote antagonism and mistrust within the overall society, since those policies foster "parallel lives" by differentiating those groups from the broader society through preservation of distinct cultural norms and values

As segregation deepens, it produces the third challenge, that is, the emergence of *extremism and radicalization*, which emerge when groups fail to tolerate different religious, ethnic and cultural values and traditions. This situation emerged vis-a-vis the communities with majority Muslims populations in the aftermath of the 7/7 bombings.[36] One of the challenges associated with multicultural policies is their encouragement of 'exclusion rather than inclusion'[37]. This exclusion from the wider society leads to preservation of cultural values and standards promoting the emergence of extremist identities, blocking change and integration within the broader society.

Finally, multiculturalism is criticized for its *inconsistency with some of liberal principles*. The central claim is that multicultur-

14(2) pp. 231-255, p.29

34 Benhabib, S. (2002). *The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.8

35 Demireva, A., & Heath, N. (2013). Has multiculturalism failed in Britain? *Ethnic and Racial Studies* , pp.161-180, p. 163

36 Demireva, A., & Heath, N. (2013). Has multiculturalism failed in Britain? *Ethnic and Racial Studies* , pp.161-180, p.162

37 Sniderman, P. M., & Hagendoorn., L. (2007). *When ways of life collide : multiculturalism and its discontents in the Netherlands /.* Princeton, N.J. ; Woodstock: Princeton University Press, p.5

alism is incompatible with liberal democracy, since it is asserted that some diverse groups preserve values and traditions such as forced marriage, which violates the fundamental principles of liberal democracy.[38] Moreover, multiculturalism is criticized for its resistance to 'cultural homogeneity' through the maintenance of its bonds and communication with 'a subordinate culture'. It is argued that 'multiculturalists [indeed] occupy a set of positions between the two poles of border-guarding and border-crossing. All rely to some extent on both, but each emphasizes one pole more than the other'[39]. The perceived concerns regarding the devastating impact of multicultural policies upon liberal values are also addressed in Christopher Caldwell's work. He claims that the implementation of multicultural policies 'requires the sacrifice of liberties that natives once thought of as rights'.[40] Ironically, multiculturalism was also blamed for the links between UK residents and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and for exporting radical ideas back to the country[41]. Commenting on the multicultural policies, Jacob Levy argues that multicultural policies result in the preservation of peace instead of preservation of a cultural diversity, which might be disappointing and a waste of time, but at the same time, provides an effective approach in a sense that those policies ease tensions originating from cultural diversity.[42]

Essentially, cultural integration and assimilation are seen in the UK as the primary means to handle the societal threats that have originated from multicultural policies.

The backlash against multiculturalism has also produced mechanisms for alternatives to multicultural policies. Essentially, cultural integration and assimilation are seen in the UK as the primary means to handle the societal threats that have originated from multicultural policies. In this sense, multiculturalism is described as a 'profoundly disturbing social experiment'[43]. Though integration sounds like a reasonable idea, one should be careful in implementing measures for the integration, making sure

38 Gilroy, P. (2000). *Between Camps: Nations, Cultures and the Allure of Race.* London: Penguin, p.242

39 Ibid. Yack, B, p.109

40 Caldwell, C. (2009). *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe.* London: Penguin, p.11

41 The Telegraph (2014, August 24). *Multiculturalism has brought us honour killings and Sharia law, says Archbishop* . Available at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/11053646/Multiculturalism-has-brought-us-honour-killings-and-Sharia-law-says-Archbishop.html(Accessed : 24 November, 2014).

42 Ibid. Yack, B, p.115

43 The Daily and Sunday Express (2007, August 9). *How the Government has declared war on white English people*. Available at: http://www.express.co.uk/comment/columnists/leo-mckinstry/15991/How-the-Government-has-declared-war-on-white-English-people(Accessed : 24 November, 2014).

that the efforts to that end are conducted with the free will of the groups who wish to be integrated with the British identity. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the government to create appropriate conditions for those wishing to maintain their own cultural traditions, as well as for those aspiring to share in a new culture by ensuring their free will within the framework of domestic laws and rules. The crucial point here is the clear and definite definition of integration, since assimilation might occur under name of integration. Integration is totally different from assimilation, since it is 'not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal opportunity, coupled with cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.[44] Thus, integration 'certainly doesn't mean that one culture predominates over another, and other cultures therefore have to fit into that culture.[45]

In particular, the integration of the diverse groups to the fundamental values derived from the Enlightenment period connected with 'secularism, individualism, gender equality, and freedom of expression' has been put forth.[46] It is believed that the more the Muslim groups of the British society integrate to these fundamental values, the more they will be 'civilized' and successfully integrate to the wider society. The idea sounds good in theory at least, but empirical tests indicate that the outcome of such an approach is not a society based on liberal values, as so-called 'integrationist' discourse expects. It is rather an 'anti-Muslim racism' that attempts to 'civilize' the Muslim groups in line with the liberal values inherited from Enlightenment.[47]

Has multiculturalism failed?

The ongoing debate over multiculturalism's effectiveness in the British political life and media would make one believe that multiculturalism has failed, but in fact, research indicates that the arguments for this failure of multiculturalism are not based on empirical evidence. The debate on multiculturalism tells a new story of 'blind men and an elephant'; in which several blind men (or men in a dark room) make physical contact with an elephant

44 R. Jenkins, Essays and Speeches (London: Collins, 1967), p. 267

45 Grillo, R. (2007). An excess of alterity? Debating difference in a multicultural society. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 30(6), pp.979-998, p.982

46 Kundnani, A. (2012). Multiculturalism and its discontents: Left, Right and liberal. *European Journal of Cultural Studies*, 15(2), pp.155-166, p.155

47 Ibid. Kundnani, A, p.155

to find out its physical shape formulating their own 'truths' about the elephant that leaves them in totally contrasted views. Different meanings have been attached to multiculturalism: it is 'a demographic condition, a set of institutional arrangements, objectives of a political movement or a set of state principles'.[48] A close examination of the backlash against multiculturalism indicates that the arguments put forth by both its proponents and its detractors are strongly influenced by the negative political discourse. Particularly, the debate on multiculturalism is strongly affected by the flashpoint issues of terrorism, radicalization or extremism, which significantly undermine the success stories of multicultural policies.[49]

A major piece of research on the weakening of liberal democracy's primary principles as a result of multiculturalism comes from Bernard Yach, who focused on finding an answer to the question, 'does multiculturalism pose a serious threat to the ideals and institutions that liberal egalitarians cherish?'[50] He found that the claim that multicultural policies damage liberal ideas and institutions was groundless and lacking in empirical evidence; the argument is empirically void. Thus, he comes to the conclusion that the various challenges have been overstated; he claims that 'multiculturalists policies more often test our tact and patience than our fundamental principles'.[51]

Thus, the central reason for the lack of integration to British society is not multicultural policies, but perceived individual and group discriminations.

Thus, what has led the groups to live parallel lives, segregated wider society, and demolished social cohesion is the perceptions and policies that have stemmed from discriminatory treatment by society at large. One study finds that although bonding social capital is considerably high among some groups (particularly, intermarriage among Pakistani and Bangladeshi), it does not necessarily bring about separate communities due to the shared working places and dwellings within the wider society.[52] Thus, the central reason for the lack of integration into the British society is not multicultural policies, but perceived individual and group

48 Ibid. Howarth, C. and E. Andreouli (n.d.), p.8

49 Hasan, M. (2011, February 5). Why David Cameron is wrong about radicalisation and multiculturalism, *New Statesman*. Available at : http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/mehdi-hasan/2011/02/cameron-speech-british(Accessed : 24 November, 2014).

50 Ibid. Yack, B, p.107

51 Ibid. Yack, B, p.107

52 Ibid. Demireva, A., & Heath, N., p.177

discriminations. These huge criticisms partially originate from presentations of multicultural policies as the primary reasons for radicalization, particularly of Muslim communities. Cameron's speech was a strong blow to public optimism for the future of multicultural policies.

This paper does not reject the view that the emergence of segregation, parallel lives or separate communities within the broader society do not exist in the UK, but instead posits that multiculturalism is not the primary reason for the appearance of those challenges through the overall evolution of the debate around multicultural policies.

Conclusion

Indeed, much of the debate on the failure of multiculturalism stems from the lack of a common understanding of the concept. The findings indicated that what has failed is not multiculturalism itself, but its perception within the wider society, since it has been represented in the contexts of terrorism, extremism and radicalization. Part of the challenge also originates from the various understandings of multiculturalism. The lack of a common comprehension of the concept led to the dominance of philosophical debate within media and political discussions. It is the understanding of multiculturalism that has failed, rather than its application. Thus, it is concluded that instead of philosophical debate on the concept, a substantial research is needed to investigate multiculturalism's everyday application through empirical evidence.

To conclude, the claim that multiculturalism causes the existence of parallel lives, disrupts social cohesion, and leads to social segregation of religious-ethnic groups and finally to radicalization, undermining the creation of a shared British identity, lacks empirical proof. The evidence tells a different story: the academic and political discourse on failure of multiculturalism engenders different perceptions on group and individual discrimination, discouraging different groups from integrating within the society as a whole. A shift from a philosophical debate to a broader understanding is needed in order to explore multicultural practices experienced in the everyday lives of groups within multicultural communities.

COMMENTARIES

Azerbaijani Community of the Nagorno Karabakh Region: Deported Community's Quest for Peace, Justice and Returning Home

Rovshan Rzayev*

Azerbaijan has experienced one the of the harshest refugee and IDP crises of modern times during its 25 years of independence which made about 13 percent of the country's population to live lives of refugee and IDP. The Azerbaijani Community of Nagorno-Karabakh (ACNK) who was forcefully displaced by Armenia during ethnic cleansing in the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh is a part of the huge refugee and IDP population of Azerbaijan. The ACNK supports the peaceful resolution of the conflict in accordance with international legal norms, and in order to accelerate the peace process, the ACNK has offered to launch direct negotiations between the Azerbaijani and Armenian communities of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. Despite all support provided by Azerbaijani state to solve socio-economic problems of the community no support can fully heal the wounds inflicted by war, occupation, massacres and ethnic cleansing. The only way to truly heal these wounds is through the resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, with peace in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the community's return to their native lands and homes.

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Azerbaijan has experienced one the of the harshest refugee and IDP crises of modern times during its 25 years of independence. The country currently has more than one million refugees and IDPs; every ninth Azerbaijani citizen was forced to leave home, left without shelter and compelled to build a new life from scratch. More than 10 percent of the country's population is classified as a refugee or IDP. Managing their socio-economic welfare has imposed a serious burden on the Azerbaijani state.

The Azerbaijani Community of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan (ACNK) underwent ethnic cleansing during Armenia's occupation of the region. They are trying rebuild their lives, help the members of the community to resolve the various problems they face, and protect and develop the community's cultural heritage. Its efforts are also directed at raising international awareness of the rights violations that have occurred and initiating a dialogue with the region's Armenian community. Unfortunately, the refugee and IDP crises facing Azerbaijan today have been largely ignored by international media, humanitarian organizations, and international human rights activists. Despite all these challenges, the Azerbaijani community of Nagorno-Karabakh remains committed to the peaceful resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and neighborly coexistence with the region's Armenian community, and still hopes to return home one day.

Unfortunately, the refugee and IDP crises facing Azerbaijan today have been largely ignored by international media, humanitarian organizations, and international human rights activists.

The Azerbaijani Community of the Nagorno-Karabakh region as a part of the national refugee and IDP problem

Out of more than one million refugee and IDP population of Azerbaijan, 250,000 refugees were deported from their native lands in Armenia in 1988-1989. In 1990-1994, 700,000 IDPs were forced to leave their homes when Armenia occupied the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and the seven adjacent districts. About 50,000 Meskhetian turks from Uzbekistan took shelter in Azerbaijan in the beginning of 1990s when unrest in the Ferghana valley forced them to flee the country. In addition, several thousand refugees from Afghanistan, Chechnya and other countries have chosen Azerbaijan as their new home in search of a better life.

The Azerbaijani community of the Nagorno-Karabakh region forms a significant part of the country's refugee and IDP population. The community consists of ethnic Azerbaijanis who lived in the territories belonging to the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region of Azerbaijan, and were forcefully deported from their homes at the result of ethnic cleansing carried out by Armenia's army and separatist forces. The 65,000 community members have held IDP status in Azerbaijan since 1992. Today community members are dispersed across the country and live in 59 different districts of Azerbaijan. For more than 20 years, IDP life has created serious socio-economic and moral problems for the community. Members of this community encounter a range of difficulties on a daily basis, including problems with housing and employment, access to education and healthcare, and psychological trauma as the result of deportation and two decades of life as an IDP. These difficulties have further united the community from within, and it has mobilized itself to resolve the problems encountered by its members. The community has been trying to address these problems with the help of the Azerbaijani state, and has never lost faith in peaceful conflict resolution and the right to return.

The community consists of ethnic Azerbaijanis who lived in the territories belonging to the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region of Azerbaijan, and were forcefully deported from their homes at the result of ethnic cleansing carried out by Armenia's army and separatist forces.

Community mobilization and main areas of activity

The recent establishment of an organizational structure has been one of the important events in the life of the Community. The ACNK was first established in line with the document signed at the first additional meeting of the CSCE (OSCE) Ministerial Council, held in Helsinki in March 1992. When the CSCE (OSCE) Minsk Group was established, Armenia and Azerbaijan were recognized as the two sides of the conflict and the Azerbaijani and Armenian communities of the region were accepted as the interested parties. According to this mandate, ACNK has participated in negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia for the resolution of the conflict on several occasions since 1992. In 2006, the ACNK was officially registered with the Ministry of Justice of Azerbaijan as a public union. Gaining formal status opened up new opportunities for the community's activity. The first congress in Baku on June 5, 2009 marked another key step towards improving the organization's structure.

As an organized union, the community tries to help to resolve the socio-economic problems of its members, to represent its members before the international community in order to raise awareness of rights violations experienced by the community, and to support the peaceful solution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

One of the major directions of the community's activity is to monitor and analyze the social and economic problems facing its members, and with the assistance of the state, help resolve these problems. At the same time, the community aims to promote international projects and programs on providing assistance to IDPs in Azerbaijan, cooperating with international and local NGOs in such projects and programs. Protecting the cultural heritage of the Azerbaijani population of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and realizing various projects in this direction; collecting data on the population, nature and the environmental situation, cultural heritage, and historical monuments in the occupied areas also features on the list of the ACNK's main activities.

The Community receives significant assistance from the Azerbaijani state for resolving social and economic problems and improving the living standards of its members within the framework of various projects. The ACNK also cooperates with various state agencies and international organizations regarding the fate of the prisoners of war and missing people from the Nagorno-Karabakh region, working to secure their return to Azerbaijan. It is also engaged in starting legal proceeding in international courts in relation to the rights violations caused by the occupation and ethnic cleansing, and reaching out to the international community.

The Community's view on the resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

The ACNK supports the peaceful resolution of the conflict in accordance with international legal norms, and has supported peace initiatives ever since it was established. In order to accelerate the peace process, the ACNK has offered to launch direct negotiations between the Azerbaijani and Armenian communities of the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan. The Community aims to establish relations with the Armenian population

of the region via public diplomacy and seeks opportunities for dialogue with them through international organizations. This kind of dialogue can facilitate the restoration of the good neighborly relations that were lost due to the 25 years of conflict, improve mutual understanding of the concerns of both communities, and create mutual trust. These can in turn play a crucial role in bringing sustainable peace to Nagorno-Karabakh, achieving peaceful co-existence and the re-integration of the Karabakh Armenians into Azerbaijani society.

The Community aims to establish relations with the Armenian population of the region via public diplomacy and seeks opportunities for dialogue with them through international organizations.

However, due to the resistance of Armenia's political authorities, it has not been possible to launch an inter-community dialogue between the Azerbaijanis and Armenians of the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Former Armenian President Robert Kocharian's statement about the existence of "ethnic incompatibility" between Azerbaijanis and Armenians can be seen as part of this policy. On January 16, 2003 Robert Kocharian said that Azerbaijanis and Armenians were "ethnically incompatible" and that it was impossible for the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh to live within an Azerbaijani state.[1] Speaking on January 30 2006 in Strasbourg, Council of Europe Secretary-General Walter Schwimmer said Kocharian's comment was tantamount to warmongering. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe President Peter Schieder said that he hoped Kocharian's remark had been incorrectly translated, adding that "since its creation, the Council of Europe has never heard the phrase "ethnic incompatibility"".[2] These words were not the only expression of anti-Azerbaijan racism by the high-ranking Armenian officials. In 2010, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan, in his meeting with Armenian diaspora journalists, talked about the superiority of Armenians over other nations, including the Azerbaijanis, who he described as a "Turkic Muslim nomadic tribe".[3] Such statements impede preparations for inter-community dialogue in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, the Azerbaijani community is resolute about its approach to the importance of the inter-com-

1 Radio Free Europe, Nagorno-Karabakh: Timeline Of The Long Road To Peace, Rferl.org, February 10, 2006, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1065626.html

2 Radio Free Europe, Newsline, Rferl.org, February 3, 2003, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1142847.html

3 APA, Permanent representative of Azerbaijan to UN addresses UN Secretary-General concerning Armenian president's remark, APA.az, November 01, 2010, http://en.apa.az/news/133297

munity dialogue and will continue to search for platforms for dialogue via various international organizations.

Armenia, citing the right to self-determination, seeks either full annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh or its recognition as an independent state, and denies the right of Azerbaijani refugees and IDPs to return their homes. However, it should be considered that Armenians used their right to self-determination in the beginning of the twentieth century, and established an independent state: the Republic of Armenia. The Armenian community of Nagorno-Karabakh also exercised its right to self-determination, and opted to stay within Azerbaijan as an autonomous region. Azerbaijan undertook to protect the rights of its Armenian citizens in Nagorno-Karabakh. During 70 years of peaceful coexistence from the beginning of 1920s to the end of 1980s, Karabakh Armenians never encountered ethnic, political or economic discrimination, and developed their ethnic identity, language and culture. The region was one of the most developed regions of the country, with living standards above the national average.

However, no support can fully heal the wounds inflicted by war, occupation, massacres and ethnic cleansing. The only way to truly heal these wounds is through the resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, with peace in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the community's return to their native lands and homes.

The Azerbaijani Community of Nagorno-Karabakh has always received support from the Azerbaijan state in addressing the community's social and economic problems. However, no support can fully heal the wounds inflicted by war, occupation, massacres and ethnic cleansing. The only way to truly heal these wounds is through the resolution of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, with peace in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the community's return to their native lands and homes. The community's violated rights should be restored, their 25-year displacement – the one of the biggest human rights violations of modern times – should be ended, and the international community should be immediately mobilized to resolve the conflict in order to end the suffering of the entire community. The ACNK backs the resolution of the conflict in accordance with the principles repeatedly stated by Azerbaijan: peaceful coexistence with the Armenian community of the Nagorno-Karabakh region with the highest possible autonomy within the borders of the Azerbaijani state.

Contemporary Refugee Issues in the EU and the Crises of Multiculturalism

Brendan Cole*

In reporting on the conflict in Syria, the media has concentrated on the refugee crisis as a key facet of the larger narrative. While the geopolitical ramifications of the conflict are pored over by political leaders, the more human consequences of this vast exodus of refugees have raised questions over the responsibility of the international community toward the millions who are fleeing. So far, it has fallen to Syria's immediate neighbors to bear the brunt of the exodus, with EU countries accepting relatively few. This has led to a discrepancy between a predominantly European call to help Syria's refugees - and how welcoming Europe is in practice. Added into the mix is the rise of anti-immigration sentiment in many European countries, where problems with the integration of immigrants is perhaps fuelling a reluctance to accept refugees. European governments are making public statements to their citizens about the rise of Islamism in Europe; the kind of anti-immigration protests seen in Germany over the last few months show how difficult it is for governments to square their humanitarian responsibilities with public doubts over the value of multiculturalism in their societies. This commentary enquires whether there is a degree of hypocrisy in the EU, given the gap between its professed concern for those fleeing violence and the help it actually offers, and asks whether this is likely to change.

* Brendan Cole is a London based broadcaster on Middle East

How should Europe respond to the refugee crisis?

A return home is at the forefront of the minds of London commuters as they scurry onto the Tube during rush hour. They may pay little notice to the advertisements plastered on underground tube stations, messages that pull no punches in portraying the plight of refugees escaping the conflict in Syria.

"She fled bombs in summer, but she can't escape winter" is the brazen message from the children's charity UNICEF; Save The Children's campaign informs us that since the start of the Syrian uprising children are becoming a "lost generation", the "forgotten victims" of the conflict who cannot be ignored.

Commuters in the British capital may have little in common with these war refugees, but as they return home from work each evening, they might do well to consider the plight of the people who may never see their homes again.

That is the thinking behind the call by charities for donations, money which can help the afflicted, the bereft and the bewildered, the number of whose victims may prove difficult for commuters in any European Union country to comprehend, such as the one million Syrian children now seeking refuge and trying to integrate into neighboring countries.

Just how wide that neighborhood spreads, and how neighborly it actually is, remains of key concern for governments and international bodies. The UNHCR says that more than 3 million have fled to Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, in addition to the 6.5 million who are internally displaced within Syria. Some 150,000 Syrians have sought asylum in the European Union, whose member states have pledged to resettle a further 33,000.[2] However, the European response is tiny in comparison with the 1.1 million that Lebanon, already bursting at the seams, has taken in.

This highlights a considerable discrepancy between a call to help refugees, with the European 'welcome' that charities believe is as cold as the winter now enveloping the region. In the last three days of November 2014, Turkey took in more Syrian refugees than Europe has in three years.

James Sadri, director of the Syria Campaign, says this is because politics is trumping humanity, and any sober analysis of the statistics shows they are at odds with Europe's heritage of accepting refugees fleeing violence. His campaign group emphasizes that Europe's refusal to accept refugees is 'a betrayal of our history', considering that the modern European continent was based on the principles of inclusion and justice, built from the ravages of two great wars.

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Refugee crisis at unprecedented levels

Not since the second of those great wars has there been such a dire refugee crisis. The flow of refugees is also fed by crises in Iraq, the consequences of the fall of Gaddafi in Libya, and the rise of Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL). The sheer numbers who put their fates in the hands of indifferent gangs ferrying them from North Africa in the hope of a better life on the other side of the Mediterranean are adding to the masses queuing at the gates of the European Union.

Their reception is a question of politics. That is because EU governments taking in refugees must seek approval from their electorates, and within those, attitudes are changing. The increasing popularity and views of right-leaning parties such as the United Kingdom Independence Party in Britain, the Front National in France, the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands and the Freedom party of Austria can make accepting migrants from war-torn countries tricky.

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At a UNHCR pledging conference for the resettlement of refugees in December, it was made clear that resettlement numbers are still limited, with most European countries offering places in the low hundreds, and many EU states not pledging any places at all.

The concern among policy makers is that people are often not told the truth about how migrants will integrate. Former European commissioner for home affairs, Cecilia Malmström, has said that negative attitudes toward migration in Europe are influencing political decisions. This stems from xenophobia; the difficulties that migrants face include integration and hostility from local populations.

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The Migration Policy Institute Europe has welcomed recent discussions on how to develop an EU-wide policy on resettlement, while the Austrian government put forward a paper entitled 'Saving Lives' in October.

The document outlines how any policy would need to incorporate some agreement from EU member states as to how to 'distribute' the resettled refugees through the European Union. A number of different models for redistribution, known as 'distribution keys', have been put forward. This conversation will continue throughout 2015, although it is unclear whether an EU-wide policy would generate significantly greater levels of resettlement.

Migration Policy Institute director Elizabeth Collett said: "One of the reasons that resettlement is often so low within the European Union is because it can be difficult and costly. There are still a number of European countries, primarily in Central Europe, that have little experience with asylum, or hosting refugees in general."

"Thus they have little existing experience or capacity to receive large numbers of refugees. In addition, some countries are experimenting with alternative means of offering asylum, from offering humanitarian visas, scholarship programs, through to allowing private sponsorship of resettlement for family members and others," she said.

Can the EU learn from the experiences of Lebanon and Egypt?

With so few refugees entering the EU, both from Syria and North Africa, it is difficult to speculate about the European integration of migrants. Given the experiences of Egypt and Lebanon, culturally closer to Syria than anywhere in Europe, the prospects for refugees in the EU so far do not look promising.

A report by the group Refugees International highlights the difficulties faced by Syrian refugees in Egypt. They were stigmatized in the media; there were attacks on Syrian children on their way to school; and the authorities impeded the work of organizations by failing to approve the registration of international NGOs intending to set up programs for Syrian refugees.

In Lebanon, they fared somewhat better, but only initially. With the country already crowded, Lebanese authorities are increasingly referring to refugees as economic migrants rather than refugees in need of protection. Government ministries are considering whether to define those coming from regions of conflict as refugees in need of protection, and whether to term those who come from more stable areas as economic migrants. This has not been translated into policy yet but demonstrates what kinds of discussions are taking place.

The Lebanese public is starting to blame Syrian refugees for the country's woes, including declining wages, rising rents and strains on the health and education systems. Over the last two and a half years, Refugees International has found that the problems that refugees are facing there are still the same. There are questions around what they do once their basic needs are met and what prospects they have in terms of becoming self-sufficient. This requires policies that would allow them to work, receive an education and contribute to society.

The experiences refugees face in Lebanon and Egypt may not be comparable to Europe. Following the downfall of Mohammed Morsi as president, the Egyptian government, saw Syrians as connected with a Muslim Brotherhood past from which Cairo wanted to distance itself. In Lebanon, residents of a small country may more quickly come to resent the added burdens placed on their public services by refugees. However there is growing concern that integrating refugees into Europe could be problematic for other reasons.

This is because European governments are scrambling to respond to an increasing number of Western-born, radicalized jihadis going to Syria to fight against Bashar al-Assad or taking up the fight on behalf of Islamic State in the Levant (ISIL). European governments are focused on eradicating the threat of both home-grown terrorism, or that of fighters going to the Middle East, as well as those who are returning. As far as a governmental message is concerned, it is difficult to claim that you have your borders under control and square this with accepting people, however needy, from a region that is essentially in collapse.

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These processes fuel anti-Islamic sentiment in EU countries whose governments are struggling to formulate a response, making the process of accepting and integrating refugees from the region even more difficult. The British public, for instance, has been told that it is on high alert for a possible terrorist attack, and the suspicion surrounding people fleeing from that part of the world is great.

In the past two years, Germany has pledged to admit 30,000 Syrians on humanitarian grounds, a number that is higher than the quotas of the rest of Europe, Australia and Canada combined. The UNHCR has described Germany's humanitarian admission program as generous, suggesting that such initiatives, in which legal pathways to Europe for refugees are created, could help address the rising death toll along the Mediterranean Sea's human trafficking routes.

But taking in so many people in such a short time creates a challenge for the local municipalities that host the refugees. Germany's Federal Office for Migration and Refugees says it has spent around 520 million Euros on humanitarian efforts connected to the Syrian crisis, including building reception centers for refugees across the country.

This largesse has come at another cost. Just before Christmas, more than 17,000 people marched on the German city of Dresden protesting the "Islamification of Europe" as a wave of xenophobia sweeps the country. Supporters of Pegida – a growing group calling itself the "Patriotic Europeans against the Islamification of the West" has held weekly rallies around Germany against perceived rising immigration and "extremism" that started in October.

Europe's challenge

Jasmin Fritzsche, the deputy director of the Swedish-based Centre for Refugee Solidarity, says it is within this difficult context that EU governments have to operate. While Germany has taken in more refugees than any other European country, it would take EU-wide political consensus to ensure the safe integration of refugees throughout the EU.

"This is always a problem when large numbers of immigrants come in, whether it be in Sweden, Germany, or France, there is

a huge problem of perception. The public don't differentiate between them and militants and fear is growing right now. They don't look at them as people in need, but as a possible threat. Lots of work has to be done to balance that perception that they pose a threat," she said.

Added into the mix is where exactly to place the refugees, she said. Often refugges are put in smaller towns in Europe, away from the big cities, in places where it is more difficult to live and in smaller communities which are less likely to give them a warm welcome. They often struggle to obtain social assistance.

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Other barriers to integration are considerable, particularly for those who may have experienced trauma or bereavement.

Elizabeth Collett from the Migration Policy Institute says that refugees from certain conflict regions may also have low levels of education or literacy that might make adaptation to the host language or labor market far harder.

"Whilst the decision to resettle is taken at national level, local authorities are responsible for finding housing, and supporting refugees beyond the first days of arrival. Ensuring that they have the capacity and resources to respond effectively is a critical challenge in many countries," Elizabeth Collett said.

So much for Germany, arguably the EU's most prosperous country. Bulgaria is the poorest of the EU's 28 member states, and it has struggled to cope with the arrival of nearly 11,000 people, most of them Syrian - even though they form only a tiny proportion of the 3 million Syrians who have fled the war since it began in 2011.

Boris Cheshirkov, spokesman for the Sofia office of the United Nations' refugee agency, UNHCR, told Deutsche Welle TV that within weeks, the situation became so dire that all the centers were overcrowded, people were sleeping up to 20 to a room, and that Bulgaria was completely unprepared to handle the influx.

EU countries such as these have until now been acting separately and there is not yet a collective EU-wide response to help refu-

gees integrate. This is because the EU has very limited ability to develop policies in the absence of strong commitment and willingness to engage on the part of national governments.

In October, the Justice and Home Affairs Council met, and EU member states agreed on a strategy for the management of migration, which lists a broad range of policy priorities, not all of which can feasibly be adopted simultaneously. There is a question about the effectiveness of a policy response by the EU and its Member States, even if substantial investments are made.

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Those advertisements on the London underground to help refugees do not yet include calling to open the UK's borders, and British sympathy may only extend as far as financial support. So far, the British government has only settled 90 refugees from the conflict, which Kate Allen of Amnesty International has described as "pitiful".

To this end, Amnesty, Save the Children in Europe, the Refugee Council and other leading charities have called on Prime Minister David Cameron to increase the number of Syrian refugees being settled in the UK. Their letter to the Independent newspaper applauded British aid to Syria but insisted that it was not enough, pointing out that historically, the UK has offered refuge to thousands at risk from war or oppression, reaching out to Vietnamese, Ugandan Asians and Kosovars.

However, 2015 is election year and Prime Minister David Cameron might see the need to delay any clear move to resettle refugees, wherever they are from, especially as the UK Independence Party (UKIP) is making inroads on Conservative Party support. This is because a key plank of UKIP's manifesto is opposition to immigration, in particular from Eastern Europe following the EU's expansion eastwards.

Although UKIP is focusing on immigration rather than refugees, the Tories will want to ensure that there is nothing that can add to UKIP's claim that Britain does not control its borders.

The narrative that Britain's public services are under strain from foreigners is one that will be played out in the run-up to the ballot in May, and it may not be politically expedient to offer any further

support, other than financial, to those fleeing conflict.

Political leaders in Britain and other parts of Europe will want to avoid a repeat of the protests that have beset Germany, and there may be reluctance and inertia within European capitals, at least in the short-term, to offer further resettlement opportunities. Ensuring the successful integration of those who have already arrived constitutes enough of a challenge.

The policies of European governments on immigration may be distinct from their policies on refugees, but amid heightened sensitivities over the challenges of multiculturalism and integration of foreigners in EU countries, they do risk becoming blurred in the eyes of some, making any future coordinated European response to refugees problematic.

COLLOQUY
Azerbaijani Refugees and IDPs: Twenty Five Years of Displacement

Chingiz Ganizade*

* Chingiz Ganizade is a chairman of the "Democracy and Human Rights Committee", and Member of Azerbaijani Parliment

The longest and bloodiest conflict in the post-Soviet space – the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – has remained unresolved for over 25 years. For Azerbaijan, the conflict has lead to numerous difficulties, and notably, the problem of refugees and IDPs. More than a million people, or roughly 13 per cent of the country's total population are forced to live as refugees or IDPs.

Caucasus International discussed this problem with Chingiz Ganizade, a leading expert in this field. Mr. Ganizade serves as a chairman of the "Democracy and Human Rights Committee" and is also a Member of the Milli Majlis (Azerbaijani Parliament). According to Chingiz Ganizade, the proportion of refugees and IDPs has over the past 25 years placed a significant economic burden on the Azerbaijani state, in addition to causing psychological trauma for refugees and IDPs. A new generation is growing up in camps and other refugees/IDP settlements. The double standards of international organizations towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict coupled with the ineffectiveness of the OSCE Minsk Group (tasked conflict resolution) have contributed to the continuation of one of the largest humanitarian crises in Europe – the refugee and IDP problem in Azerbaijan.

Historical background of the deportation of Azerbaijanis by Armenia

Touching upon the historical context of the problem, Mr. Ganizade noted that one of the most tragic pages of Azerbaijan's modern history is the forced mass displacement of a significant proportion of its population. The country's geostrategic location and its rich natural resources led to the deportation of parts of the Azerbaijani population from certain areas at the result of complex regional power dynamics. Azerbaijanis faced several phases of deportation from Armenia including in 1905, 1918-1920, 1948-1953 and 1988-1990.

The last phase of the mass deportation of Azerbaijanis began during the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In 1988-1990, Armenia perpetrated an ethnic cleansing policy targeting ethnic Azerbaijanis, causing around 250,000 people to flee their homes and seek refuge in Azerbaijan. During this period, about 50,000 Meskhetian Turks also took shelter in Azerbaijan, forced to leave

Uzbekistan as a result of turmoil and ethnic clashes.

Starting from 1998, Armenia and local Armenian separatists launched a process of ethnic cleansing in the territory of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (Region) of Azerbaijan. The cease-fire agreement reached in Bishkek in 1994 left roughly 20 percent of Azerbaijan's internationally recognized territories (including Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent districts) under Armenian occupation. Not a single Azerbaijani was left in the occupied areas, and another 700,000 Azerbaijanis became IDPs. They were dispersed across 62 different cities and districts across the country, and found shelter in makeshift camps, in schools, kindergartens and other public places as well as in unfinished buildings and other places unsuitable for habitation.

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During this period, on February 26 1992, Armenian troops committed one of the gravest military crimes of recent history – the Khojaly genocide. Together with 366th Motor Rifle Regiment of the Soviet Army, Armenian military forces invaded the Azerbaijani town, destroyed the city, and mercilessly massacred its population. There were 3,000 people in the town at the time of attack (approximately half the total population), as the remainder had been forced to leave town during the four-month blockade. In total, 613 people were killed, and 1000 civilians suffered life-limiting injuries. 106 women, 63 children, 70 old men were killed. 8 families were completely destroyed; 130 children lost one parent, and 25 lost both parents. Of the 1275 civilians taken hostage; the fate of 150 remains unknown.

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International response to Azerbaijan's refugee and IDP problem

An imporant focus of our discussion with Mr. Ganizade was the attitude of international organizations towards the refugee and IDP problem in Azerbaijan. He noted that continued diplomatic efforts by Azerbaijan have resulted in the adoption of resolutions confirming the right of Azerbaijani refugees and IDPs to return their homes by a number of major international organizations, including the General Assembly of the United Nations, United Nations Security Council, Parliamentary Assembly of the Coun-

cil of Europe, European Parliament, Organization for Islamic (OIC) Cooperation Council of Foreign Ministers, OIC Summits of Heads of States, as well as national governments. The UN Security Council adopted four resolutions (822, 853, 874, 884) demanding the unconditional withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan; these resolutions also called for the immediate return of Azerbaijani refugees and IDPs to the occupied areas.

The double standards of international organizations and major world powers and their failure to impose the terms of their own documents appears to be a factor in the ongoing, illegal occupation. When international organizations and their members are committed, resolutions are enforced within days and even hours.

Despite the resolutions, along with written and verbal calls by international organizations, Armenia continues to occupy 20 percent of the officially recognized territories of Azerbaijan, denying the right of Azerbaijani refugees and IDPs to return their homes. The double standards of international organizations and major world powers and their failure to impose the terms of their own documents appears to be a factor in the ongoing, illegal occupation. When international organizations and their members are committed, resolutions are enforced within days and even hours, such as the UN Security Council resolution against Iraq's occupation of Kuwait or against Gaddafi government in Libya. However current attitudes have given rise to a situation whereby four UN Security Council resolutions have remained unfulfilled. Moreover, the OSCE Minsk group, established in 1992 to lead negotiations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, has failed to make progress on conflict resolution. The ineffectiveness of the Minsk Group and the lack of political will on the part of the Group's co-chairs (the US, Russia and France) has encouraged Yerevan to continue its occupation and the killing of innocent people.

The refugee and IDP problem as a mass human rights violation

Considering Azerbaijan's refugee and IDP problem within the context of human rights protections, Mr. Ganizade said that many organizations and states who promote themselves as protectors of human rights and who readily react to other events in our region are choosing to ignore the violation of the rights of more than one million Azerbaijani citizens.

Mr. Ganizade further noted that, not only are rights of refugees and IDPs being violated, but the Armenian army also poses a

threat to Azerbaijani civilians who live close to the contact line. Due to the ethnic cleansing in occupied Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenian-controlled areas close to the contact line are literally population free. However, there are a significant number of Azerbaijani settlements located in the close proximity to the contact line behind Azerbaijani troops. Those settlements are frequently under fire by Armenian troops; this has resulted in many civilian injuries and fatalities. Farmers are not able to work in their fields, and people cannot hold funerals during the day because of the threat of Armenian snipers.

The policy of the Azerbaijani state towards refugees and IDPs

We also discussed state policy towards refugees and IDPs. Mr. Ganizade highlighted the fact that since the country regained independence, comprehensive legislation has been passed on the socio-economic problems of refugees, IDPs and asylum seekers. The president has signed 55 decrees and orders, and the Azerbaijani Parliament has adopted 23 laws in this field including the 'Law on the citizenship of the Republic of Azerbaijan' (1998) and the 'Law on status of refuges and IDPs' and 'Law on social protection of IDPs and other persons equal to them' (1999). Under the 'Law on the citizenship of the Republic of Azerbaijan', refugees who took shelter in Azerbaijan in 1988-1992, including 250,000 Azerbaijanis who fled Armenia as the result of ethnic cleansing, are accorded Azerbaijani citizenship. However they also retain their refugee status (including all entailed social benefits) and the right to returntheir homes. The state provides all the necessary assistance to improve living conditions of the refugee and IDP population of Azerbaijan, and they benefit from a wide array of benefits, including exemption from many taxes and payments including paying for public utilities, tuition fees and etc. People belonging to these categories also receive financial aid on a monthly basis.

The state has long been committed to the resolution of the socio-economic problems of refugees and IDPs. Because a significant proportion of IDPs used to live in makeshift camps, university dormitories, schools and kindergartens, and unfinished buildings unfit for habitation, the housing problem of IDPs has been a key priority within the state policy towards refugees and IDPs. With financing from the State Oil Fund, many new settlements

were built to resettle IDPs from tent camps. In 2007 the last – twelfth - tent camp was closed down, and its inhabitants moved into newly built houses. In addition, as the result of the state's efforts, the poverty rate among IDPs dropped from 74 percent to 18 percent, from the mid-1990s to mid-2000s. IDPs who worked in the public sector prior to deportation continue to receive their wages, and many refugees have found job placements through state assistance.

All these achievements have been no easy task for Azerbaijan, and the problems of refugees and IDPs are far from being resolved. Notably, 400,000 IDPs still live in old buildings that lack the basic necessities. In this respect, due to the magnitude of the problem, Azerbaijan still needs the support of international organizations and donors in order to better address the problems of refugees and IDPs. Azerbaijan has one of the world's highest per capita numbers of refugees and IDPs. Taking care of the needs of over one million refugees and IDPs for the past 25 years has imposed a significant burden on the state. There is only one way to reach a sustainable and comprehensive resolution of this problem: the liberation of the occupied territories and the return of the exiled populations to their homes.

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Mr. Ganizade also stated that Armenia's refusal to accept peaceful resolution based on mutual compromise should not be a pretext for 25 years of human rights violations, as experienced by Azerbaijani refugees and IDPs. All refugees and IDPs should be allowed to return to their homes as a matter of urgency. Azerbaijani IDPs should be allowed to return not only to the occupied districts adjacent to Nagorno-Karabakh, but also to Nagorno-Karabakh itself. The return of the Azerbaijani community to Nagorno-Karabakh and their peaceful coexistence with the region's Armenian community is an important guarantee of the successful resolution of the future status of the region. Otherwise, the current mono-ethnic situation in Nagorno-Karabakh will preclude a sustainable agreement on the status of the region.

JOURNALISTIC COVERS

Life in a Tent...
The Unending Plight of
Syrian Refugees in Lebanon

2014: The Year 10
Million Syrians Became an
Insignificant Statistic

Life in a Tent... The Unending Plight of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon

Samar el Kadi*

When Syrians fled their war-torn country for the relative safety of neighboring Lebanon, they little imagined that almost four years on, they would still be there. As the humanitarian assistance which they have been relying on runs out and the tolerance of their hosts wears thin, their living conditions have dramatically deteriorated. What is it like for the Syrian refugees who continue to spend years of their lives in poorly equipped tents in miserable conditions? Samar el Kadi reports from the Bekaa valley in eastern Lebanon.

* Samar el Kadi is a Red Cross Spokeswoman in Lebanon

They came in several batches, fleeing an unrelenting war that wrought death and destruction upon their homes. The Syrian conflict, now in its fourth year, forced many families to flee across the border to seek safety in neighboring countries, including Lebanon. The majority arrived during the first three years of the conflict, with meager savings, tired and hungry. They needed basic assistance including shelter, food and healthcare. Back in Syria, they had homes, relatives, friends and livelihoods. Now they have nothing.

Lebanon is overwhelmed by almost 1.2 million Syrian refugees, now equal to one-quarter of the country's population of 4.2 million.

Lebanon is overwhelmed by almost 1.2 million Syrian refugees, now equal to one-quarter of the country's population of 4.2 million. Their prolonged presence is placing clear strain on the small country's fragile economy and infrastructure, in addition to posing security threats, which have created growing resentment among the local population.

In the absence of official camps, the majority of the refugees have found shelter in random tent settlements across the country, and other makeshift locations such as basements, storefronts and buildings under construction. After more than three years of self-exile in Lebanon, their miserable conditions were not improving – and the future holds little hope.

Harsh living conditions

As dawn breaks over the Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon, Abu Hassan wakes up and steers out of his tent where his nine children and his wife are still sleeping on thin mattresses on a rug covering the bare ground. He first says his morning prayer, his body facing the Qibla, direction of the Moslem holy shrine of Mecca in Saudi Arabia, before starting another day in voluntary exile. The 44-year-old man is among more than 1.2 million Syrian refugees who have fled a terrible war in their home country, seeking refuge in Lebanon.

For almost two years, since he escaped from under the bombs in his hometown of Kuneitra in south Syria, Abu Hassan and his family have been sharing a 50-square-meter tent in the informal camp in the town of Taalbaya, which is also "home" for some 600 Syrian refugees. "First thing I would do in the morning, after the prayer, is wake two of my children who go to a camp

school where they learn the basic alphabets, merely how to read and write, just enough not to be completely illiterate," Abu Hassan said.

His other seven children do not go to school. They have been deprived of education for almost four years, since the outbreak of hostilities in Syria in March 2011. "We are not thinking about education for the children, as we struggle to secure our basic needs in order to survive and that is food and healthcare."

For almost two years, since he escaped from under the bombs in his hometown of Kuneitra in south Syria, Abu Hassan and his family have been sharing a 50-square-meter tent in the informal camp in the town of Taalbaya, which is also "home" for some 600 Syrian refugees.

The overwhelming majority of Syrian refugees in Lebanon rely almost entirely on food assistance provided by the World Food Program (WFP) through electronic food vouchers, also known as blue cards, which are topped up with a monthly amount of US $30 per family member, which the refugees can use to buy food from contracted local shops. In early December, WFP sounded the alarm over an urgent funding deficit. It suspended its food assistance briefly, reinstating it ten days later after it had succeeded in securing money from a global fundraising campaign and a public appeal, but only enough to meet the refugees' food needs for the month of December.

The overwhelming majority of Syrian refugees in Lebanon rely almost entirely on food assistance provided by the World Food Program (WFP) through electronic food vouchers, also known as blue cards, which are topped up with a monthly amount of US $30 per family member, which the refugees can use to buy food from contracted local shops.

After more than three and a half years of the protracted crisis, international donors appear to be showing signs of fatigue, triggering fears of a looming hunger crisis for hundreds of thousands of the most vulnerable refugees. "It was mass panic across the camp when we were told that food aid would be cut. And what a great relief when we knew that it was restored, otherwise we would have gone hungry," said Abu Hassan.

Unable to work, the Syrian refugee population in Lebanon, of which an estimated 50 percent are under 18, depend on assistance for food, education and healthcare. Like most of his countrymen, Abu Hassan has struggled to find occasional day jobs on construction sites, in agricultural fields or in factories, to secure some sort of income. "I have tried to work on more than one occasion, but each time it was harsh labor that was poorly paid. It is the same with all the Syrian refugees, we are simply abused and exploited as cheap labor," he said. Abu Hassan prefers, instead,

to sit all day in his tent, helping his wife to look after the children and listening to news from home. "We fled instant death at home. But we are experiencing slow death here… We are surviving day by day," he said.

Most refugees in Lebanon are concentrated in the Bekaa valley and in the northern part of the country, with the majority sheltering in tents, and wood or tin shacks in hundreds of informal settlements spread out in fields and outskirts of towns. Though Lebanon has maintained an open border policy and new refugees receive an initial aid package from local and international humanitarian organizations after registering with the UNHCR, many of the difficulties faced by refugee families stem from the Lebanese government's decision not to allow the construction of formal refugee camps.

Lebanon's experience with Palestinian refugee camps - which ended up becoming permanent settlements - raised fears that the same scenario would be repeated with the Syrians.

Lebanon's experience with Palestinian refugee camps - which ended up becoming permanent settlements - raised fears that the same scenario would be repeated with the Syrians. However, the lack of formal camps has made it extremely difficult for aid agencies to provide adequate assistance and services, such as education and health care. In addition, most refugees are paying rent for the land their tents are pitched on, and face eviction if they cannot pay.

However, Lebanon began imposing tight restrictions on the entry of Syrian refugees in early 2014, after the country had reached saturation level amid insufficient international support to cater for the refugee influx.

Bracing for another harsh winter

With winter settling in, strong winds and heavy rains have caused roofs to collapse, and partially flooded tents. Many refugees have dug trenches around the tents to deal with the rain. For some of them, this is their fourth winter in the unheated tents - which may provide some shelter from rain, but no protection from the sometimes sub-freezing temperatures.

Rows of shabby tents with plastic sheeting line up narrow and muddy dirt alleys in Qob Elias, one of the many makeshift Syrian refugee settlements dotted across the Bekaa countryside.

Barefoot children run around in the freezing puddles, wearing light clothes, inadequate for the winter cold.

"My daughter was born in this tent and died in it," recalled Mahmoud, who fled his hometown of Raqqa, in northeastern Syria, and settled in Qob Elias three years ago. His "beautiful baby Salma" was three-month-old when her frail body succumbed to the cold in her family's unheated tent in the midst of a snow storm that hit Lebanon last year. "My daughter came into this world and left it without having a single picture taken. The world does not know that she had existed. All of us, Syrians, have become mere numbers", Mahmoud said as he wiped out tears with the back of his hand.

"My daughter came into this world and left it without having a single picture taken. The world does not know that she had existed. All of us, Syrians, have become mere numbers"

The distressed father said he had begged for extra covers to prevent the cold from seeping into his daughter's small body, but his pleas fell into deaf ears. "On the third day of the storm, I rushed Salma to the nearest hospital, but the cold had seeped into her veins. After examining her, the doctor told me that she wasn't sick, but that her lungs had collapsed because of the cold. Half an hour later she was dead."

In an adjacent tent in the sprawling camp, thirty year-old Arwa, a widow from Aleppo, is struggling to protect her six children from the winter cold. She placed several mattresses on top of each other to avoid getting wet. She set fire to a pot full of timber outside until it turned into embers, which she later brought into the tent to warm it up. She repeats this several times throughout the day.

"It is freezing in winter, and suffocating in summer," she said of her tent, which is equivalent to a few wooden poles planted in the dirt, covered by a canvas on which the UNHCR logo is printed. In summer days, she said, it is not possible to sit inside the tent for more than five minutes. Heat trapped inside the nylon canvas raises the inner temperature to more than 35 degrees.

Arwa crosses a one-kilometer distance several times a day to fetch water for drinking and cooking. "It is either beans, or lentils or rice," she said mockingly of her family's almost daily diet for the past two years. "It is cheap and filling, but it would do better with some tomatoes or potatoes for a change."

Child labor

Under the tattered canvas of their tents, stories abound and tragedies surround refugees daily. As the months have passed, many have gotten used to living in tents. “Have you ever asked yourselves how refugees spend years of their life inside a tent,” demanded 65-year-old Umm Ahmad. “It simply becomes your home, because you have no other choice, nowhere else to go,” she answered.

“Every morning, as soon as I wake up, I pray for peace to be restored in Syria, I pray for my children who are still stuck there and live under the bombs without food, or water, or electricity or medical care,” she said, with tears rolling down her wrinkled cheeks.

Umm Ahmad, a widow, shares a small tent with four of her children, the youngest of 11 - the rest stayed back home in the besieged area of Ghouta Sharqiya, near Damascus. “Every morning, as soon as I wake up, I pray for peace to be restored in Syria, I pray for my children who are still stuck there and live under the bombs without food, or water, or electricity or medical care,” she said, with tears rolling down her wrinkled cheeks.

Her daily routine consists of collecting firewood from fields just outside the camp to make the bonfire she needs for cooking and heating her tent. None of her children goes to school. Her three daughters help in the cooking and cleaning, while her 12-year-old son, Dergham, works as a coffee boy in a company office.

“He goes out at seven in the morning, and does not come back before six. He works almost 12 hours a day for which he earns two thousand pounds (less than US $1.5) only, but it is better than nothing at all,” Umm Ahmad said.

She complained that the food assistance her family was getting is insufficient, and that they need every extra penny they can get. “This life is unbearable. But we can’t do anything about it. We have to survive, until we are able to go back home,” Umm Ahmad contended.

Although there are no official statistics, private estimates say more than 200,000 Syrian children aged on average between 10 and 14 live and work in the streets or are employed in agriculture and factories to help pay for food and shelter for their families.

Furthermore, formal schooling is neither affordable nor acces-

sible for the vast majority of Syrian children. Only one in five Syrian refugee children were believed to be enrolled in formal education programs in Lebanon in 2014.

Malnutrition

The humanitarian crisis resulting from the Syrian conflict is already the largest refugee crisis in a generation, and one of the largest since the Second World War, according to humanitarian organizations.

Syrians in Lebanon have fled from their home to seek safety, but are now increasingly vulnerable as basic assistance, including food, appears to be under serious threat. Food security concerns have been exacerbated following WFP's warnings that it will be unable to feed refugees in 2015 unless additional funds are secured.

According to humanitarian workers and nutrition experts, refugee children will bear the biggest toll of a shortage in aid. Stopping the food assistance would have a detrimental impact on refugee children's health and normal growth, especially among children under five, warned Dr. Zeroual Azzedine, chief nutritionist at UNICEF Lebanon.

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"For children in the first years of life, nutrition is a matter of survival for the body and mind. If they are not fed properly, their brain abilities are affected and this is an irreversible damage," Azzedine said, adding that in emergency or displacement situations food security is first priority.

"By giving them at least the stability of food on the table and keeping them healthy, you make sure they get a good start in life and a chance for a better future," commented UNICEF spokesman Salam Abdel Munem. "If they don't have the basics, then the push for a better start in life will go away and that's the real danger for many (refugee) children in Lebanon," Abdel Munem added.

With a predominantly youthful refugee population, the risk of malnutrition, juvenile crime, and drugs is real, and bound to get

worse if a food scarcity emerges. At least 900 cases of malnutrition have been detected among Syrian refugee children in 2014 in camps across the Bekaa, according to the International Orthodox Christian Charity (IOCC), which runs a program for screening and treating severely malnourished children under five.

"The figure is not high enough to call for a malnutrition emergency, but we should be ready for it, because we fear that conditions might get worse in case of food cuts or reduction for Syrian refugees," IOCC country representative Linda Berberi said. "Syrian refugee children under five are the most vulnerable and can be quickly affected by undernourishment and poor hygiene which can be detrimental for their lives if it is not handled rapidly and properly."

She explained that IOCC is currently engaged in capacity building of medical staff in clinics providing primary health care for refugees across Lebanon in order to enable them to screen, detect and treat acute cases of malnutrition. "We are also putting in place a surveillance system under which children under five would be closely monitored and followed up over a year, after their height and weight had been recorded," said Berberi.

Malnutrition is just one consequence of food cuts which would likely lead to an increase in child labor in addition to early marriages for girls. "There are hundreds of thousands of children doing physically hard jobs and very long hours, but without having proper food, their health risks increase tremendously," UNICEF's Azzaddine said.

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He noted that the trend of early marriages for girls was also on the rise among Syrian refugees in Lebanon, especially among families with big financial stress, who seek to shift the burden of feeding girls to other families.

"The bigger the stress of food security is, the more there is early marriages, and more children are pushed to drop out of school to seek work that often endanger their well-being and expose them to abuse and exploitation," said Azzadine.

Discrimination

In addition to food insecurity and inadequate living conditions, Syrian refugees in Lebanon are facing increasing violence from the local population. Simmering tensions caused by the long-term presence of a large number of refugees, competing for limited resources and straining an already fragile infrastructure, in a small country like Lebanon were inflamed after Syrian jihadi militants kidnapped and killed Lebanese security forces in border clashes in August last year.

A string of reprisal attacks targeting refugees in the past few months included torching their tents in northern and eastern Lebanon, and rounding up scores of them found lacking legal identification papers.

Human Rights Watch (HRW) said that resentment in Lebanon against Syrian refugees has grown amid accusations that militants were hiding among the displaced population. Refugees were stabbed, shot and beaten badly in many instances, in obvious reprisals to clashes between the Lebanese Army and Syrian militants in the border town of Arsal, on the eastern Lebanese-Syrian frontier, HRW said.

Some Lebanese also complain that refugees are taking jobs, driving down wages, overloading schools and hospitals, and placing massive strains on the infrastructure. Discrimination against them is discouraging many refugees from seeking work to make extra income. “They accuse us of depriving them of work opportunities, because the Syrian would accept to get paid half the amount of money that a Lebanese would get for doing the same work,” Abu Hassan complained.

To avoid mistreatment, Abu Hassan prefers to stay confined in his tent or roaming around the camp. “Why should I go out, there is no work to find anyway”, he said. “Even if I find something to do, it is mostly hard labor that is not remunerated. We are humiliated and treated badly. I prefer to die of hunger, rather than be humiliated.”

Back home, Abu Hassan, a contractor, owned property and lived a decent and respectable life, but he lost everything during the war. “I fled Syria to save my life and that of my family. The only

good thing here is that shells are not falling on our heads, otherwise, life is extremely bad here... It is not a life." "When war ends in Syria, I would return home immediately… Even if I have to go back on foot," he said.

Before the war in Syria, hundreds of thousands of low-cost Syrian labor were employed in Lebanon as unskilled workers, primarily doing hard physical jobs on construction sites, sending millions of dollars in remittances to their families back home. But with the big influx after the outbreak of hostilities, many Syrians started competing in other businesses, provoking tensions with the local population.

Looming Disaster

With no foreseeable solution to the raging conflict in Syria, the conditions of Syrian refugees in Lebanon are bound to become even more precarious in the near future if the international community fails to provide more support.

With no foreseeable solution to the raging conflict in Syria, the conditions of Syrian refugees in Lebanon are bound to become even more precarious in the near future if the international community fails to provide more support. WFP spokeswoman in Lebanon Sandy Maroun underlined that "the only consistent assistance the refugees were getting is that of WFP, and they might be losing it."

Lebanon and the United Nations asked the international community for a record $2.14 billion in funds to finance refugee response plans in 2015. In a recent appeal, WFP urged international donors to ensure the funds necessary to avert a looming disaster for Syrian refugees.

"Lack of access to even basic livelihood opportunities and diminished access to food and other assistance will make these families even more vulnerable and destitute and children will certainly become even more at risk," WFP said. "We shouldn't leave millions of refugees not only without hope, but without basic means to survive," she added.

The specter of a hunger crisis is exacerbating fears among many refugees who say they would prefer to go home and die in the war than starve from hunger. "At least there, they call us martyrs when we die. They won't say we died from hunger," said Ahmad Shaaban, another refugee in Qob Elias camp.

As the sun sets in the Bekaa, Arwa settles in her tent, exhausted at the end of yet another day in exile. It is not the baby crying with colic in the adjacent tent that keeps her awake, but worry about feeding her family the next day. They have been refugees in Lebanon for three years now. “Life in Lebanon cannot get worse,” she said. “It doesn’t get better either… We just want to go home.”

2014: The Year 10 Million Syrians Became an Insignificant Statistic

Salwa Amor*

In mid-2014, the UN declared that the influx of Syrian refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs), and the ensuing human trafficking catastrophe, had led to the worst humanitarian refugee crisis since WWII. How does the current Syrian refugee crisis fit into the historical context of this previous tragedy, and has the international community and the world at large really learnt anything from past experience? This is the question we pose, and this is the answer we give: a comparison between Europe's response to the post-WWII refugee crisis and the current, second worst crisis of its kind, reveals that Europe has advanced in many ways. However, for victims of displacement around the world, Europe has yet to move on from the WWII mentality, which was characterized by indifference.

* Salwa Amor is a British-Syrian journalist and documentary filmmaker residing in London.

The historical context of refugee tragedies

WWII resulted in millions of people from Poland to Germany becoming displaced or taking refuge in neighboring countries.

It was the magnitude of this crisis that gave birth to the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. At the time it was nothing more than a little known organization whose name was only ever mentioned amongst the refugees it was trying to aid. Today, it has a presence in every corner of the world, from Sudan to Haiti, with high profile patrons such as Angelina Jolie.

If we had a time machine, we could transport ourselves eighty years into a future where a journalist sits on his or her desk, typing about the moment that changed the scope and plight of refugees for years to come. This is now.

If we had a time machine, we could transport ourselves eighty years into a future where a journalist sits on his or her desk, typing about the moment that changed the scope and plight of refugees for years to come. This is now. Our understanding of the refugee experience is at its second most significant moment in modern history, and current momentum can direct us either towards a more humane solution, or back into pre-WWII chaos and nationalist, far right attitudes.

In 1943 Relief and Rehabilitation Administration was set up (became part of the UN in 1945) to help refugees in areas experiencing Allied liberation. UNRRA went on to help almost eight million refugees in four years, until it ceased its work in Europe in 1947, and in Asia in 1949. In 1947 it was replaced by the International Refugee Organization (IRO), which in 1950 evolved into the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

At the end of World War II, Western Europe held more than five million refugee population, while an estimated ten to fifteen million prisoners of war, slave laborers and concentration camp survivors were left displaced.

Historian Ben Shephard looks at UNRRA's work with refugees in his book "The Long Road Home". Shephard observes that at the outset, UNRRA suffered from excessive bureaucracy, corruption and poor management, yet it still bore hope for millions.

The 10 million statistics that changed everything and nothing

In late 2014, the head of UNHCR, Antonio Guterres, told the BBC that they faced a "dramatic challenge" as the number of refugees in the world exceeded 50 million, the worst since WWII.

"Conflicts," said Guterres, "are multiplying…and at the same time old conflicts seem never to die." This leaves the UNHCR with its greatest challenge to date.

The conflict in Syria is undoubtedly the main culprit for the rise in refugees, while central Africa and South Sudan are largely responsible for the remaining increase.

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According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), a shocking ten million or more Syrians have been forced to leave their homes, with almost seven million internally displaced within Syria. Over three million have abandoned hope in their war torn country, choosing to seek refuge in neighboring countries. Turkey was the first country to host Syrian refugees back in 2011, mere months after the revolt turned deadly. Today, four years on, and the majority of refugees are in Turkey, with nearby Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq also providing shelter to countless families.

While issues have arisen in all host countries, it has been the European Union countries that have raised the loudest objections to housing Syrians. The EU has taken in a mere 150,000 Syrian asylum seekers with perhaps as many news headlines pointing out the weaknesses of the EU economy and its inability to host anyone other than their own citizens.

Europe looks the other way

The responses of European states have varied widely. The Scandinavian countries have become known amongst Syrians as the most compassionate, providing asylum for over 30,000 Syrians and counting, whilst the UK stands in stark contrast, having resettled a mere 24 Syrian refugees.

UNHCR has repeatedly called on the EU to provide 130,000 resettlement spots for Syrian refugees between 2013-2016, but it has received a slow and unenthusiastic response from all ex-

cept Sweden, which has provided asylum to all Syrian applicants since the beginning of the conflict.

The tepid response to the refugee catastrophe by the EU and the rest of the world has been a source of pain and bitterness for Syrians, facing the world`s apparent indifference to their plight.

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In late 2013, along the Lebanese-Syrian border, Syrian families lined up to try to enter Lebanon, trying to escape the ongoing bombardment of their neighborhood by government forces.

A United Nations Relief and Works Agency worker, Siham El Najmi waited to greet those who had fled Syria and had reached Lebanon, where she along with other UNRWA workers were ready to register the people fleeing as new refugees.

Siham recalls, "A mother was holding her two children`s hands and when she reached the end of the Que. and it was her turn to be registered, she grabbed me and put each child`s hand in one of my hands and when she made sure that I had a good grip on both her children, she collapsed."

This is not a rare phenomena, it happens often too many mothers fleeing war; it is a case of what psychologists refer to as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, which affects those who have witnessed or experience trauma, not during the incident but after it is long over. In the case of mothers in Syria, they cannot afford themselves the luxury of feeling the trauma as it happens - they must first get their children to safety before they can emotionally and in some cases literally collapse.

But what happens when almost four million children and their mothers and fathers are waiting to flee from war, seeking only a place of safety for their children - and find the borders of the world closed?

A sea of desperation

At the beginning of the crisis, Syrians looked to European countries not only as a home for refugees but also for humanitarian aid. When four years had gone by and those hopes were long

dashed, Syrians took matters into their own hands and began the long and dangerous journey across the seas.

Syrian human rights groups estimate that a record number of 3000 Syrians fleeing war have drowned on European shores.

The smuggling gangs have little concern for the lives of their clients; they often provide old and unsubstantial boats that will most likely sink or capsize at the slightest sign of turbulence. Yet thousands of Syrians and their children board the boats on a weekly basis out of sheer desperation.

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37-year old Palestinian Syrian refugee Salah boarded a fragile looking boat, saying, “I know the risk, but the world has turned its back on us - I don`t have any choice left but to try, for the sake of my family”. Risking death in order to find life seems to be the invisible message carried by each boat.

In the aftermath of WWII, those displaced by the war included millions of Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles, Ukrainians, Russian and Polish POWs who had been enslaved and made to fight for Germany. They were left destitute and unable to return home, as they were seen as traitors by their respective countries. Russia closed the door on its POWs, with Stalin declaring, “We have no prisoners, only traitors”.

This left UNRAA with the overwhelming task of finding new resettlement plans in the form of host countries that would take the majority of refugees.

Western European countries were far from open to the idea of rehousing those left behind by the war, in fact, a look back at the media headlines of the time reveals a perception of refugees not too unlike today`s. One headline in The Daily Mirror screamed “Let them be Displaced!” – and indeed, displaced they were for many years to come.

What the post-WWII response tells us about the current crisis is that while Europe has advanced in many ways,

What the post-WWII response tells us about the current crisis is that while Europe has advanced in many ways, for those around the world who are displaced and destitute, it has yet to move on from the WWII attitude of indifference.

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Just as the bleak, hungry, tired and destitute faces of Eastern Europeans staring beyond the black and white pictures taken of them while they lined up to be resettled after the Second World War provides us today with a glimpse of what life for displaced refugees looks like, so too the boats carrying hundreds of desperate families desperately trying to reach the shores of Europe will provide a snapshot of the repercussions of this refugee crisis in years to come.

The worst humanitarian crisis of our time

The Syrian revolution four years ago devolved into an armed conflict within the first year, after protestors were unable to maintain a peaceful stance against the government's brutal military crackdown. Few could have anticipated the events that followed. Ongoing air strikes have devastated much of Syria`s infrastructure and caused the death of over 200,000 people, the disappearance of over 20,000 and the displacement of almost half of the country`s population. Assad is neither willing nor required to end the humanitarian suffering that he has inflicted on his own people.

Assad`s legacy is the second biggest humanitarian catastrophe since WWII, a tragedy to which he appears indifferent, along with his counterpart in Russia. Needless to say, with its military support and war vessels at Assad`s beck and call, Russia has not offered refuge or humanitarian support to the millions of refugees fleeing the wrath of its war planes.

The issue of Syria and its ongoing war has serious implications for the stability of the entire region, from Iraq to Turkey; few neighboring countries have not been affected by the current crisis, directly or indirectly.

The magnitude of the suffering endured by the Syrian people has too often been overshadowed by the complexities of the Syrian political entanglement.

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The conflict showed few signs of finding resolution in

2014, and 2015 looks likely to see an even greater outpouring of Syrian refugees, desperate to escape the stagnating economy and find some sort of hope that their children have for any type of future.

The final months of 2014 saw hundreds of thousands of Syrian Kurds flee from the impeding attack from the ever growing and seemingly unstoppable terrorist group ISIS.

Not even airstrikes have been able to halt ISIS, and the savagery of their acts of terror have led many analysts to predict that even greater numbers of Syrians will become displaced and seek refuge outside ISIS-controlled areas.

Turkey: a haven for over a million Syrians

Turkey has become the most popular place of refuge for Syrians. The official number of registered refugees in Turkey has reached a record one million, and it is clear from a glimpse at the hundreds of thousands of Syrians living outside of camps along the Syrian/Turkish border that Turkey is hosting a greater number of refugees than it can shoulder.

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Since the start of the conflict in 2011, thousands of Syrians have crossed back and forth over the Turkish border illegally, either to try to build a new life or simply to seek a short period of respite from the war before returning to Syria.

The 22 main government-run camps in Turkey are home to over 30 percent of the one million refugees. The remaining refugees are forced to live on handouts, and are often unable to make ends meet, leaving families destitute, sleeping in parks across Turkey and begging for baby milk, diapers, and food.

The Turkish government has yet to close its borders to the influx of Syrians, even though other neighboring countries such as Lebanon have done just that.

Turkey`s generous accommodation of Syrian refugees has cost the government over 1.5 billion dollars, forcing Erdoğan to seek international support from UNHCR and other organizations. The

European University Institute and Migration Centre have carried out the largest research project on Syrian refugees to date, and emphasize the little reported fact that Syrians in Turkey are not legally refugees but `guests`, which means that they "do not have access to all the legal safeguards accorded to refugees elsewhere and those seeking permanent resettlement must look to a third nation".

Although it is a signatory to the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, Turkey is not actually obliged to take any refugees who are not from the EU, making its response to the Syrian refugee crisis especially notable.

The Arab Gulf states: Six closed borders

Turkey stands in stark contrast to its neighboring Arab countries, especially in the Gulf region, many of whom have not offered any form of refuge to Syrians in the past four years.

Turkey stands in stark contrast to its neighboring Arab countries, especially in the Gulf region, many of whom have not offered any form of refuge to Syrians in the past four years. Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar have closed their borders to Syrian refugees. However, most Gulf countries have donated or set up refugee camps in other countries; for instance, UAE has built an entire camp for thousands of Syrians in Jordan. Qatar and Saudi Arabia have been generous with their donations to many Syrian causes, and Kuwait became the leading financial backer in rallying international financial support for Syrians, hosting the second pledging conference in January 2013, which raised a record 1.5 billion USD.

Syrian refugees no longer seek refuge in any of the six Gulf countries. Granted, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have been two of the most outspoken Arab states against the brutality of the Assad regime, whether it is via government condemnations or by broadcasting news of Assad`s crimes through state media outlets such as Qatar`s Al Jazeera or Saudi Arabia`s Al Arabiya news channels. But other than unsuccessful attempts to arm and/or finance the rebels, such sound bites have become the only measure of support that Syrian refugees have come to expect from the Arab Gulf nations.

The future

Historians work with the benefit of hindsight, and history is often unforgiving to those who had the power and ability to transform millions of lives but, for political, economic or other interests unknown, did not.

In retrospect, in the post-WWII era, the international community had little capacity or experience when it came to dealing with the influx of displaced persons and refugees on its doorstep. Nonetheless, history books have been less than forgiving at the inaction of the former great powers.

While Turkey and Jordan have provided homes for Syrians, other countries have yet to open their borders – perhaps failing to anticipate how the future will judge this humanitarian blind spot.

Book Review*
World Order

Henry Kissinger

* The Book Review was prepared by Dr. Özgür Tüfekçi, Senior Editor of Caucasus International

Henry Kissinger

World Order

Penguin Press: New York, 2014, 432 pp.

Unlike the books, *The End of History and the Last Man*, *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of the World Order*, Kissinger's latest book *World Order* deals with the balance of power. In his own words, he analyses "how to build a shared international order in a world of divergent historical perspectives, violent conflict, proliferating technology, and ideological extremism".

Francis Fukuyama, in his 1992 book (*The End of History and the Last Man*) argues that we are witnessing not just the end of the Cold War but the end of history which is the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.[1] Conversely, Samuel Huntington along with his the clash of civilizations thesis argues that the great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural and the principal conflicts will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations.[2]

In this sense, Henry Kissinger's book diverges from the aforementioned books. Kissinger alleges that there has never been a true "world order". According to him, for most of the human history, civilizations defined their own concepts of order and each considered itself the center of the world. However, he claims that the true "world order" requires civilizations to engage each other. From his perspective, they are not destined to clash. On the other hand, as a respond to Fukuyama's final form of human government thesis, Kissinger puts forward that "every region participates in questions of high policy in every other, often instantaneously. Yet, there is no consensus among the major actors about the rules and limits guiding this process, or its ultimate destination. The result is mounting tension".

1 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?", *The National Interest*, Summer 1989, [Accessed on 08.02.2015], <https://ps321.community.uaf.edu/files/2012/10/Fukuyama-End-of-history-article.pdf>

2 Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*. February 2015, [Accessed on 08.02.2015] <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/48950/samuel-p-huntington/the-clash-of-civilizations>.

The book covers almost every corner of the world except Latin America. Specifically, it focuses on four different concepts of "world order". The first one is the European Balance-of-Power system. In this concept, Kissinger makes attribution to the Peace of Westphalia. According to him, "*today* the *Westphalian concepts are often maligned as a system of cynical power manipulation, indifferent to moral claims. Yet the structure established in the Peace of Westphalia represented the first attempt to institutionalize an international order on the basis of agreed rules and limits and to base it on a multiplicity of powers rather than the dominance of a single country"* (p. 30).

The second concept is Islamic system. The book deals with the Islamic world order from the Prophet Muhammad era to the present time from the perspective of Islam's mission. Kissinger argues that the Islamic world order was based on the mission to incorporate *dar al-harb* (lands beyond the conquered regions) into its own world order and thereby to bring universal peace.

The third concept is Asian balance of power understanding which is examined from the three different perspectives (Japan, India, and China). While Kissinger acknowledges that until the arrival of the modern Western powers, no Asian language had a word for "Asia", he also points out that the term "Asia" ascribes a deceptive coherence to a disparate region. In this regard, he emphasizes that the historical European order had been self-contained although the contemporary Asian order includes outside powers as an integral feature.

Kissinger's last world order concept is the American order. In terms of this concept, he shares similar thoughts with Hillary Clinton on the contemporary world order. While Clinton expresses that the liberal international order that the United States has worked for generations to build and defend seems to be under pressure from every quarter[3], Kissinger puts forward that *no country has played such a decisive role in shaping contemporary world order as the United States, nor professed such ambivalence about participation in it* (p. 234).

All in all, expecting an impartial work from the 56th Secretary of

3 [Accessed on 08.02.2015], <http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/hillary-clinton-reviews-henry-kissingers-world-order/2014/09/04/b280c654-31ea-11e4-8f02-03c644b2d7d0_story.html>

State would be naivety. If you do so, you would be awakened by the first paragraph of the book. The following paragraph leads the reader to understand what this 432 pages book is about:

In 1961, as a young academic, I called on President Harry S. Truman when I found myself in Kansas City delivering a speech. To the question of what in his presidency had made him most proud, Truman replied, "That we totally defeated our enemies and then brought them back to the community of nations. I would like to think that only America would have done this. (p. 1)*"*

In a nutshell, Kissinger guides readers through crucial episodes of recent world history and analyses the different world order concepts. However, the bottom line is that according to him, *"In China and Islam, political contests were fought for control of an established framework of order. Dynasties changed, but each new ruling group portrayed itself as restoring a legitimate system that had fallen into disrepair. In Europe, no such evolution took hold. With the end of Roman rule, pluralism became the defining characteristic of the European order* (p.11) … *America has, over its history, played a paradoxical role in world order: it expanded across a continent in the name of Manifest Destiny while abjuring any imperial designs; exerted a decisive influence on momentous events while disclaiming any motivation of national interest; and became a superpower while disavowing any intention to conduct power politics* (p.234)".

The previous paragraph would be count as the summation of Kissinger's thinking. Apart from that, the book deals with the existing problems instead of proposing solutions. In this sense, it would be logical to claim that Kissinger, with his book, suggests that the US should lead the "world order" by assuming hegemony as it is the only country which could perform this *duty*. From this perspective, some would find this book brilliant. Yet, it should not be forgotten that it has been written by a National Security Advisor and Secretary of State under Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford and embrace a specific way of understanding and thinking.

Overall, the book is lucid and attractive. It has a great deal to recommend it but should be read with eyes wide open.

CAUCASUS UNDER REVIEW* - RECENTLY PUBLISHED BOOKS

While the Caucasus is a region of enormous diversity and potential, it is also a region about which relatively little is known. However, during the last decade, a numerous publications on the region have expanded both regional and international understanding of this diversity and potential. This overview of recent publications provides an up-to-date reading list for anyone interested in the region.

* Report prepared by Dr. Özgür Tüfekçi, Senior Editor of Caucasus International

In this issue, we feature five books, each with a different focus, from geopolitics to conflict resolution. The first book, *The Caspian Chessboard: Geopolitical, Geostrategic and Geoeconomic Analysis,* addresses geopolitical and geo-economic processes in the Caspian region, including the policies pursued by the littoral states together with the strategies of external actors towards the region. This publication is a joint project initiative of the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of Azerbaijan (SAM) and the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI). The book is published by Egea publishing house in Milan, Italy.

The second book, *Georgia: A Political History since Independence* covers Georgia's political history from the late 1980s to the present day. Professor Stephen F. Jones of Mount Holyoke College investigates the dramatic changes the country has undergone through since the end of Soviet rule. The author's rigorous analysis of political and societal issues reveals the key changes experienced within the frames of state and society in Georgia. This book provides essential insights into contemporary Georgia. It is not only well-written but also is a meaningful contribution to the existing body of literature.

The next book in our list is *Conflict Resolution in South Caucasus: Challenges to International Efforts*, by Esmira Jafarova. As the author is both from the region as well as a visiting scholar at Columbia University's Harriman Institute, she has a deep understanding of how the complex local dynamics interact with shifting international political agendas. She skillfully analyzes the benefits and limitations of international resolution mechanisms, examining how external powers have engaged with the conflicts of the South Caucasus. This book provides helpful guidance for both scholars and policymakers, exposing the flawed assumptions that often underpin the international community's engagement with the region.

The fourth book is *Legal aspects of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Hukuki Yönleriyle Dağlık Karabağ Sorunu* in its original Turkish). The author, Associate Professor Javid Abdullazada of Ankara University, illuminates aspects of this frozen conflict from the perspective of international law, focusing on the importance of international legal principles in connection with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The book concentrates on four

aspects of the conflict, starting with the historical background of the war. The second section deals with relevant national law, while the third section focuses on the bearing of international law. The final section analyses the legal aspect of Armenia's role in the conflict.

The last book is *US Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Politics, Energy and Security,* by Professor Christoph Bluth of the University of Bradford. The author examines the U.S. policy from Clinton to Obama, drawing on interviews with leading figures in the U.S. administration. This study not only presents the first systematic analysis of the US policy towards the Caspian states, but also embraces a holistic theoretical approach of the U.S. national and international security understanding.

The Caspian Chessboard: Geopolitical, Geostrategic and Geoeconomic Analysis

Edited by Carlo Frappi and Azad Garibov
Egea, 2014, 244 pp.

The book was co-edited and co-authored by Azad Garibov, a Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy department of SAM and Carlo Frappi, an Associate Fellow at the Caucasus and Central Asia Programme of the Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI). Several well-known experts from the Caspian littoral countries also contributed to the volume. The foreword to the book was co-written by SAM Director Farhad Mammadov and ISPI Director and Executive Vice-President Paolo Magri. "*The Caspian Sea Chessboard*" is one of the most comprehensive pieces of research on the Caspian basin to date. It examines the relevance of the region within the modern system of international relations, as well as describing how the region functions as an autonomous sub-system, and how its complex realities connect with the outside world. The first part of the volume examines the transnational issues that shape the littoral states' regional policies, which demand cooperation among all the riparian countries. The book addresses the legal status of the Caspian Sea, the regional arms race and the militarization of the sea, energy infrastructure security, international cooperation in the maritime environment, and so on. The second chapter covers the regional policies of the Caspian littoral states, exploring the interests and strategies of Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Iran in the Caspian Sea in connection with their economic and political strategies in the region. Finally, the last chapter provides an overview of the policies of the great powers in the Caspian region. Here, the authors examine the relations between the five littoral states and the United States, European Union, Turkey and China.

Georgia: A Political History since Independence

By Stephen Jones
I.B. Tauris, 2014, 400 pp.

Georgia emerged from the fall of the Soviet empire in 1991 with the promise of swift economic and democratic reform. But that promise remains unfulfilled. Economic collapse, secessionist challenges, civil war and the failure to escape the legacy of Soviet rule - culminating in the 2008 war with Russia - characterize a two-decade struggle to establish democratic institutions and consolidate statehood. Here, Stephen Jones critically analyses Georgia's recent political and economic development, illustrating what its 'transition' has meant, not just for the state, but for its citizens as well. An authoritative and commanding exploration of Georgia since independence, this is essential for those interested in the post-Soviet world.

Conflict Resolution in South Caucasus: Challenges to International Efforts

By Esmira Jafarova
Lexington Books, 2014, 186 pp.

This book explores the efforts by the international community to facilitate solutions to the conflicts in the South Caucasus, focusing in particular on the existing challenges to these efforts. The South Caucasus region has long been riven by lingering ethno-national conflicts—the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts within Georgia—which continue to disrupt security and stability in the entire region. Throughout different phases of the conflicts the international community has shown varying degrees of involvement in conflict resolution. For the purpose of clarity, it should be emphasized that references to the "international community" will be confined to the organizations that have an active role in the process (the UN, the OSCE, and the EU), and the states with the biggest impact on the conflict resolution processes and leverage in relation to the conflict parties—Russia, Turkey, and the United States.

Legal aspects of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict

By Javid Abdullazada
Adalet Yayınevi, 2013, 365 pp.

Prior to the collapse of the USSR, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue had come under the aegis of the Soviets. However, following independence, it became one of Azerbaijan's internal issues, and fairly quickly evolved into a war between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Such a complicated issue requires an in-depth analysis from the perspective of international law. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has claimed thousands of lives. More than one million Azerbaijanis are refugees as a result of the conflict. Although the parties reached a cease-fire agreement in 1994, the issue remains unresolved. A detailed analysis of the complicated judicial issues related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is both necessary and important.

US Foreign Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Politics, Energy and Security

By Christoph Bluth
I.B. Tauris, 2014, 288 pp.

Central Asia and the Caucasus are of immense geopolitical importance for the US and Russia, but neither power has successfully established regional domination. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the states of the Caspian region began to develop their oil and gas reserves, and as a result, their importance on the international stage has increased rapidly. Considering the impact of events such as the 9/11 terror attacks and the wars in Afghanistan and Iran, alongside issues including national security, energy policies and American ambitions to limit Russian influence, Christopher Bluth explains why the US has failed to establish authority in this globally significant region. Examining US policy from Clinton to Obama and drawing on interviews with leading figures in the US administration, this study presents the first systematic analysis of US policy towards the Caspian states.

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