

**Crises of International Law  
and Governance:  
Causes and Consequences**  
Colloquy with Novruz Mammadov

**Superpowers and  
International Governance:  
A 'Might Is Right' Story?**  
Klaus Larres

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# **CAUCASUS** **International**

*Challenging conventional thinking in the Caucasus*

Vol. 5 • No: 2 • Summer 2015

## **Failure of International Governance and Global Governmentality**

**Governing the Global Commons:  
Geostrategic and Goeconomic Sources  
of Discord in the International System**

James Sperling

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DoS Documents Suggest?**

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NATO's Nuclear Posture**

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as Global Governmentality**

Scott Hamilton

**Security Challenges for Afghanistan:  
Is the International Security Governance  
Failing or Succeeding in Afghanistan?**

Salih Doğan

**In the Absence of Effective Global  
Governance, Security Policy Based  
on Political Realism Makes Sense**

Simon Anglim

**Book Review**

Is the American Century Over?

**Caucasus Under Review:**

Recently Published Books





**Vol. 5 • No: 2 • Summer 2015**

Failure of International Governance  
and Global Governmentality



# CAUCASUS INTERNATIONAL

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## Failure of International Governance and Global Governmentality



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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

---

Vol. 5 • No: 2 • Summer 2015

## **EDITORS' NOTE**

---

8

## **COLLOQUY WITH NOVRUZ MAMMADOV**

Crises of International Law and Governance:  
Causes and Consequences

---

11

## **KLAUS LARRES**

Superpowers and International Governance:  
A 'Might Is Right' Story?

---

19

## **OLEG KUZNETSOV**

Armenia, Transnational Terrorism and Global Interests:  
What Do CIA and DoS Documents Suggest?

---

35

## **JAMES SPERLING**

Governing the Global Commons: Geostrategic and  
Geoeconomic Sources of Discord in the International System

---

53

## **AZAD GARIBOV**

OSCE and Conflict Resolution in the Post-Soviet Area:  
The Case of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

---

75

## **ROBERT M. CUTLER**

Global Energy Governance Needs to be  
Multi-level and Regionalized

---

91

## **KEITH BOYFIELD**

International Cooperation Following the Economic Crisis:  
Where Next?

---

107

<b>KAMAL MAKILI-ALIYEV</b> The Evolution and Failure of NATO's Nuclear Posture	127
<b>SCOTT HAMILTON</b> The Global Climate Has Always Been Broken: Failures of Climate Governance as Global Governmentality	141
<b>SALIH DOĞAN</b> Security Challenges for Afghanistan: Is the International Security Governance Failing or Succeeding in Afghanistan?	163
<b>COMMENTARY BY SIMON ANGLIM</b> In the Absence of Effective Global Governance, Security Policy Based on Political Realism Makes Sense	177
<b>BOOK REVIEW</b> Joseph S. Nye, Jr Is the American Century Over?	187
<b>CAUCASUS UNDER REVIEW: RECENTLY PUBLISHED BOOKS</b>	191
<b>NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS</b>	200
<b>CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS</b>	201

# Editors' Note

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“The growing disconnect between the problems that bind us and the countries that divide is the greatest threat to humanity”, writes Ian Golden of Oxford University, underlining that, “each day we are confronted by mounting evidence of the yawning governance gap”.<sup>1</sup> The current crises of international governance and international law are the most significant crises of their kind since World War II. As a consequence, we are seeing a lack of cooperation to tackle global problems such as global warming and environmental degradation, a visible rise of inter-state and civil wars across the world, a surge in the number of refugees, and the rise of transboundary criminal activity.

Accordingly, the current issue of *Caucasus International* is devoted to the failure of international governance and global governmentality. It includes a colloquy, nine articles and a commentary addressing the key aspects of this important topic. As usual, the issue also includes the *Book review* and *Caucasus Under Review* sections, providing an overview of recently published books on international politics, as well as on the South Caucasus region specifically.

The issue opens with a colloquy with Dr. Novruz Mammadov, Deputy Head of the Azerbaijani Presidential Administration and the Head of the Foreign Relations Department. Dr. Mammadov answers CI's questions regarding the current crisis of international law and governance, as well as the causes and consequences of this phenomenon.

In the first article of the issue, Klaus Larres, distinguished professor of history & international affairs at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, addresses the role and place of superpowers in international governance, asking, “Is it a ‘might is right’ story?”. In his article for CI, Dr. Oleg Kuznetsov, an assistant professor and vice principal at the Higher School of Social and Managerial Consulting in Moscow, sheds light on Armenia's transnational terrorism and global interests, based

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<sup>1</sup> Ian Coldin (27 March 2013) “Divided Nations: Why global governance is failing, and what we can do about it”, *Politics in Spire*, available at: <http://politicsinspires.org/divided-nations-why-global-governance-is-failing-and-what-we-can-do-about-it/> (accessed 01 September 2015)

on the declassified documents of the CIA and US Department of State. Dr. James Sperling, professor of political science at the University of Akron discusses governing the global commons, with a particular focus on geostrategic and geoeconomic sources of discord in the international system. Azad Garibov, leading research fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, deals with the role of the OSCE in conflict resolution in the post-Soviet area in relation to the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Dr. Robert Cutler, adjunct professor at the Institute of European, Russian and European Studies of Carleton University analyzes global energy governance, concluding that it needs to be multi-level and regionalized. Keith Boyfield, a research fellow at the Centre for Policy Studies in London, examines international cooperation in the wake of the economic crisis. Dr. Kamal Makili-Aliyev, leading research fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, looks at the evolution and failure of NATO's nuclear posture. Another featured author, Scott Hamilton, PhD candidate in international relations at the London School of Economics, talks about failures of climate governance as global governmentality. Salih Doğan, research assistant at the Department of Political Science and International Relations of Turgut Özal University in Ankara, assesses Afghanistan's current security challenges, analyzing the extent to which international security governance is failing or succeeding.

Dr. Simon Anglim, well-known author and lecturer in the field of military history and strategic theory, has also contributed a commentary on the failure of international governance, in which he argues that in the absence of effective global governance, security policy based on political realism makes sense.

The current issue also includes a comprehensive review of Joseph S. Nye's new book *Is the American Century Over?*. Last but not least, CI presents readers with reviews of recently published books on the South Caucasus and Turkey.

Finally, on behalf of the CI team, we hope this issue provides food for thought and for discussion!

*Sincerely,*  
*CI Staff*



# COLLOQUY

## Crises of International Law and Governance: Causes and Consequences

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Novruz Mammadov\*



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\* Dr. Novruz Mammadov is the Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Head of the Foreign Relations Department

Nowadays we are witnessing serious crisis of international law and governance. It is the major crisis of international legal system that emerged from the horrors of the World War II and aimed at adhering justice, preventing aggressions and protecting victims. Weaknesses of international law and international organizations in preventing illegal wars and aggression or in finding mediated solutions are ostensible. Neither International Courts nor United Nations seem able to deter aggressions, restore justice and punish aggressors.

The major powers are demonstrating a differentiated and selective approach to the same type of problems across the world. Double standards, the use of international law and the international organizations as an instrument for implementing national foreign policies has become prevalent. *CI Journal* discussed the current crisis of international law and governance with Dr. Novruz Mammadov, Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Head of the Foreign Relations Department.

*Double Standards and the Pursuit of National Interests  
by Major Powers*

While talking about the reasons of failure of international law and its consequences for international politics, Dr. Mammadav draws attention to the double standards and pursuit of national interests by major powers, under the guise of advocating for democracy and human rights. He notes that following the collapse

*Yet the West, despite becoming the dominant force, made no effort to harmonize or pacify the system of international relations. On the contrary, facing no serious competition, the West opted to ensure its self-interests completely – to secure total control over the human and natural resources of the entire world.*

of the USSR, the perseverance of a single pole, embodied by the West, gave great hope to many. There were expectations that the processes would flow smoothly, that problems would be resolved and potential conflicts disentangled not through warfare, but through negotiation and compromise, in compliance with the norms and principles of international law. Yet the West, despite becoming the dominant force, made no effort to harmonize or pacify the system of international relations. On the contrary, facing no serious competition, the West opted to ensure its self-interests completely – to secure total control over the human and natural resources of the entire world.

Dr. Mammadov mentions that very complex situation

has emerged in the system of international relations in the new millennium. A number of persistent and enduring processes have contributed to the escalation of international relations, leading to the current tensions. “Military force was relegated – killing people with bullets is now considered an international crime. The mechanisms for influence have adapted to the new realities; becoming more delicate, intricate and ‘civilized’ ”, says Deputy Head of Administration. Now, the human factor is underlined and various interventions are justified on humanitarian reasons. The West uses democracy and human rights to put pressure on other nations. There has even been a move to take the issue of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender marriage into the human rights domain.

“The outcome is obvious”, underlines Dr. Mammadov, “the West, having become a dominant force, bears responsibility for the problems that have emerged in different parts of the world, those which at times have global ramifications.” The failure of the West to remedy these problems, its reluctance to interfere in some cases, while serving as a root cause of the processes in other cases, as well as the broadening of interstate geopolitical and geoeconomic struggles and territorial conflicts show that contrary to the declaration of Francis Fukuyama, the world has not reached ‘the end of history’. Instead, it has just entered a more intense and perilous phase. Suffice to say that if during the Cold War there had been around ten countries consumed by tensions, today the number of troubled areas is around fifty.

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According to Dr. Mammadov, the most thought-provoking aspect, against this background, is that at the outset of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as societies mature, such problematic developments await resolution. It should be the case that as people and society evolves conflicts, contradictions and problems decrease. The reality, however, indicates the contrary. This is not promising for the future development of the international community.

### *Lack of Justice in International Law and International Politics*

Consequences of the current crisis of international law and failure of international organizations in enforcing the law was an-

other topic touched upon during the conversation with Dr. Mammadov. *CI Journal* asked Dr. Mammadov about necessary steps that are needed to be taken for the international law to become a regulatory mechanism for international relations.

According to Dr. Mammadov, first, it should be noted that justice is the most crucial and significant notion in evaluating the collective performance of humans. This principle stands to be the core value for assessing the conduct of everyone – from ordinary citizens to high-ranking politicians. Without justice, it is futile to expect positive outcomes of human activity in any field. The vivid manifestation of the consequences of injustice in the system of international relations is the widespread disregard, for the sake of certain interests, of mass killings and the fact that people are compelled to flee conflict zones in different parts of the world.

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The biggest problem in international relations, as Dr. Mammadov notes, is associated with the lack of justice. For this reason, the long-established system of international law with its framework for regulating the activity for all nations is undeniably crumbling. The norms and principles of the international law are no longer honored. Determining the legitimacy of the actions of certain nations within this mechanism, imposed by the West, has become a challenge. That is to say, the assessment of conduct based on the existing principles of the international law is possible, but this assessment has become dependent on the self-interests of certain nations. Therefore, international law is morphing into an instrument that serves the interests of the major powers.

The international organizations that must guarantee the implementation of the international law are in crisis. Dr. Mammadov sees the main cause of the crisis in these institutions' dependence on the interests of the major powers. These interests lead to the differentiated application of the international law to the same processes. As he mentions, on numerous occasions, President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev has stressed that in some cases the interventions into a certain country occur prior to the passing of the relevant UN Security Council resolution. By contrast, other resolutions remain in the archives for decades, without any effort to implement them.

This attitude is clearly manifested in the international community's approach to the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Dr. Mamamdov stresses. There are four UN Security Council resolutions on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as decisions and resolutions adopted by the OSCE, European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, NATO and others. The UN resolutions, in particular, demand immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the Armenian troops from Azerbaijan's occupied territories. In all of these documents, the international community and international organizations recognize the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. However, none of the provisions in these resolutions has been implemented.

“What is to be concluded from this?”, Dr. Mammadov asks, “Are the Western countries interested in preserving the status quo regarding the Nagorno Karabakh conflict, given that they do not hesitate to intervene immediately, in such places as Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya? Could that explain why the separatist regime in the Nagorno-Karabakh gets special treatment, unlike the separatist entities in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine?”

According to Dr. Mammadov, the application of double standards, certainly, casts a shadow upon international law. The processes provoked and manufactured by the West eventually backfire and gravely imperil the general system of international relations. This is widely acknowledged by many nations. The need for change is undeniable. The only real cure is to restore the principles of justice and the rule of international law. The major powers must work not for the sake of their own interests, but for the implementation of the norms and principles of international law, be it in bilateral relations or within the international organizations. Deputy Head of Administration asserts that the urgency of this issue is particularly evident in an organization like the UN: “For example, during our membership in the UN Security Council, Azerbaijan championed international law and justice, displayed principled positions on concrete issues and forwarded initiatives aimed at ensuring international peace and security and bolstering cooperation in combating terrorism. I believe that this is the only posture that can alleviate the threats in the system of international relations.”

*Failure of OSCE Minsk Group as a Mechanism of Conflict Resolution between Armenia and Azerbaijan*

*CI Journal* also asked Dr. Mammadov about his assessment of the performance or lack of it on the part of the co-chairs of OSCE Minsk Group with respect to the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict? What does he think are the key causes of the failure in the peacemaking efforts of the Minsk Group?

*The international community becomes concerned about constant tensions at the frontline; however, time and again, rather than analyzing the essence of the processes, it attempts to 'freeze' the situation.*

The Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been ongoing for over twenty-five years. Twenty percent of the internationally recognized territory of Azerbaijan remains occupied by Armenia, with over one million people forced to live as refugees or internally displaced persons. Dr. Mammadov notes that, yet for some reasons, there are persistent efforts to label this conflict 'frozen'. The international community becomes concerned about constant tensions at the frontline; however, time and again, rather than analyzing the essence of the processes, it attempts to 'freeze' the situation.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the product of geopolitical games, Dr. Mammadov mentions. Nothing is going to change if the endgame is the same. Events in such countries as Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine stand testimony to that.

Hence the question is, according to Dr. Mammadov, what exactly is the OSCE Minsk Group doing? The Co-Chairs are showing certain efforts in the direction of conflict resolution, issuing statements and producing proposals. Armenia, however, rejects these initiatives. "What is the reaction of the co-chairs?", he asks, "Shuttle diplomacy' and regional 'tourist tours' continue, creating an appearance of activity. The essence remains unchanged. How much longer can this kind of mediation last?"

*The resolution of the conflict has, in fact, been monopolized by the OSCE Minsk Group. Certain quarters have stakes in the situation remaining unchanged.*

There are some fascinating approaches to the conflict resolution, according to the Deputy Head of Administration. On one hand, the resolution of the conflict has, in fact, been monopolized by the OSCE Minsk Group. Certain quarters have stakes in the situation remaining unchanged. Every time practical efforts towards resolution are made, it says, "The OSCE Minsk Group is dealing with this matter." On the other hand, whenever a firm position

from the co-chairs is required, arguments such as “the problem has to be resolved by the parties themselves and we will support any solution” come into play.

“Therefore, there is a need for serious change in the substance of the mediation”, says Dr. Mammadov. He asserts that “first of all the attitude towards the conflict parties must change and concrete, and a clear-cut position needs to be demonstrated. The fact that Armenia is an aggressor country has to be recognized and this must be the underlying theme of the negotiations. Regrettably, we are yet to witness any of this. We cannot be satisfied with the current course of the talks.” Dr. Mammadov quotes President Aliyev who repeatedly stated that there will be no negotiations simply for the sake of negotiating, Azerbaijan will never agree to even a square inch of its lands remaining under Armenian occupation, and will eventually liberate own land. Legitimate options are on the table – peace, negotiations or other means. According to Dr. Mammadov, it would be productive for all if both the co-chairs and Armenia acknowledge this reality.

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# Superpowers and International Governance: A 'Might Is Right' Story?

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Klaus Larres\*

International governance has frequently been imposed by outright force, or more subtly by means of political, economic and military pressure. The modern world of superpowers has been no exception. In fact, their sheer overwhelming political and economic power and military might has rendered the temptation to enforce their will while ignoring or sidelining the views of other countries apparently irresistible. Nevertheless, examples from both the Cold War era and the post-Cold War world demonstrate that even superpowers cannot do as they wish. The structure of the international system as developed since 1945, along with the influence of democracy, a growing global acknowledgment of the importance of a culture of consensus and cooperation in international affairs imposes powerful constraints. This often, though not always, ensures that might is not always right. Increasingly, individual great powers do not get away with behaving like a bull in a china shop. This includes the United States (invasion of Iraq) and Russia (Crimea, Ukraine); both countries have faced significant negative consequences for their violations of international law and the conventions of global governance.



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“Global [or international] governance is a slippery term. It refers not to world government ... but to something more practical: the collective effort by sovereign states, international organizations, and other non-state actors to address common challenges and seize opportunities that transcend national frontiers.”<sup>1</sup>

“Governance is the act of governing, and thus involves the application of laws and regulations, but also of customs, ethical standards and norms.”<sup>2</sup>

### *Governance – The Ultimate Challenge*

Throughout history, governance and thus the management of relations within a state and among states has been a profound challenge for contemporary ruling authorities. This applied to the small Athenian city-states almost 2500 years ago and it was an even more profound problem for the multi-tribe Roman Empire and its modern successors such as the European colonial empires of the relatively recent past. Not surprisingly, the modern nation states that began to be formed in Europe in the 17<sup>th</sup> century were also confronted with this problem. After all, within their borders, European nation states often encompassed a variety of different ethnic minorities and smaller national entities.

The imposition of entirely new rules on the international community agreed in the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia essentially meant that a government could for the most part do as it wished without being troubled by outside criticism or interference in its domestic governance. This has largely continued to be the case. Only relatively recently, in the post-Cold War world, can a certain loosening of this concept be observed, mostly due to genocide and appalling human rights violations in the 1990s (i.e. during the Yugoslavian civil wars). The concept of “responsibility to protect” has been developed in response. Still, a large number of states, in particular authoritarian ones, have rejected this development.

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<sup>1</sup>Patrick, S. (2014) ‘The United World: The Case for Good Enough Global Governance,’ *Foreign Affairs*, 93(6), p.2.

<sup>2</sup> World Health Organization (no year) ‘Global Governance,’ Available at: <http://www.who.int/trade/glossary/story038/en/> (Accessed: 10 April 2015).

Among them are China and Russia, but also much smaller entities such as North Korea, who jealously guard their sovereign right to do essentially as they please inside their own borders, aided by non-independent and compromised judicial systems. They insist on domestic autonomy and thus independence from any global norms and standards.<sup>3</sup>

In the global arena, however, it has proven much more difficult to agree on a system for international relations that resembles the relative simplicity of the Westphalian system regarding a state's domestic affairs. A rudimentary code of behavior has been painstakingly developed over the centuries, which attempts to regulate inter-state relations to some extent. The laws of war are one such example, as are the subtle rules and customs that have governed diplomatic relations among for at least two centuries now. Adherence to detailed trading rules and the freedom of the seas are also part of this attempt to impose a mutually beneficial order on an anarchic outside world - as policymakers and many scholars have frequently viewed international relations since the days of Thomas Hobbes.<sup>3</sup> The lawful application of international rules of governance to impose order on an unruly world is a challenge with which nation states are still grappling.<sup>4</sup>

*In the global arena, however, it has proven much more difficult to agree on a system for international relations that resembles the relative simplicity of the Westphalian system regarding a state's domestic affairs.*

In modern discourse, the ideal notion of international governance tends to be defined as “a process of cooperative leadership that brings together national governments, multilateral public agencies, and civil society to achieve commonly accepted goals.”<sup>5</sup> These “common goals” of course are very much the sticking point. Before this century, the central authority of states was relatively uncontested by NGOs, civil society and other non-state actors.

Yet, even reaching agreements among governments that did not

3 For an influential book, see Ikenberry, G.J. (2000), *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*. Princeton: Princeton UP.

4 For an interesting overview from a realist point of view, see Kissinger, H.A. (2014), *World Order*. New York: Penguin. See also Krisch, N (2005) ‘International Law in Times of Hegemony: Unequal Power and the Shaping of the International Legal Order,’ *The European Journal of International Law* 16(3), pp.369-406; and D’Aspremont, J. (2011), ‘The Rise and Fall of Democracy Governance in International Law: a reply to Susan Marks,’ *The European Journal of International Law* 22(2), pp.549-570.

5 Boughton, J.M. and Bradford, C.I. Jr. (2007), ‘Global Governance: New Players, New Rules,’ *Finance & Development: a quarterly magazine of the IMF* 44(4), p.2. Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2007/boughton.htm> (Accessed: 11 April 2015).

have to worry about the influence of non-state actors, consensus on shared goals and objectives was elusive and at best only partially possible. The Versailles peace conference convened after the end of World War I lasted over six months and was attended by more than 30 national delegations. In the end, all significant decisions on war reparations, de-colonization, the redrawing of national borders and the creation of new nation states were dominated by the ‘Big Four’ of the day: Britain, France, the US and Italy. They imposed their might in numerous instances, overruling many smaller entities and special interests. But even the Big Four frequently struggled to agree amongst themselves. While Britain and in particular France insisted on a punitive peace agreement for Germany, American President Woodrow Wilson saw the long-term folly of such a strategy, though ultimately he made considerable concessions. In return, he obtained agreement on the creation of an entirely new global instrument of governance.<sup>6</sup>

At Versailles, therefore, agreement on the establishment of Wilson’s cherished League of Nations was reached. The League was a multilateral global body for discussion and joint decision-making. It proved to be a weak instrument, however, rarely taken

*At Versailles, therefore, agreement on the establishment of Wilson’s cherished League of Nations was reached. The League was a multilateral global body for discussion and joint decision-making. It proved to be a weak instrument, however, rarely taken seriously by the world’s major powers in subsequent years.*

seriously by the world’s major powers in subsequent years.<sup>7</sup> The exclusion of Germany and Russia from the new world order proved disastrous. The absence of international rules of governance that states were willing to uphold, even in times of crisis, proved fatal, hindered by nationalism, revenge and ideology. Economic dislocation, national resentments and social discontent were added to the mixture in the 1920s and the early 1930s. To a significant extent the seeds of the tensions and conflicts of the 1930s and their culmination in the Second World War were planted by the failed attempt to design a constructive new global order based on integration rather than exclusion in the aftermath of World War I.

The post-World War I world had been a world without superpowers. There was no clear hegemonic power that could impose its leadership on the other main participants of the international

6 See Keylor, W.R. (2014), ‘Realism, Idealism, and the Treaty of Versailles,’ *Diplomatic History* 38 n(1), pp.215-18; Shepley, N. (2011), *Britain, France and Germany and the Treaty of Versailles: how the allies built a flawed peace*. Luton, UK: Andrews (Ebook).

7 See Housden, M. (2012), *The League of Nations and the organization of peace*. Harlow, England: Pearson Longman.

system. Britain, the superpower of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, no longer was able to fulfill this role. The United States was not yet in a position (and lacked the will) to take over the baton. That would only happen, gradually, during the years following 1940, and then much more clearly after 1944.

### *The Uneasy Stability of the Cold War Superpower World*

New efforts toward international governance were launched after the Second World War. This time the United States did not hesitate to impose its will to develop a hegemonic system of international governance. Yet, Washington's writ was confined to what came to be called the West in its broadest sense, which included Western Europe, most of Latin America, the Middle East and most but not all of Asia, including Australia. Yet, China and neutral India were not part of America's sphere of interest. Africa was very much a contested continent between the emerging power blocs.

Stalin's Soviet Union was the other dominant power. It ruled over most of Eastern Europe. Initially Moscow was closely aligned with China, occupied with wooing the so-called non-aligned countries in the developing world, such as India, Pakistan and a number of Middle Eastern and African states, such as Egypt.

Both hegemonic powers – the US and the USSR - developed grand strategies for stabilizing and expanding their respective spheres of influence. After some time of thinking in terms of 'rolling back' communist rule, the U.S. settled on a "strategy of containment."<sup>8</sup> So did the Soviet Union, at least with regard to Europe. The communist dominated Eastern European buffer states were meant to protect the East from any German (or possibly American) revanchist ambitions. Although western territorial revanchism only existed in the fertile imaginations of Soviet leaders, it was a genuinely perceived threat, at least in the 1950s and 1960s.<sup>9</sup> In other continents, Moscow attempted to apply political and military pressure and test the water for expanding its influence, including by supporting proxy wars. However very few countries changed sides for good, as Cuba did in the late 1950s. None of the few who did were of crucial importance in the

<sup>8</sup> The classic work is still Gaddis, J.L. (2012), *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*. New York: Oxford UP.

<sup>9</sup> Mastny, V. (1996), *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: the Stalin Years*. New York: Oxford UP.

Cold War battle of the superpowers.

Washington's increasing dominance in global affairs at that time relied on setting up and running international institutions that reflected America's understanding of how the world ought to be governed: democracy, capitalism and a liberal social order with significant cultural freedom and diversity were the main pillars of this system. In the 1950s and 1960s, almost by accident, American

*Washington's increasing dominance in global affairs at that time relied on setting up and running international institutions that reflected America's understanding of how the world ought to be governed*

“soft power” was recognized as one of the most compelling forces in building willingness to cooperate with the US, both indirectly and more directly.<sup>10</sup> Intra-western ‘guided multilateralism’ and benign hegemony became the other main characteristics of US leadership. The US began to create an informal empire that quite aptly has been viewed as an “empire by invitation” (at least with regard to its western European allies).<sup>11</sup>

As early as 1944-45 the US had convened the Bretton Woods conference, the Dumbarton Oaks conference and the San Francisco conference. The World Bank, the IMF, the UN (with its important Security Council) based in New York along with the OECD and eventually the GATT were the crucial results. In 1949 NATO was founded under clear American leadership due to the country's unrivalled military might. A few years later the US threw its weight behind the emerging process of European integration that led to the EEC/EC and in its modern incarnation the EU (since 1993). Soon similar – albeit less successful - efforts in other parts of the world, such as Asia, received significant US support.

The Soviet Union relied on more direct and much more dictatorial methods in imposing its political and economic will. COMECON and the Warsaw Pact were the key among the mechanisms that Moscow established to govern its large sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and beyond. Both relied upon the Soviet Union's willingness to use economic and military force or the threat of force. Moscow lacked “soft power” tools to strengthen its international appeal or indeed expand its hegemony within its sphere of interest in Eastern Europe.

<sup>10</sup> The classic work is Nye, J. (2004), *Soft Power: the means to success in world politics*. New York: Public Affairs.

<sup>11</sup> Lundestad, G. (1999), “Empire by Invitation” in the American Century, *Diplomatic History* 23(2), pp.189-217.

The respective spheres of influence and governance had been established and, to a large extent, mutually accepted by the mid - to late 1950s, lending an element of stability to the bipolar Cold War world. The détente in the 1970s and the treaties signed at the 1975 Helsinki conference formally recognized and institutionalized this bipolar world, much to the chagrin of the political right in the US (where the rise of neo-conservatism was beginning to really take off).<sup>12</sup> Although China had broken with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s and had gradually become a more independent actor on the world stage, throughout the Cold War China remained a poor developing country and was in no position to challenge either of the two superpowers. It required the Nixon administration's 'opening to China', aimed at balancing and channeling the Soviet Union, that enabled communist China to come into its own.

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The threat of mutual annihilation by nuclear weapons, abundantly available to both superpowers since the 1950s, created the additional - and perhaps decisive - layer of stability that governed the Cold War world. The US demonstrated the destructive potential of an atomic weapon when it bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 to end the war in the Pacific against Japan. In doing so, it also demonstrated both its new-found might and willingness to use it. The Soviet Union achieved its first successful atomic test explosion in 1949, followed by the British, that most loyal of American allies, in the mid-1950s, and then both France and China in the 1960s. The Cold War world was characterized by the uneasy stability of mutual fear and the threat of potential global annihilation.<sup>13</sup>

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Not surprisingly, in that sort of world, truly international governance did not exist. There was just the United Nations and its Security Council with its five permanent members (US, USSR, Britain, France, China) that initially seemed to offer a promising

<sup>12</sup> Wenger, A., Mastny, V. and Nuenlist, C. (eds) (2008), *Origins of the European Security System: the Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965-1975*. London: Routledge, 2008; Mastny, V. (1992), *The Helsinki Process and the Reintegration of Europe, 1986-1991: analysis and documentation*. New York: New York UP.

<sup>13</sup> See Rhodes, R. (2007), *Arsenals of Folly: the making of the nuclear arms race*. New York: Knopf; also still useful Rhodes, R. (1996), *Dark Sun: the making of the hydrogen bomb*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

global instrument of governance. Yet, the superpower conflict and the ability of any of the five to wield a veto placed major constraints on the UNSC's decision-making powers. After all, Moscow vowed not to repeat the mistake it made when it boycotted the Security Council during the vote on the UN's police action in Korea in response to North Korea's invasion of the south in the summer of 1950. As a result, the UN quickly became into an impotent mode of global governance.<sup>14</sup> 'Might is right' was indeed a decisive factor in the way the superpowers ran their respective spheres of influence during the Cold War. This applied to the Soviet Union above all, but also to the United States, though Washington exercised its global power in more limited and subtle ways.

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union's hegemony and dominance in its sphere of influence faced four major challenges: uprisings against Soviet rule occurred in East Germany in 1953, in Hungary 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in Poland in the early 1980s. With the exception of Poland, during all these dangerous challenges to Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, Moscow waited to see how the crisis developed, and then reacted with overwhelming force. Moscow sent in tanks and troops and forcefully put down the uprisings causing hundreds of fatalities. Might was indeed right, and superseded any ambitions for the more democratic and indeed a more capitalist way of life to which the peoples in these Eastern European states aspired. In December 1981 the communist authorities in Warsaw proclaimed martial law as a preventive measure, and in order to regain control. The Soviet Union narrowly decided not to intervene militarily. In the case of Yugoslavia and Romania, Moscow tolerated a degree of autonomy. The difference was that neither Tito nor Ceausescu had threatened to leave the Warsaw Pact and attach themselves to the West, as had seemed to be the danger in East Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland.<sup>15</sup>

The United States, by contrast, never intervened militarily with regard to its European allies. This, of course, would have run

14 Rose, E.T. (1971), 'The United States, the United Nations, and the Cold War,' *International Organization*, 25(1), pp.59-78; Kirgis, F.L. (1995), 'The Security Council's First Fifty Years,' *The American Journal of International Law* 89(3), pp.506-539.

15 See for example Kenez, P. (1999), *A History of the Soviet Union from the Beginning to the End*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP; Hosking, G. (1992), *A History of the Soviet Union, 1917-1991*, final ed London: Fontana.

deeply counter to Western values and intra-Western notions of cooperation, and would have meant the end of US hegemony in Western Europe. Outside Europe Washington was not shy, however, in seeking to bring down foreign governments that seemed on the brink of communism or had already gone communist by means of clandestine coups (Guatemala, Egypt, Iran, Cuba, Chile, South Vietnam, Nicaragua, etc). Outside its Western European sphere of influence, Washington could be as ruthless and authoritarian as the Soviet Union at its peak.<sup>16</sup> Within Washington's informal empire in Western Europe a similar kind of 'imperialist' behavior was impossible, however.<sup>17</sup> Still, the US-dominated system of governance in the Western world was frequently employed to bring the allies to heel.

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A striking early example is the Suez crisis of 1956. Britain and France, incensed by the nationalization of the important canal by Egyptian dictator Nasser, bombed Egyptian coastal towns and prepared for an invasion of Britain's old Suez canal base, which had been returned to Egypt only a few years before. US President Eisenhower was outraged. He had not been consulted and he feared that it would turn the people of Egypt and the Middle East against the West and open the region to Soviet influence. Moreover, there were only weeks to go until the American election and Eisenhower was campaigning on a platform of peace and international reconciliation. The President adamantly refused to help when the British asked for a dollar loan to pay for additional oil resources. There had been a run on the pound since the beginning of the crisis. Soon Britain was forced to abandon the operation for financial reasons, just days before the Suez Canal would have been re-captured. Eisenhower was ruthless in his imposition of US dominance over its most loyal ally. London was forced to cave in a most humiliating way.<sup>18</sup>

Yet, this scenario was very much the exception. Usually the US imposed its might in a more subtle and diplomatic way. For instance, when the allies began complaining about the lack of nu-

16 See for instance Rabe, S.G. (2012), *The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America*. New York: Oxford UP; Livingstone, G. (2009), *America's Backyard: the United States and Latin America from the Monroe Doctrine to the War on Terror*. London/New York: Zed Books.

17 See Lundestad, G. (1997), *'Empire' by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997*. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997.

18 See for example Kyle, K. (1990), *Suez*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

clear cooperation, the Kennedy administration in the early 1960s was conciliatory. The Multilateral Nuclear Force was proposed, with European co-leadership, and the NATO Nuclear Planning Group was established, allowing the European allies a say in the West's strategic plans for its nuclear capability. Yet it soon turned out that these were empty concessions designed to placate the allies. Ultimately the American nuclear umbrella within and out-with NATO remained solely under US authority. No genuine partnership with any of the European states, not even Britain, existed in the nuclear arena. There were never any genuine European co-decision-making powers regarding the actual use of a nuclear bomb in a crisis situation.<sup>19</sup>

Similar examples in other fields can be easily found. On the whole, in military terms the US rarely conceded. President Carter, for instance, insisted on the development of a 'neutron bomb' in the late 1970s, overriding very strong European objections. In the mid-1980s President Reagan pushed for the modernization of short-range nuclear missiles deployed in Europe, despite European protests. In the end, Carter gave up the 'neutron bomb' for largely domestic political reasons, not because of European concerns. The end of the Cold War rendered the modernization of NATO's short-range missile arsenal superfluous in the 1980s; it was not European protests that had changed Reagan's mind. Thus, the US seldom genuinely compromised; instead Washington always made sure that its hegemony in military and above all nuclear questions remained uncontested.

In the economic sphere this was less often the case. Here the US was more prepared to compromise; not least as the European allies were much stronger in this field and American international competitiveness had been on the wane since the 1970s. Above all, economic disagreements were much less important in existential terms. In all truly existential questions, however, the US found ways to remain in charge of the West throughout the Cold War.<sup>20</sup>

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19 Heuser, B. (1997), *NATO, Britain, France, and the FRG: nuclear strategies and forces for Europe, 1949-2000*. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan.

20 See Larres, K. (2009), 'The United States and European Integration, 1945-1990,' in Larres, K. (ed.), *Companion to Europe since 1945*. Oxford: Blackwell/Wiley, pp.151-182.

*The Post-Cold War World*

US hegemony and its dominance over Western international governance largely continued during the early years of the post-Cold War world. In fact, the collapse and disappearance of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the absence of any serious rival powers in the 1990s created a “unilateral moment” for the U.S. The last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century marked a triumphant end to the “American century,” as the 20<sup>th</sup> century was justifiably called. In the 1990s Russia seemed to become an economically feeble but increasingly democratic partner for mighty America. There was briefly even talk of Yeltsin’s Russia joining NATO. The EU was established in 1993 by the Maastricht Treaty and, while developing into an increasingly serious economic competitor to a briefly booming America, in foreign and defense policies and in all matters military and NATO-related, the US still ruled supreme. Despite the political scandal involving President Clinton’s ill-judged sexual behavior in office and an increasingly gridlocked Congress, on the whole America’s self-confidence and notions of international omnipotence were at their peak during the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>21</sup>

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There were signs, however, indicating that the US was increasingly beleaguered in terms of the nation’s foreign policy. International governance proved a chimera, lacking a single authority. The Middle East remained a quagmire with Iran and Iraq still deeply hostile to the US, though for different reasons. They also despised each other. Despite some hopeful signs, the Israel-Palestinian peace process was still leading nowhere and in Africa the Clinton administration suffered severe setbacks that, for example, led to a pullout of its small contingent of troops from war-torn Somalia. During the genocide in Ruanda in the mid-1990s, the US remained on the sidelines, underestimating the unfolding human catastrophe there and – as now is increasingly apparent – deliberately looking the other way. Washington did not want to get involved in yet another intractable foreign policy problem.

Throughout the immediate post-Cold War years, it did not appear as if the world’s only remaining superpower was anywhere

21 See for this hubris, Krauthammer, C. (1990), ‘The Unipolar Moment,’ *Foreign Affairs* 70(1), pp. 23-33; Krauthammer, C. (2002/03), ‘The Unipolar Moment Revisited,’ *National Interest*, pp. 5-17.

*Throughout the immediate post-Cold War years, it did not appear as if the world's only remaining superpower was anywhere close to being in charge of global governance. Despite its potentially huge political, economic and military might, in many instances during the 1990s, the US appeared to be as powerless as its much smaller and weaker peers.*

close to being in charge of global governance. Despite its potentially huge political, economic and military might, in many instances during the 1990s, the US appeared to be as powerless as its much smaller and weaker peers.<sup>22</sup> Still, this was hardly acknowledged in the US or in the West at large. Instead the notion of American 'unipolar global position' retained its appeal, not least in the US itself.

The rosy vision of America's unilateral power dramatically changed with the terrorist acts of 9/11 in 2001. The rise of fundamentalist Islam in the form of Al Qaeda and more recently, ISIS, Boko Haram and Al-Shabbat, con-founded the US and the rest of the West. The drawn out and very costly involvement in the ongoing wars with

Afghanistan and Iraq together with the deep economic recession of the years 2007/08-2010/11 undermined US political and economic credibility on the world stage and sapped its confidence. Washington also fell out with some its closest European allies, Germany and France. Relations recovered slowly, with lingering suspicion about American unilateralism.<sup>23</sup>

In addition, international rivals for global dominance emerged in the form of the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa). While commentators and analysts soon began talking about a new multilateral world with the US being just one of five or six major global powers, this was always an unrealistic scenario. Instead, it was the rise of China and the threat of a hostile new bipolar world that made the US anxious.

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Not only China did emerge as an increasingly serious economic competitor and rival to the US in international trade relations, it also embarked on a rapid military program to transform itself into a formidable regional and potentially global player. In particular, China is throwing its weight about in South-east Asia (as well as in other continents, such as Africa). Regarding Asia, China clear-

<sup>22</sup> See Layne, C. (1993), 'Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,' *International Security* 17(4), pp.5-51; Layne, C. (2006), *The peace of illusions: American grand strategy from 1940 to the present*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP.

<sup>23</sup> Larres, K. (2003), 'Mutual Incomprehension: U.S.-German value gaps beyond Iraq,' *Washington Quarterly* 26(2), pp.23-42.

ly wishes to contain US power in its backyard. Beijing wants to make sure that the US accepts the South China Sea, and perhaps most of the Pacific area, as China's sphere of influence. What Beijing desires, it seems, is for Washington to maintain a respectful distance from China's borders. The US resists with this aspiration, as do most of China's neighbors. Even former enemies such as (communist-run) Vietnam as well as the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Myanmar and most other South East Asian nations look toward the US to balance China's new found power and confidence.<sup>24</sup>

Regarding China's claim over a number of islands in the South China sea, so far might has not proven to be right. There is serious resistance to China's claims. Chinese behavior in international economic relations has also been pushed back. Copyright infringements, poor environmental standards, sub-standard and sometimes dangerous goods, poor working conditions, cyber attacks and industrial espionage have given rise to significant international resistance. To some extent it has led to the implementation of reforms. China's new power is not unconstrained by any stretch of the imagination. The potential superpower of the 21<sup>st</sup> century has been exposed to the rules of international governance, and to something like a culture of consensus and cooperation. This culture is perhaps gradually becoming more prevalent in international relations.<sup>25</sup>

Russia, the old superpower and the successor state to the Soviet Union, has also experienced that 'might is by no means right' in international relations in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. President Putin's annexation of Crimea early in 2014 and Russia's support of the separatist rebel forces in Eastern Ukraine have garnered much global criticism. The US and the EU have imposed severe economic sanctions and this surprisingly united transatlantic approach to Moscow has severely damaged the Russian economy. Putin was also unlucky that the imposition of the sanctions coincided with a massive drop in prices for oil and gas, Russian's most important sources of export revenues. Compared to 2013, Russia has become an internationally isolated and globally much

<sup>24</sup> See Mearsheimer, J. (2010), 'China's Challenge to U.S. Power in Asia,' *The Chinese Journal of International Politics* 3(4), pp.381-396.

<sup>25</sup> See the pertinent analysis of Cox, M. (2012) who is skeptical about the assumed decline of the U.S. and the West: 'Power Shifts, Economic Change and the Decline of the West?' *International Relations* 26(4), pp.369-388.

less influential country that is on the brink of bankruptcy. The gradual re-integration of Russia into world governance and the world economy (perhaps by its gradual re-admission to the G8) is necessary to de-escalate tensions in the long run.<sup>26</sup> Still, the crisis over Crimea and Ukraine has made clear that ‘might is not right’ in the post-9/11 world.

But what about the sole remaining superpower? Can the world community keep the US in check and contain its still overwhelming military and economic and political power? After all, the US still has not become a member of the International Criminal Court (ICC), founded in 2002, which has evolved as an important instrument of global governance. Still, to some extent, the might of the US still faces significant international (as well as domestic economic) constraints. As the most obvious case, let’s consider the Bush administration’s invasion of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003. The unprovoked ‘war of choice’ against Iraq split the transatlantic alliance and caused a deep crisis.<sup>27</sup> Washington’s refusal to submit to a second UN Security Council resolution on whether or not Saddam Hussein was in violation of various previous UN resolutions and therefore ought to be deposed undermined US credibility and global standing:

Following the surprisingly rapid collapse of Saddam Hussein’s regime, the US encountered even more serious problems. Terrorist attacks against US and other Western forces multiplied and fundamentalist terrorist groups began to flourish in Iraq where hitherto there had been none. Due to the destruction of its arch-enemy, Iran became the region’s new great power and began to spread its anti-American influence. Tehran speeded up the development of an Iranian nuclear weapon that soon faced great international resistance. Punishing sanctions were imposed that only many years later – in mid-2015 - resulted in successful negotiations and a compromise deal concerning the containment of Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

The behavior of some of America’s forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, the use of torture to extract information from captured enemies and the controversial Guantanamo Bay prison on Cuba

<sup>26</sup> See also Szabo, S. (2014), ‘Germany’s Commercial Realism and the Russia Problem,’ *Survival* 56 (5), pp.117-128.

<sup>27</sup> Haas, R.N. (2009), *War of Necessity. War of Choice: A Memoir of two Iraq Wars*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

(which held prisoners for years on end without due process), have caused international outrage. It also led to a severe identity crisis within US political, military and intelligence circles. The US was also forced to embark on the difficult and very costly and time-consuming process of nation building in the two countries it had conquered. Former Secretary of State Colin Powell's statement to President Bush – “if you break it, you own it” – proved to be quite correct. And extracting themselves from ownership has proven impossible. US troops remain in Afghanistan and have been re-introduced in Iraq, though in much smaller numbers.<sup>28</sup>

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Still, the US did invade Iraq; it had not been prevented from doing so by the many voices opposed to this enterprise on the world stage at large and, even more importantly, among its closest allies. The powerful US was able to ignore all obstacles and President Bush did what he always intended to do: topple Saddam Hussein and punish the Taliban in Afghanistan for protecting Osama bin Laden. But was might right? This was hardly the case.

The US caused tremendous problems for itself, both domestically in terms of weakening its financial and economic power, and for the region as a whole, which in turn has damaged US foreign policy in global terms. Thus, would the US embark on a similar enterprise at present or in the near future? Probably not. The US has learned the hard way that even if it is sufficiently powerful to embark on a highly controversial foreign and military policy, ignoring the international community in the process, this is not a wise thing to do in the absence of a truly existential threat. The Obama administration has absorbed these lessons and adopted a significantly more cautious foreign policy. It relies much more on the traditional tools of international relations: diplomacy, containment, encirclement, political persuasion, soft power. Only relatively seldom does it resort to the use of outright military force.<sup>29</sup> The administration's ‘drone warfare’, however, has prov-

28 Samuels, D. (2007), ‘A Conversation with Colin Powell,’ *The Atlantic*. Available at: <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/04/a-conversation-with-colin-powell/305873/> (Accessed: 12 April 2015).

29 See for example Indyk, M. et al (2012), *Bending History: Barack Obama's foreign policy*. Washington, DC: Brookings; Bentley, M. and Holland, J. (2014), *Obama's foreign policy: ending the war on terror*. London: Routledge; Mann, J. (2012), *The Obamaitians: the struggle inside the White House to redefine American power*. New York: Viking.

en to be highly controversial both at home and abroad. But imagine the global reaction if the US instead had continued invading countries such as Syria, Yemen, Pakistan and many others.

### **Conclusion**

Traditionally, the world's most powerful and influential countries have frequently been able to base their foreign and defense policies on the notion of 'might is right.' But this always has been a difficult path, entailing both direct and indirect opposition. This even was the case during the Cold War when both superpowers were much more constrained in their foreign policies than is often assumed. In the post-Cold War world, relying on a 'might is right' approach to international relations is even less feasible. This also applies to the United States, the world's only remaining superpower. A more politically aware and better informed global public, the rise of a number of important new great powers and the experience of the Iraq War and its disastrous consequences have become crucial limitations. As I have attempted to demonstrate in this article, in the post-9/11 world, the United States as well as China, Russia and the other emerging great powers are much more constrained in their pursuit of expansionist and uninhibited foreign and military policies than is frequently assumed by the media and the general public.

# Armenia, Transnational Terrorism and Global Interests: What Do CIA and DoS Documents Suggest?

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Oleg Kuznetsov<sup>\*</sup>

The 1980s witnessed intensive theoretical engagement with and reflection on the issue of state-sponsored transnational terrorism in and outside Armenia. During that decade, this terrorism existed on an unprecedented and as yet unrepeated scale, effectiveness and emotional intensity. Scholarly debate on the subject was taking place against the backdrop of continuing geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East, particularly Lebanon, forming the primary foundation of this socio-criminological phenomenon with its mainstream experiencing deep and structural modernization, consolidation and crystallization. An adequate understanding of the goals, objectives and practical orientation of the academic discussion on Armenian terrorism has only become possible in recent years, following the release of CIA documents on Armenian terrorist organizations (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, Justice Commandos against Armenian Genocide, and New Armenian Resistance) into the public domain. A comparison of the US intelligence documents and those of the United States Department of State (DoS) with academic research materials has demonstrated a high degree of correlation across their content, potentially indicating that the majority of the theoretical analyses of the time were carried out indirectly or directly in the service of US government interests.

The main purpose of the contemporary academic discourse was to study different theoretical perspectives and different angles on the possibility of the use of resources and potential of Armenian state-sponsored terrorism against the Soviet Union as a "hot tool" in the Cold War. The affirmative answer to this question became the catalyst of aggression of originated in the Middle East Armenian terrorism against the Soviet Transcaucasia and marked the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.



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### Introduction

The distinct concept of Armenian terrorism first appeared in the United States in 1982. The term was coined by Andrew Corsun, a Counselor of the Threat Analysis Group Office of Security Department of State. In its August issue of the DoS official publication, *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, Corsun wrote an article entitled, “Armenian Terrorism: A Profile”<sup>1</sup> which almost immediately became a socio-political neologism. The article

*But be that as it may, the fact remains that following Andrew Corsun’s example, the term “Armenian terrorism” acquired an independent meaning in the terminology of contemporary political science and remains in use to this day, especially in the US and Europe (including Turkey and Azerbaijan).*

caused widespread public outcry and mass protests by the Armenian diaspora around the world. As a result, the editors had to include a written apology in the magazine’s September issue and to inform their readership (in the smallest typographic font possible) that “the article ... does not necessarily reflect an official position of the Department of State, and the interpretive comments in the article are solely those of the author”<sup>2</sup>. But be that as it may, the fact remains that following Andrew Corsun’s example, the term “Armenian terrorism” acquired an independent meaning in the terminology of contemporary political science and remains in use to this day, especially in the US and Europe (including Turkey and Azerbaijan).

The very fact that the definition of Armenian terrorism was not self-created but rather appeared in the depths of the DoS apparatus (nowhere else but in the Threat Analysis Group Office of Security) suggests that by 1982, the issue of Armenian terrorism had acquired a wide scope and a high degree of relevance, worthy of research by the DoS operating unit. Andrew Corsun’s article was, in fact, a summary of the different stages of the terrorist activity, and a clear indication that there was a sufficient volume of empirical data in the DoS for a logical and systematic statistical analysis. Put simply, by 1982, Armenian terrorism had become so apparent that it not only required a careful study, but also a political decision on how the US government should react to this socio-criminological phenomenon, which represented a serious threat to peace and security in many parts of the world. The article was a clear message to the rest of the world that the United States was prepared to attend closely to the issue.

1 Corsun, A. (1982) ‘Armenian Terrorism: A Profile’, *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 82, No 2065 Washington, D.C., pp. 31-35.

2 *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin* (1982), Vol. 82, No 2066, Washington, D.C., p. 3

Corsun was the first to attempt to absorb, reflect upon, and recognize Armenian terrorism not as an integral part or a radical element of the fight of the Armenian ethnos for the preservation of its national and religious identity and the acquisition of its national statehood, but rather as an indigenous and self-contained phenomenon with signs of sovereign institutionalization that existed as a self-organizing and a self-regulating body, independently from other institutional structures of the Armenian diaspora and the corporate ties within it. In other words, Corsun made the first ever attempt to consider Armenian terrorism as an external product of the ethno-religious Armenian community (or some kind of a secret society within the Armenian ethnos), organized, cohesive and extremist in its nature. As a professional in the field of national security, he did not suffer from delusions of conspiracy theories and phobias. Rather, he tried to understand this very specific objective reality from a purely scientific and materialist point of view.

At the same time, one should understand that Andrew Corsun was a civil service bureaucrat and not intelligence operative. Therefore, he had no access to any intelligence or any illegally obtained information. Due to the nature of his official position, Corsun could have used information gleaned either from open sources (mainly the mass media), potentially redacted diplomatic correspondence designed for official purposes, or general analytical reports of the US intelligence on specific issues (such as Armenian terrorism). Regardless of the source of his information, Corsun's article in *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin* was the result of an intellectual analysis of a single citizen given the totality of the facts and data that came into his possession on the deliberate illegal activity. Corsun sought to find a rational explanation for this activity within the scope of his own professional competences and, quite possibly, in accordance with his subjective perception of the world, his moral attitude, and level of intellectual development. In any case, Corsun's publication has been the result of his individual creativity based on the specific and limited amount of thematic information which reflected his claim for full coverage of the topic - the very goal that Corsun failed to achieve.

This aspect becomes increasingly evident when one compares

the content of Andrew Corsun's article with another official document covering similar material, a research paper titled *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat. A Research Paper* drafted in the CIA Directorate of Intelligence (№ GI 84-1008 EUR 84-10004) published no earlier than in the first quarter of 1984, which was partially declassified and published with redactions on the official website of the CIA on April 30, 2013<sup>3</sup>. Each of these two texts is interesting in itself, reflecting the work of either one author or a group of authors, with the content, consciously or unconsciously, reflecting the basic ideological positions of their drafters, as well as the goals and objectives set by the former regardless of whether they had been officially announced.

*In fact, to a certain extent, each of the texts reflects the viewpoint of the officials of DoS and the CIA, and, in a broader sense, the position of the US military and political establishment regarding the existence of Armenian terrorism in the 1970s-80s, their understanding of it and the potential responses.*

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The comparison of the documents is interesting from several

<sup>3</sup> Central Intelligence Agency. *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat. A Research Paper*. Available at: [http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document\\_conversions/89801/DOC\\_0005462031.pdf](http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0005462031.pdf) (Accessed: 20 April 2015).

<sup>4</sup> Despite the fact that the editors of The U.S. Department of State Bulletin strongly denied the official character of Andrew Corsun's article, the publication was in fact reflecting the official position of the US State Department as evidenced by a postscript entitled as a "Note": "Given the controversial nature of the events of 1915 in Asia Minor, the US State Department is not of the opinion that the Turkish government committed genocide of Armenians. It is just another reason for the Armenian terrorists to organize attacks against Turkish diplomats and missions". (Corsun, *Armenian Terrorism: A Profile*, p. 35).

points of view. Firstly, both texts, despite a substantial difference in their headlines, are thematically similar, and since the first of them was created in DoS, and the second one in the security services, together they represent a holistic and comprehensive view of the position of the US expert community on the issue of Armenian terrorism.

Secondly, the documents are so close to one another in terms of composite structure that one can suggest they were prepared by different people with approximately similar analytical or operational training and in accordance with a single (universal or unified) pattern, which once again confirms the above mentioned thought that the drafters of the documents and their end users belonged to very specific (and different to each other) circles of the American state apparatus, and had a common way of thinking, which also suggests that they had undergone the same type of theoretical and methodological training.

Thirdly, both texts are near-contemporaries (Corsun's article interrupts the statistics of Armenian terrorist activity as on July 26, 1982, while the CIA research paper does so by the end of 1983), therefore the authors almost certainly rely on and use a single amount and array of information. Consequently, the comparison of these two texts reveals a real level of competence and awareness of the issue of Armenian terrorism on the part of both the authors, as well as of those units where the former carried out their official duties.

Thus, one can conclude with near certainty that a comparison of reports drafted at about the same time by people with approximately similar professional backgrounds (DoS and CIA) enables a highly accurate assessment of the big picture, specifically in regard to the scale of the terrorist activity by Armenian political, nationalist and religious extremists in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

### *The Content of the Documents*

In assessing the content of any historical source, the focus should be not only content, but also aspects such as the contemporary relevance of the topic, the task assigned to the authors of the text, sources of objective information used by the authors in the compilation and analysis, options for practical application of the new

knowledge gained in the process of creating the document, and so on. The answers to these questions let one interpret the text as either an abstract, a compilation or a research material, and to characterize it in accordance with *The Historian's Craft* by Marc Bloch, as having been created intentionally or unintentionally, to determine which methodology was used by the author in the process of creating the document (since the officials in question are those of the US government agencies who received their professional education in the 1960s-1970s, the focus should be on the prevalent methods of representativism or those of constructionism in American school of humanities of the time). Put simply, consideration of the historical source not only in terms of its content, but also looking at the process that shaped its creation, allows one to understand not only by whom and how it was created, but also to answer the question of the author's ultimate objectives in publishing the piece.

A superficial comparison of these two documents allows one to reach a number of conclusions about their origin and the sources of information reflected in them. Every statement contained in the documents is consistent with certain other assumptions, but their cumulative comparison forms the trend, the very existence of inner consistency of which suggests a high degree of reliability of possible conclusions. In fact, the textual structure of each of the two texts was created in accordance with G. W. F. Hegel's second law of dialectics; only difference is that the transition from

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quantitative changes to the qualitative ones was carried out in accordance with the linear path of conversion of a number of similar trends to a single multifaceted process, and not with the inductive path of accumulating many private facts followed by their total transformation into a holistic phenomenon. To put it simply, in the first half of the 1980s, both the DoS and the CIA realized what Armenian nationalist, religious, and political terrorism was, so they decided to share their information with the US political elites so that the latter could decide on how this knowledge could be used for their own purposes or US national interests, and whether to use it at all. By that time, Armenian terrorism not only reached its climax, but by having exhausted the internal resources of the ethnic group, it gradually began to decline. As a result,

there was a need for outside impetus for the group's revival, if there were geopolitical reasons beyond the initial goals of the Armenian terrorists. In fact, Andrew Corsun's article raised a question within the US State Department on the US reaction to the phenomenon of Armenian terrorism: were they supposed to let it decline naturally or should they have turned it into a tool to implement their own foreign policy agenda? The same question was raised before the Intelligence Directorate of the CIA when they familiarized themselves with the research paper.

As mentioned above, both documents have a similar composite structure reflecting some sort of an algorithm or even a stereotype in relation to how the authors collected, processed, and presented the information. Both Corsun's article and the CIA research paper list historical origins of Armenian terrorism, as if justifying its right to exist and even covering it with a veil of legitimacy. Both papers briefly describe the specifics of the ideology, organizational structure, and tactical elements of the terrorist activity of the two major terrorist groups and their structural units, namely, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and Justice Commandos against Armenian Genocide (JCAG). The main difference between the contents of these two texts is that the analysis by the US intelligence contains a substantial body of information obtained through intelligence operations, therefore it is fair to suggest that it is much more informative. The authors of the texts summarize and list only the facts known to them without trying to interpret them, to establish a causal link between them, or to look for analogies, allusions and correlations, which generally corresponded to the dominant idea in American social science of the 1980s of the methodology of representivism.

Both documents view the explosion in the World Council of Churches in Beirut, Lebanon on January 20, 1975 as a starting point of Armenian terrorism of the 1970s-1980s. "Prisoner Karekin Yanikian Group" claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack. However, other evidence clearly demonstrates that the ideology and practice of Armenian terrorism were born earlier than January 1975, despite how the employees of the DoS and the CIA tried to present it to their immediate management and the international community.

The fact is that the terrorist “Prisoner Karekin Yanikian Group”, originally named ASALA, was created before January 1975 and was clearly inspired by the 27<sup>th</sup> January terrorist attack committed by an Armenian terrorist whose name was used in the title of the terrorist group. Born in Erzerum, Turkey, Karekin (Kurken) Yanikian was a graduate of Lomonosov Moscow State University. A philologist and a writer who emigrated from the USSR to the United States, Yanikian, on that same day, shot down Turkish Consul General Mehmet Baydar and Vice-Consul Bahadur Demir in the Baltimore hotel of the suburbs of Los Angeles (California, US) by luring the gentlemen to the meeting where he was promising to discuss the donation of cultural values to the Republic of Turkey.

This crime, committed by a person quite well known in US literary circles, was widely publicized and marked the first step toward the interest of US intellectual circles and that of the countries of Western Europe in the problem of Armenian terrorism as a form of revenge for the military and police measures directed against the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire at the time of WWI.

Karekin Yanikian’s murder of the Turkish diplomats was certainly a crime against the peace and security of mankind,<sup>5</sup> planned and committed by a single terrorist who acted without accomplices or support of any kind of organized crime network. This author has no doubt about the unambiguity of such a conclusion of the preliminary investigation carried out by the FBI. It seems that this is why the crime was not been included in the general list of collective Armenian terrorism offenses (where terrorists attacks were organized not by exalted single terrorosts, but by the organized and cohesive community whose activities could have been traced and brought under control of the US secret services in the national interests of the country) neither by Corsun himself, nor by the analysts of the CIA. It could mean that the specific task was assigned to the authors from the outset to collect and analyze the objective data and to describe Armenian terrorism not as a political and historical event in retrospect, but

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<sup>5</sup> The definition is given in accordance with the wording of the title of section XII of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the structure of which includes the offense under Art. 360 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, “Attacks on persons or institutions which are under international protection”.

rather as a structurally organized social phenomenon. In other words, their task was to understand and to describe the potential threats of Armenian terrorism at a very particular time, which had little correlation with the ideology that had been inspiring the terrorists to commit their crimes in the last decade of the twentieth century.

The statistics contained in the documents on committed terrorist attacks by Armenian militants are interesting. Corsun mentions over 170 terrorist attacks committed by Armenian terrorists in different countries in the period from 20 January 1975 to 26 July 1982, whereas the CIA research paper contains contradictory information in this regard. For example, 203 crimes are mentioned on page 6 of the main part of the paper as committed or prepared by Armenian terrorists but prevented by the authorities in 1975-1983. But on page 9, figure 2, the data on 168 crimes is presented by visualizing the number of terrorist attacks committed by different Armenian terrorist groups. The summary table of the Annex 2 of the document contains a reference to 146 committed or accidentally prevented terrorist attacks from 20 January 1975 to 17 August 1983, which organization by Armenian terrorists was officially proven. The CIA analysts either did not see those quantitative contradictions or simply preferred to ignore them. It could be that they did not intentionally focus their attention on the fact due to the unwillingness to tie themselves down by explanations to their management. This gives one good reason to suggest that the CIA document is characterized by approximate data and conclusions, which leads one to conclude that the CIA management asked the analysts to identify the most important trends in the state of organized structures and practices of Armenian terrorism in the early 1980s without going into too much detail.

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On the other hand, this state of affairs could be explained differently. American experts have repeatedly pointed to the extremely low level of operational and technical preparation of the committed crimes (explosions near residential and office buildings, etc), most of which could have indeed been committed by the single terrorists with no connection to Armenian terrorist organizations, yet with ideological sympathy to them, and therefore, having associated themselves with organizations such as

ASALA, JCAG, and other structurally stable groups regarded by the CIA analysts as terrorist organizations. One could allow for such a possibility also because of the research paper having been declassified and published with redactions, containing unavailable findings and operational data.

However, there is a further issue that casts doubt on the integrity of the CIA analysts who drafted the paper on the activities of the Armenian terrorist organizations. As already mentioned, it was officially called *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat*, although one can find the names of other Armenian terrorist groups (such as the Justice Commandos against Armenian Genocide and New Armenian Resistance, NAR, Orly Group, June 9<sup>th</sup> Group, October 3<sup>th</sup> Group) who were structurally not united with ASALA due to ideological differences, but were cooperating with it in the practice of terror. Today we know that most of them positioned themselves in the face of justice as structural units of ASALA while not entering the latter's organizational structure, which, in its turn, was meant to form the idea in public consciousness that ASALA was large and powerful, despite the fact that this was far from the reality.

This contradiction suggests that the CIA could have been initially tasked with compiling a dossier on the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, whose public proclamations were full of leftist and Marxist-Leninist sentiment. Therefore, the US military and political establishment could have had quite a reasonable and well-founded suspicion about the ASALA having been the product of the KGB. Nevertheless, in the process of operational and analytical activity it was found that the terrorist activities had been a practical expression of the ideological and political mainstream, so common to the radical thinking of some members of Armenian diaspora. As a result, Armenian terrorism in the context of its ideology started to be perceived by the CIA not as a monochrome picture, but rather as a bright and multicolored mosaic, with many nuances and shades.

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By having started the intelligence gathering on the possible imprint of ‘Moscow’s hand’, the CIA officers learnt quickly enough that the leadership of the Soviet Union had nothing to do with the emergence of ASALA, and that the Armenian terrorist network that spread in Europe, Middle East and North America was quite autochthonous in its origin and did not have the backstage support of any of the world powers. It took several years of intensive work to double-check those findings, which led to ASALA being deemed ‘Armenian terrorism’.

If this assumption is correct, it explains the place of Corsun’s article in the overall work structure of the US intelligence analysts on Armenian terrorism of the late 1970s and early 1980s. It is clear that within a few years of research and operational intelligence assistance, a sufficient volume of empirical material had been collected and compiled for the analysis and subsequent conclusions, first presented in 1982. The publication in *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin* magazine was not only intended to demonstrate the US’ concern about systemic Armenian terrorism to the international community, but also to give impetus to public debate on this issue in the media. Having received a certain reaction from the relevant segments of the international community, the CIA analysts may have had corrected some of their earlier findings thereby improving the quality of their work. As a result, the military and political leadership of the US received a logically structured (or at least internally consistent) analysis.

To summarize the above information, it should be stressed that both documents, despite frequent contradictions in certain aspects of their contents, can be generally considered as both adequate and reliable, sufficiently reflecting the problem of Armenian terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s in all its diversity. Together, they provide a holistic view on Armenian terrorism in the first decade of the twentieth century as an autochthonous, ideological, and criminal phenomenon, which should be studied not only from the standpoint of criminology, but also from the perspectives of politology and anthropology.

*Chronology behind the Research*

It must be explained why in 1982 (and not in the previous year or two years later instead), there suddenly appeared a request in the higher echelons of the US political elites for a comprehensive study of the phenomenon of Armenian terrorism by the DoS and CIA analysts. This was presumably the consequence of several independent factors and circumstances coinciding.

The most important event in this regard was the invasion of southern Lebanon in July-September 1982 by the armed forces of the State of Israel allied with predominantly Christian, Lebanese right-wing military forces ‘Phalange’, having resulted in the infamous massacre in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila to the north-east of the Lebanese capital (see also ‘1982 Lebanon War’, ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’). Although the main purpose of the Israeli military offensive was the destruction of the military, organizational and political infrastructures of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its terrorist proxies in southern Lebanon, those attacks were simultaneously directed against the targets of ASALA and JCAG in eastern and western Beirut, since the latter had cooperated very closely with the PLO in the joint training of militants. More precisely, the ASALA offices were located in the PLO headquarters building.

After the Israeli victory, in the early fall of 1982, political and financial structures of the PLO were relocated to Tunisia, while the military components of both the ASALA and JCAG went to Syria. As the training camps of those organizations were based in the Bekaa Valley, this Syrian territory was also occupied by the Israeli troops, having resulted in the continuing Syrian-Israeli conflict, the responsibility for which lies largely with the Armenian terrorists. Thus, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon led to disengagement within the Armenian community living in the country. Half of its armed representatives in the streets of Beirut supported the right-wing Catholics of “Phalange”, i.e. Israel’s allies, while the other part – mainly, the ASALA supporters from the Armenian quarter of Bourj Hammoud – started to fight on the side of the PLO. Despite the apparent religious antagonism between the Christians and the Muslims, they had close personal, financial, operational, and undercover ties. Due to its very close ties with the Palestinian terrorists, Armenian terrorism,

apart from its transnational character, acquired international features by having been organically incorporated in the international terrorist environment.

In 1982, President Ronald Reagan, elected two years earlier, realized that based on the success of internal political and economic reforms, the country had sufficient resources to initiate an offensive foreign policy against the Soviet Union. Reagan famously considered the USSR as an 'Evil Empire' (at least, this is how he described the USSR in his speech dated March 8, 1983, delivered to the participants of the National Association of Evangelicals). When preparing his 'Crusade against Communism', Reagan himself or likely his advisers saw Armenian terrorism as one of the possible operating forces or as a set of actors set up for the offensive. The analytical service of the official US agencies was, therefore, focused on the resources and capacities of the former. That is why in August 1982, *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin* magazine pointed to the existence of such a force. The following year, the CIA was researching ASALA and other Armenian terrorist organizations, considering the possibility of using them against the Soviet Union - primarily, the Armenian SSR and Soviet Transcaucasia as a whole. This was considered the most difficult region in terms of state management, having had complex problems and antagonisms in the area of socio-economic relations (in its broadest interpretation).

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The success of the Israeli armed forces in southern Lebanon and Beirut in 1982 led not only to the destruction of the existing infrastructure of Armenian terrorism, but also to the seizure of internal documentation of the Armenian terrorist organizations by the military intelligence and Mossad, including personal data of the militants. It is obvious that this information was almost immediately shared with US intelligence services in the framework of the military, technical and political cooperation between Israel and the US, having resulted in the former's full control of the entire network of activists and militants of ASALA, who were forced to cooperate with the American secret services to avoid criminal prosecution for their involvement in terrorist activities in their countries of residence. In other words, in 1982, the CIA established if not complete control, then at least the objective

possibility of control of the entire network of transnational Armenian terrorism, which, in its turn, allowed it to put most of the network's elements into its service.

In 1983, the organizational and structural transformation in the mainstream Armenian terrorism proved that at that time, a diverse set of Armenian terrorist organizations acquired a new consolidating and organizing principle. On July 15, 1983, ASALA was split and a group of renegades led by Monte Melkonian emerged from its rank, with the former having announced the creation of a new 'revolutionary' organization entitled, 'Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia – Revolutionary Movement', abbreviated as ASALA-RM. The group established by Hakob Hakobyan in 1975 thereby lost its members and resources and was doomed to a gradual collapse. The newly established descendant had the opportunity to express itself 'from scratch', with no shadows of past failures, defeats or mistakes. The day before, on July 14, 1983, Justice Commandos against Armenian Genocide was renamed Armenian Revolutionary Army, ARA, which was meant to symbolize the beginning of a fundamentally new stage in the history of Armenian transnational terrorism. After this re-branding, JCAG-ARA continued its terrorist activity until the early 1990s, until its fighters found the opportunity to continue their criminal acts in a different part of the world – on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. 1983 was marked by the departure from a historical scene of another Armenian terrorist organization that was operating in Western Europe under the name of 'New Armenian Resistance', NAR.

The simultaneous nature of these transformations suggests that they were not a coincidence, but that they were the parts of a single pre-planned logical sequence of actions aimed at consolidating various trends and branches of transnational Armenian terrorism around a single focal point, which would direct its activity to achieve a fundamentally different purpose not less close to the heart and in tune with the idea of the revival of the so-called 'Great Armenia'.

It seems that starting from 1983, the main enemy of the Armenian nationalists and their radical element, the terrorists, was the Soviet Union (and not the Republic of Turkey), the collapse and of which guaranteed and provided the appearance of a territo-

rial center for the Armenian diaspora for recreation and subsequent expansion of the boundaries of the Armenian statehood by capturing territories of the neighboring states – not just of Turkey, but also those of Azerbaijan, Georgia, perhaps, Iran, and Russia.

### *Studying Armenian Terrorism*

Andrew Corsun's article in *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin* magazine in 1982 was the starting point for an active debate in academic and socio-political journals of the United States. Given the wide publicity that the topic had spontaneously acquired in the circles of the American scholarly intelligentsia, the discussion was almost simultaneously joined by several people who subsequently were divided into two camps, with diametrically opposed ideological and moral positions – those who unequivocally condemned and those who unequivocally rehabilitated the Armenian terrorists and justified their crimes in historical retrospect. The first group of authors included people like Paul Wilkinson, Michael Z. Szaz and Michael M. Gunter, the second one – Robert Jordan and Christopher J. Walker.<sup>6</sup> Most of these authors' 1983 publications had been opportunistic. Having exhausted the topic in their journalistic polemics, they began to write books on the topic. But that is what their main objective was – to determine reactions of US and foreign intellectuals to their assessments and proposals, nothing more. It was through these articles that the search for social reflexion or feedback was carried out, aimed at revealing the potential reaction of the international community on possible use of resources and capabilities of Armenian terrorism in the interests of the United States.

Having generally received an indifferent, and in the case of the Armenian diaspora and Turkey, a positive response to such a per-

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6 Gunter, M. M. (1983a) 'The Armenian Terrorist Campaign Against Turkey', *Orbis*, No 27, pp. 447-477; Gunter M. M. (1983b), 'The Armenian Terrorist Campaign Against Turkey', *Orient*, No 24, pp. 610-637; Gunter M. M. (1986) 'Contemporary Armenian Terrorism', *Terrorism*, 3(8), pp. 213-252; Gunter M.M. (1985a) 'The Historical Origins of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism', *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, No 9, pp. 77-96; Gunter M. M. (1985b) 'Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism', *Conflict Quarterly*, No 5, pp. 31-52; Jordan R. (1978) 'The Proud Armenians', *National Geographic*, No 153, pp. 846-873; Szaz, M. Z. (1983) 'Armenian Terrorists and the East-West Conflict', *Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, No. 8, pp. 387-394; Walker C. J. (1983) 'The Armenian Holocaust in Its Modern Historical Context', *Ararat*, No 24, pp. 43-45; Wilkinson P. (1983), 'Armenian Terrorism', *World Today*, No 39 pp. 344-350.

spective, the US political establishment initiated active theoretical research in this direction, by providing the authors with the possibility to create theoretical models, describing a wide variety of options of potential developments. In the 1980s, books on the history and prospects of development of transnational Armenian terrorism written by authors such as Yohan Alexander and Kenneth A. Myers, M. A. Birand, Erich Feigl, Kamuran Gurun, Anat Kurz and Ariel Mirari, David C. Rapoport, Salahi Ramsdan Soniel, Yves Ternon appeared.<sup>7</sup> Simultaneously, several major international conferences on Armenian terrorism were organized and held in Turkey, (most affected by Armenian terrorism in the last quarter of the twentieth century), with the correlation of the theoretical views of researchers, as subsequently reflected in the published conference materials.<sup>8</sup>

As a result of the efforts of a dozen of authors from around the world, a holistic and integrated picture of the capacity and resources of Armenian terrorism emerged, ultimately summarized in Francis P. Hyland's 'Armenian terrorism: the past, the present, the prospects'.<sup>9</sup>

This author's structural semantic and comparative linguistic analysis of Hyland's text showed that it was almost completely identical (correlation of 0.9) with the text of the CIA paper, *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat. A Research Paper*. This allows one to conclude that Hyland was either the author of the paper, or at least, its literary editor. This, in turn, suggests that the studies on Armenian terrorism in the 1980s were carried out on the initiative and in the interests of the US government and its secret services across the entire world. It was Hyland who in 1991 first argued

7 Alexander, Y. and Myers, A. K. (1982) *Terrorism in Europe*. London: Croom Helm Ltd.; Birand, M. A. (1983) *Lisanda Ermeni Terörü*, Ankara: And Kartposatal ve Yayınları; Feigl, E. A. (1986) *Myth of Terror: Armenian Extremism: Its Causes and Its Historical Context*, Salzburg: Zeitgeschichte; Freilassing; Feigl, E. (1986) *Ein Mythos des Terrors. Armenischer Terrorismus, seine Ursachen und Hintergründe*, Freilassing: Zeitgeschichte; Gurun, K. (1985) *The Armenian File*, New York: St. Martin's Press; Kurz, A. and Mirari, A. (1985) *ASALA: Irrational Terror or Political Tool*, Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post; Rapoport, D. C. (1988) *Inside Terrorist Organizations*, New York: Columbia University Press; Soniel, S. R. (1987) *Armenian terrorism: a menace to the international community*, London: Cyprus Turkish Association; Ternon, Y. (1985) *The Armenian Cause*, New York: Caravan Books.

8 Akdeniz University, Research Center for the Study of Atatürk Reforms and Principles (1985) 'Armenian terrorism: a threat to peace'. Antalya, Turkey; International Terrorism and Drug Connection: Collection of Reports (1984). Ankara: Ankara University Press; Symposium on International Terrorism: Collection of Reports (1984). Ankara: Ankara University Press.

9 Hyland, F. P. (1991) *Armenian terrorism: the past, the present, the prospects*, Boulder: Westview Press.

that the main objective of transnational Armenian terrorism was the Soviet Union and not the Republic of Turkey, as it remained throughout the 1970-1980s. In this regard, Hyland stated that the epicenter of the terrorist activity of Armenian nationalists would be “Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan”, where the Armenian population “united and rebelled in response to the oppression on behalf of the Muslim majority”<sup>10</sup>.

As one can see, in the 1980s, there were four levels of study on Armenian terrorism in the interests of the subsequent adoption by the US leadership of a political decision on its account: operative, administrative, publicistic, and academic.

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Each of these levels of analysis had a specific and immanent purpose. The operational analysis was meant to provide an objective factology of Armenian terrorism to enable subsequent evaluation of its resources and capacity under specific historical conditions. The administrative analysis was meant to assess its resource potential and the potential for its subsequent planning in the interests of the United States and to define the contours of the usage patterns. The publicistic analysis was supposed to provide the so-called feedback to find out the attitude of the international community and the Armenians themselves to these usage patterns. Finally, the academic level was important to ensure that all the results of multi-level and multi-factor analyses were synthesized into a single plan of potential action.

In addition, the active scientific discussions around the issue of Armenian terrorism, accompanied by a highly emotional background, unconsciously served as a cover for applied analytical studies of the ways, means and methods of using the resources and capacity of transnational Armenian terrorism against the Soviet Union, which also perfectly suited the US government and the CIA.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

## Conclusion

Without going too deep into the ideological bias and partisanship of the authors who had been studying those documents, yet at the same time according due respect to their professionalism and competence, it should be emphasized that both texts (the reliability of the contents of which this author has no grounds to question) give a comprehensive description of Armenian terrorism of the 1970s-80s by interpreting it as an ethno-criminal phenomenon with orthodox ideological overtones, rather marginal in its nature and content - though highly effective in terms of its impact on the target audience. Unburdened with allusions about the categories of 'Good' and 'Evil', they considered this quite an autochthonous phenomenon from the perspective of its potential usage as a specific tool to influence the individual "pain points" of international relations in the interests of US foreign policy. Such a purely pragmatic approach had allowed the DoS analysts to persuade representatives of the top US political leadership that Armenian terrorism, apart from being a real international threat to the US interests and its allies in Europe and the South-West Asia, did not belong to the structure of global confrontation between the communist East and the capitalist West because of its autochthony and marginality. As a result, the latter could use it to serve its geostrategic interests. In the historical faith of the Soviet Union and the whole socialist bloc of countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, a factor of the 'tamed by the West Armenian terrorism' played a fatal role as Armenian nationalists and terrorists became a key strike force in organizing and deliberate unleashing in the second half of the 1980s of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh war, which essentially put an end to the existence of the USSR and the entire bloc of the Warsaw Pact.

# Governing the Global Commons: Geostrategic and Geoeconomic Sources of Discord in the International System

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James Sperling\*

The growing imbalance in rights and responsibilities in the international system not only strains regional security systems, but also jeopardizes the system of global economic governance, particularly as access to the global commons - maritime space, outer space, and cyberspace - entails critical policy vectors where it is increasingly difficult to differentiate security from economy. This article explores the impact of the global financial crises and redistribution of power in the international system on the geoeconomic and geopolitical systems of governance. The analysis proceeds in four stages. The first assesses the shifts that have taken place in the regional and global balances of capabilities since 1990 towards explaining the Chinese challenge to American geostrategic supremacy in the Pacific, the American response to Chinese revisionism, and the European effort to mollify the United States on military-strategic issues while currying mercantile favour with China. The second and third sections investigate, respectively, the systems of global economic and regional security governance, particularly with respect to major stakeholders' satisfaction with the status quo. The final section considers the intersection of the economic and strategic policy vectors in the global commons.



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*Introduction*

The post-war American presence in European and Asian affairs was occasioned by World War II, a conflict that left both Europeans and Asians dependent upon the US for their post-war economic recovery and military security.<sup>1</sup> The absence of his-

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torical, linguistic, and ethnic commonalities supporting the transatlantic community of mutual interests and values prevented the emergence of a parallel transpacific community supporting US engagement in Asia despite its strategic and economic entanglement in the Pacific. Unlike Europe, American engagement in the region has been predominately strategic and interest-driven, despite sporadic efforts to foster democratic governments and to graft Western values onto an unreceptive civilizational host. The American sense of exceptionalism often clashed with Europe's world-weariness and lingering sense of cultural superiority. In Asia, the immediacy of the colonial occupations, American and European connivance in sustaining those occupations into the first decade of the Cold War, and the reflexive assumption of civilizational superiority all reinforced Asian grievances vis-à-vis the West, particularly in China, which remains fixated on the 'century of humiliation'.

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The contradictory impulses engendered by the confluence of these psychological and cultural ties and complications have been exacerbated by competing American, European and Chinese conceptions of global governance and their roles as participant, architect, and guarantor. Transatlantic schisms emerged with the end of the Cold War; the dissolution of the Soviet Union and subsequent enfeeblement of the Russian Federation effectively ended Europe's strategic dependence on the United States. Those schisms were exacerbated by varying degrees of European discomfort with the emergence of US military unipolarity, the American triumphalism that it bred, and a newfound willingness to act alone, particularly during the George W. Bush administration.<sup>2</sup> Likewise, China's rapid economic rise

<sup>1</sup> I would like to thank Sonia Lucarelli, who critically read a very early draft of this article, as well as Husrev Tabak and an anonymous reviewer for their helpful and constructive comments on the penultimate draft. Thanks are also owed to my intrepid research assistant, Keery Walker.

<sup>2</sup> Calleo, D. (2009) *Follies of Power: America's Unipolar Fantasy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

after 1990 has led to deepening American concerns about the viability of American dominance in the Pacific and the risk of losing its privileged position as systemic guarantor.<sup>3</sup> Although Chinese rhetoric expresses an ambition to manage its ‘peaceful rise’, its full realization will nonetheless result in a modified system of global economic governance that reflects Chinese power and interests as well as the potential for Chinese military-strategic hegemony in the western Pacific.<sup>4</sup> And despite American rhetoric referring to the desirability and the potential for a strategic partnership with China, the US in fact views China as a potential military adversary in the South and East China Seas, the most likely challenger to US monetary prerogatives attending the reserve role of the dollar, and the key threat to an unfettered access to the global commons.<sup>5</sup>

These states coexist in an international system comprised of regional systems of security governance that float beneath a global system of economic governance. The system of global economic governance has been developed to maximize the joint-sum outcomes arising from deepening trade, financial, and macroeconomic interdependencies; it also enjoys a relatively high degree of legitimacy for existing and rising powers. The same cannot be said for the systems of regional security governance, which display different degrees of amity and enmity, (dis)satisfaction with the regional status quo, as well as the saliency of force in interstate relations.<sup>6</sup> China, the EU and the United States are all guarantors of the

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3 See Christensen, T.J. (2001) ‘Posing Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy’. *International Security*, 25(4), pp. 5-40; and Liff, A.P., and Ikenberry, G. John (2014) ‘Racing Toward Tragedy? China’s Rise, Military Competition in the Asia Pacific, and the Security Dilemma’. *International Security* 39(2): pp. 52-91. For a more sanguine assessment, see R. Uriu and Le, T. (2014) ‘Northeast Asia’ in Sperling, J. (ed.), *Handbook of Governance and Security*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 188-215.

4 On the meaning of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ and what it may mean for the United States role in the Asia Pacific, see Zheng, B. (2005) ‘China’s “Peaceful Rise” to Great Power Status’. *Foreign Affairs*, 84(5), pp. 18-24; Christensen, T.J. (2011), ‘The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing’s Abrasive Diplomacy’ *Foreign Affairs*, 90(2), pp. 54-67; and Breslin, S. (2013) ‘China and the global order: signalling threat or friendship?’ *International Affairs*, 89(3), pp. 615-34.

5 See US Department of Defense (2010) *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, pp. 63-67; and US Department of Defense (2014) *Quadrennial Defense Review*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, pp. 6-20; 34-5; and US Department of Defense (2013) *Air-Sea Battle: Service Collaboration to Address Anti-Access and Area Denial Challenges*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, pp. 2-7.

6 See Kirchner, E.J. and Sperling, J. (eds) (2010) *National Security Cultures: Patterns of Global Governance*. Abingdon: Routledge.

current global system of economic governance, but the United States is the sole direct stakeholder in both the Pacific and Atlantic systems of regional security governance. Neither the EU nor China are particularly concerned with assuming any responsibility for the former or latter, respectively, and the Russian Federation, which functions primarily as a revisionist power seeking to change the status quo and reassert its former dominance along its western and southern peripheries, presently lacks the financial and military wherewithal to influence significantly events outside that region.

The growing imbalance in rights and responsibilities not only puts a strain on the systems of regional security and global economic governance, but also impinges directly on the assured access to the global commons (including maritime space, outer space, and cyberspace), comprised of critical policy vectors where it is increasingly difficult to differentiate security from economy.<sup>7</sup> Aimed at understanding the nature of the threats posed to unimpeded access to the global commons by states and economic agents, this analysis proceeds in four stages. The first assesses the shifts that have taken place in the regional and global balances of capabilities since 1990, towards explaining the Chinese challenge to American geostrategic supremacy in the Pacific, the American response to Chinese revisionism, the marginalization of the Russian Federation, and the European effort to mollify the United States on military-strategic issues while currying mercantile favor with China. The second and third sections investigate, respectively, the global and regional systems of governance, particularly with respect to major stakeholders' (dis)satisfaction with the status quo. The final section considers the intersection of the economic and strategic policy vectors in the global commons.

### *Shifts in Regional and Global Balances of Power*

The end of the Cold War and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1992 marked a sudden shift from bipolarity to

<sup>7</sup> For the initial statement on US power and the global commons, see Posen, B. (2003) 'Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony', *International Security* 28(1), pp. 5-46. The emergence of the global commons as an active concern within NATO is reflected in Barrett, Maj. Gen. M., Bedford, D., Skinner, E., and Vergles, E. (2011) *Assured Access to the Global Commons*. Norfolk, VA: Supreme Allied Command Transformation, NATO. For a critique of the NATO approach to the Global Commons, see Sperling, J. (2011) 'NATO and the Global Commons: A Perspective on Emerging Challenges' in Alcaro, R. and Lucarelli, S. (eds), *Managing Change: NATO's Partnerships and Deterrence in a Globalised World*. Norfolk, VA: Supreme Allied Command Transformation, NATO.

military-strategic unipolarity and economic multipolarity, if the EU is considered as a single actor.<sup>8</sup> The EU-27 share of global GDP on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis in 1990 was greater than that of the United States (27.98% and 24.68%, respectively); those global GDP shares are essentially equal in 2013 and the US is projected to exceed that of the EU-27 in 2018.<sup>9</sup> On the military side of the ledger, the quantity and quality of European conventional, nuclear, and force projection capabilities remain second only to those of the United States, despite Europe's significant force projection capabilities shortfalls and the decline of European defense spending since 1990.

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A second major shift - the rise of China - emerged at the turn of the millennium; China's status as a great power was consolidated by the end of the first decade. The liberalization of the Chinese economy and its access to Western markets, technology, and capital transformed the geoeconomic landscape: in 1990, the Chinese share of global GDP was 3.87% (about equal to the British GDP share); in 2000, the Chinese share rose to 7.12% (about the same as the combined French and German GDP shares); in 2013, the Chinese share of 15.82% was equal to approximately 84% of the EU-27 share. China is projected to emerge as the world's largest economy (on PPP basis) in 2018 to be followed by the US and the EU-27. Similarly, Chinese defense spending as a share of global defense spending has increased: in 1990, China accounted for just 1.64% of global defense spending (compared to NATO's share of 56%), but by 2013, the Chinese share of global defense expenditures rose to 11% of the global total, while the European and American share remained about the same.<sup>10</sup> China's emergence as a manufacturing power, its increasingly critical role as global creditor, the rapid modernization of its armed forces, acquisition of maritime and land-based anti-access and area-denial

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<sup>8</sup> If the EU is disaggregated into its member states, however, the end of the Cold War also ushered in economic unipolarity; the closest competitors to the US were Japan (with 10.09% share) and Germany (with a 6.16% share).

<sup>9</sup> Data drawn from IMF (2013), 'Data and Statistics', Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/01/weodata/weoselgr.aspx> (Accessed: 15 November 2013). Author's calculations.

<sup>10</sup> SIPRI (2014) 'Military Expenditure Data Base'. Available at: [http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex\\_database](http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database) (Accessed: 15 November 2014). Author's calculations.

capabilities, and ambition to acquire a blue water navy have effectively ended unipolarity - or at least foreshadows the end of it. China's rise putatively threatens both America's strategic dominance in the Pacific and the integrity of the UNCLOS maritime regime, a regime that underpins US maritime dominance.<sup>11</sup> This second shift is largely responsible for the Obama administration's redeployment of US military assets to the Pacific Basin and repackaging of a strategic retreat from Europe as 'leading from behind'.<sup>12</sup>

A third major shift, the relegation of the Russian Federation to the status of a regional power, contributed to the relative rise of both the EU and China vis-à-vis the United States.<sup>13</sup> The Russian Federation's newfound status as a regional power is unlikely to persist in the long term given its human and physical resources, putative military capability, and geographic size and position in the Eurasian heartland, as Halford Mackinder would have it. In the medium term, however, Russia's ability to act on the global stage is limited by the decline in oil prices and the willingness of the other major states to accept Russia into the charmed circle of great powers. Its regional prerogatives, are unlikely to be challenged effectively by NATO or any other state in the region, particularly Turkey or Iran. Thus, Vladimir Putin's Russia appears capable not only of challenging or disrupting the certainties of the transatlantic system of security governance, but also of acting with impunity along its periphery with minimal risk of a NATO military response, as demonstrated by Russian interventions in Georgia, Moldova, and especially Ukraine.

<sup>11</sup> On the rising range and sources of threat to the maritime commons, see US Department of the Navy (2007) *A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower*. Washington, DC: US Department of Defense; NATO (2011) *Alliance Maritime Strategy* (Brussels: NATO); and Council of the European Union (2014), *European Union Maritime Strategy (EUMSS)- Action Plan, 17002/14*. Brussels: Council of the European Union.

<sup>12</sup> See White House (2015) *National Security Strategy*. Washington, DC: White House, pp. 3-5 and 24-25.

<sup>13</sup> President Barack Obama's 2014 observation that 'Russia is a regional power that is threatening some of its immediate neighbors' is not far off the mark. Its military forces are in a state of disrepair and defense spending, despite the modernization programme currently underway, is equal to only 10 per cent of US defense expenditures, 38 per cent of the combined British, French, German and Italian expenditures, and 55 per cent of Chinese expenditures. Moreover, Russia only accounts for only 3 per cent of global GDP, a share that is likely to decline if oil prices do not recover. See Wilson, S. (2014) 'Obama dismisses Russia as regional power acting out of weakness', *Washington Post*, 25 March. Available at: [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-dismisses-russia-as-regional-power-acting-out-of-weakness/2014/03/25/1e5a678e-b439-11e3-b899-20667de76985\\_story.html](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-dismisses-russia-as-regional-power-acting-out-of-weakness/2014/03/25/1e5a678e-b439-11e3-b899-20667de76985_story.html) (Accessed: 20 July 2015); and International Institute for Strategic Studies (2015) *The Military Balance*, London: IISS.

Developments within Europe amplified these systemic shifts in the structure of power. After 1989, the United States expected Europe to play a larger role in creating order and stability along its eastern and southern periphery. Europe simultaneously claimed the prerogative to do so, first within the NATO-sponsored European Security and Defense Identity, and subsequently within the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy - developments consistent with the declining relative power differential between the two pillars of the Alliance. Yet, the transition from the task of territorial defense to that of force projection supporting milieu-shaping security policies has eroded NATO's cohesion and clarity of purpose. There is no deep agreement on those regions critical to NATO or on the appropriate instruments for sustaining stable regional milieu. Moreover, regional instabilities present each ally with asymmetrical risks and vulnerabilities. Thus, the narrowing of the transatlantic power differential has enabled Europe to seek greater independence and autonomy from the United States (and NATO), while divergent interests within Europe have made the Europeans (and the EU) less compliant and useful security partners outside Europe.

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What have these shifts in the global and regional structures of power meant for the Euro-American relationship? First, Europeans undertook to shape their regional milieu consistent with European values and interests. Second, the end of bipolarity significantly reduced the costs of defecting from US policy preferences, with Europe adopting policies frustrating US objectives, defying the American expectation of European obeisance, or redefining their obligations under the Atlantic Alliance to act 'out of area'.<sup>14</sup> There has been a particular reticence to explicitly support US efforts to manage the shifting balance of power in the Asia-Pacific.

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What do these shifts in the global and regional structures of

<sup>14</sup> The 2011 Libyan operation is a case on point. For nuanced analyses of the NATO operation and its consequences for the alliance, see Engelbrekt, K., Mohlin, M. and Wagnsson, C. (eds) (2014) *The NATO Intervention in Libya: Lessons Learned from the Campaign*. Abingdon: Routledge; and Miskimmon, A. (2012) 'German Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis', *German Politics*, 21(4), pp. 392-410; and Coticchia, F. (2015) 'Effective strategic narratives? Italian Public Opinion and military operations in Iraq, Libya and Lebanon', *Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza*, pp. 1-26. Available at: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ipo.2015.1> (Accessed: 23 April 2015).

power mean for the Sino-American relationship? Chinese dissatisfaction with the US-sponsored post-war order in the Pacific has had three consequences: first, it led the Americans to recalibrate the strategic importance ascribed to Europe and downgrade American responsibility for secondary strategic challenges in southeastern Europe and the Mediterranean basin; second, European wariness of the US global security agenda, particularly in Asia, has manifested itself as European resistance to NATO's globalization from a fear of global entrapment in military-strategic issues which have no direct (or indirect) bearing on European security; and third, China has begun to challenge the post-war hegemonic order, not only with respect to American maritime prerogatives in the South Pacific but also American privileges and institutional power in the global system of economic governance.<sup>15</sup>

*Transatlantic cohesion has been strained by Europe's readiness to disagree with the United States on the definition of what constitutes a common strategic threat and the optimal method for addressing one, particularly with respect to the security salience for Europe of China's military modernization.*

These post-Cold War shifts in the global and regional structures of power have had four major consequences for the trilateral relationship between Europe, the United States and China. First, alliance cohesion - between North America and Europe or within Europe itself - weakened with the institutionalization of the NATO-Russian relationship. The process of transforming Russia from an adversary to a partner removed the existential threat to member-state security that gave giving Article 5 its binding power, although the annexation of Crimea has reinvigorated Article 5 and cast into doubt (again) the wisdom of enlargement and the purpose of NATO policy vis-à-vis Russia.<sup>16</sup> Second, transatlantic cohesion has been strained by Europe's readiness to disagree with

<sup>15</sup> On China as a revisionist power, see Rachman, G. (2014) 'Revisionist powers are driving the world's crises', *Financial Times*, 30 June, at: <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fb9a5ba6-fd4d-11e3-96a9-00144feab7de.html#axzz3Y31WDv6z> (Accessed: 21 April 2015). For representative analyses suggesting the China has limited aims in the international system, see Kang, D. (2007) *China Rising: Peace, Power and Order in East Asia*. New York: Columbia University Press or Johnston, A.I. (2003) 'Is China a Status Quo Power?', *International Security*, 27(4), pp. 5–56. An example of US efforts to block an expansion of Chinese economic influence in the international system was amply demonstrated in the Obama Administration's largely unsuccessful effort to persuade its closest allies to refrain from joining the China-sponsored Asia Infrastructure Development Bank. See Chakravorti, B. (2015) 'Bank is a Wake-Up Call for Washington', *Harvard Business Review*, 20 April, Available at: <https://hbr.org/2015/04/chinas-new-development-bank-is-a-wake-up-call-for-washington> (Accessed: 22 April 2015).

<sup>16</sup> For an early and recent critique of NATO enlargement and disregard for Russian strategic interests, see Kennan, G.F. (1997) 'A Fateful Error', *New York Times*, 5 February, p. A23; and Mearsheimer, J. (2014) 'Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin', *Foreign Affairs*. Available at: <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141769/john-j-mearsheimer/why-the-ukraine-crisis-is-the-west-s-fault> (Accessed: 24 April 2015).

the United States on the definition of what constitutes a common strategic threat *and* the optimal method for addressing one, particularly with respect to the security salience for Europe of China's military modernization. Third, Europe's geostrategic sanguinity in the Asia-Pacific is matched by a growing concern over the geostrategic trajectory of the Atlantic system during post-Crimea period. That concern translates into a positive re-evaluation of Europe's continuing dependence on the US security guarantee in Berlin, Warsaw and the capitals of the alliance's 'frontier' states more generally. The proliferation of territorial claims and counter claims in the Caucasus and the western Pacific underscores the continuing position of the United States as Europe's pacifier and Asia's traffic cop. And finally, as European trade in dual-use technologies or finished goods does not impose significant direct or indirect security costs on Europeans, their contribution to Chinese military modernization in the Pacific will inevitably emerge as a source of conflict with the US as the technology differential between the two antagonists narrows. This will replicate the European-American discord that attended the export of 'strategic' goods to the Soviet Union.

### *The Global System of Economic Governance*

The assessment of Europe and China's importance to the United States has both subjective and objective elements. But it is clear that the American political and foreign policy elites' subjective interpretation of Europe's capabilities, interests, and value as an ally and economic partner is not always consistent with Europe's contribution to American foreign policy goals or its economic importance for the United States. Similarly, the relatively 'quiet' role China played and was asked to play in the financial crisis contrasts vividly with the American geopolitical preoccupation with China's role in the Pacific as compared to its performance as a stakeholder in the global system of economic governance.

The concurrent financial, fiscal, and Eurozone crises have damaged transatlantic relations: the US increasingly considers 'Europe' to be an unreliable partner in addressing the negative externalities of globalization, while the Europeans blame the United States for the near col-

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lapse of the international financial system and macroeconomic policy solipsism.<sup>17</sup> The process of globalization has also weakened transatlantic multilateralism more generally, owing to the attending shifts in national calculations of self-interest and the geopolitical reorientation of the United States to regions of the world where multilateralism is normatively and institutionally weak, and where Europe lacks compelling geostrategic interests. The Sino-American relationship is, if anything, more complex: in the real sector of the economy, China is a critical trading partner but also one prone to ignore or bend the ‘rules of the game’: there are serious concerns about the non-protection of intellectual property rights, the tolerance if not sponsorship of industrial cyber-espionage, the violation of WTO trading rules that harm US (and European) producers and the multilateral trading regime more generally, and the government management of the external value of the renminbi, particularly the cross-exchange rate with the dollar. These US (and to a lesser extent European) complaints about Chinese trading practices must be considered in tandem with an equally important question: did China act as a responsible stakeholder and credible partner during the 2008 financial crisis?

The failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 conveniently demarcates the onset of the near-collapse of the international financial system and the Great Recession in the transatlantic economy. The European and Chinese responses to the crisis provide a basis for assessing whether China has acted as a ‘responsible’ stakeholder in managing the global macroeconomy. Eurozone Europe and China agreed that the crisis was ‘made in America’ and caused by an asset bubble created by low interest rates and ineffective regulation of the financial and banking sectors of the economy. An OECD report supported that claim, but also pointed to unsustainable Chinese, German and Japanese current account surpluses as a contributing and enabling factors.<sup>18</sup> The United States, despite the British and Japanese support for fiscal stimulus, faced a recalcitrant Germany and a supportive China. The US, however, had to craft a solution to the financial crisis and

<sup>17</sup> A typical European critique of US policy and regulatory policies can be found in Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie (BMWi) (2008) *Schlaglichter der Wirtschaftspolitik: Sonderheft Finanzkrise*. Berlin: BMWi.

<sup>18</sup> Furceri, D. and Mourougane, A. (2009). ‘Financial Crises: Past Lessons and Policy Implications’, *Economics Department Working Papers No. 668, ECO/WKP(2009)9*. Paris: OECD.

deepening recession that would satisfy the German demand for fiscal balance in Europe and global regulatory reform with the more pressing concern of allaying the Chinese (and Japanese) concern about the future value of their sizeable dollar-denominated assets. China emerged as a key partner for the United States, while the Germans saw China as the only solution to the problem of global economic growth *and* European austerity: Chancellor Merkel suggested that China pursue more expansive fiscal policies to increase global demand; China, in her view, could avoid increasing its level of debt and had a greater growth potential than Germany - two claims that could equally be made for Germany.<sup>19</sup> The United States, in turn, depended upon the Chinese willing purchase of US Treasury bonds to support the \$841.2 billion fiscal stimulus package and accept the attending risk of an eventual revaluation of the renminbi vis-à-vis the dollar.

Not only did the Chinese government acquiesce to the Obama administration's request that they continue to purchase US debt to finance the financial bailout and stimulus programs, but embarked upon their own fiscal stimulus program that risked inflation and a significant rise in central government debt. In 2010, the output gap in China was -0.05 (suggesting a near balance of potential and actual output) whereas the (unweighted) output gap was -6.3 for Germany, France and the UK, -5.5 in the US, and -7.9 in Japan. On the debt side of the equation, the Chinese central government balance rose from -0.1% of GDP in 2008 to -2.0% in 2009 and 2010, while the German balance increased from -0.1 to -4.2% and -4.6% for those two years. The German and US stimulus packages struck similar balances between tax reductions and spending increases, whereas the Chinese stimulus package was devoted almost exclusively to upfront expenditures. More important, the US and China fiscal stimulus packages amounted to \$841 billion (4.9% of GDP) and \$204 billion (4.4% of GDP), respectively, while the combined stimulus measures of France, Germany and the UK amounted to \$192 bn (2% of GDP on an unweighted basis).<sup>20</sup>

19 Wolf, M. (2009) 'Why G20 leaders will fail to deal with the big challenge', *Financial Times*, 1 April. Available at: <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/22e0122a-1e1d-11de-830b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Y9J6YsGc> (Accessed: 24 April 2015). The German position is presented in Benoit, B. (2009) 'Berlin warns US on inflation spiral', *Financial Times*, 18 March. Available at: <http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ded7c284-1341-11de-a170-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3Y9J6YsGc> (Accessed: 24 April 2015).

20 IMF (2009) *The State of Public Finances: Outlook and Medium-Term Policies After the 2008*

The macroeconomic consequence of the crisis, compounded by the paralytic political process in Washington, was the focal point of European (read German) dissatisfaction with the American policy response to the crisis, the so-far unrealized Chinese (and Japanese) concern about their dollar-denominated debt losing value owing to a steady depreciation of the dollar, inflation or even technical default, and the American concern that these deficits could leave future American governments facing an inescapable debt trap and vulnerable to linkages between the continued holding of US debt and the resolution of geostrategic conflicts on terms favorable to China. In important respects, China has supplemented, if not supplanted, Germany as the most likely candidate to perform the role of a macroeconomic 'locomotive' in the global economy. China is nonetheless an increasingly status quo participant in the current system of economic governance, with the exception of its desire to qualify the privileged position of the dollar in the current international monetary system.

### *Systems of Security Governance*

Regional security subsystems range from non-institutionalized governance (the transpacific balance of power) to more complex forms of governance (the transatlantic security community) to a virtual absence of regional governance (the South Caucasus).

The structural characteristics of the post-Westphalian European state impels them to seek highly institutionalized systems of security governance, just as the Westphalian states populating the Pacific Rim possess at best an instrumental and contingent interest in a weakly institutionalized one. Any security governance system has three distinct components - the regulator, the normative framework, interaction context - which fall along a broad spectrum of values.<sup>21</sup> The range of values assigned to these three constitutive elements for a particular system of security governance provides a mechanism for identifying and categorizing them along a continuum bounded by an international state of nature and a security community. The

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*Crisis, 6 March; IMF World Economic Outlook. Washington, DC: IMF.*

<sup>21</sup> These three variables are drawn from, respectively, Rosecrance, R. (1963) *Action and Reaction in World Politics: International Systems in Perspective*. New York: Little Brown; Holsti, K.J. (1991) *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648-1989*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; and Sperling, J. and Webber, M. (2014) 'Security Governance in Europe: A Return to System', *European Security*, 23(2), pp. 126-44.

*system regulator* identifies the conflict resolution mechanism(s) dominating a given geopolitical space. As the utility or legitimacy of war declines, so too does the willingness of states to rely on it to regulate conflict. Where there is a coalescence of national identities into a broader collective identity, institutions are likely to emerge as the preferred mechanism for conflict resolution. Where those conditions are absent, war remains the *ratio ultima regum*. The *normative framework* of a governance system considers whether system-level norms govern within-group interactions, the extent to which both the sovereignty principle is discounted and within-group war or coercion is delegitimized. When those conditions are met, system-level norms become intrinsic to the calculation of interest. When they are not, narrow national interests will trump system norms when they collide. The *interaction context* refers to the level of amity and enmity in the system and the intensity of the security dilemma. If state interactions are embedded in international or regional *institutions*, the security dilemma is likely to dissipate and amity will characterize interstate relations. Similarly, where states retain sovereign prerogatives and treat sovereignty as inviolable, then the security dilemma will remain acute, war remains a viable option, and bilateral relations will be characterized by enmity.<sup>22</sup>

A dense network of institutions, the most important of which are NATO and the EU, characterize the transatlantic system of security governance. Although NATO and the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy remain intergovernmental in nature, the level of defence cooperation in both institutions is unsurpassed anywhere else in the world. It is also the case that in critical areas of security-infrastructure protection, cross-border crime and terrorism, European states have sacrificed a great deal of sovereignty in order to craft and execute common solutions. Security governance in the transatlantic security space has the following characteristics: there are mechanisms for the peaceful adjudication and resolution of conflict; there are instrumental and normative constraints on the use of force, an unwillingness to use force as an instrument of within-group conflict resolution, and an expectation that interactions are rule-governed; and

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<sup>22</sup> For a comprehensive exploration of these variables, see Sperling, J. (2014) 'Regional Security Governance' in Sperling, J. (ed.) *Handbook of Governance and Security*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 98-121.

collective identity formation has created high levels of amity and the literal absence of an intragroup security dilemma.

There are three systems of security governance coexisting and overlapping in the Asia-Pacific. The first is characterized by a system of non-transitive, spoke-and-hub bilateral security relationships between the United States and its major allies in the region—South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.<sup>23</sup> The second is the ten-member Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which represents a multilateral system intended to reinforce the principle of non-interference, facilitate economic cooperation, and insulate those nations from great power competition.<sup>24</sup> The third is the China-sponsored Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which was initially designed as a forum for resolving border conflicts in Central Asia, but now represents a Sino-Russian institutional framework for balancing US power in the region.<sup>25</sup> The transpacific system of security governance corresponds to the elements of a balance of power system. There is a lack of normative constraints on the use of force as an instrument

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for effecting within-group conflict resolution - a willingness demonstrated within the ASEAN countries and now between China and the majority of the western Pacific littoral states. International law plays a non-binding role in the governance of interstate interactions when conflicts arise; there are no established and legitimate mechanisms for the peaceful adjudication and resolution of conflicts that touch on issues of national sovereignty. Moreover, national identities remain sharply defined and constructed in opposition to the other states and civilizations occupying the Pacific Basin - the Japanese, American and Chinese exceptionalisms are mutually exclusive and historical grievances from the distant past remain operational. The lack of trust in the region - particularly between

23 See Cha, V.D. (2009/10) 'Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia', *International Security*, 34(3), pp. 158-96; and Ikenberry, G.J. (2004), 'American hegemony and East Asian order', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 58(3), pp. 353-367.

24 The understanding of the precise nature of the system of governance in Southeast Asia ranges from those claiming it is a security community to those who treat it as a system governed by the balance of power. See, respectively, Acharya, A. (2014) *Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order*. 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. Abingdon: Routledge; and Emmers, R. (2004), *Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF*. Abingdon: Routledge

25 For the best treatment of this subject, see Cooley, A. (2014), *Great games, local rules: The new great power contest in Central Asia*. New York: Oxford University Press.

China and the US, between China and Japan, and between China, Japan and their littoral neighbors - reflects a high level of enmity and an aggravated security dilemma, particularly between the US and China.

The South Caucasus region represents a geostrategic buffer between the Atlantic and transpacific systems of security governance, but disruptions in that regional subsystem have significant (and negative) security repercussions, particularly for European states. In the absence of any effective regional platform, the current system of security governance in the South Caucasus region can be best described as a geopolitical version of bare-knuckle boxing. Only a balance of power or cooperation among Russia, Turkey and Iran, coupled with resolution of intra-regional conflicts can minimize the prospect of future wars in this region or provide a foundation for the regional institution building. NATO intervention or NATO membership are not realistic options; despite Alliance rhetoric there is no appetite to offer membership to any of the states wedged between the Black and Caspian Seas or to challenge Russian interventions along its periphery. In the South Caucasus, currently, there is no effective mechanism for the peaceful adjudication and resolution of conflicts. The states in the region face an intense security dilemma; there are no instrumental or normative constraints on the use of force; and international law seemingly fails to have binding force on regional actors, particularly in term of deviating attempts of the alteration of internationally recognized boundaries.

### *The Global Commons*

The global commons represents the intersection of the policy vectors of global economic and regional security governance. The preoccupation with assured access to the global commons may be attributed to the concurrent demilitarization of security within the transatlantic area and the securitization of issues once considered the exclusive domain of domestic politics. The four domains constituting the global commons - aerospace, maritime space, cyberspace and outer space - are inextricably linked, but the rules and principles governing maritime

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*The four domains constituting the global commons - aerospace, maritime space, cyberspace and outer space - are inextricably linked, but the rules and principles governing maritime space, cyberspace, and outer space are increasingly contested.*

space, cyberspace, and outer space are increasingly contested.

*The Maritime Commons.* The maritime commons retains an unparalleled security salience: the global and Atlantic economies are a heavily dependent on sea-borne trade for manufactures and raw materials, and three-quarters of global trade passes through vulnerable international straits and canals. The evolution of the global supply chain has made the advanced economies particularly vulnerable to any disruption of maritime trade, the global communications infrastructure is underpinned by a complex web of undersea cables, and global energy infrastructures are similarly dependent upon a stable maritime space. The violation of any component of ‘freedom of the seas’ inevitably impinges upon the American and European ability to engage rivals at sea or to intervene militarily in regions outside the North Atlantic area deemed critical to allied security.<sup>26</sup>

These objectives, in turn, have focused NATO’s attention on the importance of protecting the integrity of the UNCLOS regime, particularly innocent passage through territorial seas, transit through straits used for international navigation, archipelagic sea passage, and key legal definitions such as territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and continental shelf. The importance of the UNCLOS regime reflects the perceived threat posed to Allied freedom of action on the seas owing to the putative and actual emergence of China as a formidable maritime power in conjunction with China’s revisionist ambitions in the South China Sea and ongoing infringement of the UNCLOS provision on innocent passage inside the internationally recognized Chinese EEZ.<sup>27</sup>

The US and Europe equate the integrity of the UNCLOS regime with the protection of the transatlantic economies from disrupt-

<sup>26</sup> These concerns are expressed in NATO Allied Command Transformation (2010) *ACT Workshop Report. NATO in the Maritime Commons*, (Norfolk, VA: USS Enterprise, 30 September). Available at: [http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2010/ge/report03\\_norfolk.pdf](http://www.act.nato.int/images/stories/events/2010/ge/report03_norfolk.pdf) (Accessed: 15 July 2011); Smith-Windsor, B. (2009) ‘Securing the Commons: Towards NATO’s New Maritime Strategy’, *Research Paper No 49*. Rome: NATO Defense College; and Dowdall, J. and Hasani, B. (2010) *Protecting the Global Commons, SDA Report*. Brussels: Security & Defence Agenda.

<sup>27</sup> Paxton, J.M., Jr. and Kühnel, P. (2008) *Maritime Security Primer: Global Maritime Security Cooperation in an Age of Terrorism and Transnational Threats at Sea*. Copenhagen: Multilateral Planners Conference VI, pp. 6-7. Available at: [http://jcs.dtic.mil/j5/conference/MPCVI\\_Maritime\\_Sec\\_Primer.pdf](http://jcs.dtic.mil/j5/conference/MPCVI_Maritime_Sec_Primer.pdf) (Accessed: 25 August 2012).

tions to sea-borne trade and the preservation of NATO's comparatively unencumbered maritime power projection capabilities. Policy analysts recognize that the NATO maritime powers alone are unable to ensure freedom of the seas or counter the threats posed by piracy, drug trafficking, and sea-borne WMD proliferation in the Indian Ocean, the Straits of Malacca, or elsewhere.<sup>28</sup> A global system of maritime surveillance protecting sea-borne commerce could be enforced by a US-led Global Maritime Partnership or by integrated regional initiatives, but China among others is unlikely to acquiesce to a system that perpetuates US dominance. Yet, American naval forces - and those of the NATO allies more generally - are central to any global solution to the security threats posed to the uninterrupted flow of goods on the high seas. The policy debate attending the progressive globalization of NATO's naval role has revealed fissures between the continental and maritime member states of the Alliance. But those fissures pale in comparison with the chasm between NATO and non-NATO states, particularly those with a plausible claim to regional dominance, notably China, India, and Russia. The purpose - and hence legitimacy - of a NATO-dominated maritime order is questioned outside the North Atlantic area. Arguably, the BRICS have as great a stake in an uninterrupted flow of manufactures and raw materials on the high seas as do NATO member states. Despite the recognition that NATO alone is unable to provide security on the high seas, the emerging maritime powers are viewed as posing a challenge to US (and NATO) governance of the global maritime commons, rather than as potential partners contributing to the stability of the global economy - a contradictory position if maritime space is indeed a global commons.

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US suspicions of the Chinese, Indian, or Russian maritime ambitions are only explicable if the western ambition is to lock in the American command of the maritime commons. As China - and the other BRICS - become capable of challenging the maritime prerogatives now enjoyed by American (and NATO) naval forces

<sup>28</sup> Barrett, Maj. Gen. M., Bedford, D., Skinner, E., and Vergles, E. (2011) *Assured Access to the Global Commons*. Norfolk, VA: Supreme Allied Command Transformation, NATO, pp. 7-9.

outside the North Atlantic region, the viability of the maritime regime currently servicing their shared commercial interests will be undermined by opposed diplomatic and strategic objectives in the Indian and Arctic Oceans and the South China Sea. Thus, the geostrategic and geoeconomic requirements for securing the maritime commons are counter-indicative: the latter would welcome an enhanced BRICS naval contribution for the purposes of enforcing the letter and substance of the UNCLOS, while the former underscores the need for continued American (and NATO) naval dominance.

*Cyberspace.* Cyberspace has perforated national sovereignty; it has accelerated the growing irrelevance of geography and borders for commerce, finance, and communications. The revolution in information technologies and the digital linking of national economies and societies has contributed to the unparalleled openness, productivity, and vulnerability of NATO member state economies. The ease with which disturbances are transmitted across cyberspace and the difficulty of deflecting those disturbances have reduced systemic resiliency to exogenous shocks or malevolent acts by a broad range of actors. Not only is data transmitted in cyberspace vulnerable to attack, so too are the physical and virtual infrastructures containing cyberspace. The private ownership of the cyber infrastructure (e.g., software and the global fiber-optic cable network) in conjunction with the military reliance upon that infrastructure has not only securitized civilian cyberspace, but elevated cyberspace to a critical theatre of NATO operations.<sup>29</sup>

The threats to cyberspace are varied with respect to agent (terrorists, malicious hackers, criminals, states), strategies of disruption (computer network operations, computer network attack, domination of the electromagnetic spectrum), and target (data, physical infrastructure or software).<sup>30</sup> Moreover, major power vulnerability to the disruption of cyberspace is asymmetrical. Unlike Americans and Europeans, late adapters - like China - have been able to reduce their vulnerability to disrupted cyber-

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29 Ames, P. (Rapporteur) (2010) *Cyber Security: A Transatlantic Perspective*. Brussels: Security and Defence Agenda, p. 5.

30 See Brenner, J. (2011) *America the Vulnerable: Inside the New Threat Matrix of Digital Espionage, Crime, and Warfare*. London: Penguin.

space with national gateway controls. Moreover, the American-led embrace of net-centric warfare has created new vulnerabilities for American and Allied forces, particularly with regard to the targeted destruction of the physical or virtual infrastructure of cyberspace.

There are significant external barriers to the creation of a viable international regime creating a cyber-commons.<sup>31</sup> First, any regime must first address the problem of attribution, state responsibility for non-state actors operating within national jurisdictions, and the proportionality of response to cyber-attacks, - spying or - commercial espionage. Second, the physical conflation of commercial and military assets places into question the appropriate institution for crafting such a regime, particularly since the critical vulnerabilities of western societies are economic and financial data networks, and the legitimacy of a leading NATO role is contested in the Asia-Pacific. A final barrier to an effective international regime protecting access to the cyber-commons is the opposing strategic objectives of the major cyber-antagonists in the international system, the United States and China: each seeks cyber-dominance and the ability to disrupt the networks of potential adversaries.

*Outer Space.* The outer space and cyberspace commons are partially substitutable: each can be used to transmit data. Access to the space commons, however, is essential for the important (military) task of data collection, whereas cyberspace remains the key location for storing and analyzing data. The vulnerabilities plaguing the outer space commons are not dissimilar to those found in cyberspace and, like cyberspace, the securitization of space has virtually erased the distinction between the civilian and military functions of space-based communications assets. The military-strategic importance of outer space can hardly be overstated. NATO and US access to space-based assets is the *sine qua non* for expeditionary operations, a state of affairs driven by the transition to net-centric warfare.<sup>32</sup> The overriding goal of NATO in the outer space commons is the development of an internation-

31 For a comprehensive overview, see Tikk, E. (2012) 'Establishing Rules for Cyber Security' in Jasper, S. (ed.), *Conflict and Cooperation in the Global Commons*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, pp. 215-31.

32 On US policy see, US Department of Defense and Office of the Director of Central Intelligence (2011) *National Security Space Strategy: Unclassified Summary*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, pp. 5-13.

al space regime that will establish rules for orbital (and spectrum) allocations that will not degrade or impede NATO's military mission. NATO access to space-based assets is threatened by any number of actors - states, terrorist or criminal organizations or even recreational hackers, matched only by the number of threats to access: electronic warfare, anti-satellite weapons, kinetic attacks on ground stations, and space debris that threatens the integrity of space-based platforms.

An effective and broadly legitimate outer space regime faces significant barriers. First, a common space policy is problematic owing to the competitive nature of national space programs. Established and rising powers alike seek to reap the commercial benefits of a robust space industry, and all parties have an interest in enhancing or acquiring an autonomous space-based intelligence capability. Moreover, the American transition to net-centric warfare and the policy objective of space dominance creates another set of barriers: the former has made US armed forces extremely vulnerable to an interruption of space-based communications and information gathering platforms, while the latter requires an offensive as well as defensive capability in space - an option China has chosen and Europe has explicitly rejected.<sup>33</sup> There is little evidence that NATO member states and formal US allies in Asia jointly possess the legitimacy or power to create unilaterally a regime that would allow the Americans unfettered access to outer space in support of out-of-area operations or enhance the ability to project power into areas of strategic concern to China and other rising powers. Most important, perhaps, is the improbability that China, or any other rising power, will function as a constructive partner in forging an international agreement that does little more than reduce the vulnerability of space-based platforms critical to US (or NATO) military operations.

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33 See Paradiso, N. (2013) 'The EU Dual Approach to Security and Space: Twenty Years of European Policy Making', *Report 45*. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute, pp. 25-3; and Rathgeber, W. and Remuss, N-L (2009) *Space Security: A formative role and Principled Identity for Europe*. Vienna: European Space Policy Institute.

## Conclusion

The post-war consensus on the rules governing the various aspects of the global commons has been disrupted by abrupt changes in the hierarchy of power as well as technological changes that have outstripped international law and the ability of states to control their borders, particularly with respect to cyberspace. Many of the major stakeholders in the international system - the EU (and its member states), the US and Japan - remain by and large status quo states with respect to the rules governing access to each domain of the global commons. But the others are not. The Russian Federation and China, particularly, are challenging those rules across each domain in response to their desire for a change in the current status quo privileging American power and prerogatives. The Chinese challenge to the American-dominated system reflects an effort to realign the rules and principles of the governance systems consistent with China's emergence as a great power. The Russian Federation, particularly under Vladimir Putin, has challenged the governance systems in an effort to reassert the geopolitical prerogatives enjoyed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

The global system of economic governance remains largely uncontested, although there are demands, particularly by China, that the dollar be displaced from its position at the center of the global financial and monetary system - a goal shared with France and Germany, among others, to varying degrees of intensity and sincerity since the late 1960s. Despite the heralded rise of the BRICS countries as major players in the global economy, only China enjoys the same status and legitimacy as the EU, Japan and the US as governors of the global economy. The systems of security governance, however, remain more volatile and varied than the global system of economic governance; they reveal the deep conflicts of interest that exist between Russia and the NATO allies in the transatlantic setting, particularly the nature and extent of Russian influence along its western and southern boundaries. In the Asia-Pacific, China's assertion of territorial claims along its entire littoral areas and dissatisfaction with the UNCLOS regime is consistent with China's desire to resume its

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‘historical’ prerogatives in Asia. That desire, in turn, has engendered regional patterns of both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ balancing with the United States, particularly after the American pivot to Asia.

The tensions within the systems of governance are increasingly played out in the contestation of the rules governing the global commons. The intra-mural debates between the United States and Europe on the commons have so far been restricted to a marginal contestation of the rules, rather than a questioning of the principles underlying them. The BRICS, led by China and Russia, are dissatisfied with both the rules and the principles governing the commons. For the United States, open access to the four domains of the global commons underpins its ability to operate globally on air, land and sea, while for China and the other BRICS, open access translates into a system of rules and norms that facilitate US strategic hegemony and economic dominance. Just as the US has an interest in sustaining the regimes governing the commons and ensuring that any modification to them does no harm to its strategic interests, China and Russia have an interest in modifying those governance systems to minimize US strategic freedom of action and to expand their own. The future is not particularly promising: the US is unlikely to yield to Russian or Chinese demands for a fundamental change in the current systems of governance, particularly in the global maritime commons; and neither Russia nor China is likely to abandon its efforts to effect such changes.

# OSCE and Conflict Resolution in the Post-Soviet Area: The Case of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

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Azad Garibov\*

The Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is one of the several conflicts in the post-Soviet space in which Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is involved in mediation of peace negotiations, but failed to facilitate any kind of sustainable resolution of the conflict. The OSCE continued peace-making efforts from 1992 to date; it has deployed several institutions that are tasked dealing with conflict, including the OSCE Minsk Group. In the environment of impunity coupled with the inefficacy of OSCE, Armenia refuses to compromise for the sake of peace and repeatedly sabotages the negotiations process, rendering resolution of the conflict virtually impossible. In such a complex situation, the OSCE needs to be very committed and to have a significantly more effective and coherent peace building strategy. However, OSCE's peace efforts and mediation strategy suffers significant setbacks; the major purpose of the Minsk Group troika's efforts seems to have become 'conflict management' rather than genuine conflict resolution.



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*Introduction*

The Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is one of the few conflicts in the post-Soviet space in which Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is heavily involved in terms of mediation of peace negotiations. The conflict started at the end of 1980s, when Armenia sought to annex the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast of Azerbaijan (NKAO), seizing the opportunity created by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The conflict gradually evolved into a full-scale interstate war between Armenia and Azerbaijan as they gained independence, leaving about 30,000 dead and over a million IDPs and refugees. The active phase of the bloodiest of the post-Soviet conflicts ended with a ceasefire agreement of 1994. Hostilities continue ever since taking the lives of dozens of soldiers each year and the line of contact between Armenian and Azerbaijani troops has become the most militarized area in the whole post-Soviet space.

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*Azerbaijan still hopes for peaceful resolution of the conflict based on mutual compromises - unconditional withdrawal of occupation forces, return of displaced people to their homes, restoration of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, opening of all communication routes with Armenia and guarantee of high level self-rule for Karabakhi Armenians. However, the delays and stagnation of the peace process threaten to render resort to military means as the only viable solution for restoring territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.*

The OSCE Minsk Group was created in 1992, and the co-chairmanship institution was introduced in 1994 in order to carry out mediation between the conflict parties. However, despite more than two decades of negotiations, the OSCE has failed to achieve a breakthrough in regard to this protracted and complex conflict. Armenia capitalizes a lack of international interest, taking unlawful actions to strengthen the status quo in the conflict zone, which strongly favors Yerevan. Azerbaijan still hopes for peaceful resolution of the conflict based on mutual compromises - unconditional withdrawal of occupation forces, return of displaced people to their homes, restoration of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, opening of all communication routes with Armenia and guarantee of high level self-rule for Karabakhi Armenians. However, the delays and stagnation of the peace process threaten to render resort to military means as the only viable solution for restoring territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.

This article evaluates the course of the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process in order to uncover the scope of the OSCE's action with regard to conflict resolution and ana-

lyze the reasons for the failure of the peace process. As a mediator of the conflict resolution process in Nagorno-Karabakh, is OSCE acting as an effective peace broker, or is it contributing to the protraction of the conflict and the continuation of the dangerous ‘no war, no peace’ situation? In addressing these questions, the article first provides a historical overview of the peace process, and then describes the scope of the OSCE’s current activity, and the kinds of institutions it has deployed in the service of conflict resolution. Finally, and most importantly, the article seeks to shed light on why the OSCE is failing to bring peace to this war-torn region.

### *Historical Overview of the Peace Process*

Until 1991, there were no international mediation efforts towards resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as both Azerbaijan and Armenia were parts of Soviet Union and any foreign effort could be considered interference into domestic affairs of the USSR. When both countries became independent, the conflict was gradually internationalized. In 1991-1992, the first unsuccessful mediation attempts were made by Russia, Kazakhstan and Iran. The United Nations did not shoulder the responsibility for conflict mediation, as it was already overburdened with other priorities around the world.<sup>1</sup> In 1992 Azerbaijan and Armenia became members of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), and the CSCE undertook a major mediating role from then on.

At the beginning, the CSCE sent a special mission of rapporteurs (headed by Karel Schwarzenberg and later by Dienstdier) to gather information about the conflict. After the brutal massacre against Azerbaijanis in Khojaly by Armenian armed forces on February 26 1992, at the Additional Meeting of the CSCE Council of Ministers (Helsinki, March 1992) a decision was taken to convene a conference on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in Minsk as soon as possible, under the auspices of the CSCE with the aim of providing an effective forum for negotiations towards a peaceful settlement.<sup>2</sup> From then on, the OSCE negotia-

<sup>1</sup> Esmira Jafarova (March 2014) “OSCE Mediation of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”, *The Washington Review of Turkish & Eurasian Affairs*, available at: <http://www.thewashingtonreview.org/articles/osce-mediation-of-nagorno-karabakh-conflict.html> (accessed 23 July 2015)

<sup>2</sup> The Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Republic of Austria, *Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)*, available at: <http://www.azembassy.at/multilateral-issues/osce/>

tion group formally known as ‘the Minsk Group’ and comprised of eleven participating states (current members of the Group are Belarus, the US, Russia, France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland, and Turkey, as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan) took the role of the key mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process.

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From the outset, the CSCE’s mediation efforts were complicated by developments in Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia’s occupation of the cities of Shusha (May 8, 1992) and Lachin (May 18, 1992) further escalated the conflict and damaged peace efforts.<sup>3</sup> In November 1992, the CSCE decided to establish a special planning process to prepare the Advance Monitoring Group to be deployed in the region. Subsequently, in February 1993 a preliminary agreement was signed to send a group of special observers to monitor the situation. However, new Armenian attacks in Kelbajar district of Azerbaijan at the end of March, and a new surge in the level of violence in the front line played havoc with peace plans.<sup>4</sup>

*In April 1993, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 822, condemning the occupation of Kelbajar region and other areas of Azerbaijan by Armenian forces and demanding an end to military actions and the unconditional withdrawal of forces.*

At the beginning of 1993, in an attempt to restart the stalled CSCE negotiations, Russia, Turkey and the United States held a series of private discussions, resulting in what became known as the ‘3+1 initiative’ which was ultimately failed due to the Armenia’s “concerns about Karabakh Armenians’ rejection”.<sup>5</sup>

In April 1993, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 822, condemning the occupation of Kelbajar region and other areas of Azerbaijan by Armenian forces and demanding an end to military actions and the unconditional withdrawal of forces. Throughout 1993, the UN Security Council adopted three further resolutions (853, 874 and 884) demanding the unconditional withdrawal of Arme-

(accessed 10 July 2015)

3 Ramiz Mehdiyev (2014) Nagorno-Karabakh: The History Read from the Sources (in Russian Нагорный Карабах: История, прочитанная по источникам), Moscow: Akvarius publishing, p. 262

4 Esmira Jafarova (March 2014) “OSCE Mediation of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”, *The Washington Review of Turkish & Eurasian Affairs*, available at: <http://www.thewashingtonreview.org/articles/osce-mediation-of-nagorno-karabakh-conflict.html> (accessed 23 July 2015)

5 Bahar Başer (15 July 2013) “The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Minsk Group: Towards a more productive engagement?”, *ADA Biweekly*, Vol. 6, No. 14, available at: [http://biweekly.ada.edu.az/vol\\_6\\_no\\_14/The\\_Nagorno\\_Karabakh\\_conflict\\_and\\_the\\_Minsk\\_Group\\_Towards\\_a\\_more\\_productive\\_engagement.htm?print=1](http://biweekly.ada.edu.az/vol_6_no_14/The_Nagorno_Karabakh_conflict_and_the_Minsk_Group_Towards_a_more_productive_engagement.htm?print=1) (accessed 7 July 2015)

nian forces from the occupied territories of Azerbaijan, all of which were ignored by Armenia and remain unfulfilled to date.

From 1993 to December 1994, Russia played an influential role in brokering peace in the region. Russian diplomats and Russia's special envoy to the Minsk Group employed shuttle diplomacy to mediate between the conflicting parties.<sup>6</sup> Russia sought to seize control of the situation through this mediating role, and did eventually succeed in brokering a ceasefire agreement in Bishkek in May 1994. When the ceasefire agreement entered into force the territory of former NKAO and 7 adjacent administrative regions of Azerbaijan – roughly 20% of the country remained under occupation of Armenia.

After the signing of the so-called 'Contract of the Century' - in September 1994 between the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and consortium of foreign oil companies on the development and production sharing of Azerbaijan's oil reserves in the Caspian sea, the West began to perceive Azerbaijan in more strategic terms.<sup>7</sup> Signing of the contract increased the West's interest in the region and consequently intensified its engagement in the conflict resolution giving the new momentum to the peace process via CSCE mediation.

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The CSCE Budapest Summit in December 1994 discussed the conflict and established the co-chairmanship institution of the Minsk Group "to conduct effective negotiations to end armed hostilities and create conditions for calling Minsk conference."<sup>8</sup> Russia and Sweden served as the first co-chairs of the Group. The introduction of the co-chairmanship played key role in moving the CSCE forward from the initial stalemate it had encountered. The Budapest Summit also adopted a decision on the deployment of the CSCE multinational peacekeeping force after the achievement of the possible agreement between the Parties on the cessation of the armed conflict. To that end, the High Level Planning Group (HLPG) was established to assist the CSCE Chairperson

6 Ibid

7 Esmira Jafarova (March 2014) "OSCE Mediation of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict", *The Washington Review of Turkish & Eurasian Affairs*, available at: <http://www.thewashingtonreview.org/articles/osce-mediation-of-nagorno-karabakh-conflict.html> (accessed 23 July 2015)

8 Ramiz Mehdiyev (2014) Nagorno-Karabakh: The History Read from the Sources (in Russian Нагорный Карабах: История, прочитанная по источникам), Moscow: Akvarius publishing, p. 265

in Office with the preparation and deployment of CSCE peace-keeping force.

At the December 1996 OSCE Lisbon Summit, the major principles of conflict resolution were set forth, gaining support from all member countries except Armenia. The principles included (1) territorial integrity of both countries; (2) legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh defined in an agreement based on self-determination which confers on Nagorno-Karabakh the highest degree of self-rule within Azerbaijan; (3) guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and its whole population.<sup>9</sup> The principles were accepted by 53 out of 54 participating states of the Lisbon Summit, including Russia. However, Armenia rejected the principles, and due to the consensus rule, it was not possible to reflect the principles in the final Lisbon document.

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In 1997 France took over the Finnish co-chairmanship seat (Sweden vacated this position to Finland in 1995). This gave rise to opposition from Azerbaijan, which requested United States representative instead. The dispute was resolved by appointing the United States as a third co-chair and since then this troika has remained in place. It was also in 1997 that the direct negotiations were suspended and substituted with shuttle visits by the co-chairs to Armenia, Azerbaijan and the conflict zone.

In June 1997, the Minsk Group co-chairs, during their visit to the region, presented a proposal for solution of the conflict which became known as a ‘package’ solution. The proposal envisaged achieving the solution on cessation of hostilities/withdrawal of armed forces by Armenia and the agreement on final status of Nagorno-Karabakh region in one stage. Despite the agreement of Azerbaijan to start the negotiation based on this document, the proposal was rejected by Armenia claiming that it was against of the idea to determine the status of Nagorno-Karabakh at the Minsk Conference.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> The Embassy of the Republic of Azerbaijan to the Republic of Austria, *Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)*, available at: <http://www.azembassy.at/multilateral-issues/osce/> (accessed 10 July 2015)

<sup>10</sup> Ramiz Mehdiyev (2014) Nagorno-Karabakh: The History Read from the Sources (in Russian Нагорный Карабах: История, прочитанная по источникам), Moscow: Akvarius publishing, p. 267

In September 1997, the Minsk Group co-chairs put forward new proposal based on a ‘stage-by-stage’ approach to the resolution of the conflict. According to the proposal, it was planned at the first stage to liberate 6 occupied regions, to deploy the OSCE peacekeeping operation, to return the displaced persons to the liberated territories and to restore main communications in the conflict zone. At the second stage the problems of Lachin and Shusha were to be solved and the main principles of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh were to be adopted. As a result, the OSCE Minsk Conference ought to be convened. On 10 October 1997, the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia in their joint Statement in Strasbourg stated that “the recent proposals of the Co-Chairmen were a hopeful basis for the resumption of negotiations within the framework of the Minsk Group”.<sup>11</sup>

However, despite the President Levon Ter-Petrossian’s initial agreement, the proposal was fiercely rejected by his political opponents in Armenia and he was forced to resign. With the coming to power in March 1998 of Robert Kocharian, the leader of Nagorno-Karabakh separatist, Armenia officially withdrew the consent to the proposals on the ‘stage-by-stage’ settlement of the conflict.<sup>12</sup>

In November 1998, the Minsk Groups co-chairs put forward proposals based on the concept of a ‘common State’. According to this concept, Nagorno-Karabakh would have the status of a State and a territorial unit in the form of a republic, which, together with Azerbaijan would constitute the common state within the internationally recognized borders of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan rejected the proposal since they violated its sovereignty and contradicted the Lisbon principles.<sup>13</sup>

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In order to give an additional impetus to the negotiations, in April 1999 direct talks between the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia took place. In 1999-2001 the presidents met several times in

11 MFA of Azerbaijan, “Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: General Overview”, available at: <http://mfa.gov.az/?language=en&options=content&id=835> (accessed 19 July 2015)

12 Ramiz Mehdiyev (2014) Nagorno-Karabakh: The History Read from the Sources (in Russian Нагорный Карабах: История, прочитанная по источникам), Moscow: Akvarius publishing, p. 265

13 MFA of Azerbaijan, “Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: General Overview”, available at: <http://mfa.gov.az/?language=en&options=content&id=835> (accessed 19 July 2015)

Washington, Istanbul, Geneva, Davos, Moscow, Yalta, Paris and Key West. However, mutually exclusive demands of the parties coupled with Armenia's rigid negotiating position to perpetuate its gains from the war rendered these talks fruitless.<sup>14</sup>

In 2002, two meetings between the special representatives of the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan took place near Prague. The direct talks between the Foreign Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan started to be known as the so-called 'Prague Process' since 2004.

During the meeting between the two presidents in Kazan in 2005, the Minsk Group co-chairs set forth 'basic principles' for further negotiations.<sup>15</sup> These principles were later refined and presented to the conflict parties at the OSCE Madrid Ministerial Council in 2007. The so-called 'Madrid Principles' were further updated in 2009. Initiation of Madrid principles brought a degree of opti-

*Initiation of Madrid principles brought a degree of optimism about a window of opportunity to achieve a settlement between the election cycles in Azerbaijan and Armenia.*

mism about a window of opportunity to achieve a settlement between the election cycles in Azerbaijan and Armenia. In 2010 Azerbaijan partially disclosed the principles to the press. The principles envisaged withdrawal of Armenian troops from five occupied regions around Nagorno-Karabakh and partial withdrawal from Lachin region; the restoration of communications; a donors' conference on post-conflict rehabilitation; and the deployment of peacekeeping observers. The second stage entailed the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the remaining Kalbajar and Lachin districts and the return of IDPs, and only then to be followed by the determination of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, on the condition of the non-violation of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan.<sup>16</sup>

In 2011, the Presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia held two meetings at the invitation of the President of the Russian Federation, Dmitry Medvedev: on March 5, in Sochi and on June 24, in Kazan. Despite giving its initial assent to the concept of the

14 Esmira Jafarova (March 2014) "OSCE Mediation of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict", *The Washington Review of Turkish & Eurasian Affairs*, available at: <http://www.thewashingtonreview.org/articles/osce-mediation-of-nagorno-karabakh-conflict.html> (accessed 23 July 2015)

15 International Crisis Group (14 November 2007) "Nagorno-Karabakh: Risking War", *Europe Report*, N 187

16 REF/RL (March 15, 2010) "Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Discloses Details of Madrid Principles", *Caucasus Report*, available at: [http://www.rferl.org/content/Azerbaijani\\_Foreign\\_Minister\\_Discloses\\_Details\\_Of\\_Madrid\\_Principles/1984485.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/Azerbaijani_Foreign_Minister_Discloses_Details_Of_Madrid_Principles/1984485.html) (accessed 12 July 2015)

Madrid principles, and participating in the talks on that basis, Yerevan “apparently was mostly unhappy about the clause concerning the withdrawal of its forces from the occupied territories.”<sup>17</sup> At the 2011 Kazan summit, the document presented to the sides, in fact, was different than that of agreed three months ago in Sochi. This gave rise to a serious backlash from Azerbaijan, effectively stalling negotiations.

For the most part, negotiations remained stalled up until when presidential meetings were resumed in Vienna in November 2013. Armenia was still aiming to consolidate the current status quo and impose finally a *fait accompli* situation.<sup>18</sup> Despite the lack of progress due to the rigid approach of Armenia, the resumption of the stalled talks was deemed a positive development. Presidents Aliyev and Sargsyan met twice more in 2014, in Sochi in August and then in Paris in October 2014.

Over the last few years, while negotiations are continuing under the auspices of the OSCE Minsk Group, causalities along the line of contact have continued to surge. In fact, the conflict can no way be characterized as frozen like many international organizations try to label it. Official Baku, weary of the status quo, sees the starting point of reconciliation with Armenia as contingent on the withdrawal of Armenian forces from the occupied territories.<sup>19</sup> Azerbaijan’s position is supported by four UN Security Council Resolutions and many other international documents issued by the UN General Assembly, the European Parliament, Parliamentary Assembly of CoE, Organization of Islamic Cooperation, etc.<sup>20</sup> But despite the fact that the principles in these international documents are acknowledged by the international community, no pressure has ever been exerted on Arme-

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*But despite the fact that the principles in these international documents are acknowledged by the international community, no pressure has ever been exerted on Armenia, and no international sanctions have been introduced on.*

17 Esmira Jafarova (March 2014) “OSCE Mediation of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict”, *The Washington Review of Turkish & Eurasian Affairs*, available at: <http://www.thewashingtonreview.org/articles/osce-mediation-of-nagorno-karabakh-conflict.html> (accessed 23 July 2015)

18 MFA of Azerbaijan, “Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: General Overview”, available at: <http://mfa.gov.az/?language=en&options=content&id=835> (accessed 19 July 2015)

19 Zaur Shiriyev (2013) “A Bleak Future for Nagorno-Karabakh: Models, Formats and Prospects” in Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, *The South Caucasus 2018: Facts, Trends and Future Scenarios*, p. 250, available at: [http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\\_35353-1522-22-30.pdf?130912141452](http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_35353-1522-22-30.pdf?130912141452) (accessed 19 July 2015)

20 Kamal Makili-Aliyev (2013) *Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in International Legal Documents and International law*, Baku: Silver LTD publication, available at: <http://sam.az/uploads/PDF/Nagorno-Karabakh%20Conflict.pdf> (accessed 17 August 2015)

nia, and no international sanctions have been introduced on. Azerbaijan's point is that concessions will have to be made by both conflict parties, and Nagorno-Karabakh should receive self-rule in the form of the highest possible autonomy within the framework of the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. However, the issue of the status of Nagorno-Karabakh is not one that should be resolved at the moment. Instead the sides should agree on the disengagement and withdrawal of forces, displaced persons should be allowed to return home, and all land transport links should be reopened.<sup>21</sup> This means, as stated by the Azerbaijani Minister of Foreign Affairs, Elmar Mammadyarov, "Armenia should withdraw from the seven districts around Nagorno-Karabakh which it occupies and Azerbaijan will open all roads and communications, and sides will try to gradually establish normal relations in the region."<sup>22</sup> After that the sides can discuss the future status of the Nagorno-Karabakh region in a more constructive environment.

#### *What Is OSCE Doing in Regard to the Resolution of the Conflict?*

Currently, OSCE activities relating to the conflict resolution process are comprised of the following.

The major OSCE body in the conflict resolution process is the Minsk Group, tasked with finding peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. According to the official mandate provided in the Budapest Summit's decision, the co-chairs of the Minsk Group should "provide an appropriate framework for conflict resolution in the way of assuring the negotiation process; to obtain conclusion by the Parties of an agreement on the cessation of the armed conflict in order to permit the convening of the Minsk Conference; and to promote the peace process by deploying OSCE multinational peacekeeping forces".<sup>23</sup> In practice, co-chairs occasionally produce suggestions as frameworks of the conflict resolution, engage in shuttle diplomacy to discuss basic principles of the solution of the conflict with Armenia and Azerbaijan, organize field missions to assess the overall situa-

21 CommonSpace.eu (10 July 2015), *Mammadyarov: "Status of Karabakh is not an issue that should be resolved now"*, available at: <http://www.commonspace.eu/eng/news/6/id3315> (accessed 25 July 2015)

22 Ibid

23 OSCE, *Minsk Group: Mandate*, available at: <http://www.osce.org/mg/108308> (accessed 28 July 2015)

tion in occupied regions of Azerbaijan, including humanitarian and other aspects, as well as assist in organizing direct meetings between the Azerbaijani and Armenian presidents and foreign ministers. The current co-chairs of the Minsk are James Warlick, Jacques Faure and Igor Popov, representing the US, France and Russia respectively.

There is also the Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office on the Conflict, based in Tbilisi, Georgia. The Personal Representative is mandated to represent the Chairperson-in-Office (CiO), assist him in achieving an agreement on the cessation of the armed conflict in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, and help to create conditions for the deployment of an OSCE peace-keeping operation.<sup>24</sup> Additionally, the Personal Representative's mandate includes assisting Azerbaijan and Armenia in implementing and developing confidence-building, humanitarian and other measures facilitate the peace process, in particular by encouraging direct contacts, etc.<sup>25</sup> The holder of this post has never changed since its establishment - Andrzej Kasprzyk, a senior Polish diplomat has been serving as a Personal Representative of CiO since January 1997.

The least known, and in fact, the least active OSCE institution dealing with Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is the High-Level Planning Group (HLPG), which was established in 1994 and mandated "to make recommendations to the OSCE CiO on developing a plan for the establishment, force structure requirements and operation of a multinational OSCE peacekeeping force for the area of conflict dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference"<sup>26</sup>. However, except at certain points in 1994 and 1995, the deployment of peacekeeping forces has never seemed a realistic goal. Nonetheless, HLPG continues to exist; its main role is the involvement of some HLPG representatives in the periodical monitoring of the contact line between Armenian and Azerbaijani armed forces. The Head of the HLPG is appointed by the CiO, and the group is composed of five officers seconded by OSCE participating states. The current head of HLPG is Colonel Markus Widmer of Switzerland who assumed the position on January 1, 2014.

<sup>24</sup> OSCE, *Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk*, available at: <http://www.osce.org/prcio> (accessed 28 July 2015)

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>26</sup> OSCE, *High-Level Planning Group*, available at: <http://www.osce.org/hlpg> (accessed 28 July 2015)

*Its field assessment, fact finding and environmental assessment missions are occasionally sent to occupied regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh in order to assess the overall situation there, including humanitarian, environmental and other aspects.*

In addition to the facilitation of peace talks as its major task, OSCE also periodically monitors the line of contact between Azerbaijani and Armenian armed forces. Its field assessment, fact finding and environmental assessment missions are occasionally sent to occupied regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh in order to assess the overall situation there, including humanitarian, environmental and other aspects (missions were sent in 2005, 2006 and 2010). All of the fact finding and assessment missions deployed by OSCE in the occupied region report the “disastrous consequences of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the failure to reach a peaceful settlement”, and mention that almost all the towns and villages that existed before the conflict in the occupied territories are abandoned and entirely in ruin.<sup>27</sup> There is no real economy and the Armenians who were relocated to there are from other parts of the world; they live in a few small settlements in precarious conditions.

In addition, the environment has undergone severe damage at the result of the ongoing conflict.<sup>28</sup>

#### *Why and How Is the OSCE Failing to Achieve a Peace Settlement?*

*Of course the OSCE is making certain efforts towards reaching a peaceful settlement, but Armenia’s rigid and uncompromising position is the single most important barrier to the resolution process. However, there are clear shortcomings in the OSCE mediation efforts too, which prevent it from galvanizing this complex peace process.*

The OSCE Minsk group has overseen peace negotiations for more than two decades. However, OSCE mediation has failed to deliver long-awaited peace to the region. Similar to other conflicts in the post-Soviet space, such as in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, where the OSCE has also deployed a peace-making and peace-keeping missions, the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process appears to be a failure. Of course the OSCE is making certain efforts towards reaching a peaceful settlement, but Armenia’s rigid and uncompromising position is the single most important barrier to the resolution process. However, there are clear shortcomings in the OSCE mediation efforts too, which prevent it from galvanizing this complex peace process.

Above all, it should be noted that the OSCE is a clear example of

27 OSCE, *Executive Summary of the “Report of the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs’ Field Assessment Mission to the Occupied Territories of Azerbaijan Surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh*, available at: <http://www.osce.org/mg/76209?download=true> (accessed 30 July 2015)

28 Ibid

an intergovernmental organization with no supranational powers. This intergovernmentalism means that any OSCE activity in any member country, and any mission deployed on behalf of the organization is subject to unanimous approval from all member states, and particularly the country to which the activity or mission pertains. Thus, every country in the organization has an effective veto power on any decision. As already mentioned, in 1996 the OSCE was unable to include the famous three principles in the Lisbon declaration due to Armenia's objection, despite winning the support of 53 out of 54 member states. This essential systemic weakness constrains the OSCE's effectiveness in many cases, including its involvement in conflict areas when there is need to punish aggressors and protect victims.

*This essential systemic weakness constrains the OSCE's effectiveness in many cases, including its involvement in conflict areas when there is need to punish aggressors and protect victims.*

In considering shortcomings peculiar to Minsk Group itself, the biggest problem is that it tries 'not to hurt anyone'. The Minsk Group tries to seem neutral and this near-obsession with neutrality does not allow it to be fair and impartial. It is claimed that openly naming Armenia as an aggressor country and calling for fulfillment of UN Security Council resolutions - which entails unconditional withdrawal of forces from Nagorno-Karabakh - might discredit OSCE Minsk group in the eyes of Armenian side.<sup>29</sup> However, it does not mean that OSCE can play this 'game of neutrality' over justice forever. The Minsk Group co-chairs avoid making clear-cut statements about their positions on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. They avoid bringing up the fact of occupation; they make general and vague statements at best, or indeed make contradictory declarations depending on whether they are in Baku or Yerevan. In so doing, they claim that they are addressing the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. However, when there is need for a firm position, the co-chairs state that Armenia and Azerbaijan should find a solution themselves since it is their problem, and that the Minsk Group will support any decision they make. This attitude and the visible failure of shuttle diplomacy has resulted in such widespread distrust in OSCE Minsk Group's activity that the Azerbaijani media has begun to refer to the co-chairs' visits to the region as 'tourist

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<sup>29</sup> NewTimes (27 February 2015) *America's "impartial mediation" logic: Can't name the "aggressor"*, available at: <http://newtimes.az/en/politics/2568> (accessed 16 August 2015)

excursions'.<sup>30</sup>

*The lack of interest and consequent lack of commitment on the part of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries to the resolution process is another visible setback; they seem to be in position to manage the situation as opposed to engaging in genuine conflict resolution.*

The lack of interest and consequent lack of commitment on the part of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chair countries to the resolution process is another visible setback; they seem to be in position to manage the situation as opposed to engaging in genuine conflict resolution. The co-chairs seem to be dealing much more with 'conflict management' – trying to reduce the tensions between parties via occasional visits to region, rather than with a 'conflict resolution mechanism'.<sup>31</sup> As Novruz Mammadov, Deputy Head of Presidential Administration of Azerbaijan pointed out, the OSCE Minsk group had monopolized the

resolution process of the conflict<sup>32</sup>, but it lacks the needed commitment to push the process forward. This lack of commitment is also seen in the form of the low level of involvement by co-chair countries in the resolution process. The involvement of more mid or high level diplomats and politician might prove effective in accelerating the peace process. Talks that carry high-level international commitment - such as the 2001 Key-West negotiations, which involved the US President George Bush - might be a necessary change, given that this low-profile shuttle diplomacy seems to be failing. History shows that when major powers are interested and committed, they are able to facilitate effective negotiations to find a solution to the complex conflicts similar to Nagorno-Karabakh. To give comparable examples, during the bloody dissolution of Yugoslavia, the US commitment and appointment of a special representative was key in hammering out the 1995 Dayton Agreement, while French president Jacques Chirac's personal involvement played the same role in reaching the 2006 Rambouillet Accords.

Moreover, if in the beginning OSCE involvement as a mediator was intended to represent impartial international involvement, today the OSCE Minsk Group's approach is a troika-based ap-

30 ANSPRESS (14 July 2015) *Co-Chairs Come to the Region with Empty Hands* (In Azerbaijani: Həmsədrilər regiona "alıboş" gəlir), available at: <http://www.anspress.com/index.php/index.php?a=2&lng=az&cid=1&nid=333295> (accessed 12 August 2015)

31 Zaur Shiriyev (2013) "A Bleak Future for Nagorno-Karabakh: Models, Formats and Prospects" in Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, *The South Caucasus 2018: Facts, Trends and Future Scenarios*, p. 244, available at: [http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\\_35353-1522-22-30.pdf?130912141452](http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_35353-1522-22-30.pdf?130912141452) (accessed 19 July 2015)

32 NewTimes (29 April 2015) *Top official: Pressure constantly exerted on Azerbaijan*, available at: <http://newtimes.az/en/processstrends/3557> (accessed 15 August 2015)

proach rather than a genuine and inclusive OSCE approach. The OSCE seems to have little influence over the Minsk Group; three chair states are in a full control of the process. On top of that, the three members of troika have their own divergent positions on the peace process, which further hampers the prospect of successful negotiations. Russia has frequently sought to dominate the process, while the US increased its attention when its stakes rose in the South Caucasus. Moreover, the domestic considerations of these three countries also play a certain role in their approach to the peace process and conflict parties. It is worth mentioning that the three co-chair countries are home to the largest, wealthiest, and best organized Armenian Diasporas. For instance, at the beginning of the 1990s, the Armenian lobby managed to block US financial support to Azerbaijan under the 'Freedom Support Act' (FSA) program; in addition, the US ambassadorial nominee to Azerbaijan in 2010 was blocked by influential Senators representing the US states with powerful Armenian Diasporas. Moreover, the US provides direct financial aid to the separatist Nagorno-Karabakh regime.<sup>33</sup>

*Moreover, if in the beginning OSCE involvement as a mediator was intended to represent impartial international involvement, today the OSCE Minsk Group's approach is a troika-based approach rather than a genuine and inclusive OSCE approach.*

It is also worth to mention that other co-chair - Russia is Armenia's closest strategic ally, and Yerevan is frequently claimed to have *de facto* protectorate-metropolis relations with Moscow.

In fact, the members of Minsk Group troika represent the key global power centers (assuming France's informal representation of the EU). Thus, if willing, it has the necessary geopolitical weight to pressure the aggressor to compromise, which would eventually bring about the long awaited and greatly overdue breakthrough in the peace process. However, again, the problem is not one of capacity, but one of political will.

<sup>33</sup> Report.az (04 February 2015 ) *Novruz Mammadov: US provides direct financial support to separatist regime of Nagorno-Karabakh*, available at: <http://report.az/en/nagorno-karabakh/novruz-mammadov-us-provide-direct-financial-support-to-separatist-regime-of-nagorno-karabakh/> (accessed 15 August 2015)

## Conclusion

The peace process within the framework of the OSCE is already 23 years old; however it remains underdeveloped in terms of what has been achieved. During the course of the long negotiations, the OSCE Minsk Group mediators have paid numerous visits to the region, and numerous rounds of meetings between presidents, foreign ministers and sometimes special representatives have been held. Despite these, hostilities continue and the death toll rises against the backdrop of these failed efforts.

In this environment of impunity coupled with the inefficacy of OSCE, Armenia refuses to compromise and repeatedly sabotages the peace process, rendering the resolution of the conflict virtually impossible. In such a complex situation, the OSCE needs to be very committed and to have a significantly more effective and coherent peace building strategy.

Though the OSCE has several institutions that are tasked dealing with Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, including the OSCE Minsk Group, the Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office and the High-Level Planning Group, the major purpose of their efforts seems to have become ‘conflict management’ rather than genuine conflict resolution. Several factors ranging from the weaknesses characteristic to the OSCE to the internal controversies of the Minsk Group troika contribute to the overall ineffectiveness of the OSCE’s mediation and peace efforts. Trying to seem neutral prevents the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs from naming realities and from differentiating between the aggressor and victim. The only visible result of the long and fruitless mediation efforts to date is the ‘monopolization’ of the conflict resolution by the OSCE and the ‘privatization’ of the Minsk process by the so-called troika. Although the Minsk Group troika has the necessary power and influence in the region to advance the peace process, a lack of commitment is preventing them from utilizing their capacity to resolve the bloodiest conflict in the post-Soviet space.

*The only visible result of the long and fruitless mediation efforts to date is the ‘monopolization’ of the conflict resolution by the OSCE and the ‘privatization’ of the Minsk process by the so-called troika.*

# Global Energy Governance Needs to Be Multi-level and Regionalized

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Robert Cutler\*

The exclusive focus on universal-level global energy governance is problematic. Even in the European Union, emphasis is placed on multi-level governance in the energy policy issue-area. Yet although the EU has been near the forefront of advocacy for global energy governance, it has failed to consider systematically, or at all, the advantages of multi-level governance from the global through the regional to the national levels, as well as the cross-cutting transnational and transgovernmental levels. The contrast between the failure of regional European-Ukrainian-Russian energy cooperation on the one hand and, on the other, the success of regional Azerbaijani-Georgian-Turkish energy cooperation drives the point home. Incentive structures of practitioners and academics, conditioned by the sociology of knowledge, inhibit common dialogue over energy governance. Academic-policy boundary organizations represent only a special case of knowledge transfer processes. If overarching global policy goals are to be achieved, then idiosyncratic regional contexts cannot be ignored in global energy governance. They must be respected and allowed their relative autonomy.



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*The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project demonstrated the strategic value of having of multiple export pipelines, offering flexibility to producers and consumers alike.*

The present article draws a contrast between the failure of negotiations among the EU, Ukraine, and Russia over the reconstruction of the Ukrainian gas transportation system (GTS) even before the annexation of Crimea, and Azerbaijan's successful experience of energy development, exporting energy not only to Georgia and Turkey but also to Russia and other countries.

The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project demonstrated the strategic value of having of multiple export pipelines, offering flexibility to producers and consumers alike. Interestingly, this project was constructed without direct reference to Energy Charter Treaty norms. A review of these two cases sets the stage for conclusions about global energy governance.

In particular, this comparison of the two cases underlines the failure of current designs for global energy governance to account for regional geo-economic realities. From this is can be concluded that global energy governance must be multi-level if it is to have any chance of succeeding. This means that it must also be regionalized from a global level downwards. The successes and failures of energy governance in the South Caucasus and its neighborhoods strongly suggest that universal-membership organizations are unable to solve local problems. Account must be taken of local and regional geo-economics and geopolitics if global energy governance is not to suffer failure due to its refusal to recognize realities. A few ideas in this direction are also suggested.

### *Introduction*

Discussions of energy security have tended to focus on security of supply, giving rise to a criticism that this is treated as a zero-sum game. Such critiques typically seek to draw attention to the institutions of the market and the 'rules of the game' that structure them.<sup>1</sup> The strategy in this regard is that policy elites may then 'adjust' those norms in order to promote the particular type of public behavior they wish to see. Thus 'energy governance' has become a cottage industry among academic researchers,

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1 Goldthau, A. and Witte J.M. (2009) 'Back to the future or forward to the past? Strengthening markets and rules for effective global energy governance'. *International Affairs*, 85(2), pp. 373–90; Goldthau, A. and Witte, J.M. (2010) 'The Role of Rules and Institutions in Global Energy: An Introduction', in Goldthau, A. and Witte, J.M. (eds.) *Global Energy Governance: The New Rules of the Game*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, pp. 1–21.

policy analysts and decision-makers concerned with the global level. Such a focus is perhaps best illustrated by the widespread concern with establishing limitations upon carbon emissions. In this respect, great hope has been accorded to the United Nations Climate Change Conference (Paris, December 2015) on a universal and legally binding agreement on greenhouse gas emissions.

The real situation is more complex. For example, Chester points out two fundamentally different definitions of energy security, one framed in market-centric terms of price and supply while the other includes such issues as affordability, availability, capacity, and sustainability. The first views energy security as the outcome of a self-equilibrating, competitive, and self-regulating market. The second sees energy security as a market outcome resulting instead from institutional arrangements and processes orchestrated by the actions and policies of the state.<sup>2</sup> The dichotomy may also be interpreted through the division between the realist and neoliberal approaches in Western theories of international relations.

Johansson's approach complements that view by pointing out that the traditional categories of security of supply and security of demand are in fact subcategories of the 'energy system as an object exposed to security threats' that fail to take into account the 'energy system as a subject generating or enhancing security'. The latter includes economic and political risk factors, technological risk factors, and environmental risk factors.<sup>3</sup> Here the salient point is that the expansion of the concept of energy security beyond the economic zero-sum brings under consideration many risk elements that depend upon local conditions and are therefore not amenable to treatment under global frameworks. Moreover, the main characteristics of an energy system as a security-enhancer are risk factors, and although risks may also be regarded as opportunities, they often predispose the players to a zero-sum approach. Chester's two different definitions of energy security broadly

*Here the salient point is that the expansion of the concept of energy security beyond the economic zero-sum brings under consideration many risk elements that depend upon local conditions and are therefore not amenable to treatment under global frameworks.*

2 Chester, L. (2010) 'Conceptualising energy security and making explicit its polysemic nature'. *Energy Policy*, 38(2), pp. 887–895. See also Omonbude, E.J. (2007) 'The transit oil and gas pipeline and the role of bargaining: A non-technical discussion'. *Energy Policy*, 35(12), pp. 6188–94.

3 Johansson, B. (2013) 'A broadened typology on energy and security'. *Energy* 53(1), pp. 199–205.

correlate with Johansson's two super-categories.

European policy-makers have been at the forefront of global energy governance, and the concept of 'European energy governance' has been part of their vocabulary for some years. 'Multi-level governance' is an approach to European integration studies introduced into the scientific literature two decades ago.<sup>4</sup> It is therefore odd that the idea of multi-level governance has not been coupled with the concept of global energy governance, even by the Europeans, although the practice of EU energy policy implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) incorporates multi-level approaches.<sup>5</sup>

*The Energy Charter Treaty and the Failure of European-Ukrainian-Russian Regional Energy Cooperation*

A glance at the successes and failures of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) sheds light on prospects for the evolution of global governance in the energy sector. The ECT represented the institutionalization of the European Energy Charter signed in The Hague on 17 December 1991. The Energy Charter Secretariat evolved from this declaration, and was institutionalized by the legally binding ECT subsequently signed in Lisbon in December 1994, which entered into force in April 1998. The ECT's main organ is the Energy Charter Conference (ECC), in which state-signatories participate, and which has as its subsidiary bodies three groups, one working group, and two committees. Its failure at the end of the last decade to negotiate and adopt a Protocol on Transit has stymied its further development, although it has continued to propagate its principles and draw third parties into Observer status, particularly from North Africa and Asia. There are also a few Observers from South America.

The Energy Charter's original purposes were to diminish Europe's dependence on OPEC and encourage post-Soviet reform by promoting free trade and ensuring access to resources.

4 Hooghe, Liesbet (ed.) (1996) *Cohesion policy and European integration: Building multi-level governance*. Oxford: Clarendon Press; Hooghe, L., and Marks, G. (2001) *Multi-level governance and European integration*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield; for a review of the field as of the end of the last decade, see Piattoni, S. (2009) 'Multi-level governance: A historical and conceptual analysis'. *European Integration*, 31(2), pp. 163–180.

5 For a recent implicit counterexample, see Hoppe, R., and Wesselink, A. (2014) 'Comparing the role of boundary organizations in the governance of climate change in three EU member states'. *Environmental Science and Policy*, 44(1), pp. 73–85.

Its principles were subsequently codified in the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) with its Secretariat in Brussels, now an institution autonomous of the EU, and periodic meetings of the ECC. The ECT was signed by essentially the entire membership of ‘OSCE Europe’ and ratified by all but a handful of these countries. Italy, notably, served notice in 2015 of its intention to withdraw from the ECT in 2016. The United States signed ECT but did not ratify it.

Russia signed the ECT under the Yeltsin regime but was unable to ratify it and later renounced its attempt to do so. In the mid-1990s, the ECT was sent to a committee of the Russian Duma where the majority of members represented the interests of certain industrial bureaucracies, and ratification foundered. President Yeltsin tried and failed to implement it by decree. The failure of the South Stream pipeline project is the logical consequence of Russia’s failure to accede to and implement the ECT, as this pipeline project fell afoul of the EU’s Third Energy Package, which may be considered as implementing certain ECT norms in Europe.

Europe had suffered energy shortages during the January 2006 Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis caused by Moscow’s harsh and very public decision to cut off supplies. The G-8 summit in St. Petersburg held in July 2006 had questions of energy cooperation as an explicit focus. In the run-up, Russian President Vladimir Putin flatly and explicitly rejected the ECT’s attempts to open Russia’s domestic energy market to competition, broaden access to its energy transit infrastructure, and assure nondiscriminatory treatment for non-Russian firms.

Ukraine signed an accession protocol to the EU-sponsored Energy Community (distinct from the ECT) in September 2010, which entered into force in February 2011. Ukraine’s accession to the Energy Community required it to implement the EU’s Third Energy Package, including ‘unbundling’. This meant, among other things, that *Naftohaz Ukrainy* would cease to exist as it had, and gas import contracts with Russia would be renegotiated within the new economic and legal environment.

The unbundling of *Naftohaz Ukrainy* changed the calculations of transit economics for Gazprom and Russia. Gazprom would

have to compete with alternative sources of energy that Ukraine was developing, which enabled it to seek to change the pricing formula. As a result, even before the Russian annexation of Crimea, Gazprom was seeking to diminish or eliminate its dependence upon the Ukrainian market and also upon Ukraine as a transit country to the EU.

In fact, Ukraine first moved towards unbundling its supply and transit contracts with Gazprom as early as the spring of 2004, before the Orange Revolution. Ukraine's objective was to justify increasing transit fees for Russian gas to Europe. The unexpected result was higher prices for gas from Russia. The EU and Ukraine opened negotiations over energy issues in 2008, but Ukraine moved decisively to cooperate with the EU over energy policy only following the second of the two Russian gas cut-offs, the first lasting three days in January 2006 and the second lasting 19 days in January 2009.

The opening of the Nord Stream gas pipeline in 2011, under the *The opening of the Nord Stream gas pipeline in 2011, under the Baltic Sea from Russia directly to Germany and Europe, threatened Ukraine's place as a transit country and the economic value of its GTS.* Baltic Sea from Russia directly to Germany and Europe, threatened Ukraine's place as a transit country and the economic value of its GTS. However, Nord Stream's capacity utilization has fallen significantly. Even with the second route now open, potentially enabling transit of 55 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y), the throughput for 2014 was only slightly more than half that quantity, at 29 bcm. Gazprom's moves towards the now-failed South Stream pipeline and its 'Turkish Stream' successor (with a supposed projected capacity of 63 bcm/y) represent the same threats against Ukraine as did Nord Stream.

After 1991, Gazprom became the proprietor of the GTS in several Soviet successor states by taking ownership in exchange for cancelling debts accrued as a result of gas imports. This possibility was discussed with Ukraine in the middle of the last decade, but in 2007, the Ukrainian Rada passed a law written personally by then-prime minister Yuliya Tymoshenko. That law set out several different ways in which Ukraine's GTS could be alienated from state property and forbade them all in detail. The law acquired the force of a constitutional provision. An agreement signed with the EU in March 2009 in Brussels underlined that Ukraine's GTS (including more than 60,000 kilometers of pipe

plus 71 compressed air plants and 13 underground gas storage facilities) was and would remain the property of the Ukrainian state.

From Moscow's standpoint, the problem was that even though the gas to Europe transits Ukraine, Russia as supplier is responsible for its delivery to the EU. Even in 2006 and 2009, EU customers raised no claims against Russia; nevertheless, Russia perceived a transit risk from Ukraine. The non-transparency of Ukraine's GTS and its inefficiency made it difficult and sometimes impossible to trace the status of any discrepancy between the amount of gas that Russia said it sent, and the amount that Europe said it received. Ukraine's four goals in talks with Russia had been to renegotiate prices to a lower level, to reconsider the June 2009 gas bilateral delivery contract, to ensure the 'stability and predictability' of gas supply especially via Ukraine to Europe, and to consider options for modernizing the GTS.

In 2010 the Russian ambassador to the EU, Vladimir Chizhov, said that his country welcomed proposals by Kiev for a 'three-sided' plan to modernize Ukraine's GTS, with Moscow's involvement. At the time, Ukraine's Prime Minister Mykola Azarov announced that his government would look for a trilateral approach that would include Russia, a point that he repeated in September 2012. However, the EU showed itself unwilling to discuss anything other than Ukraine's compliance with the administrative norms of the Energy Community.

Despite early estimates that modernization of Ukraine's GTS could cost at least \$15 to \$20 billion, a group of German engineers who visited the country in 2012 looked at the question in specific detail arrived at the more modest price-tag of \$5.3 billion. A pilot demonstration project costing one percent of that amount was successfully implemented in 2013. In early 2013 the EU finally said it was interested in a trilateral solution, but that a bilateral Ukraine-Russia solution was also possible. The IMF, the World Bank, and the EBRD allocated US\$1.7 billion for industrial modernization projects, such as the replacement of old compressor stations responsible for significant leakages. However, these loans were not authorized.

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Ukraine's future depends on all this geopolitical and geo-economic jockeying. Russia wanted Ukraine to join its Eurasian Customs Union (ECU), an entity that already included Belarus and Kazakhstan. Yet Ukraine's legal obligations under the ECT (and also under the Association Agreement with the EU) precluded the possibility of both joining the ECU and deepening European cooperation with the EU. Every attempt at international and regional energy governance failed in the EU-Russia-Ukraine energy triangle because of the underlying geo-economic and geopolitical stakes and conflicts. Overarching normative frameworks could not be implemented in a way that resolved underlying geo-economic conflicts.

*Regional Focus and the Success of Azerbaijani-Georgian-Turkish Energy Cooperation*

In contrast to the failure of EU-Russia-Ukraine cooperation on energy security stands the success of Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey cooperation. The negotiation and successful implementation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil export pipeline is correctly said to be the foundation of this trilateral cooperation, which has since expanded into other realms of economic and political activity. Although the BTC pipeline is now taken for granted, the odds were in fact strongly against it. The early and mid-1990s saw the hot wars in the North and South Caucasus, the absence of state structures and capacities in Azerbaijan and Georgia, and the price of oil well under \$20 per barrel.

The BTC pipeline was, furthermore, the first oil pipeline in the history of the industry to be built through three countries:

*The BTC pipeline was, furthermore, the first oil pipeline in the history of the industry to be built through three countries: a producing country, a transit country, and an export country.* a producing country, a transit country, and an export country. As a result, the parties to the negotiations, including the international oil companies and their consortia as well as the international financial institutions (IFIs), had to engage in a great deal of organizational innovation and institutional learning. Even legal regimes to govern the transit of oil through such pipelines did not exist.

Three lessons from energy development strategies in the Caspian basin during the 1990s enabled the partners to overcome these obstacles. The first was about the need to coordinate production

and pipeline development, also taking account of the fact that financiers are not concerned with the problem, such that it is necessary to involve shippers as partners. The second lesson was that if a pipeline goes through two or more countries, it is helpful to split up financing by splitting the project itself into segments, each of which is justifiable on its own merits.

The third lesson was that the multiplicity of different consortium members significantly complicates their ability to act upon a financing strategy, especially where strategies differ from one field to another. For example, in large mature fields that remain essential to a host country's economy and where there is an established skill base, the strategy should be to address fixed costs and to optimize the infrastructure. By contrast, in immature, partially developed fields and satellite fields, it is still necessary to establish a good legal framework and reasonable tax law.<sup>6</sup>

It was necessary to negotiate in parallel, for simultaneous signature, no fewer than four agreements: a cost guarantee agreement, about the responsibilities of governments; an agreement between investors and the transit states; the agreement on the export pipeline itself, with multiple parties including the governments, the investors, and the pipeline's management and operating authority simultaneously to be created; and the construction contract itself, agreed among the three parties plus the contractors. Yet even these agreements did not guarantee that the BTC pipeline would be built, first because BP's support for it did not guarantee financing, and second because the necessary volumes had not yet been identified or committed.

Georgia was brought into the BTC negotiations at a relatively late stage. As a result, Tbilisi found it necessary to raise a series of questions to ensure that its own interests would be taken into account. There were three questions: one about tariff levels for the right of transit, one about financial responsibility in case of *force majeure* (and the related question of responsibility in case of cost overruns), and one about obtaining right-of-way overland for pipeline construction (and related question of reimbursement to property owners).

<sup>6</sup> For background, see Cutler, R.M. (1999) 'Cooperative energy security in the Caspian region: A new paradigm for sustainable development?'. *Global Governance*, 5(2), pp. 251–271.

These questions were complicated by the political geography of Georgia. It was originally conceived that the pipeline would traverse the ethnic Armenian region of Javakhetia, which at the time hosted Russian military bases inherited from the Soviet era. The alternative was the effectively autonomous region of Ajaria, then ruled as a fiefdom by Aslan Abashidze. In the end, the pipeline was routed through Ajaria, increasing the overall construction cost by four percent.

Georgian issues prevented the formal signature of the four agreements at the November 1999 summit of the OSCE in Istanbul, as had been planned, but it was at least possible to initial them. After this, BP's position on BTC changed. The company committed not only to contributing to the oil volumes for the pipeline, but also to investing in the engineering and design of the entire line and to organizing shippers and financing for the project on the basis of equal access by all producers.

*The agreements thus acquired the status of international treaties, guaranteeing a stable business environment and giving uncertain investors the confidence that they needed in order to proceed.*

After the agreements were subsequently formally signed, the national parliaments of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey all ratified them and incorporated their provisions into domestic legislation. The agreements thus acquired the status of international treaties, guaranteeing a stable business environment and giving uncertain investors the confidence that they needed in order to proceed.

Aside from political protests by Russia and Iran, the only obstruction to building the BTC came from the consortium developing the offshore Azeri-Chirag-Guneshli deposit, the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC). Sometimes it seemed that AIOC was searching more for obstacles to the pipeline's construction than for ways to overcome them. A principal organizational problem was that there was no executive body acting exclusively on behalf of the AIOC's own interests, as a consortium, within the framework of Caspian energy development.

As a result, AIOC's capacity to respond to changes in its business and political environment was limited by the evaluation of those changes by its participating members, each on the basis of its own interests. The construction of the BTC pipeline was complicated by the AIOC's declaration that it would not participate in the

financing, because it was exclusively an oil exploration and production outfit. Rather, the consortium's members would decide, each for itself, whether and to what extent to participate in the financing.

Since Turkey had agreed to cover possible overruns on the Turkish segment, but the matter of how to cover overruns on the Georgian segment was still under dispute, one practical effect of that declaration was to leave the source of any putative reimbursement of landowners in Georgia (selling their right-of-way) unresolved. Perhaps AIOC became so accustomed to being an agenda-maker that was blind to the possibility that its inaction could make it an agenda-taker.

The consortium's members went through a learning process as they defined issues of common interest and acted jointly with reference to them.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, issues in the business and political environment that touched AIOC on a strategic level affected its participating members only indirectly. Consequently, the AIOC was often slow and weak in formulating a strategic response to changing conditions, unable to overcome the particular interests of its members who had other assets and interests throughout the Caspian region.

Despite all the talk about the need for BTC to be commercially justifiable, the AIOC was a latecomer to the task of improving the business environment of the consortium itself. Therefore BP, as the strongest and most prominent component company, not to mention the operator, eventually took the lead in defining the incentive structure of the consortium as a whole. It is worth noting that oil from both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have for several years been making up a significant proportion of BTC's throughput, as was envisaged fifteen years ago, when the Shah-Deniz deposit unexpectedly turned up gas and condensate rather than oil.

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The AIOC acted as if it believed that it could finesse other players into assuming cost and risk. However, the above-mentioned Istanbul accords (November 1999) changed the overall business

<sup>7</sup> James, R.A. (2011) *Strategic alliances between national and international oil companies*. Working Paper 104, Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, Program on Energy and Sustainable Development.

environment for energy development in the Caspian Sea region. Another factor driving the AIOC's new flexibility after the Istanbul accords was likely the discovery, by BP, of the Shah-Deniz gas and condensate field, where, before drilling, oil had been expected.

This unexpected discovery raised the issue of Azerbaijan's desire to put this gas into the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) from Turkmenistan. Although this find obviated the need to continue negotiations over the TCGP at the time, the organizational learning and infrastructural work done in connection with the BTC made it extremely easy to add the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP, also BTE for Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum) for gas along essentially the same route. The SCP, in turn, now makes TANAP possible.

## Conclusion

The sociology of knowledge of global energy governance, itself a relatively new policy concept, explains in part why regional energy security governance has not really entered into global considerations. One reason is that the academic subfield of global energy governance has since its appearance paid special attention to so-called 'boundary organizations' that mediate the transfer of knowledge from its production by technically specialized, mainly university-based scientists to politically specialized decision-makers and their policy advisors.<sup>8</sup>

This analytical category originated among American political scientists for the study of domestic American energy policy-making. It was then exported to the field of policy studies of 'global energy governance', itself a fairly new field that developed at roughly the same time but independently. The concept of 'boundary organization' has been adapted to studies of energy governance, but its application has largely remained at the global political level, with a focus on putatively universal international conventions and treaties and on the mediation

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<sup>8</sup> For one *locus classicus*, see Guston, D.H. (1999) 'Stabilizing the boundary between US politics and science: The role of the Office of Technology Transfer as a boundary organization'. *Social Studies of Science*, 29(1), pp. 87–112. For general background, see Guston, D.H. (2001) 'Organizations in environmental policy and science: An introduction'. *Science, Technology and Human Values*, 26(4), pp. 399–408.

between the formulation and negotiation of those texts on the one hand, and on the other, the creation and distribution of scientific reports, produced to inform the process of international policy formulation.

The contrast between the two case studies summarized above underscores the need to take account of idiosyncratic regional contexts and configurations of social and political forces, in explaining political and economic outcomes. Industrial associations and energy development consortia often transmit scientifically generated industrial information (for example, geological findings on hydrocarbon deposits) to national governments or regional cooperative structures, and receive normative direction from those governments and structures. It is possible therefore to suggest that they too meet the criteria to be considered a particular type of boundary organization at the national and/or regional level. To entertain such a possibility highlights the limitations of the existing approach to global energy security relying upon the study of practice of a particular type of boundary organizations, specifically the focus by academics upon university-based research.<sup>9</sup>

*The contrast between the two case studies summarized above underscores the need to take account of idiosyncratic regional contexts and configurations of social and political forces, in explaining political and economic outcomes.*

Today, the practitioners of such an approach have a professional incentive structure that deters them from extending the approach to the study of regional energy security and cooperation, because of their focus on normative international policy-formation. It is tempting to suppose that the distinctive feature of a boundary organization, as applied within the field of global energy governance, is not just its transnational and distributed quality but also its universal policy remit.

At the same time, experts on regional energy security and cooperation have no incentives to use the categories of academic theories of international relations, because these offer no added value to their own practical and applied analyses of energy exploration and production. The latter experts may even be members of technically specialized think tanks that meet the definition of ‘boundary organization’ on a regional level. Yet

<sup>9</sup> For such a criticism, see Parker, J., and Crona, B. (2012) ‘On being all things to all people: Boundary organizations and the contemporary research university’. *Social Studies of Science*, 42(2), pp. 262–289.

their very national or regional character leads students of (global-level) boundary organizations to exclude their consideration.

*The main innovation of the 'boundary organization' concept has been to draw attention to the institutionalization of channels of such knowledge transfer, in contrast with the 'epistemic community' approach.*

The main innovation of the 'boundary organization' concept has been to draw attention to the institutionalization of channels of such knowledge transfer, in contrast with the 'epistemic community' approach. Interestingly, the latter had been better equipped to take account of regional networks of cooperation at the implementation stage, albeit on the interpersonal level.<sup>10</sup> As explained above, there seems to be little prospect for a dialogue between global and regional specialists in energy security governance, unless another boundary organization is created in order to facilitate their dialogue; however the efficacy of proliferating boundary organizations may have a limit, given that problems of coordination also increase.<sup>11</sup>

Nevertheless, the conscious development of dedicated boundary organizations at the national and especially regional levels may promote regional energy security governance. This has certainly been so in the case of the European Union, but those who conduct EU studies typically decline to consider the degree to which the EU experience may be generalized to other regions of the world.

As explained above, the AIOC's reluctance to demonstrate autonomy contributed to inefficiencies in the promotion of regional energy development. The reason was that this reluctance led to severe hesitation about distributing proprietary industrial information even among consortium members. A forum managed by a fair and impartial arbiter, trusted by all consortia and concerned exclusively with analysis, that could receive information confidentially from the consortia and promote transparency without compromising industrial secrets or national interests, would have been useful.

The South Caucasus was one of the first proving-grounds for post-

<sup>10</sup> See Haas, P.M. (1992) 'Epistemic communities and international policy coordination', *International Organization*, 46(1), pp. 1-35; Haas, P.M. (1989) 'Do regimes matter? Epistemic communities and Mediterranean pollution'. *International Organization*, 43(3), pp. 377-403; Kolodziej, E.A. (1997) 'Epistemic communities searching for regional cooperation'. *Mershon International Studies Review*, 41(1), pp. 93-98.

<sup>11</sup> But for a still-relevant partial inventory of issues that should be addressed, see Cutler, R.M. (2006) 'Current problems of global energy security: In light of the Caspian Sea region's recent experience'. *Oil, Gas and Energy Law* 4(1), Available at: <http://tinyurl.com/problem-global-energy-security> (Accessed: 27 April 2015).

Cold War strategic alliances in the industry, when the collapse of international bipolarity opened new markets and created the need for companies to develop new competences and capabilities, and to do so on the basis of continuous organizational learning. Such forums, as just suggested, may even be planned as elements of a strategic alliance within the industry, in cooperation with government and even civil society.<sup>12</sup> There is no reason not to consider regional formations, including those outside universities (which in the 21<sup>st</sup> century no longer have a monopoly on the creation of knowledge) also to be boundary organizations, and to focus on their practical work, not just their ‘boundary work’ - in practice if not in theory.

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12 For suggestions, see Cutler, R.M. (2007) ‘The new concept of cooperative energy security’. *Oil, Gas and Energy Law* 5(4), Available at: <http://tinyurl.com/new-concept-cooperative-energy> (Accessed: 27 April 2015). Compare: Elmut, D., and Kathawala, Y. (2001) ‘An overview of strategic alliances’. *Management Decision*, 39(3), pp. 205–217; Todeva, E. (2005) ‘Strategic alliances and models of collaboration’. *Management Decision*, 43(1), pp. 123–148; and especially Grant, R.M., and Baden-Fuller, C. (2004) ‘A knowledge accessing theory of strategic alliances’. *Journal of Management Studies*, 41(1), pp. 61–84. The virtues of such an approach are beginning to be recognized in the issue-area of health policy: See, for example, Drimie, S., and Quinlan, T. (2011) ‘Playing the role of a “boundary organisation”: Getting smarter with networking’. *Health Research Policy and Systems* 9(Supp.1), S11.



# International Cooperation Following the Economic Crisis: Where Next?

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Keith Boyfield\*

This paper examines initiatives to oversee a coordinated response to the recent worldwide economic crisis. The paper highlights the manner in which the regulation of the global financial system was dangerously fragmented, triggering the collapse of leading banks such as Lehman Brothers and the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS). In order to address the disintegration in international confidence, world leaders were obliged to act – overtly through the G20, but more covertly via the US government’s willingness to act as the lender of last resort. Turning to the role played by key institutions established by the Bretton Woods Agreement, the paper assesses the responses of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Focusing on future challenges, this paper highlights the way in which the Eurozone has continued to suffer from spasmodic growth, with many EU members recording erratic progress and high levels of unemployment. The Euro has been a casualty, reflecting a fault line in strategy between France and Germany, clearly demonstrated in the ongoing crisis surrounding Greece. By contrast, other regions of the world have achieved impressive levels of economic growth. This has been helped by regional development banks, such as the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). Meanwhile, China has opted to create a brand new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with the support of a cluster of OECD partners. The article concludes by noting that the world’s response to the financial crisis has illustrated the shifting epicenter of global economic power. The US is losing its pre-eminence to China and a more self-confident Islamic world. The EU remains inward-looking, and the IMF’s support for continued Greek membership of the Euro has raised questions about the Fund’s future direction and leadership.



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*Introduction*

This paper examines initiatives to launch and maintain a coordinated response to the recent worldwide economic crisis. The crisis in confidence which gripped international financial markets in 2008 exposed the fault lines in the global governance of economies, both large and small, where investors struggled to find attractive financial returns in an era characterized by low interest rates. The paper moves on to highlight the manner in which the regulation of the global financial system was dangerously fragmented, triggering the collapse of leading banks such as Lehman and RBS. In order to address the disintegration in international confidence, world leaders were obliged to act – overtly through the G20, but more covertly in the shape of the US government’s willingness to act as the lender of last resort. Turning to the role played by other key institutions established by the Bretton Woods Agreement, the paper assesses the responses of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.

*The crisis in confidence which gripped international financial markets in 2008 exposed the fault lines in the global governance of economies, both large and small, where investors struggled to find attractive financial returns in an era characterized by low interest rates.*

Focusing on future challenges this paper highlights the need to move away from debt and improve productivity as the crucial lever to enhance GDP growth. The Eurozone has continued to suffer from spasmodic growth with a number of EU members recording erratic progress and high levels of unemployment. The Euro has proved to be one of the main casualties, illustrated by the ongoing crisis surrounding Greece’s place in the currency union. By contrast, other regions of the world have achieved impressive levels of economic growth, notably sub Saharan Africa, the Gulf region and Far East Asia. This has been helped by regional development banks, such as the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB). The latter has made imaginative use of *Sukuk* debt instruments to channel investment into trade finance, infrastructure and small to medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Meanwhile, China has opted to create a brand new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) with the support of a cluster of OECD partners, but facing US opposition.

*The Euro has proved to be one of the main casualties, illustrated by the ongoing crisis surrounding Greece’s place in the currency union. By contrast, other regions of the world have achieved impressive levels of economic growth, notably sub Saharan Africa, the Gulf region and Far East Asia.*

The article concludes by noting that the world's response to the financial crisis has illustrated the shifting epicenter of global economic power. The US is losing its pre-eminence to China and a more self-confident Islamic world. The EU remains inward-looking and the IMF's support for continued Greek membership of the Euro has raised questions about the Fund's managing director and her personal commitment to the preservation of the Euro at all costs, in preference to long-established IMF rules for debt relief. Looking ahead, this may trigger an overhaul of global financial institutions established to maintain financial stability and economic growth.

*The World is Struck by the Worst Financial Crisis in Eighty Years*

The economic crunch that had such a devastating impact on global capital markets was first signaled by the collapse of Bear Stearns, a Wall Street investment bank which ran into serious difficulties as a result of its heavy involvement in complex mortgage-backed securities, notably collateralized debt obligations often known by the acronym CDOs. The fundamental flaw in the bank's business model - it was by no means the exception - was that these securities were built on feet of clay: the assets underpinning these complex instruments - CDOs, CDO squared or even CDOs cubed<sup>1</sup> - were unable to justify the values ascribed to them. In the years before the crisis hit, there was a flood of irresponsible mortgage lending in the US. Loans were freely doled out to "subprime" borrowers with poor credit histories who then struggled to repay them. The risks were exacerbated by financial engineers at the major investment banks - sometimes referred to as "rocket scientists" - who transformed them into supposedly low-risk securities by aggregating large numbers of them in pools: the CDO time bomb.

Furthermore, low interest rates maintained by the US Federal Reserve Bank created an incentive for banks, hedge funds and other investors to seek out riskier assets offering higher returns. This was dubbed the search for yield. Under pressure from their shareholders to in-

*Furthermore, low interest rates maintained by the US Federal Reserve Bank created an incentive for banks, hedge funds and other investors to seek out riskier assets offering higher returns. This was dubbed the search for yield. Under pressure from their shareholders to increase returns, banks operated with minimal equity, which in turn left them vulnerable if things went wrong.*

<sup>1</sup> Collateralized debt obligations cubed are a special purpose vehicle with securitization payments in the form of tranches. In turn, CDO-cubeds are backed by a pool of collateralized debt obligation squared (CDO-squared) tranches

crease returns, banks operated with minimal equity, which in turn left them vulnerable if things went wrong. Moreover, from the mid-1990s financial institutions were allowed greater scope to employ their own internal models to assess risk. In effect, this enabled them to set their own capital requirements.

This dangerous state of affairs was compounded by central bankers and other financial market regulators who bear some responsibility for mishandling the crisis and failing to identify the risks associated with economic imbalances. When warnings were given, for example by the Bank for International Settlements, they were ignored. In January 2008, Malcolm Knight, the chief executive of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the central bank for central bankers, highlighted “the Balkanization of regulation - fragmented across market segments, (and) across national jurisdictions as a major challenge” for regulators in what was meant to be a global financial system.<sup>2</sup>

### *The Crisis Breaks*

This elaborate house of cards began to collapse when Bear Stearns was sold to JP Morgan Chase at the knockdown price of \$10 per share in March 2008. This was a massive discount on the bank’s pre-crisis 52-week peak of \$133.20 per share. Yet Bear Stearns was just the first of a number of high profile casualties. The tale of woe continued for the next six months as other leading names on Wall Street ran into difficulties. The casualties included Lehman Brothers, a global bank with extensive investment banking interests and a major name in bond trading; one of the world’s major insurers, AIG; and Merrill Lynch, a firm synonymous with stock broking whose brand was symbolized by a confident bull. However, over the course of the year, global capital markets were caught in a downward spiral, leading to the demise of many famous names. Merrill Lynch was one of them: the firm was acquired by Bank of America, another victim of the much misunderstood US mortgage-based CDO market.

The other side of the Atlantic also witnessed a wave of banking failures, notably the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) Group, which had over extended recklessly; the Halifax Bank of Scotland Group that could not muster one qualified banker to stand on

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<sup>2</sup> ‘BIS warns on fragmented regulation’. *Financial Times*, 26 January 2008.

its board; and two of Belgium's largest banks, Fortis and Dexia. None of these banks would have been able to continue trading were it not for taxpayer support in the form of government bail-outs.

The UK government effectively nationalized a clutch of major banks; seven years later the coalition government was still seeking to unravel some of these toxic assets and find buyers for its extensive shareholding stake, albeit acquired under unprecedented duress. Ironically, state ownership of banks was rejected by a Labour administration in the 1970s as too radical a step; yet only a generation later a moderate Labour government was obliged to nationalize a large share of the banking sector in order to prevent a calamitous slide into depression.

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In the case of Belgium, Fortis was split into two parts: the Dutch division was nationalized, while the Belgian business was sold to BNP Paribas. Dexia was disaggregated with the Belgian bank taken into state ownership.

These examples of banking incompetence in three separate jurisdictions illustrate just how close the world came to a collapse in global confidence - and one, moreover, that would have rivaled the Great Depression of the early 1930s in its reach. Politicians were determined to avert such a disaster and they responded immediately to President George W. Bush's invitation to meet in Washington DC to hammer out a response to the greatest threat to international capital markets since the end of the Second World War.

### *The G20's Response to the Financial Crisis*

Thus, shortly after the implosion of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, President Bush invited the leaders of the G20 nations to Washington in order to co-ordinate a response to what was rapidly evolving into an economic meltdown. This summit, together with a massive stimulus package agreed at the London G20 summit five months later, was widely perceived as playing a pivotal role in rebuilding confidence in the global financial system. However, on closer scrutiny, this perception turns out to be significantly exaggerated.

In retrospect, it is more accurate to argue that the crucial aspect of the international financial management of the crisis was the willingness on the part of the United States to act as an international lender-of-last-resort (ILLR). It did so on an unprecedented scale. If US authorities had not provided liquidity in this way, the possibility of a collapse of the global economy would have been a far greater threat. The US opted to intervene on a unilateral basis through bilateral swaps, and offered to act as the ILLR. Significantly, these initiatives were taken prior to the first G20 leaders' summit. The subsequent meetings of the G20 largely endorsed and publicly ratified the strategy adopted by US policy makers and the Fed in collaboration with leading central banks worldwide.

*The US opted to intervene on a unilateral basis through bilateral swaps, and offered to act as the ILLR.*

One of the principal coordinating instruments employed by the world's major economies in response to the crisis was the Basel Committee, previously an obscure body composed of central bank governors from the world's leading economies. The Basel Committee's primary role is to establish global standards for the prudential regulation of banks; it also provides a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory matters. Its key mandate is to strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability – a role which it failed to effectively fulfill in the years before the crisis.

*Mea culpa* was long overdue and central banks and regulators needed to take responsibility for their shortcomings in the lead up to the financial crisis. Accordingly, the Basel Committee led the way with the announcement that it would seek to identify the weaknesses of the pre-crisis banking sector and implement a new set of global standards to address both firm-specific and broader, systemic risks. Central bankers clearly acknowledged that they needed to be seen to be taking concrete steps to ensure that a similar financial crisis would not threaten global capital markets in the foreseeable future. Having made such a mess of matters prior to the crisis, the onus was on central bankers to restore confidence.

In November 2008, Britain's Queen Elizabeth II memorably asked how the credit crunch could have taken so many economics experts by surprise. Her Majesty uttered this remark when

she quizzed some of the leading lights in the economics profession at the opening of a new academic building at the London School of Economics (LSE), midwife to many a Nobel Prize winner in economics. What caught the newspaper headlines was the fact that the economists present failed to come up with any compelling reply to her query. In this context, it is worth recalling that only six months earlier, the Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, a former professor at the LSE, had opined: “It’s quite possible that at some point we may get an odd quarter or two of negative growth. But recession is not the central projection at all”.<sup>3</sup> His prediction proved to be spectacularly inaccurate.

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### *Basel III*

In the wake of the collapse in confidence in global capital markets, the program of measures initiated by the Basel Committee has been termed “Basel III”. The response features the following elements, which were agreed upon and issued by the Committee and its governing body between July 2009 and September 2010:

1. The adoption of new standards with respect to higher quality of capital, with a focus on common equity, and higher levels of capital to ensure banks are able to absorb the types of losses sustained in the 2008 financial crisis;
2. Improved coverage of risk, especially for capital market activities;
3. An internationally harmonized leverage ratio to constrain excessive risk taking and to serve as a backstop to the risk-based capital measure. In the technical jargon this is referred to as “migrating to a Pillar 1 treatment based on appropriate review and calibration”<sup>4</sup>;
4. The adoption of capital buffers, which should be built up in good times so that they can be drawn down in periods of stress;
5. Minimum global liquidity standards to improve banks’ resilience to acute short term stress and to improve lon-

<sup>3</sup> Giles, C. (2008) ‘The economic forecasters’ failing vision’. *Financial Times*, 25 November.

<sup>4</sup> ‘Basel III leverage ratio framework and disclosure requirements; Press Release, BIS, January 2014, Available at: <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs270.htm> (Accessed: 30 May 2015).

ger term funding; and

6. Stronger standards for supervision, public disclosures and risk management.

*The Basel Committee's membership - 28 full members and three observers - is drawn from the leading central banks of the world.*

The Basel Committee is also contributing to the Financial Stability Board initiative to address the risks of globally systemic banking institutions. The Basel Committee's membership - 28 full members and three observers - is drawn from the leading central banks of the world.

*The Role Played by the IMF*

In addition to the G20 and Basel Committee, the other key players in the global initiative to restore confidence in international capital markets were the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, both of their institutions established by the Bretton Woods Agreement dating back to 1944. What became known as the Bretton Woods system was an attempt to establish a fully negotiated monetary order which would govern monetary relations between sovereign nations following the ravages of the Second World War.

As part of the G20 response to the economic crisis, the IMF saw its funding substantially increased through the quota subscriptions paid by its 188 member countries. It also negotiated larger borrowing agreements from certain member countries. This was done with the aim of creating a 'crisis firewall'.<sup>5</sup>

*The IMF has focused in particular on the poorest countries worldwide and has quadrupled resources devoted to concessional lending.*

In turn, the IMF was able to step up its lending to countries which had run into difficulties. As part of this program, it has so far committed over \$600 billion in loans to its members. The IMF has focused in particular on the poorest countries worldwide and has quadrupled resources devoted to concessional lending.

Renewed efforts have been made to improve the Fund's monitoring, risk analysis and policy functions. Moves have also been made to reform the IMF's governance structure, although it is important to note that the Fourteenth General Review of Quotas, approved in principle in December 2010, remains to be implemented because of the inability to gain support from certain key

<sup>5</sup> 'IMF Response to the Global Economic Crisis', *IMF*, 27 March 2015, Available at: <https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/changing.htm> (Accessed: 30 May 2015).

members, notably the US. This has curbed the planned increases in the financial resources available to the Fund and has denied certain countries, China, India, Brazil and South Korea for example, a greater say in how the Fund operates. This impasse is worrying since it does not recognize the shifts that have been seen in world economic power in the last couple of decades.

### *The Role Played by the World Bank*

The other key global institution established by the Bretton Woods Accord is the World Bank. In the aftermath of the economic crisis of 2008-9, the World Bank and its affiliates (notably the International Finance Corporation [IFC]) responded with unprecedented expansion of financial support to member countries, centering on low income countries that had suffered a high level of stress. It is striking to note that the World Bank points out that average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth among its client countries declined from 6 percent in 2005 –0.7 to 1 percent in 2009.<sup>6</sup>

In its response to the credit crunch, the Bank sought to protect the world's poorest by stabilizing member countries' financial and private sectors, as well as helping governments manage fiscal challenges, while underpinning long term development expenditures, notably for infrastructure. As part of this program, the World Bank announced in 2009 that it intended to triple lending through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), with new commitments totaling \$100 billion over three years. The World Bank's response was unparalleled. Average new commitments by the Bank and IFC together amounted to USD 63.7 billion a year in fiscal 2009–10, compared with less than half that amount each year during the pre-crisis period, 2005–07.

The World Bank made a determined effort made to improve the evaluation of financial support and accelerate the disbursement of funding. However, the World Bank's own evaluation of its response to the economic crisis reveals that, "Although the Bank provided substantial support in social protection to a number of countries, it was hampered by limited country capacity to target those who

*The World Bank made a determined effort made to improve the evaluation of financial support and accelerate the disbursement of funding.*

<sup>6</sup> World Bank (2011) 'The World Bank Group's Response to the Global Economic Crisis', *Phase II report*, Available at [http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/chapters/crisis2\\_overview.pdf](http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/chapters/crisis2_overview.pdf) (Accessed: 30 May 2015).

were made poor by the crisis, and, as a result, the bulk of support went to the chronically poor.”<sup>7</sup>

### *Future Challenges*

While it is to be hoped that these measures by the Basel Committee and its members, along with initiatives adopted by the IMF and World Bank, will rectify the problems of the past, there are still worrying signs that financial instability might once again grip international capital markets. In its 2014 annual report, the BIS expressed concerns that the present low-interest rate regime, initiated in a move to overcome the effects of the 2008 crash, has pushed financial markets to new highs while lowering the rate premium for many risky loans. The BIS notes that markets had been “exuberant over the past year”, particularly in advanced economies, but warned that they were “dancing mainly to the tune of central bank decisions”, with volatility reaching historical lows and “market participants ... hardly pricing in any risks.” The Bank added, “Overall, it is hard to avoid the sense of a puzzling disconnect between the markets’ buoyancy and underlying

*It is essential to move away from debt as the main engine of growth.*

economic developments globally.” Yet, as the BIS points out, “The only source of lasting prosperity is a stronger supply side.” Accordingly, the Bank concluded, “It is essential to move away from debt as the main engine of growth.”<sup>8</sup>

Nonetheless, despite a huge monetary and fiscal stimulus, including a considerable injection of liquidity through quantitative easing coupled with exceptionally low interest rates, the global recovery has remained erratic; the Eurozone, in particular, has shown only spluttering signs of a revival. Indeed, several Euro members, notably Ireland, Spain, Portugal and Greece have experienced exceptionally difficult unemployment and a sizeable downturn in GDP. This has led, in turn, to damaging public protests and serious social tensions – nowhere more so than in Greece.

In retrospect, it can be seen that the creation of the Euro triggered a major expansion of the financial sector both within the Eurozone and in adjacent banking hubs such as London and Switzer-

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7 Ibid.

8 ‘84th BIS Annual Report, 2013/2014’, Press Release, *BIS*, 29 June 2014, Available at: <http://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2014e.htm> (Accessed: 30 May 2015).

land. Recent detailed research by Professor Hyun Song Shin,<sup>9</sup> a Korean economist previously at Princeton University currently, the Economic Adviser and Head of Research at the BIS, has demonstrated that this boom in global banking – illustrated by the excessive expansion of the RBS Group – exerted a significant influence on the loose credit conditions that characterized the US economy before the credit crunch.

The crisis which engulfed the world’s capital markets in 2008 exposed important weaknesses in the governance of the Euro, ironically the currency that many analysts thought had the best chance of challenging the dollar’s global role at the time of the outbreak of the crisis. This proved to be a chimera.

Southern European economies racked up massive current-account deficits during the first decade of the Euro, while countries in northern Europe ran significant offsetting surpluses. The imbalances were financed by credit flows from the Eurozone core to the overheated housing markets of countries like Spain and Ireland. That proved to be an immense problem when the economic crisis struck in 2008. Peripheral Euro economies began to implode and emergency measures were required to shore up several EU economies. However, market analysts have continued to be concerned about the balance sheets of many European banks, which are characterized by bad debts as a result of imprudent investments in residential, commercial and retail property.

*Southern European economies racked up massive current-account deficits during the first decade of the Euro, while countries in northern Europe ran significant offsetting surpluses.*

Ten years earlier, Professor Martin Feldstein of Harvard University had with great foresight predicted problems with the determined move to establish a single currency for the EU. In an article in the journal *Foreign Affairs*, Professor Feldstein predicted the risks associated with this political move to establish a common currency so long as sovereign member states retained power over fiscal policy. He observed: “... the attempt to manage a monetary union and the subsequent development of a political union are more likely to have the opposite effect. Instead of increasing intra-European harmony and global peace, the shift to EMU and the political integration that would follow it would be

<sup>9</sup> Hyun Song Shin, a Korean economist, was educated at Magdalen College, Oxford, where he obtained his DPhil. In his distinguished academic career he has also held posts at the London School of Economics and Princeton University.

more likely to lead to increased conflicts within Europe.”<sup>10</sup>

Furthermore, as Professor Feldstein predicted, “if countries discover that the shift to a single currency is hurting their economies and that the new political arrangements also are not to their liking, some of them will want to leave”.

In the last year, Greece, which was admitted into Euro membership despite Eurostat statistics indicating it was unable to meet the qualifying criteria,<sup>11</sup> has exemplified the tensions surrounding the maintenance of the current Eurozone. The country’s two main political parties, PASOK and New Democracy, hemorrhaged popular support and a new coalition government, led by Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, was elected in January 2015. Tsipras’s party was highly critical of the economic constraints laid down by creditor nations, notably Germany.

*Relations were not improved when the Greek government announced in the same month that Germany owed it nearly €279 billion in war reparations, from the Nazi occupation during World War Two.*

Negotiations over economic reform and the repayment of an emergency EU-IMF bailout totaling €240 billion have proved particularly fraught. In April 2015, IMF managing director Christine Lagarde observed that talks between Greece and its creditors had been “difficult on almost a daily basis.”<sup>12</sup> Relations were not improved when the Greek government announced in the same month that Germany owed it nearly €279 billion in war reparations, from the Nazi occupation during World War Two.<sup>13</sup> This led Sigmar Gabriel, Germany’s Economic Minister, to claim that it was foolish to link Greece’s bailout by the Eurozone with the question of war reparations. “To be honest I think it’s dumb,” said Gabriel. “I think that it doesn’t move us forward one millimeter on the question of stabilizing Greece.” In July 2015, after a marathon 17-hour negotiation session running through the

<sup>10</sup> Feldstein, M. (1997) ‘EMU and International Conflict’. *Foreign Affairs*, 76(6), November/December.

<sup>11</sup> It was revealed in 2010 that a number of leading investment banks, notably Goldman Sachs and JPMorgan Chase had devised financial products which enabled the Greek government – along with other euro members such as Italy - to disguise their real level of borrowing which would have disqualified them from membership of the single currency, see , for example, Blodget, H. (2010) ‘Greece Paid Goldman \$300 Million To Help It Hide Its Ballooning Debts’. *Business Insider*, Available at: <http://www.businessinsider.com/henry-blodget-greece-paid-goldman-300-million-to-help-it-hide-its-ballooning-debts-2010-2> (Accessed: 30 May 2015).

<sup>12</sup> Kollwe, J. (2015) ‘Greece defends bailout tactics as latest deadline looms’. *The Guardian*, 13 April.

<sup>13</sup> See ‘Greece Nazi occupation: Athens asks Germany for €279bn’, 7 April 2015, Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32202768> (Accessed: 30 May 2015).

night, a deal appeared to have been struck between Greece and its creditors. But the conditions for the bailout were humiliating for Mr. Tsipras's government, overturning many of the key points he had personally fought for in a referendum only a week before.

Some commentators think that Greece is just playing for time. According to Brian Sturgess, Managing Editor of *World Economics*, "After a decade of deceit in relation to the near fraudulent economic statistics presented to Eurostat, successive Greek governments continue to play kick-the-can down the road promising reforms and economies and delivering little until the next deadline approaches. This game can only end in tears. Sensible plans have to be put in place for Greece to leave the Eurozone with a smooth transition."

*The Emerging Role of Regional Development Banks: Underpinning the Global Economy*

Sustainable economic growth remains an unfulfilled goal in many EU economies, and in recent years the low level of economic growth has contrasted sharply with other regions of the world, most notably Asia and many sub-Saharan African economies, albeit develop from a relatively low base. In fact, Africa's economy has grown fourfold since the turn of the millennium. Seven of the world's ten fastest-growing economies are in Africa.

*Economic growth on the African continent has been greatly helped by foreign direct investment, notably from China, but also from other investors looking for attractive yields.*

The roles played by the World Bank and IMF are reasonably well known. What is less well-understood is the increasing role played by some of the regional development banks. Their success is confirmed by the decision to launch a new infrastructure development bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), with its headquarters in Beijing.

Economic growth on the African continent has been greatly helped by foreign direct investment, notably from China, but also from other investors looking for attractive yields. With an emerging middle class in Africa, there have been renewed calls for improvements in desperately needed infrastructure, education and training. In this context, it is worth highlighting the role played by regional development banks in attracting and leveraging private capital to fund such initiatives. The African Development Bank (AfDB) committed USD 6.7 billion to projects and

programs to its 54 continental member countries in 2013 with a further substantial sum invested by its sister organization, the African Development Fund, mainly funded by the Bank's non-African member states.

The AfDB is making good progress on its Ten-Year Strategy, particularly with respect to mobilizing resources within the continent and elsewhere to finance infrastructure projects in Africa. What is more, all four major rating agencies have awarded the AfDB their top AAA credit rating with respect to the Bank's senior debt, with a stable outlook. As Dr. Donald Kaberuka, the Bank's President notes, "This confirms the Bank's capital adequacy, prudent financial and risk management, solid shareholder support, and preferred creditor status."<sup>14</sup>

Another important development bank that is making a real impact is the Islamic Development Bank (IDB), first established over 40 years ago. The IDB is very much a 'South-South' institution whose member countries are virtually all developing nations. As with the AfDB, the IDB boasts an AAA credit rating from the major international credit rating agencies, enabling it to mobilize resources from international capital markets to finance development activities in member countries. One of the IDB's main tasks has been to foster and encourage a range of industries across member countries so that they can diversify their economies and improve their independence from unexpected fluctuations in global commodity markets.

*The record to date has shown that the IDB's Sukuk bond program has proved highly sought after by Islamic investors, not least because of the Bank's AAA credit rating.*

The IDB Group has rapidly expanded over the last six years. Over this period, the Group has benefited in three ways: firstly, from a substantial increase in its capital base; secondly, from the addition of a tier of debt finance on its balance sheet through the sale of *Sukuk* debt instruments; and thirdly, through a sharp increase in income which reached a historic peak in 2009 (1429H).

More recently, as noted above, the Bank has explored methods of borrowing money in the rapidly expanding international market for Islamic debt instruments, notably *Sukuk*. The IDB Group now issues Islamic bonds in London, Kuala Lumpur and, most

<sup>14</sup> African Development Bank Annual Report 2013, p ix, Available at: [http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Annual\\_Report\\_2013.pdf](http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/Annual_Report_2013.pdf) (Accessed: 1 June 2015).

recently, through the Nasdaq Dubai Exchange. The record to date has shown that the IDB's *Sukuk* bond program has proved highly sought after by Islamic investors, not least because of the Bank's AAA credit rating. Furthermore, the recent launch of the Bank's issuance initiative in Dubai has been a welcome boost to trading volumes in this Gulf finance center.

During the course of this decade, and following the financial crisis that gripped capital markets on both sides of the Atlantic in 2008-9, there has been considerable interest in learning more about Islamic banking and finance. The principles integral to *Shari'ah* have also proved the driving engine for new and innovative forms of providing project finance in the Muslim world. This has served as a catalyst for the remarkably rapid development of the Islamic finance industry worldwide and a strong interest from other Multinational Development Banks (MDBs) in the use of *Shari'ah*-compliant instruments to fund development. In turn, this has acted as a spur for ingenuity and well-tailored financial products that address the key needs of their market. Since it is fundamentally against the principles of *Shari'ah* to market and sell interest-bearing bonds, international debt plays no part in the Group's operations. But it is for this reason that the IDB – along with other Islamic banks – was spared the complications and problems caused by the turmoil in international capital markets from 2008.

Islamic banks have emerged as a major force in the trade finance arena. The IDB Group, for example, has placed considerable emphasis on the importance of trade financing operations. Indeed, since its inception, the Group has consistently channeled resources and management time into this area of activity via its subsidiary, the International Islamic Trade Finance Corporation (ITFC), which was specifically set up to advance trade. Today, it is one of the leading players within this market. In 2014 (1434H), the ITFC accounted for nearly half the IDB Group's net investment approvals by value.

*The main IDB member country in the Caucasus region is Azerbaijan, where the bank has been active.*

The main IDB member country in the Caucasus region is Azerbaijan, where the bank has been active. According to Brian Sturges of *World Economics*, "The amount of IDB Group financing for Azerbaijan has so far reached USD 1.7 billion for major in-

frastructural development projects in the sectors of roads, energy, agriculture, water supplies, as well as financing private sector and foreign trade operations.”

*A new Chinese Player on the Asian stage*

Although some economic commentators anticipated that China might try to challenge US dominance during the crisis, Chinese policymakers ended up playing a relatively low profile role. For various domestic political reasons, Chinese policymakers were for the most part unwilling to divert from their traditional export-oriented development strategy. However, the crisis gave the Chinese a nasty shock, not least because of their extensive portfolio of US Treasury bonds. As a result, China began to diversify its investment portfolio worldwide, and the world’s second largest economy also opted to develop a more prominent and independent role in global monetary and financial affairs.

A good example of this revised strategy is the move to establish an Asian infrastructure bank, the AIIB, which will be launched in 2015 with a planned \$100 billion in shareholder capital. Significantly, a number of OECD member countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Switzerland have along with India and Pakistan decided to join this Chinese initiative as founder partners, despite strong US opposition. Their motivation for doing so is the recognition that Asia offers some of the best economic prospects in the world – in contrast to the prospect offered by a stultified Europe. Britain is just one of the countries that is looking to find and win infrastructure contracts for its national companies. Confirming this trend, Australia has opted to join them, too, although the US put considerable pressure on the country to stay out.

David Marsh, the Managing Director of the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF) believes,<sup>15</sup> “China will do its best to scotch American and other western concerns over the AIIB’s governance by recruiting top-notch international management and policing a firm line on environmental and social standards for the bank’s lending.”<sup>16</sup>

15 OMFIF provides a useful forum to link central banks, sovereign funds and private sector financial groups and leading experts in the economic and banking fields internationally.

16 Marsh, D. (2015) London’s Beijing links could herald fresh strains’. *OMFIF Briefing*, 16 March, 6 (12.1).

## Conclusion

The way in which international capital markets and official policy makers have responded to the tsunami that hit financial markets in 2008-2009 reflects a shift in the tectonic plates of world economic power. Whereas the US was the undisputed leader of the pack a decade ago, we are now witnessing the advent of other prominent world players, notably China, but also those in the Islamic world. Previous backwaters, such as the continent of Africa, are emerging as important economic markets, attracting investment from major corporations, private equity funds, and hedge funds.

*Whereas the US was the undisputed leader of the pack a decade ago, we are now witnessing the advent of other prominent world players, notably China, but also those in the Islamic world.*

Whereas mainland Europe, with the exception of a few countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, continues to ossify and suffer from myriad supply side rigidities, companies and investment funds based in Europe are seeking to identify and invest in promising new export markets in Central Asia, the Middle East, Far East, and Africa. William Hague, who stepped down as Foreign Secretary in the UK coalition government, made the development of closer ties with rapidly expanding export markets worldwide one of his key goals while he was in office. This concerted export push is set to continue and develop.

Recognizing that economic recovery within the UK was dependent upon British businesses both expanding in existing international markets and winning in new ones, British Government policy focused on this challenge. As Angus Miller, a former special adviser to the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), comments: “Under the new coalition Government led by David Cameron no UK minister, or official, was to hold a conversation without an economic growth dimension being included – the Growth Agenda as it came to be known.” He adds: “And no diplomat overseas was to enter into a conversation without there being a similar economic growth dimension.” Not only was the UK Government talking about helping the recovery, through the FCO, it organized overseas support to British business to fulfill this objective. At the same time, state resources were mobilized and focused to provide front line support through the UKTI (UK Trade & Industry) agency to British embassies, especially in the

emerging economies of Central and Southern Asia and South America. This activity was paralleled by a concerted effort to attract new private and institutional investors from the growing economies of these same states, such as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and China, as well as from countries with traditional ties.

Looking ahead, we are likely to see fresh moves to adapt the world's financial institutions to this new reality. Already, there is a significant link between the AIIB and China's aim to become part of the Special Drawing Right (SDR), the International Monetary Fund's composite currency unit. A review of how this might be achieved is due to be concluded by the end of 2015. One of the crucial justifications behind China's bid is that the IMF's currency unit could be much strengthened by the inclusion of China's relatively strong currency, even though the renminbi is not fully convertible.

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It is important to note that enlarging the SDR to include an emerging market currency - the renminbi - could promote the idea that the AIIB should adopt the SDR as its own unit of account, thereby extending the use of SDR by a wide range of international organizations, such as the BIS and AfDB.

Any such steps will simply recognize the shifting status quo, as the US and European economies lose their share of world trade to rapidly developing economies such as China, Malaysia and India. At the same time, we are likely to witness greater pressure on the US and major European economies to implement the promised reforms to the IMF which were agreed back in 2010. The US Congress's reluctance to ratify even the modest reform agreed to by member countries in 2010 is likely to lead to mounting calls for concrete action by China and other rapidly developing economies. Since China is a major holder of US Treasury bonds, Congress may find it difficult to prevaricate for much longer.

Furthermore, the prolonged and discordant negotiations over Greece's membership of the Euro, and its ability to service a debt mountain totaling €320 billion, is likely to trigger a number of longer term consequences, hinging on the continued shape of the Euro currency area but also the wisdom of continuing to appoint a European as the head of the IMF. The strong support

for Greece's continued membership of the Eurozone shown by Christine Lagarde, a former French finance minister who has demonstrated many admirable talents in her career to date, has nonetheless raised questions about the IMF's independence and fairness in dealing with individual member countries. If no satisfactory answer is found to repaying the sum of €26 billion owed by Greece to the IMF, other countries far poorer than Greece will find it more difficult to access funding in future. Such an outcome would accelerate moves to reform the governance of the IMF and give non-Europeans a greater say in the direction of the Fund, beginning with the appointment of managing director, as this author highlighted in an article for *The Wall Street Journal Europe* at the time of Christine Lagarde's appointment.<sup>17</sup>

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17 Boyfield, K. and Sturgess, B. (2011) 'Jose de Gregorio Rebeco for IMF Chief', *Wall Street Journal Europe*, 6 June, Available at: <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303745304576361332505734782> (Accessed: 30 May 2015).



# The Evolution and Failure of NATO's Nuclear Posture

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Kamal Makili-Aliyev\*

As a military alliance with nuclear capabilities, NATO's nuclear posture has gone through a very interesting evolutionary period, shaped by the security environment during its existence. Not only has the Alliance shifted its focus in terms of conventional/nuclear forces ratio following the end of the Cold War, it has gradually changed its vision of nuclear weapons and their role in the world. Alliance remains a nuclear power, at least until the global elimination of all nuclear weapons. However, that goal remains a distant one. Will the Alliance adopt a proactive strategy when it comes to nuclear weapons? Will it modernize its nuclear posture? This article attempts to tackle these questions, while also providing an outline of the stages of the evolution of NATO's nuclear posture. At the same time, it is argued that Alliance's nuclear posture is currently failing, and urgently requires reforms and a new vision.



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### *Introduction*

Since its establishment in 1949, NATO has evolved considerably. Its nuclear policies, priorities and posture in general have been influenced by internal developments both across the organization and within member states. It has to be pointed out

*US have emerged out of WWII not only with nuclear weapons, but with least casualties and damage done to the state that became no less dominant in the world, if not stronger.* that the US (arguably the primary driving force behind the Alliance) was the first state to develop and use nuclear weapons, and therefore plays a significant part in the general discussion of NATO's nuclear policies. Moreover, the US have emerged out of WWII not only with nuclear weapons, but with least casualties and damage done to the state that became no less dominant in the world, if not stronger.<sup>1</sup>

Furthermore, during the Cold War, nuclear deterrence played a major role in the standoff between the Alliance and the Eastern bloc, led by the USSR. Accordingly, the nuclear posture of NATO was shaped by Cold War contexts and stereotypes. However, with the dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, the situation inevitably began to change, prompting the revision of the nuclear policies in all the nuclear states. Given that three members of the “nuclear five” (namely the US, UK and France) are members of NATO, it can be safely said that evolution of nuclear posture played a crucial role in the overall evolution of NATO's approach toward defending and deterring against all perceived threats.

As NATO's overall posture has evolved, the prospects for the potential use of nuclear weapons in any future conflict have declined. Emphasis has shifted towards the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons and focus of confidence for the Alliance's members.<sup>2</sup> This clear policy shift has prompted changes in the international security discourse, bringing both NATO's conventional capabilities and the debate on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to the forefront of the discussion. The post-Cold War era has brought different perspectives on these issues. However, while the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is reflected in contemporary NATO policies, this organization remains far from

<sup>1</sup> Gaddis, J. (2005) *The Cold War: A New History*. London: Penguin, pp. 8-9.

<sup>2</sup> NATO Parliamentary Assembly (2010) *212 DSCFC 10 E REV 1 - U.S. Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Fundamental NATO Debate*, paras. 22-26.

becoming a non-nuclear Alliance.

This paper will review the evolution of NATO's nuclear posture, starting with the Cold War period, proceeding to the immediate post-Cold War period, and concluding with an assessment of modern approaches and trends in NATO nuclear policies. These three periods will be analyzed in order to identify milestones in NATO's nuclear posture in different international security contexts. The paper will discuss NATO's approaches to its deterrence and defense functions from the nuclear standpoint. This will be helpful for drawing conclusions in the final part of the paper.

The roots of NATO's nuclear posture date back to its establishment and the beginning of the Cold War.

### *Establishment of NATO and Its Nuclear Posture during the Cold War*

As mentioned earlier, the US emerged from WWII confident in its ability to operate as a dominant world power, rebuild Europe and achieve supremacy over the Soviet Union; by the end of the 1940s only the US had nuclear leverage. Essentially, Washington's false belief that the US would have monopoly in the field of nuclear weapons for perhaps another decade after the war, allowing them to raise Europe up from the ashes while deterring USSR through nuclear capabilities, triggered – in the context of the prevailing international security conditions - what we know now as the Cold War. The Cold War was based around the nuclear standoff between the Western Alliance and the Eastern bloc. In fact, the USSR acquired nuclear weapons in 1949, the same year that NATO was established. Thus in formal terms, it was the Alliance that was engaged in the nuclear power play, and not just the US. Thus, the US required a new strategy to handle the Soviet Union under these new conditions and in the framework of the new integration project established by the North Atlantic Treaty.<sup>3</sup>

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Due to the situation in post-WWII Europe, along with other objective factors, it was the US that was almost exclusively respon-

<sup>3</sup> Gaddis, *The Cold War*, pp. 34-35.

sible for shaping NATO's policy on nuclear weapons. To try and gain ground on the Soviet Union, the US was forced to upgrade conventional forces while stationing some of them on European soil, build more nuclear weapons to gain leverage in terms of volume, and start research in thermonuclear areas to build a hydrogen bomb, taking nuclear weapon development to a whole new level.<sup>4</sup> NATO, in due course, produced "The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area" (1950). NATO became a nuclear alliance by definition following the adoption of NSC-162/2, now commonly known as the doctrine of Massive Retaliation. At that time, the Alliance struggled to find a balance between nuclear and conventional forces, but found itself locked into a posture that was heavily reliant upon nuclear weapons, taking into account the perceived superiority of conventional forces of USSR and the Warsaw Pact. This enabled European nations to take more control over the nuclear arms based on their territories, thereby reducing US dominance within NATO.<sup>5</sup> This nuclear posture of NATO prevailed throughout the Cold War long into 1980s, arguably until the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In line with this approach, in 1953-1954, the US began the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe. It was believed that these relatively short-range and less powerful nuclear arms would provide deterrence, and act as counterweights against the conventional forces of Warsaw Pact if needed. NATO's Military Committee clearly believed that these non-strategic nuclear weapons could prevent the swift occupation of Europe in the event that deterrence failed.<sup>6</sup> The allocation of this nuclear arsenal probably served to reassure the European states that the US was capable of using its nuclear potential in defense of the continent. With this in mind, at the beginning of 1960s, the US managed to position its non-strategic nuclear weapons in West Germany, Italy, the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands and Turkey.

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France hosted US nuclear weapons until 1959. The Europe-based nuclear weapons arsenal included a wide range of nuclear arms, from very com-

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, p. 36.

<sup>5</sup> Lindley-French, J. and Macfarlane, N. (2006) *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: The Enduring Alliance*. London: Routledge, pp. 22, 28-29.

<sup>6</sup> North Atlantic Military Committee (1954) *Decision on M.C. 48: A Report by the Military Committee on the Most Effective Pattern of NATO Military Strength for the Next Few Years*. Available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a541122a.pdf>, pp. 2, 6-7 (Accessed: 20 May 2015).

pact landmines to mid-range cruise missiles with ground launchers. In 1970s these nuclear weapons numbered more than 7000, but with the end of the Cold War that number declined.<sup>7</sup>

It must be pointed out that NATO members did not always agree on how to proceed with national and/or multilateral nuclear programs during the Cold War. The United Kingdom and France developed their own nuclear programs. Italy and West Germany introduced an arrangement allowing for multilateral nuclear forces, i.e. with the participation of all the European Allies. However, the US never stopped trying to maintain dominance with regard to NATO's nuclear policies, while trying to keep all the non-nuclear European Allies under its umbrella, thereby preventing them from pursuing their own nuclear ambitions. Nonetheless, the Allies were able to reach common ground (the ongoing challenges notwithstanding) on using nuclear capabilities and sharing corresponding responsibilities. For example, if NATO authorized the use of nuclear weapons, European states would assume responsibility for the delivery of US nuclear arms, while the U.S. would maintain control over the nuclear charges until the actual moment of deployment. These steps prompted the creation of the Nuclear Planning Group inside NATO in 1966, mandated to make decisions on nuclear policies. The High Level Group was subsequently created in 1977 (where U.S. still presides) tasked with advising the Nuclear Planning Group on policy, planning and posture. Much of that system remained even after the end of the Cold War in the form of shared physical and institutional framework of NATO's decision making on nuclear matters.<sup>8</sup>

### *NATO's Nuclear Posture in the Post-Cold War Era*

The dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold War changed the international security framework so dramatically that even the reasons for the continued existence of NATO and US involvement in European security were put into question. However, neither the US nor Europe were ready to disband NATO and end collaboration on security matters.<sup>9</sup> The subsequent Gulf War and Balkan conflict convinced the Allies of the prevailing threats

<sup>7</sup> Kristensen, H. (2005) *U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A Review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels, and War Planning*. Natural Resources Defense Council, pp.24-34.

<sup>8</sup> NATO Parliamentary Assembly, *U.S. Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe*, paras. 17-21.

<sup>9</sup> Kaplan, L. (2004) *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance*. London: Praeger, pp. 113-115.

to North-Atlantic community, and it would have been premature to dissolve NATO.

However, due to the change in the nature of threats and their sources, NATO's nuclear posture has been adapted. With the adoption of the new Security Concept in 1991, NATO affirmed that it would adopt and transform itself in accordance with the

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new security realities in the Post-Cold War era. That also meant revising nuclear security policies, taking into account that NATO's purpose was now exclusively self-defense.<sup>10</sup> Thus, nuclear weapons were moved from being the means of first resort to the last. As an early indicator of that switch, in 1991 the START treaty between US and Russian Federation was signed, reducing their respective nuclear arsenals to 3500 warheads.<sup>11</sup>

The largest reduction in numbers was witnessed in Europe's non-strategic nuclear arms. NATO's tactical nuclear doctrine and strategy were criticized in the mid 1980s, mostly for the concentration and growing reliance on strategic nuclear weapons, leaving the tactical nuclear doctrine in stagnation and the arsenal in deterioration. NATO needed to change its tactical nuclear posture in Europe due to the shift in the strategic environment. This critique pushed for changes in strategy, advocating a flexible response as an alternative to the existing tactical nuclear doctrine, and calling for the reduction of non-strategic nuclear arsenal in Europe.<sup>12</sup> It was only logical that following these trends the US would reduce the number of non-strategic nuclear weapons at the beginning of the 1990s. This complied with NATO's Strategic Concept and the overall changes in NATO's nuclear posture, marking a shift from Cold War era policies. Tactical nuclear weapons were no longer the actual combat-ready means of the forward defense, as propagated by NATO during the 1950-1980s.

As a result, the US started the unilateral withdrawal of all ground-launched, short-range non-strategic nuclear weapons globally; from Europe it withdrew nuclear-warhead artillery ammo, surface-to-surface missiles and anti-submarine bombs,

10 Behnke, A. (2013) *NATO's Security Discourse after the Cold War*. London: Routledge, pp. 79-80.

11 Lindley-French and Macfarlane, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, pp. 61, 64.

12 Maiorano, A. (1983) *The Evolution of United States and NATO Tactical Nuclear Doctrine and Limited Nuclear War Options*. Thesis: Naval Postgraduate School, pp. 4-11.

around 2500 units in total. The free-fall B-61 bombs carried by special fighter-jets were the only kind of tactical nuclear weapons left in Europe. Most of that arsenal was also removed from Europe, leaving only about 600-700 bombs available. Moreover, in line with the reduction of quantities came the reduction of quality. Nuclear attack readiness times were reduced, and potential threats for weapons to target were no longer specified. NATO's reductions were part of the political move to push the Russian Federation to undertake corresponding reductions: a strategic 'cool down'. The presidents of the US and Russia were very active in their initiatives to unilaterally reduce their nuclear potentials in the 1990s. What slowed down the process was the absence of a mechanism to mutually verify these steps, creating concern that some of the reductions may be exaggerated or transferred into shadows - the other side not following up on its obligations.<sup>13</sup>

*NATO's reductions were part of the political move to push the Russian Federation to undertake corresponding reductions: a strategic 'cool down'.*

By the end of the 1990s, estimates showed that only about 500 US tactical nuclear warheads remained in seven European states. In 2001, the US retracted the twenty warheads that it had been keeping in Greece. This marked the first total retraction in the post-Cold War period, since 1959, when France first requested the withdrawal of US warheads. Starting from 2004, the U.S. began gradually to remove around 130 nuclear warheads from Germany, leaving estimated 10-20 warheads in position. A further 110 tactical weapons were removed from the UK.<sup>14</sup>

NATO's post-Cold War nuclear policy has proceeded precisely in line with the terms of the 1990 London Declaration, which promised to downgrade nuclear weapons to weapons of last resort. Whereas the 1991 Strategic Concept believes that the use of nuclear weapons already seems even more remote than in the realities of the Cold War. However, the slight caveat is that non-strategic nuclear weapons still provide a special link to strategic nuclear weapons that support the "trans-Atlantic link". This was largely reaffirmed in the 1999 Strategic Concept, which identifies non-strategic nuclear weapons as sub-strategic forces of NATO that at minimal levels should adequately preserve peace and stability for the Alliance.<sup>15</sup>

13 NATO Parliamentary Assembly, *U.S. Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in Europe*, paras. 22-24.

14 Kristensen, *U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe*, pp.53-62.

15 NATO (1990) *London Declaration on transformed North Atlantic Alliance*. Available at: <http://bit>

While the post-Cold War period saw the reduction of nuclear capabilities on both strategic and tactical levels, new threats and challenges in the nuclear area have emerged and must be addressed.

*Modern Approaches and Trends in NATO's Nuclear Posture*

The reduction of nuclear weapons has been maintained in NATO's nuclear policies since the early 2000s, both at the US' own initiative and with lobbying from the European Allies. That lobbying have arguably culminated in 2010 on the eve of the adoption of NATO's new Strategic Concept in Lisbon. Calls for a serious revision of NATO's nuclear posture and for the elimination of US nuclear arsenal in Europe were voiced inside the Western European branch of the Alliance, especially Germany. That met with opposition from Central European members (geographically closer to Russia), who argued that nuclear weapons remained critical for the security of the Alliance. In spring 2010, the US

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administration released a Nuclear Posture Review report that called for the reduction of the role and volume of US nuclear arsenal to the minimum level required to serve as an adequate deterrent for the US and its allies and partners. The US declared that the single purpose of nuclear weapons was as a deterrent against nuclear attack on US territory or the territory of its allies and partners.<sup>16</sup>

With this in mind, NATO adopted a new strategic concept that used much stronger language on the improbability of the use of nuclear weapons by the Alliance, calling it "extremely remote". However, the new concept reaffirmed that as long as nuclear weapons exist in this world, NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance with strategic nuclear weapons (mainly belonging to the US) as a key security guarantee. Moreover, it reaffirmed the Alliance's approach toward collective defense planning on nuclear roles, further diminishing the dominant role of the US and focus on the appropriate combination of nuclear and conventional forces.

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ly/1zjzvnD (Accessed: 20 May 2015); NATO (1991) *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*. Available at: <http://bit.ly/1GZjuJA> (Accessed: 20 May 2015); NATO (1999) *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*. Available at: <http://bit.ly/1vdHssg> (Accessed: 20 May 2015).

16 Pifer, S. (2011) *NATO, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control*. Paper 7. Washington: Brookings, pp. 10-12.

At the same time, the new strategic concept reflects NATO's desire to create conditions for a world free of nuclear weapons, and does not specify the "trans-Atlantic" link between US-based strategic nuclear weapons and non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe, unlike previous concepts.<sup>17</sup> While the Alliance has not completely reduced the role of nuclear weapons within the frame of its deterring and defending posture, it has indicated that there is a strong desire to diminish their role to the bare minimum until the time comes to eliminate last of the nuclear weapons and declare the world and the Alliance free of this burden. However futuristic and improbable that goal may seem in the near future, it is a clear development of the NATO's nuclear posture at present time. It has to be pointed out though, that such a change in posture have its own very clear rationale.

By the time the new strategic concept was adopted in Lisbon, NATO had been through a very challenging ten years, which had transformed many aspects of the Alliance. The Strategic Concept clearly states that NATO has entered the new phase in its development, and needs to remain effective in a changing world against new threats with new capabilities and new partners.<sup>18</sup> This was a logical outline of what NATO have experienced in the conflicts and different crisis situations in 2000s. Security environment is now perceived globally, with the nuclear deterrence functions in stagnation and conflicts stripped of nuclear character on both political and physical levels. The proliferation of nuclear weapons themselves (as opposed to the system of mutual nuclear deterrence) is emphasized as a global threat. Monitoring the international environment to anticipate and identify potential crises, as well as acting to prevent them from developing into conflict situations has become increasingly important. This, rather than nuclear deterrence, is underscored in the 2010 Strategic Concept. Terrorism on global level was a push that shifted the perspective of how the new threats should be viewed and treated by the Alliance.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> NATO (2010) *Active Engagement, Modern Defense: Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization*. Available at: <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf> (Accessed: 21 May 2015).

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> Behnke, *NATO's Security Discourse after the Cold War*, pp. 79-80. Lindley-French and Macfarlane, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, pp. 162-166.

Moreover, by the time the 2010 Strategic Concept was adopted, there was (and still is) a growing discontent among five European Allies with regard to NATO's current nuclear sharing arrangements. Essentially, they are tired of hosting the remaining US non-strategic nuclear weapons - namely B61 gravity bombs. This position ultimately influenced NATO's overall nuclear posture discourse. Even with the establishment of the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR) and the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) Control and Disarmament Committee to support it, the European Allies' position has not changed significantly, though there have been compromises. In addition, there are varying approaches among the Allies towards Russia - from those who favor a kind of appeasement to the more hardline perspective of Russia as a nuclear-armed enemy. Though the Alliance seems to find the balance between these approaches, such compromises have led to changes in nuclear posture at the global level. Slowing the change in nuclear posture is usually the position taken by France, via its voting patterns in the North Atlantic Council, despite the efforts of Nuclear Planning Group.<sup>20</sup> However, despite these obstacles, NATO's nuclear posture is now very different from the 1950s when these challenges first emerged. At the same time, NATO arguably faces no less (if not more) challenges that it had during the Cold War than it has in contemporary security environment.

### *The Failure of NATO's Nuclear Posture*

With all the challenges that NATO faces as a military alliance, it is still lagging behind in adopting new effective principles in terms of its nuclear posture and in introducing modernized approaches to nuclear weapons. These changes are long overdue in both WMD-related policies, as well as in the political context that Alliance is promoting globally.

First of all, NATO's policy decision to reduce nuclear arms was justified from many perspectives. Nuclear disarmament, maintenance cost-reduction, recycling of nuclear material, strategic changes in nuclear arms defense mechanisms, 'means of last resort' policy, etc. - all of these are positive trends in relation to

20 Seay III, E. (2012) *Dissecting the DDPR: NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture Review and the Future of Nuclear Sharing*. Nuclear Policy Paper No.10. London/Washington: BASIC. Available at: <http://bit.ly/1zXz0Cl>, pp. 1-2 (Accessed: 21 May 2015).

the ongoing reduction of the arsenal that Alliance have carried out since 1990s. However, such reduction of the arsenals have brought a lot of questions from European Allies, in terms of their vulnerability due to such drastic reductions and softening of the posture, as well as left a lot of gaps in the nuclear defense capabilities of the Alliance as a group of states; now heavily relying on the good will of only one member – the US.

Secondly, the changes in nuclear posture have been carried out with a focus on the prevailing political context. This means that political messages and ‘nuclear rapprochement’ with Russia and China have been a priority in formulating strategies of reduction of nuclear arsenals, as opposed to focusing on strategic and tactical nuclear defense *per se*. As a consequence, modernized approaches to nuclear defense have suffered greatly. It is evident that despite modernization of conventional forces, nuclear capacity remains constrained by the technologies of Cold War era. Of course there are new warheads and carriers, new rocket-launching systems being tested and implemented, but those are based on the warhead-delivery systems of the 1950s and 1960s.

With that in mind, NATO has failed to comprehensively develop its nuclear posture both politically and technologically. Politically, it has failed to maintain the same level of psychological security for European Allies as before, when it had greater nuclear arms capacity. Technologically, it failed to justify the reduction of nuclear weapons with the implementation of smart technologies that would change approaches to nuclear defense and overcome the negative effects of reduction of arsenals.

It is clear that in the modern security environment, there are different types of threats, never seen in the Cold War era when nuclear posture was born. Non-state actors are a very real threat nowadays; this has significantly changed the context of national security. Nonetheless, the introduction of smart technologies into WMDs are lagging far behind, even though introducing this technology could have mitigated many of the attendant security concerns (e.g. that WMDs could end up in the hands of non-state actors or ‘rogue states’). Even such a sophisticated organization as

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NATO is long overdue in this area, concentrated on the conventional weapons modernization.

NATO's failure to achieve true political consensus on the reduction of nuclear arms is even more evident. European Allies in the east, closer to Russia, are generally skeptical of the progressive reduction of NATO's nuclear arsenals. On the other hand, western European Allies are tired of hosting nuclear weapons both due to maintenance costs and to the psychological effects of hosting foreign WMDs on their territories. Their perception of the Russia-based nuclear threat is quite different among the countries to the east. Here, the US could play a crucial role in shaping the discourse to improve not only the effectiveness of trans-Atlantic link, but also to ensure consensus among European Allies by introducing clear and multi-vector reforms in nuclear defense that would justify the reduction of arsenals without damaging NATO's overall nuclear deterrence capabilities.

For now, NATO's nuclear posture does not demonstrate a comprehensive stance on the present and future status of nuclear weapons. Recent events clearly show the reactiveness of NATO policies in this regard. Russia's plans to increase its nuclear arsenal have sparked US countermeasures; Washington is enlarging the assortment of heavy weapons in eastern European Allies, including the Baltic states. These allies are increasingly concerned about Russia's assertive nuclear policy decisions.<sup>21</sup> Nonetheless, NATO's reaction seemed disproportionate. It seems that the Alliance is not ready for this turn of events and underestimates the changing nature of nuclear security context. To salvage its failing nuclear posture, NATO needs to come up with a clear vision of political and technological reforms before it is too late.

## Conclusion

NATO's nuclear posture have been through more than sixty years of evolution that brought it to the modern period with no less questions and competitive approaches for going forward in its development than it was in the beginning of the Cold War.

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<sup>21</sup>Tsetvetkova, M. (2015) *Putin says Russia beefing up nuclear arsenal, NATO denounces 'saber-rattling'*. Reuters. Available at: <http://reut.rs/1Legyua> (Accessed: 22 May 2015).

If it was very clear for the Alliance during the times of Cold War who the enemy was and who should be deterred through nuclear capabilities and arms race, after the end of the Cold War it took some two decades for the Alliance to reevaluate its nuclear posture under the present conditions. The process cannot be labeled as a fast one, which is understandable from the point of view that such changes do not happen overnight in the Alliance guided by the democratic principles and relying on common consent. Differences in approaches, views and positions of the Allies have arguably slowed the evolution of the nuclear posture down, but from the other side have been going into the only possible direction of deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons. That was in its turn a quality result based on the common grounds and not on unilaterally-imposed reforms.

*Differences in approaches, views and positions of the Allies have arguably slowed the evolution of the nuclear posture down, but from the other side have been going into the only possible direction of deemphasizing the role of nuclear weapons.*

The striking difference in today's international security environment must also be taken into account. During the Cold War, the Alliance had to depend on its non-strategic nuclear capabilities to counter Warsaw bloc's supremacy in conventional forces. Nowadays, it is probably the other way around. The combined conventional forces of the Alliance can outflank the conventional forces of any potential adversaries. Thus, it is only natural for the Alliance to seek the elimination of all the nuclear weapons, firstly because of their potential for global destruction, and secondly because of the understanding that its superiority in conventional forces (outranked only by the nuclear capabilities of others) is unlikely to be challenged even in the long term.

Within this framework the steps that NATO has taken do not seem entirely logical. For example, the reluctance of some of the Allies to eliminate all non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe is understandable, especially considering that NATO will not gain anything by taking this action unilaterally (i.e. without commitment from Russia to carry out similar reductions). However, if we also consider the current concerns about nuclear terrorism and general proliferation of WMDs - the challenges to NATO's nuclear posture become very clear. Thus, NATO's efforts in the near future will be likely focused on maintaining a balance between changing its stance on collective nuclear deterrence, while at the same time avoiding a loss of confidence in the Alliance's commitments.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Pifer, *NATO, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control*, p. 36.

*NATO has failed to implement the reforms and changes to its gradually failing nuclear posture and will soon face serious problems, especially when it comes to the proliferation of WMDs.*

With that in mind, one can conclude that NATO has failed to implement the reforms and changes to its gradually failing nuclear posture and will soon face serious problems, especially when it comes to the proliferation of WMDs. This very apt quote from Lindley-French and Macfarlane provides a succinct and useful summary of the concerns addressed in this paper:

“Sixty years ago, NATO stood on the verge of the first nuclear age; today the Alliance stands on the verge of the third. The Alliance will need to play a role in the new deterrence that will become the new reality. Indeed, the technology of destruction was the preserve only of the most powerful sixty years ago, but today it is slowly spreading as the non-proliferation regimes that were created for one age, leak and crack in the face of another. Counter-proliferation will necessarily provide vital reinforcement for non-proliferation, but can Europeans and Americans agree on the application of coercion when faced with the fact of WMD threat? They need to because whilst the U.S. continues to offer Europe protective power at the higher end of the conflict spectrum, the European democracies still afford the U.S. its greatest pool of democratic legitimization, and both are needed in the coming struggle.”<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> Lindley-French and Macfarlane, *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization*, pp. 61, 64.

# The Global Climate Has Always Been Broken: Failures of Climate Governance as Global Governmentality

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Scott Hamilton\*

International climate governance is commonly referred to as a failure, due to the inability of states to take substantive action against anthropogenic global climate change. This raises an important question: if international collective action is required so as to heal, fix, or prevent further damage to the global climate, have we ever had a concept of the global climate that was not damaged, broken, or in need of international governance? This article argues that we have not. Today's naturalized concept of a 'global' climate emerged in international relations only as recently as the late-1980s, framed from its outset as a broken or damaged global object resulting from failures of governance to steward the Earth. By combining the Foucauldian tools of governmentality and genealogy, this article traces how an implicit 'rationality of powerlessness' has undergirded the global climate since its international political inception; from the 1979 World Climate Conference, to its global spread in the mid-1980s by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), to its naturalized meaning today. This powerlessness, crystalizing in explicit political failures of governance, is shown to be an implicit global governmentality: a shaping, conducting, and governing of thought and action, by a concept of global climate change that is at its conceptual root *always already broken*, thereby engendering failure in a Sisyphean quest to fix what is conceptually unfixable.



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*“In short, there is a problem of the regime, the politics of the scientific statement... [and] of how and why at certain moments that regime undergoes a global modification.” Michel Foucault (1976)<sup>1</sup>*

*“What we are doing now is killing this [climate governance] process. The signal we are giving the outside world when millions are watching will be: ‘We failed. The UN system failed’.” Delegate at UN-FCCC Climate Negotiations, Copenhagen Denmark (2009)<sup>2</sup>*

### *Introduction*

According to the latest report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), our planet Earth is in serious trouble. “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal”, the IPCC declares, “and since the 1950s, many of the observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millennia.”<sup>3</sup> These changes are the result of humanity’s addiction to fossil fuels, in which the combustion of carbon molecules to generate energy for transportation, agriculture, and economic production, has simultaneously spewed excessive amounts of carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) into the air. Incoming radiation from the sun is captured by this CO<sub>2</sub> and other greenhouse gases (GHGs) stuck in the atmosphere, altering its composition of radiative energy because it is unable to escape the Earth and radiate back outwards into space – thereby warming the globe like a greenhouse. This planetary ‘greenhouse effect’, or global warming, is now catalyzing a human-induced, or ‘anthropogenic’, global climate

1 Foucault, M. (1994) ‘Truth and Power’, in Faubion, J.D. (ed) *Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984*, London: Penguin Books, p. 114.

2 Delegate quoted in Dimitrov, R.S. (2000) ‘Inside Copenhagen: The State of Climate Governance’, *Global Environmental Politics*, 10(2), p. 21.

3 IPCC (2013) ‘Summary for Policymakers’, in Stocker, T. et. al (eds) *Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 4.

change that portends catastrophe for the future of humanity writ large. Indeed, regardless of state or nationality, global climate change threatens “rising sea levels and population displacement, increasing severity of typhoons and hurricanes, droughts, floods, disruption of water resources, extinctions and other ecological disruptions, wildfires, severe disease outbreaks, and declining crop yields and food stocks”.<sup>4</sup> As a global problem that clearly transcends the borders of sovereign states and threatens the very existence of international relations with systemic collapse, “climate change has ascended to the realm of high politics.”<sup>5</sup> This raises a paradoxical question of paramount importance, however: why is it that an increasing scientific certainty and political recognition of global climate change, and its portent of catastrophic danger, elicits continuous and seemingly intractable failures of international governance? “Put simply,” notes Paul Harris, from the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 and its attempt to regulate carbon emissions, to the Copenhagen Accord of 2009, “with too few exceptions, the politics of climate change, despite being increasingly energetic, has failed.”<sup>6</sup>

This commonplace narrative of failure presupposes a number of implicit or naturalized assumptions about global climate change, international relations, and global governance that this short article will problematize and examine. How? Take, for example, the frequent lamentation that, “The failure to generate a sound and effective framework for managing global climate change is one of the most serious indications of the challenges facing the international order.”<sup>7</sup> True, although climate change is indeed a daunting and ineluctable challenge facing humanity, here, statements such as this contain many tacit assumptions that can still be unpacked. For instance, the climate is simply taken for granted and deemed a natural and global object. What has ‘failed’, therefore, must simply be attributed to its

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4 Mazo, J. (2010) *Climate Conflict: How Global Warming Threatens Security and What to Do About It*. London: Routledge, p. 13.

5 Carter, N. (2013) ‘Climate Change and the Politics of the Global Environment’, in Beeson, M. and Bisley, N. (eds) *Issues in 21<sup>st</sup> Century World Politics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 177.

6 Harris, P.G. (2013) *What’s Wrong with Climate Politics and How to Fix It*, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 2.

7 Held, D. and Hervey, A. (2011) ‘Democracy, Climate Change, and Global Governance: Democratic Agency and the Policy Menu Ahead’, in *The Governance of Climate Change: Science, Economics, Politics and Ethics*. Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 96.

explicit governance, implying that the opposite of this failure is somehow a *successful* governance of climate change that might contribute to fixing or to healing the anthropogenic damage now done. Yet – has there *ever* been a successful “sound and effective” international governance of climate change? Extending this line of questioning, we may further problematize the taken-for-granted concept of the climate as a global, natural, or immutable object. Has our concept of the ‘global climate’ ever existed, or been conceptualized, without being associated with, demarcated by, or framed and grounded upon, notions of damage, broken-

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ness, or failure? Have we ever thought of a ‘global climate’ without tacitly conjoining these notions of damage and brokenness, to failures of governance? In short, this article asks: is it even possible for us today to *think* of the concept of global climate change, without associating it, implicitly and subjectively, with a broken global object that conjures thoughts of powerlessness and failures of governance? This article argues that it is not. Upon historical examination, our contemporary and naturalized understanding of ‘climate change’ did not always refer to a natural, global, universal, nor immutable object enveloping the Earth. Instead, the global climate first emerged into being as a thinkable political concept as recently as the late-1980s, when it was constructed through international conferences as something already broken, damaged, and in need of repair, due to failing regimes of international governance to steward local, regional, and state-centric sovereign climates. Hence, to ascribe to international relations today the task of fixing a global climate that at its conceptual root is always already broken, is a Sisyphean endeavor. It is an objective call to fix what is, upon deeper analysis and interpretation, subjectively unfixable. What failures of international climate governance do illustrate, however, is how the concept of ‘global climate change’ governs conduct and thought from levels of the self to that of the globe, ranging from the micro-scales of one’s own carbon-footprint to the macro-scales of the international economic and political systems and the planetary Earth sciences.<sup>8</sup> In short, thinking the concept itself facilitates a global governmentality, in which governing works *through* these endemic political failure(s) to fix a damaged and broken climatic object. It

<sup>8</sup> Methmann, C. (2011) ‘The sky is the limit: global warming as global governmentality’, *European Journal of International Relations*. 19(1), p. 9.

operates, as is illustrated below, through an implicit ‘rationality of powerlessness’, resulting from humanity’s awareness of the power and unpredictability of Nature.

It must be noted that this article does not question nor detract from the accuracy of climate science, nor from the seriousness of the threat of climate change for the future of humanity. Instead, it is intended to critique naturalized or ossified assumptions about its present political conceptualization and governance, so that the potential to move beyond these static concepts and political barriers, to new spaces of possibility for thought and action, may be pursued. This article’s argument will be demonstrated in three steps. First of all, a brief overview of the “global governmentality debate” will be provided.<sup>9</sup> Secondly, emphasizing the importance of combining governmentality with genealogical methods, a short history of our present understanding of global climate change and international governance will be traced. This section will examine how the ‘ontology’ of an international or global climate, or what the climate ‘is’ or has been conceived of as an object, has changed over time. Finally, this article will sketch out how this concept and ontology of a ‘global climate’ was constructed out an underlying ‘rationality of powerlessness’ that emerged in 1979 in the First World Climate Conference. When shared computational methodologies were spread internationally in the late-1980s by the IPCC, it legitimated and standardized a global epistemology or way of knowing the climate, which tacitly used and embraced the broken and failing ontology that emerged in 1979. This article then concludes by questioning how we may fight against the future failings of our global climate regime, when ‘failure’ itself appears woven into the DNA of global climate change itself. In fighting this monster, are we consigned to become it? How can a concept made of and through rationalities of failure, overcome failure? It is research into these questions that this short article hopes to catalyze.

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### *International Governance and Global Governmentality*

After decades in which Michel Foucault’s concept of governmentality “barely registered” in the discipline of International

<sup>9</sup> Vrsti, W. (2012) ‘Universal but not truly ‘global’: governmentality, economic liberalism, and the international’, *Review of International Studies*. 39(1), p. 2.

*After decades in which Michel Foucault's concept of governmentality "barely registered" in the discipline of International Relations (IR), a recent "Foucault effect redux" has now inspired IR scholars to embrace and apply his analytic of power, practice, and subjectivity, to problematiques of the macro-scale: the international and global.*

Relations (IR), a recent "Foucault effect *redux*" has now inspired IR scholars to embrace and apply his analytic of power, practice, and subjectivity, to problematiques of the macro-scale: the international and global.<sup>10</sup> Although IR scholars agree on a broad and general definition of governmentality as "a 'conduct of conducts' and a management of possibilities", with "conduct" referring to both the ability to lead others, and as "a way of behaving within a more or less open field of possibilities",<sup>11</sup> a so-called "global governmentality debate" has recently broken out. Critics restrict governmentality to the liberal state, while proponents claim that it may also analyze how subjectivity interacts with global problems and practices, too.<sup>12</sup> Constraints of space prevent a full examination of this debate in the current article;<sup>13</sup> so, governmentality refers here simply to the constitution and orientation of subjective thought, and to the possibilities of agency, or thinking, within implicit yet socially-acquired conceptual boundaries. In short, governmentality examines how and why people think and act the way they do, when there is no direct application of force, discipline, or sovereignty, dominating or threatening them from above to force specific conducts or behaviors from them.<sup>14</sup> In this article, applying governmentality to the naturalized assumptions surrounding climate governance allows for the diagnosis of subtle yet "eternally optimistic, but congenitally failing practices", which prescribe a *telos* or end through which to "conduct the conduct" of subjectivity and agency.<sup>15</sup> As we will see below, through the very conceptual framing of global climate change itself, governmentality is indeed able to go global in both ontology and epistemology, as so to 'govern' thought *through* purported failures of international governance. A global governmentality,

10 Walters, W. (2012) *Governmentality*. Abingdon: Routledge, p. 82.

11 Foucault, M. (1994) 'The Subject and Power', in Faubion, J.D. (ed) *Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984*, London: Penguin Books, p. 341.

12 For an excellent introduction to both sides of this debate, see Neumann, I.B. and Sending, O.J. (2010) *Governing the Global Polity*. New York: University of Michigan Press and Joseph, J. (2012) *The Social in the Global: Social Theory, Governmentality and Global Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

13 However, for a more in-depth account see Hamilton, S. (2015) 'Add Foucault and Stir? The Perils and Promise of Governmentality and the Global'. *European Review of International Studies*. 1(2), pp. 129-141.

14 Neumann and Sending, *Governing the Global Polity*.

15 Dean, M. (2010) *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*. London: SAGE Publications, p. 85.

therefore, is not only constitutive of failures of international climate governance, but undergirds the concept of global climate change itself.

### *Going Global: Governmentality and the Climate*

As Methmann and Oels have each argued, global climate change constitutes a paradigmatic case for analyzing practices of a global, rather than a local or state-centered governmentality. “‘Rendering climate change governable’ is a perfect example of a genuinely global governmentality,” writes Methmann, “as it is constructed on a planetary problem-space: the disturbance of the earth’s carbon cycle.”<sup>16</sup> For Methmann, the creation of a new carbon market through the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), and its concomitant failure, exemplifies governing through a depoliticisation of climate change: connecting the local and the global through a carbon footprint and market in a globalized space of “carbon governmentality”. Failure, in this case, normalizes the (neo)liberal status-quo, as the CDM is ultimately abstracted away from the social and economic structures actually causing climate change. Likewise, for Oels, market-based solutions that disclose and attempt to govern global climate change through economic strategies actually exemplify a global shift in governmental ‘rationality’, which can be defined as a specific style of conduct and thought, or way of rendering reality thinkable.<sup>17</sup> In this case, climate change shifts underlying political rationalities from that of a ‘biopower’ grounded in the organization and preservation of life, to that of an advanced liberal (i.e. neoliberal) governmentality extended over the entire planet: “climate change [is thus rendered] governable ... as an issue of state failure requiring market-based solutions or the creation of markets.”<sup>18</sup> The global climate, therefore, becomes an object governed and depoliticized by the inexorable failures of neoliberal international political economy.

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However, both of these accounts of a global (climate) govern-

16 Methmann, ‘The sky is the limit’, p.3; Oels, A. (2005) ‘Rendering climate change governable: from biopower to advanced liberal government?’. *Journal of Environment Policy & Planning*, 7(3), p. 185-207.

17 Miller, P. and Rose, N. (2008) *Governing the Present: Administering Economic, Social and Personal Life*, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 16.

18 Oels, ‘Rendering Climate Change governable’, p. 201.

*The climate, in other words, is simply a global thing.* mentality err in two crucial respects. Firstly, they conflate governmentality with liberalism, consigning it to a top-down or preordained liberal-market structure only. As IR scholars such as Corry have noted, “Put bluntly, in the current debate global governmentality is either imagined as a (nascent) world-wide regime of liberal power or (for the critics) as a configuration of governance tools only able to survive in patches where liberal states (or states susceptible to liberal rule) already exist.”<sup>19</sup> Instead of being preordained in this fashion, any analysis of subjectivity and diagnosis of governmentality should be nominalist, or bottom-up, detected from the study and interpretation of empirical practices themselves. Secondly, Methmann and Oels both assume that the global climate *itself* is a universal or natural object, to be taken for granted as such. The climate, in other words, is simply a *global* thing. “Climate politics takes place in a genuinely global climate polity” that is enabled by the existence of an appropriate problem space of the Earth’s global carbon cycle, which has, according to Methmann, defined climate politics since 1896 when Svante Arrhenius published his “path-breaking work” on human-induced climate change.<sup>20</sup> A problem arises immediately, however, given that Arrhenius’s work was “not widely read”; attempted to account for the onset of ice-ages rather than analyzing anthropogenic carbon emissions; and that the carbon - or CO<sub>2</sub>-theory of global warming was virtually abandoned by climate scientists until well after World War II.<sup>21</sup> Likewise, climatic change *itself* barely registered on the radar of international governance or ‘high politics’ until the late-1980s.<sup>22</sup> The point here is that even scholars embracing governmentality have fallen into the habit of using naturalized objects or concepts as preordained universals within their analyses of climate change. Hence, a new historical interpretation is justified and warranted. This will be provided below, through a short examination of the international governance of global climate change.

### *Conducting a Genealogy of Global Climate Governance*

This section provides a brief history of how the concept of ‘glob-

19 Corry, O. (2013) *Constructing a Global Polity: Theory, Discourse and Governance*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 52.

20 Methmann, ‘The sky is the limit’, p. 9.

21 Fleming, J.R. (1998) *Historical Perspectives on Climate Change*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

22 Brenton, T. (1994) *The Greening of Machiavelli: The Evolution of International Environmental Politics*. London: Earthscan Publications.

al climate change' emerged within practices of international governance. It responds to the call of governmentality scholars to embrace genealogy, because if governmentality "is to maximize its transformative potential in relation to the political sciences [and IR]" by eschewing the *a priori* assumptions invoking top-down liberal economics noted above, "then the interaction with genealogy needs to be clarified and intensified."<sup>23</sup> Why? A genealogy is a unique way of writing and thinking about the history of everyday practices, concepts, or objects that we assume to be natural or universal. Through a nominalist, inductive, or bottom-up perspective that eschews "presentism", or the reifying of our everyday ways of thinking as ahistorical or uniform across time, it can open new conceptual spaces by showing how practices and objects actually came into being in contingent and unexpected ways – ways previously concealed by presentist thinking.<sup>24</sup> The genealogist's goal is to uncover "the secret that they [the universals being examined] have no essence or that their essence was fabricated in a piecemeal fashion from alien forms" throughout "the long baking process of history."<sup>25</sup> A genealogy, in other words, reveals how the way we think is both historically contingent, and is the result of hitherto unpredictable twists and turns of past practices, which have been forgotten to us in the present yet continue to delimit the boundaries of our own rationalities, thoughts, and governmentalities.

The first step in any genealogy is to *problematize* a referent that is deemed to be uncontroversial, unproblematic, and ahistorical.<sup>26</sup> For instance, even governmentality scholars such as Methmann and Oels simply assert that "climate politics takes place in a genuinely global polity", because it is "first and foremost visualized as a global problem ... which constructs global warming as an inherently global field of visibility."<sup>27</sup> Indeed, it is assumed as obvious and commonsensical that the climate is, and has always been, *global*: "Climate change

*Indeed, it is assumed as obvious and commonsensical that the climate is, and has always been, global: "Climate change is a global issue that requires global response... [It] is a classic global commons problem" afflicting international governance.*

<sup>23</sup> Walters, *Governmentality*, p. 114.

<sup>24</sup> Dreyfus, H.L. and Rabinow, P. (1983) *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 2nd ed., Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

<sup>25</sup> Foucault, M. (1981) 'Nietzsche, Genealogy, History' [NGH], in Rabinow, P. (ed) *The Foucault Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's Thought*. Toronto: Penguin Books, p. 78-79.

<sup>26</sup> Koopman, C. (2013) *Genealogy as Critique: Foucault and the Problems of Modernity*. Indiana: Indiana University Press.

<sup>27</sup> Methmann, 6; also, see Corry, *Constructing a Global Polity*.

is a global issue that requires global response... [It] is a classic global commons problem” afflicting international governance.<sup>28</sup> Therefore, the climate as a global object, as existing within regimes of international governance, becomes a problem to be explored genealogically.

The next step is to select an empirical *practice* to trace this problematic climatic object throughout history. For Foucault, “to start with these concrete practices and, as it were, pass these [problematized] universals through the grid of these practices”, is the essence of genealogical analysis.<sup>29</sup> This article uses international conferences as a practice through which the international governance of climate change is expressed, most prominently today in the UN’s Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN-FCCC), and in declarations and protocols such as the ‘Conference of the Parties’ (CoP), including the famous Kyoto (1997) and Copenhagen (2009) Protocols. Indeed, CoP15, the 2009 Copenhagen conference, witnessed the “global political elite” meeting “to finalize humankind’s response to global climate change ...[in] the highest concentration of robust decision-making power the world had seen.”<sup>30</sup> Our question, thus, becomes not *why* this accord failed, but how the global climate as a political object is conceived and thought of within this practice of international governance.

Third, every genealogy must interpret the underlying ‘rationalities’ or ‘styles of thought’ undergirding, framing, and locating the problematized practice within its social background, context, or world.<sup>31</sup> As Lemke points out when drawing from Foucault, it is not the practice itself but the historical *rationality* that genealogy and governmentality attempt to uncover and diagnose, that grants these tools insight into historical modes of subjectivity.<sup>32</sup> As outlined above, our contemporary rationality undergirding global climate change and international governance is saturated

28 Xinyuan, D. (2010) Global Regime and National Change, *Climate Policy*, 10, p. 622-623.

29 Foucault, M. (2010) The birth of biopolitics: lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 3.

30 Dimitrov, R. S. (2010) Inside Copenhagen: the state of climate governance. *Global Environmental Politics*, 10(2), p. 18.

31 Miller, P. and Rose, N. (2011) *Governing the Present: Administering Economic, Social and Personal Life*. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 30-39.

32 Lemke, T. (2002) ‘Foucault, Governmentality, and Critique’, *Rethinking Marxism: A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society*, 14(3), p. 55, Dreyfus, H.L. and Rabinow, P. (1983) *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, 2nd ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

by lamentations over governance failure and pending catastrophe: it is, as is explored below, a rationality of *powerlessness*.

Finally, the most crucial component of a genealogy is what grants it its ethos as a denaturalizing critique of our present assumptions: the uncovering of the moment of singularity, “eventalization”, or the *emergence* of our contemporary and modern rationality into historical being.<sup>33</sup> This moment of emergence will be illustrated below in two international conferences that each fostered an ontology (i.e. *what* the climate is) and epistemology (i.e. *how* we can know what the climate is) of what we take for granted today as global climatic change.

### *A Rationality of Powerlessness: How Our Global Climate Emerged as Broken?*

Failures of climate governance are typically attributed to the selfish nature of states. “The failure of international negotiations to achieve agreements that will do more to avert catastrophic climate change – their stated objective from the outset – can be largely attributed to the cancer of Westphalia.”<sup>34</sup> Examined with the genealogical tools outlined above, however, inconsistencies in this account allow for a rather different narrative to materialize. Take, for instance, the seemingly universal assumption about ontology: that the climate is a natural object or thing that has always been global in scope. Even a cursory look into the history of this problematized object reveals that as recently as 1946, the concept of a ‘global climate’ was virtually nonexistent within states and regimes of international governance. To take only one example, the U.S. Weather Bureau considered the climate as a sovereign “natural resource ... part of the natural endowment of a country”, and hence it was “axiomatic” that “the outdoor climate cannot be changed, except on the smallest scale ... [and in] contrast to mineral resources, climate is inexhaustible.”<sup>35</sup> Climate was considered as a local, regional, state resource. Likewise, in 1966, the U.S. National Research Council (NRC) stressed that regional climatic changes would have only “locally catastrophic effects”, without fram-

*Failures of climate governance are typically attributed to the selfish nature of states.*

<sup>33</sup>Foucault, *NGH*, 86; Walters, *Governmentality*.

<sup>34</sup>Harris, *Climate Politics*, p. 63.

<sup>35</sup>Landsberg, H. (1946) ‘Climate as a Natural Resource: Section of Industrial Climatology, U.S. Weather Bureau’, *The Scientific Monthly*. 63(4), p. 293.

ing, nor positing climate change in either international or global terms.<sup>36</sup> The point here is that statist ontologies of climate were previously limited to localized, regional, and bounded objects, akin to other natural resources and thus primed for economic exploitation within each state's sovereign borders.<sup>37</sup> Yet, if this was the case, then when, and how, did these multiple sovereign 'climates' merge into a singular object of international or global governance?

This article lacks the space to explore the massive and complex historical relationship between climate and the state in its entirety. As outlined above, it instead seeks to historicize the political rationality underlying international conferences on climate change, so as to reveal where, and how, our contemporary thinking first emerged. Indeed, the very first international conference on climate change, 'The First World Climate Conference', was held by the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) only as recently as February 1979. However, IR scholars are fond of asserting that the first major international meeting of states discussing climate change was the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, which was one "of the biggest international environmental events that have ever taken place" and which conveniently "provides an excellent snapshot of the state of global environmental attitudes at the time it took place".<sup>38</sup> Notably, analyzing the 1972 Conference's final "Declaration" of "26 Principles" that were to act as the bedrock for future international environmental governance reveals absolutely no mention of climate change whatsoever.<sup>39</sup> Instead, the 26 Principles of the 1972 Declaration focus explicitly on "the human environment", aiming to make the world aware that "a stage has been reached when, through the rapid acceleration of science and technology, man has acquired the power to transform his environment in countless ways and on an unprecedented scale." Hence, because "Of all

36 From Edwards, P.N. (2001) Representing the Global Atmosphere, in Edwards, P.N. and Miller, C.A. (eds) *Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance*. New York: MIT Press, p. 32.

37 The history of the concept of climate and its relationship to the state is too expansive for this short article. Instead, see Fleming, *Historical Perspectives on Climate Change*; Weart, S.R. (2003) *The Discovery of Global Warming*. London: Harvard University Press.

38 Brenton, *The Greening of Machiavelli*, p. 12, 13, 164; Rowlands, I.H. (1995) *The politics of global atmospheric change*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 70.

39 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment - United Nations Environment Programme, June 1972, Available at: <http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=97&articleid=1503> (Accessed: 30 May 2015).

things in the world, people are the most precious”, it is the potential of the Earth to provide resources for the benefit of “all mankind”, that is the overarching concern of the 1972 conference.<sup>40</sup> As one section declares: “The Conference [is] launching a new liberation movement to free men from the threat of their thrall-  
 to environmental perils of their own making.”<sup>41</sup> The goal is to conquer and control Nature, not to steward it. Now, climate change is indeed mentioned here in the 1972 Stockholm conference for the first time by state policymakers and officials (and not simply between scientists or climatologists), appearing in the conference’s ‘Recommendation 79’, a section on pollutants. Yet this small mention merely advocated further study of “the causes of climatic changes [and] whether these causes are natural or the result of man’s activities.”<sup>42</sup> This brief mention was not referring to the same global climatic object with which we are now familiar today, but instead to many local and regional “climatic zones” that should facilitate cooperation between nations sharing similar but disparate climates.<sup>43</sup> The point here is that the climate, and global climate change as a concept, is nonexistent within international politics and conferences concerning the environment. Instead of safeguarding or protecting the climate and the planet from harm, when interpreted genealogically, the dominant style of thought or rationality underlying the 1972 Stockholm Declaration is actually one of securing “mankind’s” technological control and use of the “resources” of Nature at “his” disposal. It is a rationality of *control* over Nature.

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Although there were smatterings of scientific gatherings, no international conference between state leaders or officials on the topic of climate change appears until the 1979 First World Climate Conference in Geneva, Switzerland. Interestingly, although climate change is indeed an issue of the 1979 conference, it is still not regarded as being global in scope, nor is it even primarily considered as anthropogenic or human-induced.<sup>44</sup> Instead, the

40 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.

41 Brief Summary of the General Debate - Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, United Nations Environment Programme (1972), Available at: <http://www.unep.org/documents.multilingual/default.asp?DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1497&l=en>, p. 34. (Accessed: 30 May 2015)

42 Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (1972), p. 12.

43 Ibid., p. 20-21, 26.

44 ‘The Declaration of the World Climate Conference’, *Declaration and Supporting Documents*:

Conference continues the established practice of treating the “climate” primarily as many local, regional, and national spaces: “All countries of the world are vulnerable to climatic variations, ... The climates of the countries of the world are interdependent.”<sup>45</sup> Secondly, as highlighted in the Conference’s keynote speech by Robert M. White, the impetus of the conference was still not to safeguard the Earth, nor to prevent pending climatic catastrophe. Instead, following from the rationality underpinning the Declaration of the 1972 Stockholm conference, it was to learn how to better harness national and regional climates as *resources* for economic development and exploitation. “We must therefore begin to think of climate itself as a resource to be allocated wisely”, White stressed, “contribut[ing] to a bright future for mankind by national and international actions to provide for the wide use of climatic resources to improve the economic and environmental welfare of people”.<sup>46</sup> At this point, therefore, and in accordance with other historical accounts of the epistemological development of climate change at this time,<sup>47</sup> regional or national climate change remained the political norm. The ontology of climate concerned a local and regional object. Although CO<sub>2</sub> was indeed discussed sporadically, the purpose of the 1979 Conference was not to caution humankind about the portent or threat of anthropogenic global climate change; it was to teach states how to use and exploit their own sovereign climate for effective economic development within their own borders.

*By 1979, although the economic and regional focus on sovereign climates remained dominant, the underlying political rationality framing the First World Climate Conference was no longer the retention and promotion of humanity’s control over Nature.*

Interpreted genealogically, a pronounced shift in thinking between the 1972 and 1979 conferences can be detected. By 1979, although the economic and regional focus on sovereign climates remained dominant, the underlying political rationality framing the First World Climate Conference was no longer the retention and promotion of humanity’s control over Nature. Instead, it had transformed into an increasing awareness and fear that, despite rapid advances in technology, control over Nature was illusory: a newfound vulnerability and uncertainty concerning hu-

*World Climate Conference: A Conference of Experts on Climate and Mankind*, World Meteorological Organization (12-23 February, 1979).

45 ‘Declaration’, *World Climate Conference*, p. 3.

46 White, R. M. (1979) ‘Climate at the Millennium: Keynote Address’, *Proceedings of the World Climate Conference: A Conference of Experts on Climate and Mankind*, World Meteorological Organization, 12-23 February, p. 5, 1.

47 Weart, S.R. (2003) *The Discovery of Global Warming*, London: Harvard University Press.

manity's relation to Nature and its power, unpredictability, and instability, was emerging. "What is new," White stressed, "is the realization that vulnerability of human society to climatic events has not disappeared with technological development."<sup>48</sup> Suddenly, the notion of transnational "man-induced climatic changes" enters the conversation when a "new world condition" of climate is hazarded and heralded for the coming millennium, simultaneously highlighting the interconnectedness of nations to their own and to the world climate: "The importance of climate, recognized in these Conferences, suggests that the time is at hand to view world affairs through a climatic prism."<sup>49</sup> Crucially for this article, this mention of the world climate represents the genesis of the now-familiar concept of a 'global climate' within international governance. It is the event through which global climate change congeals into being at the level of international political rationality. Note that this 'climatic prism', however, is not borne through a neutral or scientific discourse that transposes or degrades a functioning, normal, or healthy world climate downwards, into a "man-induced" hazardous anthropogenic climatic change. Instead, global climate change emerges from the outset through a political rationality framed at its root by fear, uncertainty, and under the threat of the failure of human society to develop and to sustain the agricultural and economic resources required for its survival. It is not a rationality of control, but of *powerlessness*. And yet, from this rationality grows the fledgling notion that there is something larger in scope than the parceled, individual, sovereign economic climates previously commonplace and commonsensical within states and international governance prior to 1979.<sup>50</sup> The "possibility that actions by individual nations may influence climates of others" now catalyzes and legitimates the consideration of a possible 'world climatic prism' and "global climate change" that transcends local and regional scales and borders. The global climate emerges here in international politics as an object of governance – yet one now predefined as always already broken and damaged, latent with global scope and potential, and projecting a tacit rationality of

48 White, 'Climate at the Millennium', p. 3.

49 White, 'Climate at the Millennium', p. 5.

50 It should be noted that 1979 was a watershed year for 'global' events that would also have intersected with the First World Climate Conference, such as the election of Margaret Thatcher in the United Kingdom, the Three Mile Island nuclear accident, etc., yet these cannot be discussed nor interpolated here due to space constraints.

powerlessness within which ‘mankind’ finds itself when realizing its own vulnerability in relation to, and failure to conquer or to overcome, Nature. Take, for instance, the opening statement of the summary of the Toronto ‘World Conference on The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security’ from 1988, which highlights both the proliferation and the normalization of this new rationality within international politics. “Humanity is conducting an unintended, uncontrolled, globally pervasive experiment whose ultimate consequences could be second only to a global nuclear war”, the statement reads. “These changes represent a major threat to international security and are already having harmful consequences over many parts of the globe.”<sup>51</sup> The comparison between conferences in 1972, 1979, and 1988, is clear: “mankind’s” control over the Earth and its regional sovereign climates has failed, and a ‘global’ climate has now emerged into international political consciousness from its outset as an uncontrollable, unpredictable, and inherently broken and damaged object resulting from international failures to govern the global climate accordingly.

*Naturally, these past references to ‘sovereign climates’ and using a state’s ‘climate as a resource’ now seem alien or outrageous. They are easily omitted from present literature as irrelevant, outdated, or eccentric.* Naturally, these past references to ‘sovereign climates’ and using a state’s ‘climate as a resource’ now seem alien or outrageous. They are easily omitted from present literature as irrelevant, outdated, or eccentric. To analyze and interpret such empirics and texts is the point of connecting genealogy to (global) governmentality: to trace how our modern and tacit political rationalities, which conduct our conduct at the subjective level, first emerged into being. It is, thus, crucial to remember that in 1979, the First World Climate Conference was “considered as the most profound and comprehensive review of climate and of climate change in relation to mankind yet published.”<sup>52</sup> Yet, this landmark review admits that its findings concerning climate change were not yet global in scope. Why? “At present,” the Conference concludes, “new applications [and] methodology is largely being developed on an ad hoc limited national ‘needs’ basis. This leads to redundancy and the development of products that do not necessarily make use of the best methodology.”<sup>53</sup> In short,

51 Conference Statement: Summary (1988) *The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security*, Conference held June 27-30, 1988, in Toronto, Ontario, Canada, p. 292.

52 Foreword, *Proceedings of the World Climate Conference*, viii.

53 ‘Declaration’, *World Climate Conference*, p. 23.

each state was using its own distinct concepts, methodologies, and knowledge to delimit what each bounded sovereign climate was, thereby leading to incommensurable ontologies and epistemologies of climate at the international level. In other words, states could not blend multiple sovereign climatic resources into a uniform global object. In order to become truly global, not only did sovereign climates have to be re-conceptualized into a single global climate, but disparate states first had to bring this climate into being in the same way, using commensurable methodologies and technologies that could collectively define what this shared (conceptual) climate actually was. In order to discuss a global climatic object within practices of international governance (i.e. ontology), states first needed to be *governed* in a manner that would make the study and knowledge of climate commensurable across their borders (i.e. a shared epistemology). Indeed, “Programmes must be set up to assist [states] to participate fully in the World Climate Programme through training and the transfer of appropriate methodologies”, declared the 1979 conference, requiring “an inter-disciplinary effort of unprecedented scope at the national and international levels.”<sup>54</sup> A global or macro-object of climate required a uniform and commensurable scientific epistemology to be established and shared within the micro-levels of each state. Indeed, after 1979, a “hardening of the scientific view gave rise to further rounds of scientific work”,<sup>55</sup> with international conferences at Villach, Austria (1985) and Bellagio, Italy (1987) echoing these claims (and the underlying rationality) of 1979’s call for a global scientific body to unify global climatic knowledge in order to catalyze international climate governance.

This “international effort” towards methodological homogenization was finally established in 1988, allowing the previously disparate sovereign understandings of climate to adopt and share the global concept of climate first raised at the 1979 World Climate Conference. As Edwards writes, the “scientific expertise, technological systems, political influence, economic interests, mass media, and cultural reception” of global climate change were finally realized in 1988, through the “global knowl-

*This “international effort” towards methodological homogenization was finally established in 1988, allowing the previously disparate sovereign understandings of climate to adopt and share the global concept of climate first raised at the 1979 World Climate Conference.*

<sup>54</sup> ‘Declaration’, *World Climate Conference*, p. 6.

<sup>55</sup> Brenton, *The Greening of Machiavelli*, p. 165.

edge infrastructure” of the IPCC.<sup>56</sup> Founded in 1988 by the WMO and the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), the IPCC served to combine science and politics into a new political hybrid between scientists and policymakers: “the most important institutional innovation in the history of climate science”,<sup>57</sup> serving as the international authority to create, legitimize, and justify the epistemological and ontological standards of “how weather and climate data ... get created in the first place, how they are transformed into intelligible and reliable information, and, most important [*sic*], how that information becomes knowledge.”<sup>58</sup> Prior to 1988, there was no international authority to legitimate and unify methodologies for climate science, and hence to define what a global climate actually *was*. With the IPCC’s formation, however, we find in its first Overview Report of 1990 the agreement that its “measures . . . require a high degree of international co-operation with due respect for national sovereignty of states [*sic*]”, and yet “the convention should recognize climate change as a common concern of mankind and, at a minimum, contain general principles and obligations” to gain adherence of the largest possible number of states.<sup>59</sup> Here, in the first unified methodological and international declaration of climate change as a global concern, “climate change would affect, either directly or indirectly, almost every sector of society, [and so a] broad global understanding of the issue will facilitate the adoption and implementation of such response options . . . [meaning that] Further efforts to achieve such global understanding are urgently needed.”<sup>60</sup> Indeed, as Hulme has argued, this “globalised knowledge” and understanding from the IPCC “erases geographical and cultural difference” by collapsing previously local, regional, and sovereign understandings of climate, into a homogenized or global object that “[claims] to offer the view from everywhere.”<sup>61</sup> This planetary normalization of climate operates through standards easily detectable by governmentality’s toolkit: a standardizing global average temperature; the policing, regulating, econ-

56 Edwards, P.N. (2010) *A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming*. Cambridge: The MIT Press, p. 8.

57 Ibid, p. 16.

58 Ibid.

59 Overview Report, IPCC, 1990.

60 Overview Report, IPCC (1990), p. 60.

61 Hulme, M. (2010) ‘Problems with making and governing global kinds of knowledge’, *Global Environmental Change*. 20, p. 559.

omization, and calculating of carbon; and the marketization of the climate itself, as Methmann and Oels have described. As Oels noted, “the IPCC may thus be understood as the administrative space created by governments where they expanded their biopolitical mission of using and optimizing the forces and capacities of ‘life’ to the entire ‘planet’.”<sup>62</sup> Yet what this article highlights is how this planetary expansion of the IPCC disseminated the conceptual ontology and epistemology of ‘global climate’ that first emerged in 1979, fostering a shared international understanding of what the global climate was, and how it could be studied and known; at its conceptual root, through a rationality of the powerlessness of states and people alike to govern this broken object accordingly.

### **Conclusion: Governing through Failure**

A global governmentality is not limited to liberalism, carbon, nor to the actions of states alone. As this article has argued, a global governmentality can operate by simply producing and shaping how a concept can be thought of or made thinkable, governing conduct from micro to macro levels by delimiting conceptual pathways for action. The global climate has been argued here to be just such a concept. Prior to 1988, states and the international system lacked the ontology and epistemology to think of a single, shared, and global climate. Through the unification of international social and technological infrastructures linking technologies of general circulation models (GCMs) used within the IPCC, to the concept of ‘climate’ used within every single state, a “global knowledge” of a global climate was indeed legitimated and disseminated to peoples and to states alike. This knowledge now spans micro-levels of the self to macro-levels of international and global governance. What the brief genealogy provided here has revealed, is that this naturalized concept and knowledge of a ‘global climate’ that is embraced by the IPCC and international conferences, first emerged into historical and political being in a specific yet forgotten way: through an implicit political rationality of powerlessness and its concomitant failure to control Nature, first detectable in the 1979 First World Climate Conference. Here, the sovereign climates belonging to

<sup>62</sup> Oels, ‘Rendering climate change governable’, p. 198.

each state began to merge over and transcend the borders of the international, suddenly crystalizing into a singular global object – yet one subjectively and conceptually pre-defined as always already damaged and broken. Thus, anthropogenic global climate change is, and has always been, in dire need of an international governance that is consigned by the underlying political rationality bringing it into being, to fail. Simply put, there was never a knowledge of a ‘normal’ or healthy global climate within international political discourse. From its outset, our global climate has *always* been broken.

*The Anthropocene, and notions of previous states or stages of global climatic change, reside only in the echo of this political rationality and the failure(s) it now elicits.*

The Anthropocene, and notions of previous states or stages of global climatic change, reside only in the echo of this political rationality and the failure(s) it now elicits. When in 1992 the first UNFCCC declaration claimed to “Reca[ll] the pertinent provisions of the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, adopted at Stockholm on 16 June 1972”, and declared that “change in the Earth’s climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of humankind” at a “global” level,<sup>63</sup> it was not actually referring to a universal or ahistorical climatic object, nor to a consistent political goal. Instead, it was channeling and disseminating the implicit rationality of powerlessness that underpins this assumed and commonsensical concept of global climate change and international climate governance, now made most explicit in failures such as the 1997 Kyoto Protocol and the 2009 Copenhagen Accord. Indeed, to even think of these events and the global climate change they portend, is thus to be governed, albeit implicitly, by a governmentality that operates and is reinforced by the same congenital failures of governance that it laments. It is a governmentality that governs through this endemic and Sisyphean *telos* to fix what, at its political and conceptual root, is unfixable. To explore this global governmentality is therefore to tease-out the thinkable limits of this global climatic object, how it emerged and what it does to thought and politics, and to critique its historical constitution so as to bend and move beyond the static and inveterate political failures associated and conjoined with it. And yet, an awareness of this rationality of powerlessness underlying climate governance should not stop us

<sup>63</sup> United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992). Available at <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf>, p. 2.

from trying to think and imagine new spaces or ways to facilitate successes, albeit from alternative conceptualizations of the global, the climate, Nature, and of our own international relations and political subjectivities. This is the difficult task of thought. It is to these new and hitherto unpredictable ways of thinking the climate into being that this article hopes to contribute.



# Security Challenges for Afghanistan: Is the International Security Governance Failing or Succeeding in Afghanistan?

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Salih Doğan\*

The end of 2014 marked the conclusion of the United States' longest war, at least in the sense of its role as a direct combatant. The military intervention in 2001, continued as a NATO mission, sought to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat terrorist and insurgent groups in Afghanistan. The international community withdrew most of their troops and left only 13,500 non-combatant soldiers under the new NATO mission. Named the Resolute Support Mission, the mission is designed to train, advise and assist the Afghan National Security Forces. However, the number of troops and their non-combatant role could pose difficulties in terms of Afghanistan's security. An increase in the number of troops and a shift back into a combatant role might be needed in the near future.

Obviously, it would be very optimistic to assume that the Afghan National Security Forces could overcome the terrorist threat on their own, given that this was impossible even with almost 150,000 NATO troops present in the country. With the Afghan forces fully responsible for security issues, 2014 became the bloodiest year since 2001. Moreover, the Islamic State (in Iraq and the Levant) moved beyond the Middle East and became active and operational in Afghan soil during this time. They began to carry out attacks in the country, which led the Islamic State and the Taliban to declare jihad against one another. Afghanistan's current security situation has implications beyond its national borders; it is a trans-boundary security threat affecting Central Asian, South Asian and Middle Eastern countries. The situation now requires a common strategy from the international coalitions constituted to counter the Taliban and Islamic State, in order to fight these groups in the wider region.



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*Security Challenges for the New Afghan Administration*

*When Ashraf Ghani was sworn in as Afghan president on 28 September 2014, he was confronted with a long to-do list, comprised of many issues, from security to stability, corruption to economy, and local government reform to a new constitution-making process.*

When Ashraf Ghani was sworn in as Afghan president on 28 September 2014, he was confronted with a long to-do list, comprised of many issues, from security to stability, corruption to economy, and local government reform to a new constitution-making process. In order to realize all these objectives, new ministers needed to be appointed. The new national unity government was to be formed by the President Ashraf Ghani and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Abdullah Abdullah.

President Ashraf Ghani had made a quick start by signing the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States and the Status of Forces Agreement (SoFA) with NATO within the first 24 hours of his presidency. These agreements also formed the foundation of the Resolute Support Mission, the new NATO mission in Afghanistan for the post-2014 era. Shortly afterwards, he oversaw the opening of the Kabul Bank case, which had been one of the largest corruption operations in Afghanistan. But despite these positive developments, when it came to forming the new government, Ghani could not fulfil the promises he made during the oath-taking ceremony - he was unable to announce the names of the ministerial candidates within the first 45 days of his presidency.<sup>1</sup>

It is understandable that establishing a strong cabinet in a highly factionalized and unstable country like Afghanistan would be time-consuming. However, in the post-2014 era, the Afghan people can no longer tolerate such breaches of faith, despite having become accustomed to such delays in the past. The key reason for the low public confidence in the governments during the civil war and Taliban era was the inability of the administration to deliver basic services to the public, not to mention security.

It has been seen many times in the last 35 years in Afghanistan that the leadership of politics and administration would not accept any vacancy since the security situation in the country could easily deteriorate due to power vacuum. President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah, who began leading the country

<sup>1</sup> 'Afghanistan's Team of Rivals', *AlJazeera America*, Available at: <http://projects.aljazeera.com/2015/02/afghanistan-rivals> (Accessed: 30 April 2015).

more than seven months ago, failed to secure the approval for all the ministers of the national unity government by the end of April 2015. The only ministerial post that has not yet been approved is the Ministry of Defence.<sup>2</sup> One of the most important institutions in terms of shaping Afghanistan's future is the National Security Forces (ANSF) with its 352,000 personnel.<sup>3</sup> As a result of the withdrawal of the NATO combat forces with the end of the ISAF mission by the end of 2014, security related matters across all provinces were left to the Afghan security forces. At this juncture, it is seriously problematic that not one candidate has been able to obtain the necessary vote of confidence to become the next Defence Minister. This also raises questions about the capabilities of the ANSF in the post-2014 era.

NATO's new mission to train the ANSF is aimed at ensuring that it has the capacity to protect the Afghan people. However, before talking about the capacity of the ANSF, it must first be noted that its annual operational budget is \$5.1 billion.<sup>4</sup> The Afghan economy cannot afford this without help from the international community. The funding of the ANSF is not a short-term issue since the recovery of the Afghan economy is not expected until the end of the Transformation Decade in 2024. If everything goes well in terms of economy and security over the next ten years, then it might be possible to talk about a self-sufficient Afghan economy. Until then, the international community will have to continue to provide financial support.

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### *Capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces*

#### *The Afghan National Police*

A Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) was recently signed between the Head of the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan, EUPOL Afghanistan, Pia Stjernvall, and the Afghan Minister of Interior, Mr. Noor-ul Haq Ulumi. The MoC is a reaffirmation of the European Union's on-going support for and

2 'Afghan Lawmakers Approve 16 Cabinet Members; Only Defense Post Unfilled', *RFE/RL*, Available at: <http://www.rferl.org/content/afghan-government/26965209.html> (Accessed: 30 April 2015).

3 'NATO and Afghanistan', *NATO Official Website*, Available at: [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_8189.htm?](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm?) (Accessed: 1 May 2015).

4 Gady, F. (2015) 'Can the Afghan Army Prevail on the Battlefield?', *The Diplomat*, Available at: <http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/can-the-afghan-army-prevail-on-the-battlefield/> (Accessed: 7 May 2015).

collaboration with Afghanistan.<sup>5</sup> The Memorandum extended EUPOL's mission in Afghanistan for another two years. EUPOL will continue to work closely with Ministry of Interior of Afghanistan to develop "a civilian police service that will serve the needs of the people, that makes people feel safe and protected, that will be professional, accountable and effective, with strong links to the judiciary, and can be the foundation for a lasting peace", said Stjernvall during the joint press conference.<sup>6</sup>

*Following the withdrawal of the NATO and US combat troops of forces by the end of 2014, the Afghan National Police (ANP) now has much heavier burden on its shoulders apart from the one on the Afghan National Army (ANA).*

Following the withdrawal of the NATO and US combat troops of forces by the end of 2014, the Afghan National Police (ANP) now has much heavier burden on its shoulders apart from the one on the Afghan National Army (ANA). EUPOL has been providing training to the ANP since 2009 to boost its operational capacity. The continuation of this training in the post-2014 era is very important in forming a professional Afghan police force, given that the ANP will have to deal with threats from the Taliban and other insurgent militant groups in the near future.

However, there remain issues that need to be resolved within Afghan police forces, and this cannot be achieved without the help of the international community. According to a report of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), Afghan security forces, particularly the police forces, face a major challenge in the form of illiteracy.<sup>7</sup> The report states that almost 60,000 police officers are illiterate. The Deputy Minister of Interior for Administrative Affairs Kiramuddin Yawar has confirmed this figure, while also emphasizing the on-going efforts to teach police officers to read and write.<sup>8</sup>

This widespread illiteracy is due to a number of factors. The first one is the significant increase in the number of police in the Afghan national forces over the last five years due to the growing fight against terrorism. This rapid growth led to an overall decline in the quality of officers. With resources increasingly

5 'EUPOL and Afghan Ministry of Interior sign Memorandum of Cooperation', *European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan Official Website*, Available at: <http://www.eupol-afg.eu/node/579> (Accessed: 25 April 2015).

6 *Ibid.*

7 Hussainkhail, F. (2015) '60,000 Afghan Police Are Illiterate', *TOLO News*, Available at: <http://www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/19181-60000-afghan-police-are-illiterate> (Accessed: 24 April 2015).

8 *Ibid.*

stretched, training was inadequate. Most of the new recruits simply wanted to “earn a living for their family, and they were neither willing, nor qualified to fight against Taliban militants in a combat zone”<sup>9</sup>. Through increased support from missions as EUPOL, Afghan police officers should receive proper training before they become fully active in operations.

The second issue is the allegations of police corruption. A recent UN-backed investigation revealed that some Ministry of Interior officials have been disregarding the corruption complaints against the police, and that only 9 of the 2000 complaints were directed to legal bodies for further investigation.<sup>10</sup> The Afghan authorities are under serious pressure from the international community, particularly the US, to address corruption. The Ghani administration has taken a strong stance on this issue from the outset, and seems determined to continue to tackle corruption. The assistance of international organizations, like the UN, could usefully be sought when required.

### *The Afghan National Army*

Afghanistan’s security is largely dependent on the Afghan National Army (ANA). As of 20 November 2014, the number of the ANA personnel - including the Afghan Air Forces - was 169,203, according to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction’s (SIGAR).<sup>11</sup> This marks the lowest number of ANA forces since August 2011. In his report, the Special Inspector General also notes that as of 31 December 2014, the US had “obligated \$34.8 billion and disbursed \$33.7 billion of Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) to build, train, equip, and sustain the ANA.”<sup>12</sup>

According to a US Department of Defence report, despite making remarkable progress in recent years, the ANA still faces two major challenges: “sustainment and the development of the more complex enabling capabilities.”<sup>13</sup>

*According to a US Department of Defence report, despite making remarkable progress in recent years, the ANA still faces two major challenges: “sustainment and the development of the more complex enabling capabilities.”*

9 Doğan, S. (2013) ‘International Aid to Afghanistan and Its Importance in the Post-2014 Era’, *Caucasus International*, Special Issue: Afghanistan’s Security in 2014: Domestic, Regional and International Dimensions, 3(3), pp. 71-81.

10 Hussainkhail, *Afghan Police Are Illiterate*.

11 ‘Supplement to SIGAR’s January 2015 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress’, *Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)*, February 2015.

12 *Ibid.*

13 ‘Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan’, *US Department of Defense*,

Logistics and retention continue to be a key problem. Most of the ANA taskforces are only able to sustain themselves at the tactical level for a short time, and the absence of “trained maintenance technicians and a logistics system” has a negative impact on capacity.<sup>14</sup> The ANA is also constrained by its air capabilities. The Afghan Air Force is a relatively new institution, meaning that the ANSF is forced to rely upon the Resolute Support Mission in the areas of “close air support, casualty evacuation, logistics, C-IED, and ISR.”<sup>15</sup> In addition to these various challenges, military casualties are another significant problem for the ANA, in addition to the high attrition rate, despite the ANA’s efforts to recruit new personnel.

The Afghan National Security Forces suffered record casualties in the first fifteen weeks of 2015. Since they began combat operations against Taliban without the support of US and NATO troops on the ground, i.e. from the end of December 2014, the ANSF has encountered serious difficulties. Afghan officials stated that the number of Afghan security forces killed or injured had increased by 70%, reaching an average of 330 a week in the first fifteen weeks of this year, when compared to the same period in 2014.<sup>16</sup> Following the international coalition’s mission shift at the end of 2014 - from combat to advising and assisting – Afghan security forces have found themselves more vulnerable to attacks by the Taliban. In this context, the continuation of US air support under the Resolute Support Mission would significantly help the Afghan National Army to conduct more effective operations against the Taliban and other insurgent groups.

### *The Bloodiest Year: 2014*

2014 marked the bloodiest year of the thirteen-year war in Afghanistan. While 3,500 NATO coalition forces soldiers were killed in the previous thirteen years, more than five thousand Afghan security forces lost their lives in 2014 alone. The number of the civilian casualties gradually increased throughout 2014, reaching more than three thousand. Suicide attacks and bomb-

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April 2014, pp. 35-43.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>16</sup> Michaels, J. (2015) ‘Afghan security forces suffer record casualties’, *USA Today*. Available at: <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/05/03/afghan-security-forces-suffer-record-casualties/26828193/> (Accessed: 4 May 2015).

ings have increased in many central residential districts, especially in the capital city of Kabul.

UNAMA has been recording civilian casualties in Afghanistan since 2009, and the annual figure peaked in 2014. According to UNAMA reports, the number of Afghan civilian casualties in 2014 was 10,548 (3,699 deaths and 6,849 injured).<sup>17</sup> Compared to 2013, civilian deaths saw a 25 per cent increase, while civilian injuries increased by 21 per cent. During the six years that the UNAMA has been recording civilian casualties in Afghanistan, it has documented 47,745 civilian casualties, of which 17,774 were fatal, with 29,971 injured (Table 1).

*Compared to 2013, civilian deaths saw a 25 per cent increase, while civilian injuries increased by 21 per cent.*

Table 1.

Civilian Deaths and Injuries from 2009 to 2014			
Year	Deaths	Injuries	Total
2009	2412	3556	5968
2010	2792	4368	7160
2011	3133	4709	7842
2012	2769	4821	7590
2013	2969	5668	8637
2014	3699	6849	10548
<b>Total</b>	<b>17,774</b>	<b>29,971</b>	<b>47745</b>

Source: UNAMA 2014 Afghanistan Annual Report

### *A New Security Threat: The Islamic State in Afghanistan*

NATO's combat mission formally ended in Afghanistan at the end of 2014, following which Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) took over full responsibility for national security. Taliban officials considered the end of NATO's combat mission a "victory".<sup>18</sup> Around 13,500 NATO, mainly American, troops remain in Afghanistan under the new NATO mission, the Resolute Support Mission (RSM). The aim of RSM is to train, advise and

<sup>17</sup> 'Afghanistan Annual Report 2014: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict', *The United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)*, Kabul, Afghanistan: February 2015.

<sup>18</sup> 'Taliban claims victory in Afghan War as NATO ends combat mission', *Russia Today*, 29 December 2014, Available at: <http://rt.com/news/218435-taliban-victory-afghanistan-nato/> (Accessed: 17 April 2015).

*Thus, US troops may conduct counterterrorism operations when military interference is inevitable, thereby going beyond the advisory and training role of the new NATO mission.*

assist the Afghan National Security Forces. However, US President Barack Obama has authorized the continuation of limited air and ground operations.<sup>19</sup> Thus, US troops may conduct counterterrorism operations when military interference is inevitable, thereby going beyond the advisory and training role of the new NATO mission.<sup>20</sup>

In the last week of 2014, it was reported that hundreds of Taliban militants laid down their weapons and surrendered to first Vice President Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum in the northern Jawzjan province.<sup>21</sup> The Afghan authorities welcomed this move, and Vice President Dostum declared his hope that this move would lead to nationwide peace and stability. Dostum also called on other Taliban militants to join the on-going peace process,<sup>22</sup> but no concrete settlement has yet been achieved.

*Despite the on-going efforts towards the peace process, levels of insurgency are gradually increasing. For the Taliban, the recent developments, in particular the NATO withdrawal, seem to represent an opportunity to gain ground.*

Despite the on-going efforts towards the peace process, levels of insurgency are gradually increasing. For the Taliban, the recent developments, in particular the NATO withdrawal, seem to represent an opportunity to gain ground. Several American security experts suggested increasing the number of troops due to remain in Afghanistan at the start of this year. Even President Ashraf Ghani has expressed concerns about the possible arrival of the Islamic State (IS, formerly known as ISIS or ISIL) fighters in Afghanistan, suggesting that the US should re-examine the current troop withdrawal timeline.<sup>23</sup> While no

one wants another Iraq, the seriousness of President Ghani's concern was not been fully appreciated by Resolute Support Mission (RSM) Commander Gen. John Campbell, who said: "This is not Iraq. I don't see ISIL coming into Afghanistan like they did into

19 Lerman, D., Najafizada, E. and Alwan, A. (2014) 'Hagel Leaves Successor with Two Wars Obama Pledged to End', *Bloomberg Business*, Available at: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-12-05/hagel-leaves-successor-with-two-wars-obama-had-pledged-to-end> (Accessed: 20 April 2015).

20 Doğan, S. (2015) 'Presence of ISIL in Afghanistan and Central Asia', *Today's Zaman*, Available at: [http://www.todayszaman.com/op-ed\\_presence-of-isil-in-afghanistan-and-central-asia\\_371125.html](http://www.todayszaman.com/op-ed_presence-of-isil-in-afghanistan-and-central-asia_371125.html) (Accessed: 20 April 2015).

21 '200 Taliban militants surrender to Gen. Dostum in Jawzjan', *Khaama Press*, 29 December 2014, Available at: <http://www.khaama.com/200-taliban-militants-surrender-to-gen-dostum-in-jawzjan-8892> (Accessed: 20 April 2015).

22 *Ibid.*

23 Chumley, C. (2015) 'Ashraf Ghani, Afghanistan president: Obama should 're-examine' withdrawal,' *The Washington Times*, Available at: <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jan/5/ashraf-ghani-afghanistan-president-obama-should-re/> (Accessed: 22 April 2015).

Iraq. The Afghan Security Forces would not allow that.”<sup>24</sup> Unfortunately, Gen. Campbell could not be more mistaken about ISIL.

As a matter of fact, there were several reasons to take precautions, contrary to Campbell’s belief. In early September 2014, a faction of Hezb-e-Islami led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar said they were considering joining the ISIL militants.<sup>25</sup> Some factions of the Pakistani Taliban have pledged allegiance to ISIL’s self-proclaimed caliphate in October 2014.<sup>26</sup> In January 2015, a senior Afghan army general told Al Jazeera that ISIL has been active in Afghanistan, and a source from the Ministry of the Interior confirmed ISIL’s existence in Afghanistan.<sup>27</sup> There are also reports from different provinces in Afghanistan of ISIL recruitment and training activity.

### *Conflict between Islamic State and the Taliban on Afghan Soil*

Islamic State has been trying to expand its area of control over the past year, after having rapidly gained dominance of an area as big as the United Kingdom. Beyond the Middle East region, South Asia and Central Asia seem the most convenient locations for ISIL militants. It has been already accepted by the Afghan authorities that ISIL has been present in Afghanistan for some time.

In its attempt to recruit more militants in the region over the last few months, ISIL has gradually become active and operational in the region. It has been training militants in Afghanistan and providing arms for some time, and recently they carried out a suicide bomb attack on a bank branch in Jalalabad, Nangarhar, which killed at least 35 and wounded more than a 100 people.<sup>28</sup> This is the first major ISIL attack in Afghanistan. When ISIL claimed

24 Logan, L. (2015) ‘Ending America’s Longest War’, *CBS News*, Available at: <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/afghanistan-war-60-minutes-lara-logan/> (Accessed: 22 April 2015).

25 ‘Islamic State claims Pakistan and Afghanistan for its “caliphate”’, *The Telegraph*, 5 September 2014, Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/11075390/Islamic-State-claims-Pakistan-and-Afghanistan-for-its-caliphate.html?mobile=basic> (Accessed: 24 April 2015).

26 Nelson, D. and Yusufzai, A. (2014) ‘Pakistan Taliban pledges allegiance to ISIL’, *The Telegraph*, Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/11162277/Pakistan-Taliban-pledges-allegiance-to-Isil.html> (Accessed: 24 April 2015).

27 ‘Officials confirm ISIL present in Afghanistan’, *AlJazeera*, 18 January 2015, Available at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2015/01/afghan-officials-confirm-isil-presence-201511815245847478.html> (Accessed: 24 April 2015).

28 Alokozay, K. and Nordland, R. (2015) ‘Afghan President Blames ISIS for a Bombing’, *The New York Times*, Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/19/world/asia/afghanistan-jalalabad-suicide-bombing-bank.html> (Accessed: 28 April 2015).

responsibility for the attack, the Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid stated, “It was an evil act. We condemn/deny involvement in it.”<sup>29</sup>

*ISIL's presence in Afghanistan and the declaration of the caliphate represent an uncomfortable situation for the Taliban leadership.* | ISIL is attempting to advance towards South Asia and Central Asia to increase its recruitment rate throughout the region. The salary that ISIL promises to its militants is much higher than what the Taliban can afford. In these circumstances, the region's new “emerging terrorist group” is spreading out to the Central Asian borders much faster than imagined.

ISIL's presence in Afghanistan and the declaration of the caliphate represent an uncomfortable situation for the Taliban leadership. These two terrorist groups have different motivations: the Taliban wants to rule Afghanistan with its version of religious law, whereas ISIL has declared global jihad, of which Afghanistan is only one part. The publication of the 5000-word biography of the Taliban leader Mullah Omar on their official website is one of the biggest indicators of the Taliban's discomfort with ISIL.<sup>30</sup> Mullah Omar has been leading the Taliban for almost two decades; however, there have been speculations of him being dead due to the little information about his life and there are no video or audio recordings of him at all. This unexpectedly published biography of the self-proclaimed Amir al-Mu'minin, or the Commander of the Faithful, Mullah Omar, was both a message of strength to the Taliban militants and a response to the caliphate declarations by the ISIL leadership.

Even the speculation of his death has caused some militants to defect from the Taliban and join ISIL. But now since the Afghan officials confirmed the death of Mullah Omar and it was also reported that he had already been dead for more than two years,<sup>31</sup> it would be harder for Taliban leadership to restrain its militants from joining other groups in the region.

The struggle between the two terrorist groups escalated with the

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<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>30</sup> Bezhan, F. (2015) 'The Secret Life Of Mullah Omar Revealed', *RFE/RL*, Available at: <http://www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-taliban-reveals-secret-life-mullah-omar/26943516.html> (Accessed: 30 April 2015).

<sup>31</sup> Goldstein, J. (2015) 'Afghan War's Convenient Myth: A Living Mullah Omar', *The New York Times*, 7 August, Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/07/world/asia/afghan-wars-convenient-myth-a-living-mullah-omar.html> (Accessed: 12 August 2015).

recent attacks, and they have officially declared jihad, or holy war, against each other.<sup>32</sup> The police chief of southern Helmand province, Nabi Jan Mullahkhil, stated that he had documents in which both sides announced jihad on each other.<sup>33</sup> It is known from previous declarations the groups oppose one another. The leadership of ISIL has called the then Taliban leader Mullah Omar “a fool and illiterate warlord” who does not deserve spiritual or religious credibility. Taliban militants have been ordered to never let an ISIL flag to rise in Afghanistan.<sup>34</sup>

*The struggle between the two terrorist groups escalated with the recent attacks, and they have officially declared jihad, or holy war, against each other.*

In fact, both groups have a lot in common. ISIL’s rapid gains in Iraq and Syria are reminiscent of the Taliban’s capture of southern and eastern Afghanistan in 1994. Common characteristics include their recruitment methods, military capabilities, operational similarities, mobility, and organizational loyalty. If ISIL was not aiming to advance beyond the Iraq-Syria line, these two groups would probably not come face-to-face - and yet they are about to engage in direct combat within the Afghan borders now. The death of Mullah Omar could trigger factionalism within the Taliban and it would accelerate the tension between the two groups in the near future.

In the wider region, Russia and China are among the countries most concerned about the increasing influence of the Taliban and the ISIL in Afghanistan. During a meeting with former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Russian President Vladimir Putin recently stated that, “The Taliban is active and it controls a significant part of Afghanistan’s territory, many border crossing points. But what is even more disturbing is that the so-called Islamic State is getting increasingly active in Afghanistan, consolidating its position there. I believe we are already seeing the Islamic State’s presence in 25 out of the 34 provinces.”<sup>35</sup> The presence

32 ‘ISIS, Taliban announced Jihad against each other’, *Khaama Press*, 20 April 2015, Available at: <http://www.khaama.com/isis-taliban-announced-jihad-against-each-other-3206> (Accessed: 30 April 2015).

33 Spencer, R. (2015) ‘Islamic State, Taliban declare jihad against each other’, *Jihad Watch*, Available at: <http://www.jihadwatch.org/2015/04/islamic-state-taliban-declare-jihad-against-each-other> (Accessed: 30 April 2015).

34 Kliegman, A. (2015) ‘Taliban and Islamic State Declare Jihad on Each Other’, *Center for Security Policy*, Available at: <http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/2015/04/23/taliban-and-islamic-state-declare-jihad-on-each-other/> (Accessed: 30 April 2015).

35 ‘Meeting with Hamid Karzai’, *President of Russia – The Kremlin Moscow*, 24 June 2015, Available at: <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/49760> (Accessed: 14 July 2015).

of ISIL in Afghanistan is not only an issue for the Afghan government but also for the countries in the wider region. Taking advantage of the current power vacuum, ISIL's ultimate goal is to secure a safe haven in the country. In order to do that, they are continuing to engage with regional insurgent and terrorist groups in Afghanistan. Putin's comments and concerns regarding the security and stability of Afghanistan and the region must be taken into consideration by NATO officials; the situation is a common challenge for Afghanistan, Russia and NATO countries.

On the other side, China is currently dealing with its own radical groups who are said to have ties with the ISIL. A volatile Afghanistan will pose a threat to China for security and economic reasons. Chinese deputy Foreign Minister Cheng Guoping recently said, "due to the spill over effect of the Islamic State terrorist activities, Afghanistan now faces a grim security situation."<sup>36</sup> With the United States gradually moving away from Afghanistan, China has recognized that its involvement in the Afghan peacekeeping activities is increasingly important. A possible cooperation of the ISIL and the Chinese separatist groups in the western region of Xinjiang would create an enormous problem for neighbouring countries and NATO.

## Conclusion

The decade of 2015 to 2024 has been declared Afghanistan's "Transformation Decade", envisioning the establishment of a secure Afghanistan, a self-sufficient economy, a certain level of stability, reduced unemployment, an end to institutional corruption, the coming into force of a new inclusive constitution, and a level of economic prosperity by the end of 2024. In order to achieve this dream, economic reform, controlled flow of foreign aid, creation of a transparent and accountable administration, and strengthening of local governance are required. However, all of these developments demand first and foremost the internal security of the country.

Unfortunately, the NATO combat mission has not left behind a

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<sup>36</sup> Osman, B. (2015) 'Why China is alarmed about IS presence in Afghanistan', *Deutsche Welle*, Available at: <http://www.dw.com/en/why-china-is-alarmed-about-is-presence-in-afghanistan/a-18570097> (Accessed: 14 July 2015).

peaceful Afghanistan. The Afghan economy relies on international aid even just to pay the salaries of the Afghan National Security Forces, whose ability to fight the Taliban and other radical armed groups is uncertain, even at 352,000 personnel. In this environment, the much needed security and stability cannot be guaranteed; the benefits of other investments and projects will be very limited in the absence of security. The formation of a national unity government is almost complete, albeit still lacking a Defence Minister - arguably the most important position. The functionality of the NUG will be decisive for the future of Afghanistan.

*The Afghan economy relies on international aid even just to pay the salaries of the Afghan National Security Forces, whose ability to fight the Taliban and other radical armed groups is uncertain, even at 352,000 personnel.*

Considering the current security situation within the borders, in particular the fight between Taliban and the ISIL, the troops that serve under the Resolute Support Mission of NATO might need to extend their current mandate, which is to train, advise and assist the ANSF, and become combatants again. It is unlikely that the ISIL militants in Afghanistan will be able to maintain their presence for much longer and continue to advance in the absence of economic and military support from the headquarters in the Middle East. However, if they continue to receive such support, they at least have the same potential as the Taliban to cause trouble for the Afghan government and neighbouring countries. A potential Taliban-ISIL conflict in this region will result in a much greater problem than many are currently predicting. While the notion of mutual destruction might seem superficially appealing, it will be the civilians and the Afghan government who bear the brunt of the damage.

From this perspective, it seems likely that there will come a point where the global struggle against the ISIL in the Middle East and against the Taliban in Afghanistan will have to be assessed as two sides of the same big problem. The military interventions of the international coalitions in both regions have not been as effective as expected. ISIL's possible expansion in the region will certainly create more conflicts than ever before, since they will fight both states and non-state actors, i.e. other insurgent militant groups. Considering that even with the help of the NATO and US troops, which numbered around 150,000 at the peak of the intervention, the Afghan security forces were not able to defeat the Taliban

militants. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that without significant external support, the ANSF will succeed overcoming the terrorist threat. The situation has become more complex with the presence of ISIL in Afghanistan. The international community should not neglect Afghanistan while focusing on the ISIL problem in the Middle East. This is a shared problem of both regions and needs to be dealt with via a common strategy.

As recently expressed by many regional and global leaders, ISIL's advancement in Afghanistan needs to be tackled immediately. This development demonstrates that the international security governance is not succeeding, particularly in the Middle East, and even more particularly in Iraq, Syria, and South Asia, notably. Hence, the failure of the international community to prevent ISIL's regional advance in the region has increased the threat levels, and the current situation needs to be addressed by Afghanistan and international coalitions standing shoulder-to-shoulder.

# In the Absence of Effective Global Governance, Security Policy Based on Political Realism Makes Sense

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Simon Anglim\*

To political realists, the world is a dangerous place, anarchic and without any central body to enforce international law or any universal system of morality. Consequently, states cannot trust each other, and have a duty towards their citizens to maximise their power in order to ensure their protection. A political leader may have a strong sense of personal morality, but this must be put aside in the face of possible threats to the safety and welfare of the people who have entrusted him/her with high office. Other forms of guaranteeing state and international security, for instance through collective security, are contingent on trust and optimistic interpretations of human nature. Consequently they have flaws and loopholes where realism does not, and the current emphasis on liberal intervention could be making the world less stable, and therefore less secure.



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Realists claim to see the world as it is, not as it should be, conceding that what they see is rarely attractive. They are skeptical about attempts at global governance, and, indeed, the ‘modern realist’ school of international relations arose in the 1950s as a reaction to the failure of the League of Nations, a body realists saw as full of good intentions but with no practical means of realizing those aims. Central to the realist worldview is the state’s pursuit of Power - which we might define as ‘the capability to ‘achieve ends despite opposition’; the centrality of military force to that power, and the inevitability of conflict in a world full of competing sovereignties and bad intentions. To realists, the international system is anarchic, with no universally recognised central authority to impose order on the international community; sovereignty, at least currently, is therefore inherent to nation-states. States have needs which may be mutually incompatible, and a state can never be entirely sure about the intentions of others, and thus, can never be certain that it is not at risk of attack. Consequently, in a world in which states are ready, and potentially willing, to attack each other, states interested in preserving their sovereignty - which presumably most are - must be wary of trusting others. States agree to cooperate for practical or ideological reasons, but all that is required to upset any international community is for one state to act selfishly. Moreover, with no central authority to turn to for help, and no deterrent to aggression other than the survival instincts of third parties, states have even more reasons to be afraid. Thus states must help themselves, by pursuing ‘Interest defined as Power’.<sup>1</sup> Power is intangible, only capable of being measured in relative terms. For instance, Paul Kennedy reminds us that Britain is now richer in absolute terms than it was in the Victorian period, and its forces possess destructive power beyond the wildest dreams of Victorian commanders, but this is of little consequence when Britain’s share of world GDP has shrunk from 25% to 3%, and it shares the world stage with the great armed powers of the USA and China.<sup>2</sup> In a world where power is all, as Thucydides put it, the strong do what they will and the weak suffer what they must. Indeed, there are plenty of historical examples to support this,

<sup>1</sup> For an introduction to the tenets of realism, see Morgenthau, H. (1967) *Politics among Nations*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, pp.4-15, or Waltz, K. (1954) *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. New York: Columbia University Press, pp.16-41.

<sup>2</sup> Kennedy, P. (1989) *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. London: Fontana, p.xxv.

from Hitler's seizure of Austria and Czechoslovakia in the 1930s to Stalin's conquest of Eastern Europe the following decade to the current international posturing over Ukraine.<sup>3</sup>

Realists do not deny the role of morality and law in interstate relations; they merely argue that they are less important than others might wish. It is certainly important for political leaders to have an ethical code, or at least a sense of honour, as this is vital to building the trusting relationships on which internal political leadership and external diplomacy depend. However, realists agree with Machiavelli that in a world full of people who are not virtuous, the virtuous man cannot survive on virtue alone, and it can also be questioned whether an elected political leader's personal morals or sense of honour should be pursued to the point of compromising national security. To realists, the central mechanism for peacekeeping is not morality but the balance of power, wherein an increase in the relative Power of one state is countered by increased strength or expanded alliances of others. While this process is inherent in the international system, balance of Power policies can be pursued deliberately.

This opens the issue of whether the accumulation power in and of itself should be a national priority. Fortunately for realists, there are reasons to suggest that it should. History provides numerous examples of the weak suffering what they must, and realists accept that history has losers and victims and believe that it is the duty of policymakers to protect their constituents from that fate: since 1900, perhaps 100 million people have been killed by police or 'security' forces. Their murderers faced little resistance, because their victims could not fight for themselves. Confronted with such evidence, realists argue, public servants have no right *not* to prioritize the security of their peoples.<sup>4</sup>

The concepts of an 'anarchic' international system and the need for security are closely linked. St. Augustine argued that man's sinfulness necessitates government; this is borne out by historical examples of what happens when higher authority is removed, as in post-colonial Africa, or more recently in Afghanistan or Iraq since 2001. The absence of central authority entails the ab-

<sup>3</sup> Thucydides, *The History of the Peloponnesian War*.

<sup>4</sup> Figures from Seabury, P. and Codevilla, A. (1992) *War: Ends and Means*. New York: Basic Books, pp.6-7.

sence of an entity capable of resolving disputes and of enforcing those resolutions. This perhaps explains why many policymakers currently place their faith in systems of ‘collective security’ to deter threats or restore peace when deterrence fails. Collective security agrees with realism that military power is central to international relations, but believes power can be managed through collective international institutions such as NATO or the United Nations. Collective security requires that all states agree to settle differences peacefully: paradoxically, if this were so, there would be no need for collective security arrangements. Collective security posits that states must go beyond self-interest when acting against ‘rogue’ states, instead equating their interests with the broader interests of the ‘international community.’ Specifically, states must believe that their interests are so closely linked with those of others that an attack against one becomes an attack on all. Trust is the most important component of collective security; states must be absolutely sure that others within the system will come to their aid should they be targeted by ‘rogues’.

Unlike realism, there is one fundamental question to which collective security does not provide an answer: how can states trust one another? Realists maintain that states fear one another because of their offensive military capabilities in an anarchic world and the uncertainty about the intentions of others. Collective security has nothing to say about this and condemns the balance of power, a means by which security may be increased. In this regard, the American political scientist John Mearsheimer has posed eight conundra for states participating in collective security arrangements.

Firstly, it can be difficult to distinguish between aggressor and victim, particularly in the case of pre-emptive strikes, as with the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Secondly, the theory assumes that all aggression is wrong, but there are cases where conquest was possibly warranted, as in the Allied action against Germany and Japan in World War Two and against Saddam in 2003, and could be again in the case of the *Daesh* in Iraq. Thirdly, some states are friendly or hostile due to historical, ideological or cultural reasons, and may be reluctant to join collective action against their friends or alongside their enemies; it is difficult to imagine the USA using direct military force against Britain or Israel, for

instance. Fourth, even if states do agree to act collectively, there may be controversy over burden sharing, and the response of a collective security alliance can depend on the political will of its main burden sharers, as indicated by the different Western and Middle Eastern responses to the *Daesh*. Fifth, there is the problem of guaranteeing an efficient response, particularly if the aggression is unforeseen; the Western Allies took six months to remove Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1990-91 and it has taken nearly a year for their actions against the *Daesh* to take place. From this perspective, many states are unlikely to invest in a system that only eventually delivers aid, possibly long after they have been conquered and thousands of lives have been lost. Sixth, collective security posits the threat of escalation, particularly if the aggressor has friends with strong interests in the area of conflict, as, initially, with Serbia and Russia in the 1990s or the *Daesh* with certain ruling families in the Gulf region. Seventh, the notion that states must respond automatically to aggression creates problems of sovereignty; collective security denies states the right to declare or stay out of war; states, particularly democracies, are likely to debate vociferously over whether or not to confront an aggressor, as indicated by the events of early 2003. Lastly, there are philosophical contradictions about the use of force that could impede states coming to the rescue of a victim. Collective security is rooted in the liberal notion that war is so repugnant that it should be renounced, creating doubts about the will of states not threatened directly. Indeed, most proponents of collective security generally prefer the use of diplomacy and economic sanctions over force.<sup>5</sup>

This leads to perhaps the principal flaw of collective security institutions - they are frequently nothing more than the expression of the will of participating nations, a fig leaf to conceal their pursuit of national interests. If those nations feel they have no stake in the conflict, they will not react; if they do, then it is not the institution itself which is promoting international law, but the participating powers. Moreover, 'peace enforcement' operations have only worked when one or more of the great powers have participated, guaranteeing adequate military might – consider the events in Bosnia in the early 1990s or in Libya in 2011. There

<sup>5</sup> See Mearsheimer, J. (1994) 'The False Promise of International Institutions', *International Security*, 19(3), pp.26-33.

are, then, reasons enough to suggest that seeking security exclusively through such a system may be imprudent, and states that recognise these problems are likely to prefer the realist practise of self-help. And yet curiously, few do.

Another feature of realism is the assumed centrality of the state to international relations. This worldview was challenged in the 1960s, when behaviouralism was presented as an alternative. Behaviouralists claim realism is oversimplified, that the growth of international communications and transnational linkages means that significant aspects of international relations now bypass the state. While behaviouralism has not produced an encompassing theory of international relations, some of its offshoots challenge the monopoly of realism, among them Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) and Interdependence.

FPA studies factors influencing foreign policy, and rejects one of the core tenets of realism, that the state is a unitary actor which manages its policies rationally to maximize its power. Rather, says FPA, there is fragmentation and rivalry within the state; input from the domestic community, including special interest groups and the media; as well as the ideology and career interests of military officers and policymakers. From this viewpoint, FPA provides a persuasive account of the making of foreign policy, with its occasional dithering, inconsistencies and illogicality. It was from FPA that the concept of interdependence arose. Interdependence is currently popular amongst the Western liberal 'intelligentsia' and the diplomatic community, and reworks the classical liberalism of Adam Smith and the Marquis De Montesquieu, who believed that free trade, would create an international 'division of labour'. As a consequence, they believed, the economic interests of one state would be tied to those of all others; with states able to obtain goods via trade, the need for wars and conquest would diminish.<sup>6</sup> Similarly, the withdrawal of trade – 'economic sanctions' – can be used to restore the balance of power by forcing states to act as others wish.

These assumptions rest on the proposition that the state is losing its dominant position in international relations to commercial entities, and so military power is not as important as before. However, for all the talk of 'globalisation' and 'global issues',

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<sup>6</sup> Waltz, *Man*, pp.92-99

the nation-state remains responsible for resolving issues of war and peace, the environment and so forth. Thus, individuals still delegate security and welfare functions to the state, and transnational entities remain subject to the laws of nation-states. In many ways, the modern state is a unitary actor. Perhaps the most serious flaw in interdependence theories is that economic resources are essential to support a large security establishment, and so the relative size of a state's economy profoundly affects its standing as a military power. It is more than a coincidence that the United States of America, the greatest military power in the history of the world, has the biggest and most aggressive trading economy in the history of the world too.

It is difficult to draw a line between economic and security issues, and so relative gains must be considered even within the economic domain. Relative gains color any method of achieving bilateral trust by economic means: even if covert action were totally impossible, gaps in gains could soon be translated to military advantage. Moreover, there is a serious failure to see the limits of rationality. Economic relationships will not deter states who feel strongly enough that their interests can be served by force. The placing of most European economies onto the gold standard did not prevent the Second World War, and the USSR was supplying Germany with timber and other raw materials until the very day it was invaded in 1941 (popular myth has it that German tanks advanced east past Soviet trains carrying timber west). Most damning of all for interdependence theories, three quarters of all conflicts since 1945 have been civil wars, involving the breakup of integrated economies. Moreover, in a reversal of the classical liberal argument, some states may attempt to gain by force what they lack the patience or ability to obtain by economic means, as with Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.

Finally, in many cases the replacement of the nation state hoped for by interdependence theorists has manifested itself in a deeply troubling manner, exemplified by ethnically based civil conflicts or the growth of unwelcome transnational movements, including terrorists, religious fundamentalists and international criminal cartels. These groups take the pull of 'Interest defined as Power' to an illogical extreme. The killing of the hundred million cited above was in many respects sanctioned by states, parties and

organizations similar, if not identical in political philosophy and method to these emergent groups. This should be cause enough for security concerns.

All this contrasts somewhat with the current stated guiding principal of the security policy of the Atlanticist powers, a hybrid of interdependence and collective security we can call ‘moral interventionism’. Moral interventionism argues that ‘civilized’ states must seek a more democratic, understanding and, by implication, peaceful world through a range of means, including military action, although this should only be used as a last resort against ‘aggressor’ states and mass violators of human rights, so that, in Tawney’s words, war becomes either a crusade or a crime.<sup>7</sup> Moral interventionism combines the Utopian impulse to better the world through the muscular Christianity and ‘can do’ philosophy of the Western professional classes. Consequently, in contrast with other Utopian movements, which are generally patient and opportunistic, moral interventionism is often robustly proactive, laying at the very core of the external policies of significant political actors such as the ‘Neo-Conservatives’ that grouped around President George W. Bush and continue to dominate US Republican foreign policy, but also ‘progressivist’ parties such as Mr. Blair’s ‘New’ Labour and the new centrist-inclined British Conservative Party under David Cameron. Such a worldview is intrinsically confrontational, setting up elites, in a small number of rich states, as judge, jury and sometimes executioner for how others should live, manifested, for example, in Mr. Blair’s assertions over events from Sierra Leone to Serbia to Afghanistan, that the ends justified whatever means might have been used. The assumption that others may wish to live in Western-style, New Labour-voting liberal democracies is not only parochial but also reminiscent of cultural imperialism, and is likely to be counter-productive in practice. Moral interventionism is as Utopian as other millennialist theories of interstate relations, and is potentially as unlimited in its aims. Not only confrontations between moral interventionists and other Utopians are more likely, but also they are more likely to escalate, as the Second World War indicates.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Quoted in *ibid*, p.111.

<sup>8</sup> Unquestionably the best discussion of the realist versus interventionist approach to foreign affairs is that to be found in Fisher, D. (2011) *Morality and War: Can War be Just in the Twenty-First Century?*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.11-27, 221-242

In denying that history has some grand purpose, realists acknowledge that it is not just their particular state or way of life that has vital interests, but all states and ways of life. These interests can be assessed rationally, and perhaps accommodated with our own. At least, we might pursue our interests so that others do not feel that theirs are threatened, thus allowing relations between states to develop in an atmosphere and manner of mutual respect and in a safer world, than in a situation dominated by those who feel they have God, ethics or historical inevitability on their side. In a world of multiple, equally valid interests, opportunities for inter-state and inter-civilizational cooperation will be greater, and true interdependence may result. Moreover, military action in the pursuit of rationally assessed state interest can surely be controlled and limited more efficiently than apocalyptic crusades, as Clausewitz argued at the very beginning of the modern era. I make no apologies for quoting again the oft-cited remark of the great British historian, Taylor: ‘Bismarck...fought “necessary” wars and killed thousands; the idealists of the twentieth century fight “just” wars and kill millions.’<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Quoted in Waltz, *Man*, p.114.



# **Book Review\***

## Is the American Century Over

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Joseph S. Nye, Jr



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\* The Book Review was prepared by Dr. Özgür Tüfekçi, senior editor of Caucasus International

**Joseph S. Nye, Jr**

*Is the American Century Over?*

Polity Press: Cambridge, 2015, 146 pp., \$10.29 (hbk)

Students of International Relations like books that ‘talk big’, such as Francis Fukuyama’s *The End of History and the Last Man*, Samuel Huntington’s *The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of the World Order*, and Henry Kissinger’s latest book *World Order*. In a similar vein, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., a former Dean and now professor at the Harvard John F. Kennedy School of Government has just published *Is the American Century Over?*

As a small volume, it is one of the best short reads about global geostrategic power shifts. Leading International Relations scholar Joseph Nye, famous for his “soft power” concept, addresses the debate over the posited decline of America, presenting a clear argument that “the American Century is not over”.

He comes to this conclusion by analyzing the prospective challengers: Europe, Japan, Russia, India, Brazil and China. Nye begins the book with a general synopsis to present the concept of the American century. In this chapter, he tries to explain what he means by “the American century,” and traces its origins. As the readers will find, Nye concludes each chapter with a declaration underscoring that the American century is not over. In this sense, the very first chapter ends as follows:

*The short answer to our question is that we are not entering a post-American world... The American century is not over, but because of transnational and non-state forces, it is definitely changing in important ways (pp. 14-15).*

In chapter 2, Nye discusses the notion “American decline”, exploring America’s historical positions in comparison with other prominent powers over the same periods.

Chapter 3 consolidates the argument that the United States is not in absolute decline, but that the rise of other powers stands uncontested. In this regard, Nye assesses the potential challengers to the United States, finding that they all suffer from structural limitations that will prevent them from becoming hegemons in the global world order. He submits that while Europe is always

changing, it is unlikely to surpass the United States: *The probability of a united Europe becoming more powerful than the United States and helping to cause the end of the American century is very low.* He adds, *the same can be said for Japan. Three decades ago, many Americans feared being overtaken after Japanese per capita income surpassed that of the United States. Instead, Japan's economy suffered two decades of slow growth and Japan faces severe demographic problems.* Consequently, Nye's view is that Japan is unlikely to become a global challenger to the United States, either economically or militarily.

Within the same chapter, Nye continues these comparisons with an examination of Russia, stating that

*in the 1950s, many Americans feared that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States as the world's leading power. However, it did not happen and it seems unlikely that Russia would again possess the resources to present the same sort of balance to American power.*

When it comes to India, Nye argues that population alone is not an index of power, unless those human resources are developed. In this sense, *India remains very much an underdeveloped country, with hundreds of millions of illiterate citizens living in poverty.* According to Nye, another competitor is Brazil. However, *Brazil's infrastructure is inadequate, its legal system overburdened, it has a very high murder rate, and serious corruption problems.* On this basis, Nye argues that it is unlikely that Brazil will aspire to compete with the United States as a peer.

Nye alleges that the only potential competitor is China. Among the BRICS, China is by far the largest, with an economy equal to those of all the other countries combined. It has the largest army, the largest military budget, the highest rate of economic growth, and the most Internet users. Yet, he emphasizes that the rise of China globally is a long process that is still some way from signifying the end of the American century.

In the next chapter, Nye compares the United States with Rome, concluding that

*American culture has cleavages, but they remain manageable and less dangerous than at times in the past.*

*Social problems abound, with some getting worse and some better. The society remains open to the outside world and better able than most to renew itself by immigration. The American economy is growing more slowly than in the past, but it remains innovative at using and commercializing technologies because of its entrepreneurial culture, the most mature venture capital industry and the world's top ranking universities. It leads the world in research and development, and is at the forefront of new cyber, nano, bio, and energy technologies... America has many problems and they raise many questions, but they are not creating an absolute decline that gives us a clear answer about when the American century will end.*

All in all, the book is well-written and most readers will find it both engaging and insightful. Nye assesses America's place in the world and tries to correct the pessimism about America's future. He brilliantly articulates the issues around the challenges and challengers. Whether or not his assessments are correct is another question. However, Nye argues strongly that American geopolitical superiority or hegemony is still firmly in place and far from declining, and that the biggest threat is not China, India, Japan, Russia or Europe but America itself.

# CAUCASUS UNDER REVIEW\* - RECENTLY PUBLISHED BOOKS

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While the Caucasus is a region of enormous diversity and potential, it is also a region about which relatively little is known. However, during the last decade, numerous publications on the region have expanded both regional and international understanding of this diversity and potential. This overview of recent publications provides an up-to-date reading list for anyone interested in the region.



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\* Report prepared by Dr. Özgür Tüfekçi, senior editor of Caucasus International

This issue features 7 books which delve into a range of issues, from identity to security; cooperation to development. The first book, **Caspian Security Issues: Conflicts, Cooperation and Energy Supplies**, deals with key regional issues, as its title suggests. It is edited by *Marco Valigi*, a Professor at the American University of Rome. The book focuses on the level of international competitiveness in the region, in particular Russian pressure on the countries of the Southern Corridor. EU interest in and engagement with the Southern Corridor initiative is also addressed by the authors.

**Azerbaijan and the New Energy Geopolitics of Southeastern Europe**, is published by the Jamestown Foundation in cooperation with the Center for Strategic Studies in Baku, edited by *Margarita Asenova* and *Zaur Shiryev*. It focuses on Southeastern Europe's energy security and the Southern Gas Corridor. The book brings forward Azerbaijan's aspiring role as an energy supplier and contributor to energy security in Southeastern Europe, and provides a comprehensive analysis of the ways in which the Southern Gas Corridor poses an unprecedented challenge to Russia's gas monopoly in Southeastern Europe.

The third book, **The South Caucasus beyond Borders, Boundaries and Division Lines: Conflicts, Cooperation and Development**, addresses borders, boundaries, and division lines from the perspectives of conflicts, cooperation and development. It is an edited volume by *Mikko Palonkorpi*, a researcher at the Aleksanteri Institute, Helsinki. The book is the final publication of a research project with the same name, conducted as part of the security cluster of the Wider Europe Initiative.

The next book is **Identity and Politics in Central Asia and the Caucasus**, edited by *Mohammed Ayoob*, University Distinguished Professor of International Relations at Michigan State University and *Murad Ismayilov*, doctoral researcher at the University of Cambridge. The post-independence experiences of the multicultural region of Central Eurasia offer an ideal case study for analyzing theories of identity and foreign policy in non-European contexts. Looking to re-introduce identity as a multi-dimensional factor informing state behavior, this book analyzes the experiences of the different Central Eurasian states in their post-independence pursuits.

The next book, **From Anatolia to Aceh: Ottomans, Turks, and Southeast Asia**, is co-authored by *Andrew Peacock* and *Annabel Teh Gallop*. This work is a product of the 2009-2012 British Academy-funded research project Islam, Trade and Politics across the Indian Ocean, administered by ASEASUK (Association of Southeast Asian Studies in the UK) and the BIAA (British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara). The project set out to investigate all aspects of the links between the greatest Middle Eastern power – the Ottoman Empire – and the Muslim lands of the Malay Archipelago in Southeast Asia over the past five centuries. Culminating in a conference held in Banda Aceh in 2012, the project also produced a travelling photographic exhibition produced by the British Library which toured the UK, with a Turkish version which travelled to Istanbul and Ankara, while Indonesian versions were displayed in various venues in Aceh and in Jakarta at the Bayt al-Qur'an & Museum Istiqlal.

The sixth book is **Turkish-American Relations, 1800-1952: Between the Stars, Stripes and the Crescent**, written by *Şuhnaz Yilmaz*, Professor of Koç University. The aim of the book is to revisit a neglected period (1800-1952), by providing a comprehensive study of the formative stage of Turkish-American relations. It draws heavily on Turkish, American and British archival sources and presents both the Turkish and the American perspectives on this relationship.

The last book is **The History of Transnational Armenian Terrorism in the Twentieth Century: Historical and Criminological Research**, written by Russian historian and lawyer *Oleg Y. Kuznetsov*. Although Armenian terrorism has been the subject of international research for the past forty years, Oleg Y. Kuznetsov's new book, 'The History of Transnational Armenian Terrorism in the Twentieth Century: Historical and Criminological Research', is the first Russian-language work on the topic that is aimed at a wide readership. Its publication has broken the traditional circle of silence that has long prevented Russian scholars from addressing the topic.

**Caspian Security Issues:  
Conflicts, Cooperation and Energy Supplies**

*Edited by Marco Valigi*

The Caucasus and the Caspian areas have been a core interest for the main actors of international politics from the Persian Empire to the 21<sup>st</sup> century Chinese power. However, the internal and systemic constraints that once drove various political powers to compete for the control of the area have changed throughout history. This collection focuses on issues such as the positional relevance of this region in the major powers' policies, the unique (and contested) legal status of the Caspian Basin (saline as an ocean; closed like a lake), the energy policies of some of the Caucasian countries and the role of these strategic resources as a cause for possible conflicts or, conversely, as an contributing factor in their non-violent resolution.

These topics are examined in the book's nine essays, which offer a range of theoretical backgrounds, including political science, legal studies, history and economics to ensure that each topic is addressed in appropriate depth.



**Azerbaijan and the New Energy Geopolitics of  
Southeastern Europe**

*Edited by Margarita Asenova & Zaur Shiriyev*

The collection **Azerbaijan and the New Energy Geopolitics of Southeastern Europe** arrives at timely moment, as concerns about energy security are growing in the midst of military, economic, and energy conflicts in East and Southeast Europe. As the construction of the Southern Gas Corridor from Azerbaijan to Europe is advancing, natural gas from the Caspian region challenges the prospects for a gas monopoly in Southeast Europe, thus changing the geopolitical landscape in the region.

An edited volume with ten chapters, this study enhances our understanding of Southeast Europe's energy security and the potential impact of the Southern Gas Corridor. The book focuses on Azerbaijan's aspiring role as an energy supplier and contributor to energy security in Southeast Europe, its evolving relations with

countries in the region, and, as a consequence, Baku's expanding relations with the European Union and the United States.



## **The South Caucasus beyond Borders, Boundaries and Division Lines: Conflicts, Cooperation and Development**

*Edited by Mikko Palonkorpi*

In the past twenty-five years, the Caucasus region – North and South Caucasus combined – has been a semi-permanent epicenter of recurring ethno-separatist conflicts and inter-state wars. This has led not only to redefinitions of identities, borders and boundaries in the region, but also to contested and controversial political and legal statuses among the regions' recognized and unrecognized constituent parts. In recent decades the military clashes in the former Soviet space have been concentrated in the Caucasus region, with just a few exceptions due to conflict flare-ups in Central Asia (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan) and in Moldova (Transnistria). Given the fact that the entire Caucasus region is only a minuscule slice of the total landmass and population of the former Soviet Union, its clear tendency towards conflict is all the more notable.

The Aleksanteri Institute's project was implemented within the Security Cluster of the Wider Europe Initiative (WEI), funded by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, as part of a research consortium with the Tampere Peace Research Institute (TAPRI) and the Karelian Institute at the University of Eastern Finland. Research themes in the project ranged from cross-border cooperation to Turkish-Armenian reconciliation and trans-border energy issues. Project activities included several conferences, seminars, guest lectures and round table discussions in Tbilisi, Yerevan, Baku and Helsinki, where opposing side(s) of the conflict(s) were represented. Researcher exchanges from South Caucasus to Finland and vice versa were also arranged. This publication is a result of the Aleksanteri Institute's research cooperation with three partner organizations in the South Caucasus: the Heinrich Böll South Caucasus Office in Georgia, the Caucasus Institute (CI) in Armenia and the Center for Strategic Studies (SAM) in Azerbaijan.

## **Identity and Politics in Central Asia and the Caucasus**

*Edited by Mohammed Ayoob and Murad Ismayilov*

The book is structured into two broadly defined sections, with the first half examining the different ways in which the combination of domestic, regional, international and trans-national forces worked to advance one national identity over the others in the states that comprise the region of post-Soviet Central Eurasia. In the second half, the chapters analyze the many ways in which identity, once shaped, influence the foreign policy behaviors of the regional states, as well as the overall security dynamics in the region. The book also looks at the ways in which identity, by doing so, enjoys an intricate, mutually constitutive relationship with the strategic context in which it bears its effects on the state and the region. Finally, given the special role Russia has historically played in defining the evolutionary trajectory of the regional states, the book discusses the ways in which Russia itself and its post-Cold War policies towards its former territories have been conditioned by factors associated with Russia's evolving post-Soviet identity.

Placing the region firmly within existing theories of identity and state practices, the book will be of interest to students and scholars of Central Asian Politics, Security Studies, Foreign Policy and International Relations.



## **From Anatolia to Aceh: Ottomans, Turks, and Southeast Asia**

*By Andrew Peacock and Annabel Teh Gallop*

Southeast Asia has long been connected by trade, religion and political links to the wider world via the Indian Ocean, and especially to the Middle East through the faith of Islam. However, little attention has been paid to the ties between Muslim Southeast Asia - encompassing the modern nations of Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore and the southern parts of Thailand and the Philippines - and the greatest Middle Eastern power, the Ottoman Empire.

The first direct political contact took place in the 16th century, when Ottoman records confirm that gunners and gunsmiths were sent to Aceh in Sumatra to help fight against the Portuguese domination of the pepper trade. In the intervening centuries, the main conduit for contact was the annual Hajj pilgrimage, and many Malay pilgrims from Southeast Asia spent long periods of study in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, which were under Ottoman rule from 1517 until the early 20th century. During the period of European colonial expansion in the 19th century, once again Malay states turned to Istanbul for help. It now appears that these demands for intervention from Southeast Asia may even have played an important role in the development of the Ottoman policy of Pan-Islamism, positioning the Ottoman emperor as Caliph and leader of Muslims worldwide and promoting Muslim solidarity.

The papers in this volume represent the first attempt to bring together research on all aspects of the relationship between the Ottoman world and Southeast Asia - political, economic, religious and intellectual – with much of it based on documents newly discovered in archives in Istanbul.



### **Turkish-American Relations, 1800-1952: Between the Stars, Stripes and the Crescent**

*By Şuhnaz Yilmaz*

This book aims to take the reader on a journey through the intricate web of Turkish-American relations. It critically examines the process during which the relations evolved from those of strangers into an occasionally troubled, yet resilient alliance. Through extensive use of Turkish, American and British archival documents and numerous private paper and manuscript collections, the book examines Turkish-American relations from 1800 to 1952, starting with the earliest contact and ending with the institutionalization of the alliance after Turkey's entry into NATO. Its purpose is to provide a better understanding of the key issues in Turkish-American relations, such as the impact of international developments on foreign policy decisions, the role of key figures and organizations in shaping the relations, the interaction of political, economic, cultural and military factors in policy forma-

tion, and the importance of mutual perceptions in shaping bilateral relations. The analysis locates Turkish-American relations in the larger context of diplomatic history, through an evaluation of how the United States' relations with Turkey fit into the general framework of American foreign policy, also providing an examination of the conduct and changing priorities of Turkish foreign policy in this era. This study not only enhances our knowledge of Turkish-American relations during the period of 1800-1952, but also provides further insight into relations during the Cold War and its aftermath.



**The History of Transnational Armenian Terrorism in the Twentieth Century: Historical and Criminological Research**  
*By Oleg Y. Kuznetsov*

According to Kuznetsov, the hierarchy of the Armenian Apostolic Church was the organizing principle in the structures of Armenian terrorism, the first victims of which included the Supreme Commander of the Caucasus, General of the Cavalry Knyaz G. S. Golitsyn; Governor-General of Kutaisi province and Head of the 2nd Caucasian Cossack Division Lieutenant General M. Alikhanov-Avarsky; Civil Governor of Baku province and Privy Councillor Knyaz A. M. Nakashidze; Governor of Yelizavetpol province Lieutenant General N. A. Luttsau; and others. Kuznetsov argues that the emergence and subsequent spread of Armenian terrorism throughout the world was never provoked by the actions of the authorities of the Ottoman Empire against the Armenian ethnos. Rather, it was an indigenous political mainstream phenomenon that emerged in the Armenian ethnos. Based on declassified CIA documents and a number of studies carried out by American, Israeli, Turkish and European authors, Kuznetsov concludes that the US security services conducted significant operational work aimed at subjugating the majority of Armenian terrorist groups who had Middle Eastern origins, with the aim of consolidating and 'cleansing' them of past crimes by simultaneous re-branding, so that their potential could be re-directed within the framework of the struggle against the Soviet Union.



## Notes for Contributors

### **Submissions**

Articles should be original and in English, between 3,000–6,000 words and should include a 200-word abstract, as well as the full title and affiliation of the author. Please check with the editor should you wish to extend beyond the suggested length or would like to submit a shorter contribution. All notes should appear as footnotes and provide full citations. References should

include the full name of the author, title of the work and publication date. Please send manuscripts to [editor@cjournal.az](mailto:editor@cjournal.az). Manuscripts submitted to Caucasus International should be original and not under consideration by another publication at the time of submission.

### **Style**

Authors are responsible for ensuring that their manuscripts conform to the journal style. Please limit repetition in the article; do not repeat the points in the article again in a conclusion section. We prefer academically sound articles as well as academic style writing. Papers must be in English. We strongly recommend that non-native speakers get their articles edited by a native English speaker *before* submitting to Caucasus International.

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Books:

Author(s), Title, (Place of Publishing: Publisher, Year), Page.

Articles:

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- Separatism and Georgia's relations with breakaway regions
  - Prospects of Georgian - Abkhazian conflict resolution
  - Prospect of Georgian - South Ossetian conflict resolution
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- Georgia's relations with neighboring countries:
  - Georgia - Azerbaijan relations
  - Georgia - Armenia relations
  - Multilateral format of cooperation: Azerbaijan - Georgia - Turkey trilateral cooperation
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  - Georgian Dream Coalition's rapprochement with Russia since 2012
  - Russia's agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Possible impact on Russia-Georgia and Russia-Abkhazia/South Ossetia relations
- Georgia's Euro-Atlantic aspirations
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