

# Armenia, Transnational Terrorism and Global Interests: What Do CIA and DoS Documents Suggest?

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The 1980s witnessed intensive theoretical engagement with and reflection on the issue of state-sponsored transnational terrorism in and outside Armenia. During that decade, this terrorism existed on an unprecedented and as yet unrepeatable scale, effectiveness and emotional intensity. Scholarly debate on the subject was taking place against the backdrop of continuing geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East, particularly Lebanon, forming the primary foundation of this socio-criminological phenomenon with its mainstream experiencing deep and structural modernization, consolidation and crystallization. An adequate understanding of the goals, objectives and practical orientation of the academic discussion on Armenian terrorism has only become possible in recent years, following the release of CIA documents on Armenian terrorist organizations (Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, Justice Commandos against Armenian Genocide, and New Armenian Resistance) into the public domain. A comparison of the US intelligence documents and those of the United States Department of State (DoS) with academic research materials has demonstrated a high degree of correlation across their content, potentially indicating that the majority of the theoretical analyses of the time were carried out indirectly or directly in the service of US government interests.

The main purpose of the contemporary academic discourse was to study different theoretical perspectives and different angles on the possibility of the use of resources and potential of Armenian state-sponsored terrorism against the Soviet Union as a "hot tool" in the Cold War. The affirmative answer to this question became the catalyst of aggression of originated in the Middle East Armenian terrorism against the Soviet Transcaucasia and marked the beginning of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.



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### Introduction

The distinct concept of Armenian terrorism first appeared in the United States in 1982. The term was coined by Andrew Corsun, a Counselor of the Threat Analysis Group Office of Security Department of State. In its August issue of the DoS official publication, *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, Corsun wrote an article entitled, “Armenian Terrorism: A Profile”<sup>1</sup> which almost immediately became a socio-political neologism. The article

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caused widespread public outcry and mass protests by the Armenian diaspora around the world. As a result, the editors had to include a written apology in the magazine’s September issue and to inform their readership (in the smallest typographic font possible) that “the article ... does not necessarily reflect an official position of the Department of State, and the interpretive comments in the article are solely those of the author”<sup>2</sup>. But be that as it may, the fact remains that following Andrew Corsun’s example, the term “Armenian terrorism” acquired an independent meaning in the terminology of contemporary political science and remains in use to this day, especially in the US and Europe (including Turkey and Azerbaijan).

The very fact that the definition of Armenian terrorism was not self-created but rather appeared in the depths of the DoS apparatus (nowhere else but in the Threat Analysis Group Office of Security) suggests that by 1982, the issue of Armenian terrorism had acquired a wide scope and a high degree of relevance, worthy of research by the DoS operating unit. Andrew Corsun’s article was, in fact, a summary of the different stages of the terrorist activity, and a clear indication that there was a sufficient volume of empirical data in the DoS for a logical and systematic statistical analysis. Put simply, by 1982, Armenian terrorism had become so apparent that it not only required a careful study, but also a political decision on how the US government should react to this socio-criminological phenomenon, which represented a serious threat to peace and security in many parts of the world. The article was a clear message to the rest of the world that the United States was prepared to attend closely to the issue.

1 Corsun, A. (1982) ‘Armenian Terrorism: A Profile’, *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 82, No 2065 Washington, D.C., pp. 31-35.

2 *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin* (1982), Vol. 82, No 2066, Washington, D.C., p. 3

Corsun was the first to attempt to absorb, reflect upon, and recognize Armenian terrorism not as an integral part or a radical element of the fight of the Armenian ethnos for the preservation of its national and religious identity and the acquisition of its national statehood, but rather as an indigenous and self-contained phenomenon with signs of sovereign institutionalization that existed as a self-organizing and a self-regulating body, independently from other institutional structures of the Armenian diaspora and the corporate ties within it. In other words, Corsun made the first ever attempt to consider Armenian terrorism as an external product of the ethno-religious Armenian community (or some kind of a secret society within the Armenian ethnos), organized, cohesive and extremist in its nature. As a professional in the field of national security, he did not suffer from delusions of conspiracy theories and phobias. Rather, he tried to understand this very specific objective reality from a purely scientific and materialist point of view.

At the same time, one should understand that Andrew Corsun was a civil service bureaucrat and not intelligence operative. Therefore, he had no access to any intelligence or any illegally obtained information. Due to the nature of his official position, Corsun could have used information gleaned either from open sources (mainly the mass media), potentially redacted diplomatic correspondence designed for official purposes, or general analytical reports of the US intelligence on specific issues (such as Armenian terrorism). Regardless of the source of his information, Corsun's article in *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin* was the result of an intellectual analysis of a single citizen given the totality of the facts and data that came into his possession on the deliberate illegal activity. Corsun sought to find a rational explanation for this activity within the scope of his own professional competences and, quite possibly, in accordance with his subjective perception of the world, his moral attitude, and level of intellectual development. In any case, Corsun's publication has been the result of his individual creativity based on the specific and limited amount of thematic information which reflected his claim for full coverage of the topic - the very goal that Corsun failed to achieve.

This aspect becomes increasingly evident when one compares

the content of Andrew Corsun's article with another official document covering similar material, a research paper titled *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat. A Research Paper* drafted in the CIA Directorate of Intelligence (№ GI 84-1008 EUR 84-10004) published no earlier than in the first quarter of 1984, which was partially declassified and published with redactions on the official website of the CIA on April 30, 2013<sup>3</sup>. Each of these two texts is interesting in itself, reflecting the work of either one author or a group of authors, with the content, consciously or unconsciously, reflecting the basic ideological positions of their drafters, as well as the goals and objectives set by the former regardless of whether they had been officially announced.

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The comparison of the documents is interesting from several

<sup>3</sup> Central Intelligence Agency. *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat. A Research Paper*. Available at: [http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document\\_conversions/89801/DOC\\_0005462031.pdf](http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0005462031.pdf) (Accessed: 20 April 2015).

<sup>4</sup> Despite the fact that the editors of The U.S. Department of State Bulletin strongly denied the official character of Andrew Corsun's article, the publication was in fact reflecting the official position of the US State Department as evidenced by a postscript entitled as a "Note": "Given the controversial nature of the events of 1915 in Asia Minor, the US State Department is not of the opinion that the Turkish government committed genocide of Armenians. It is just another reason for the Armenian terrorists to organize attacks against Turkish diplomats and missions". (Corsun, *Armenian Terrorism: A Profile*, p. 35).

points of view. Firstly, both texts, despite a substantial difference in their headlines, are thematically similar, and since the first of them was created in DoS, and the second one in the security services, together they represent a holistic and comprehensive view of the position of the US expert community on the issue of Armenian terrorism.

Secondly, the documents are so close to one another in terms of composite structure that one can suggest they were prepared by different people with approximately similar analytical or operational training and in accordance with a single (universal or unified) pattern, which once again confirms the above mentioned thought that the drafters of the documents and their end users belonged to very specific (and different to each other) circles of the American state apparatus, and had a common way of thinking, which also suggests that they had undergone the same type of theoretical and methodological training.

Thirdly, both texts are near-contemporaries (Corsun's article interrupts the statistics of Armenian terrorist activity as on July 26, 1982, while the CIA research paper does so by the end of 1983), therefore the authors almost certainly rely on and use a single amount and array of information. Consequently, the comparison of these two texts reveals a real level of competence and awareness of the issue of Armenian terrorism on the part of both the authors, as well as of those units where the former carried out their official duties.

Thus, one can conclude with near certainty that a comparison of reports drafted at about the same time by people with approximately similar professional backgrounds (DoS and CIA) enables a highly accurate assessment of the big picture, specifically in regard to the scale of the terrorist activity by Armenian political, nationalist and religious extremists in the last quarter of the twentieth century.

### *The Content of the Documents*

In assessing the content of any historical source, the focus should be not only content, but also aspects such as the contemporary relevance of the topic, the task assigned to the authors of the text, sources of objective information used by the authors in the compilation and analysis, options for practical application of the new

knowledge gained in the process of creating the document, and so on. The answers to these questions let one interpret the text as either an abstract, a compilation or a research material, and to characterize it in accordance with *The Historian's Craft* by Marc Bloch, as having been created intentionally or unintentionally, to determine which methodology was used by the author in the process of creating the document (since the officials in question are those of the US government agencies who received their professional education in the 1960s-1970s, the focus should be on the prevalent methods of representativism or those of constructionism in American school of humanities of the time). Put simply, consideration of the historical source not only in terms of its content, but also looking at the process that shaped its creation, allows one to understand not only by whom and how it was created, but also to answer the question of the author's ultimate objectives in publishing the piece.

A superficial comparison of these two documents allows one to reach a number of conclusions about their origin and the sources of information reflected in them. Every statement contained in the documents is consistent with certain other assumptions, but their cumulative comparison forms the trend, the very existence of inner consistency of which suggests a high degree of reliability of possible conclusions. In fact, the textual structure of each of the two texts was created in accordance with G. W. F. Hegel's second law of dialectics; only difference is that the transition from

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quantitative changes to the qualitative ones was carried out in accordance with the linear path of conversion of a number of similar trends to a single multifaceted process, and not with the inductive path of accumulating many private facts followed by their total transformation into a holistic phenomenon. To put it simply, in the first half of the 1980s, both the DoS and the CIA realized what Armenian nationalist, religious, and political terrorism was, so they decided to share their information with the US political elites so that the latter could decide on how this knowledge could be used for their own purposes or US national interests, and whether to use it at all. By that time, Armenian terrorism not only reached its climax, but by having exhausted the internal resources of the ethnic group, it gradually began to decline. As a result,

there was a need for outside impetus for the group's revival, if there were geopolitical reasons beyond the initial goals of the Armenian terrorists. In fact, Andrew Corsun's article raised a question within the US State Department on the US reaction to the phenomenon of Armenian terrorism: were they supposed to let it decline naturally or should they have turned it into a tool to implement their own foreign policy agenda? The same question was raised before the Intelligence Directorate of the CIA when they familiarized themselves with the research paper.

As mentioned above, both documents have a similar composite structure reflecting some sort of an algorithm or even a stereotype in relation to how the authors collected, processed, and presented the information. Both Corsun's article and the CIA research paper list historical origins of Armenian terrorism, as if justifying its right to exist and even covering it with a veil of legitimacy. Both papers briefly describe the specifics of the ideology, organizational structure, and tactical elements of the terrorist activity of the two major terrorist groups and their structural units, namely, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and Justice Commandos against Armenian Genocide (JCAG). The main difference between the contents of these two texts is that the analysis by the US intelligence contains a substantial body of information obtained through intelligence operations, therefore it is fair to suggest that it is much more informative. The authors of the texts summarize and list only the facts known to them without trying to interpret them, to establish a causal link between them, or to look for analogies, allusions and correlations, which generally corresponded to the dominant idea in American social science of the 1980s of the methodology of representivism.

Both documents view the explosion in the World Council of Churches in Beirut, Lebanon on January 20, 1975 as a starting point of Armenian terrorism of the 1970s-1980s. "Prisoner Karekin Yanikian Group" claimed responsibility for the terrorist attack. However, other evidence clearly demonstrates that the ideology and practice of Armenian terrorism were born earlier than January 1975, despite how the employees of the DoS and the CIA tried to present it to their immediate management and the international community.

The fact is that the terrorist “Prisoner Karekin Yanikian Group”, originally named ASALA, was created before January 1975 and was clearly inspired by the 27<sup>th</sup> January terrorist attack committed by an Armenian terrorist whose name was used in the title of the terrorist group. Born in Erzerum, Turkey, Karekin (Kurken) Yanikian was a graduate of Lomonosov Moscow State University. A philologist and a writer who emigrated from the USSR to the United States, Yanikian, on that same day, shot down Turkish Consul General Mehmet Baydar and Vice-Consul Bahadur Demir in the Baltimore hotel of the suburbs of Los Angeles (California, US) by luring the gentlemen to the meeting where he was promising to discuss the donation of cultural values to the Republic of Turkey.

This crime, committed by a person quite well known in US literary circles, was widely publicized and marked the first step toward the interest of US intellectual circles and that of the countries of Western Europe in the problem of Armenian terrorism as a form of revenge for the military and police measures directed against the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire at the time of WWI.

Karekin Yanikian’s murder of the Turkish diplomats was certainly a crime against the peace and security of mankind,<sup>5</sup> planned and committed by a single terrorist who acted without accomplices or support of any kind of organized crime network. This author has no doubt about the unambiguity of such a conclusion of the preliminary investigation carried out by the FBI. It seems that this is why the crime was not been included in the general list of collective Armenian terrorism offenses (where terrorists attacks were organized not by exalted single terrorosts, but by the organized and cohesive community whose activities could have been traced and brought under control of the US secret services in the national interests of the country) neither by Corsun himself, nor by the analysts of the CIA. It could mean that the specific task was assigned to the authors from the outset to collect and analyze the objective data and to describe Armenian terrorism not as a political and historical event in retrospect, but

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<sup>5</sup> The definition is given in accordance with the wording of the title of section XII of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the structure of which includes the offense under Art. 360 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, “Attacks on persons or institutions which are under international protection”.



rather as a structurally organized social phenomenon. In other words, their task was to understand and to describe the potential threats of Armenian terrorism at a very particular time, which had little correlation with the ideology that had been inspiring the terrorists to commit their crimes in the last decade of the twentieth century.

The statistics contained in the documents on committed terrorist attacks by Armenian militants are interesting. Corsun mentions over 170 terrorist attacks committed by Armenian terrorists in different countries in the period from 20 January 1975 to 26 July 1982, whereas the CIA research paper contains contradictory information in this regard. For example, 203 crimes are mentioned on page 6 of the main part of the paper as committed or prepared by Armenian terrorists but prevented by the authorities in 1975-1983. But on page 9, figure 2, the data on 168 crimes is presented by visualizing the number of terrorist attacks committed by different Armenian terrorist groups. The summary table of the Annex 2 of the document contains a reference to 146 committed or accidentally prevented terrorist attacks from 20 January 1975 to 17 August 1983, which organization by Armenian terrorists was officially proven. The CIA analysts either did not see those quantitative contradictions or simply preferred to ignore them. It could be that they did not intentionally focus their attention on the fact due to the unwillingness to tie themselves down by explanations to their management. This gives one good reason to suggest that the CIA document is characterized by approximate data and conclusions, which leads one to conclude that the CIA management asked the analysts to identify the most important trends in the state of organized structures and practices of Armenian terrorism in the early 1980s without going into too much detail.

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On the other hand, this state of affairs could be explained differently. American experts have repeatedly pointed to the extremely low level of operational and technical preparation of the committed crimes (explosions near residential and office buildings, etc), most of which could have indeed been committed by the single terrorists with no connection to Armenian terrorist organizations, yet with ideological sympathy to them, and therefore, having associated themselves with organizations such as

ASALA, JCAG, and other structurally stable groups regarded by the CIA analysts as terrorist organizations. One could allow for such a possibility also because of the research paper having been declassified and published with redactions, containing unavailable findings and operational data.

However, there is a further issue that casts doubt on the integrity of the CIA analysts who drafted the paper on the activities of the Armenian terrorist organizations. As already mentioned, it was officially called *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat*, although one can find the names of other Armenian terrorist groups (such as the Justice Commandos against Armenian Genocide and New Armenian Resistance, NAR, Orly Group, June 9<sup>th</sup> Group, October 3<sup>th</sup> Group) who were structurally not united with ASALA due to ideological differences, but were cooperating with it in the practice of terror. Today we know that most of them positioned themselves in the face of justice as structural units of ASALA while not entering the latter's organizational structure, which, in its turn, was meant to form the idea in public consciousness that ASALA was large and powerful, despite the fact that this was far from the reality.

This contradiction suggests that the CIA could have been initially tasked with compiling a dossier on the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, whose public proclamations were full of leftist and Marxist-Leninist sentiment. Therefore, the US military and political establishment could have had quite a reasonable and well-founded suspicion about the ASALA having been the product of the KGB. Nevertheless, in the process of operational and analytical activity it was found that the terrorist activities had been a practical expression of the ideological and political mainstream, so common to the radical thinking of some members of Armenian diaspora. As a result, Armenian terrorism in the context of its ideology started to be perceived by the CIA not as a monochrome picture, but rather as a bright and multicolored mosaic, with many nuances and shades.

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By having started the intelligence gathering on the possible imprint of ‘Moscow’s hand’, the CIA officers learnt quickly enough that the leadership of the Soviet Union had nothing to do with the emergence of ASALA, and that the Armenian terrorist network that spread in Europe, Middle East and North America was quite autochthonous in its origin and did not have the backstage support of any of the world powers. It took several years of intensive work to double-check those findings, which led to ASALA being deemed ‘Armenian terrorism’.

If this assumption is correct, it explains the place of Corsun’s article in the overall work structure of the US intelligence analysts on Armenian terrorism of the late 1970s and early 1980s. It is clear that within a few years of research and operational intelligence assistance, a sufficient volume of empirical material had been collected and compiled for the analysis and subsequent conclusions, first presented in 1982. The publication in *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin* magazine was not only intended to demonstrate the US’ concern about systemic Armenian terrorism to the international community, but also to give impetus to public debate on this issue in the media. Having received a certain reaction from the relevant segments of the international community, the CIA analysts may have had corrected some of their earlier findings thereby improving the quality of their work. As a result, the military and political leadership of the US received a logically structured (or at least internally consistent) analysis.

To summarize the above information, it should be stressed that both documents, despite frequent contradictions in certain aspects of their contents, can be generally considered as both adequate and reliable, sufficiently reflecting the problem of Armenian terrorism of the 1970s and 1980s in all its diversity. Together, they provide a holistic view on Armenian terrorism in the first decade of the twentieth century as an autochthonous, ideological, and criminal phenomenon, which should be studied not only from the standpoint of criminology, but also from the perspectives of politology and anthropology.

*Chronology behind the Research*

It must be explained why in 1982 (and not in the previous year or two years later instead), there suddenly appeared a request in the higher echelons of the US political elites for a comprehensive study of the phenomenon of Armenian terrorism by the DoS and CIA analysts. This was presumably the consequence of several independent factors and circumstances coinciding.

The most important event in this regard was the invasion of southern Lebanon in July-September 1982 by the armed forces of the State of Israel allied with predominantly Christian, Lebanese right-wing military forces ‘Phalange’, having resulted in the infamous massacre in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatila to the north-east of the Lebanese capital (see also ‘1982 Lebanon War’, ‘Operation Peace for Galilee’). Although the main purpose of the Israeli military offensive was the destruction of the military, organizational and political infrastructures of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its terrorist proxies in southern Lebanon, those attacks were simultaneously directed against the targets of ASALA and JCAG in eastern and western Beirut, since the latter had cooperated very closely with the PLO in the joint training of militants. More precisely, the ASALA offices were located in the PLO headquarters building.

After the Israeli victory, in the early fall of 1982, political and financial structures of the PLO were relocated to Tunisia, while the military components of both the ASALA and JCAG went to Syria. As the training camps of those organizations were based in the Bekaa Valley, this Syrian territory was also occupied by the Israeli troops, having resulted in the continuing Syrian-Israeli conflict, the responsibility for which lies largely with the Armenian terrorists. Thus, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon led to disengagement within the Armenian community living in the country. Half of its armed representatives in the streets of Beirut supported the right-wing Catholics of “Phalange”, i.e. Israel’s allies, while the other part – mainly, the ASALA supporters from the Armenian quarter of Bourj Hammoud – started to fight on the side of the PLO. Despite the apparent religious antagonism between the Christians and the Muslims, they had close personal, financial, operational, and undercover ties. Due to its very close ties with the Palestinian terrorists, Armenian terrorism,

apart from its transnational character, acquired international features by having been organically incorporated in the international terrorist environment.

In 1982, President Ronald Reagan, elected two years earlier, realized that based on the success of internal political and economic reforms, the country had sufficient resources to initiate an offensive foreign policy against the Soviet Union. Reagan famously considered the USSR as an 'Evil Empire' (at least, this is how he described the USSR in his speech dated March 8, 1983, delivered to the participants of the National Association of Evangelicals). When preparing his 'Crusade against Communism', Reagan himself or likely his advisers saw Armenian terrorism as one of the possible operating forces or as a set of actors set up for the offensive. The analytical service of the official US agencies was, therefore, focused on the resources and capacities of the former. That is why in August 1982, *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin* magazine pointed to the existence of such a force. The following year, the CIA was researching ASALA and other Armenian terrorist organizations, considering the possibility of using them against the Soviet Union - primarily, the Armenian SSR and Soviet Transcaucasia as a whole. This was considered the most difficult region in terms of state management, having had complex problems and antagonisms in the area of socio-economic relations (in its broadest interpretation).

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The success of the Israeli armed forces in southern Lebanon and Beirut in 1982 led not only to the destruction of the existing infrastructure of Armenian terrorism, but also to the seizure of internal documentation of the Armenian terrorist organizations by the military intelligence and Mossad, including personal data of the militants. It is obvious that this information was almost immediately shared with US intelligence services in the framework of the military, technical and political cooperation between Israel and the US, having resulted in the former's full control of the entire network of activists and militants of ASALA, who were forced to cooperate with the American secret services to avoid criminal prosecution for their involvement in terrorist activities in their countries of residence. In other words, in 1982, the CIA established if not complete control, then at least the objective

possibility of control of the entire network of transnational Armenian terrorism, which, in its turn, allowed it to put most of the network's elements into its service.

In 1983, the organizational and structural transformation in the mainstream Armenian terrorism proved that at that time, a diverse set of Armenian terrorist organizations acquired a new consolidating and organizing principle. On July 15, 1983, ASALA was split and a group of renegades led by Monte Melkonian emerged from its rank, with the former having announced the creation of a new 'revolutionary' organization entitled, 'Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia – Revolutionary Movement', abbreviated as ASALA-RM. The group established by Hakob Hakobyan in 1975 thereby lost its members and resources and was doomed to a gradual collapse. The newly established descendant had the opportunity to express itself 'from scratch', with no shadows of past failures, defeats or mistakes. The day before, on July 14, 1983, Justice Commandos against Armenian Genocide was renamed Armenian Revolutionary Army, ARA, which was meant to symbolize the beginning of a fundamentally new stage in the history of Armenian transnational terrorism. After this re-branding, JCAG-ARA continued its terrorist activity until the early 1990s, until its fighters found the opportunity to continue their criminal acts in a different part of the world – on the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. 1983 was marked by the departure from a historical scene of another Armenian terrorist organization that was operating in Western Europe under the name of 'New Armenian Resistance', NAR.

The simultaneous nature of these transformations suggests that they were not a coincidence, but that they were the parts of a single pre-planned logical sequence of actions aimed at consolidating various trends and branches of transnational Armenian terrorism around a single focal point, which would direct its activity to achieve a fundamentally different purpose not less close to the heart and in tune with the idea of the revival of the so-called 'Great Armenia'.

It seems that starting from 1983, the main enemy of the Armenian nationalists and their radical element, the terrorists, was the Soviet Union (and not the Republic of Turkey), the collapse and of which guaranteed and provided the appearance of a territo-

rial center for the Armenian diaspora for recreation and subsequent expansion of the boundaries of the Armenian statehood by capturing territories of the neighboring states – not just of Turkey, but also those of Azerbaijan, Georgia, perhaps, Iran, and Russia.

### *Studying Armenian Terrorism*

Andrew Corsun's article in *The U.S. Department of State Bulletin* magazine in 1982 was the starting point for an active debate in academic and socio-political journals of the United States. Given the wide publicity that the topic had spontaneously acquired in the circles of the American scholarly intelligentsia, the discussion was almost simultaneously joined by several people who subsequently were divided into two camps, with diametrically opposed ideological and moral positions – those who unequivocally condemned and those who unequivocally rehabilitated the Armenian terrorists and justified their crimes in historical retrospect. The first group of authors included people like Paul Wilkinson, Michael Z. Szaz and Michael M. Gunter, the second one – Robert Jordan and Christopher J. Walker.<sup>6</sup> Most of these authors' 1983 publications had been opportunistic. Having exhausted the topic in their journalistic polemics, they began to write books on the topic. But that is what their main objective was – to determine reactions of US and foreign intellectuals to their assessments and proposals, nothing more. It was through these articles that the search for social reflexion or feedback was carried out, aimed at revealing the potential reaction of the international community on possible use of resources and capabilities of Armenian terrorism in the interests of the United States.

Having generally received an indifferent, and in the case of the Armenian diaspora and Turkey, a positive response to such a per-

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6 Gunter, M. M. (1983a) 'The Armenian Terrorist Campaign Against Turkey', *Orbis*, No 27, pp. 447-477; Gunter M. M. (1983b), 'The Armenian Terrorist Campaign Against Turkey', *Orient*, No 24, pp. 610-637; Gunter M. M. (1986) 'Contemporary Armenian Terrorism', *Terrorism*, 3(8), pp. 213-252; Gunter M.M. (1985a) 'The Historical Origins of Contemporary Armenian Terrorism', *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, No 9, pp. 77-96; Gunter M. M. (1985b) 'Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism', *Conflict Quarterly*, No 5, pp. 31-52; Jordan R. (1978) 'The Proud Armenians', *National Geographic*, No 153, pp. 846-873; Szaz, M. Z. (1983) 'Armenian Terrorists and the East-West Conflict', *Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, No. 8, pp. 387-394; Walker C. J. (1983) 'The Armenian Holocaust in Its Modern Historical Context', *Ararat*, No 24, pp. 43-45; Wilkinson P. (1983), 'Armenian Terrorism', *World Today*, No 39 pp. 344-350.

spective, the US political establishment initiated active theoretical research in this direction, by providing the authors with the possibility to create theoretical models, describing a wide variety of options of potential developments. In the 1980s, books on the history and prospects of development of transnational Armenian terrorism written by authors such as Yohan Alexander and Kenneth A. Myers, M. A. Birand, Erich Feigl, Kamuran Gurun, Anat Kurz and Ariel Mirari, David C. Rapoport, Salahi Ramsdan Soniel, Yves Ternon appeared.<sup>7</sup> Simultaneously, several major international conferences on Armenian terrorism were organized and held in Turkey, (most affected by Armenian terrorism in the last quarter of the twentieth century), with the correlation of the theoretical views of researchers, as subsequently reflected in the published conference materials.<sup>8</sup>

As a result of the efforts of a dozen of authors from around the world, a holistic and integrated picture of the capacity and resources of Armenian terrorism emerged, ultimately summarized in Francis P. Hyland's 'Armenian terrorism: the past, the present, the prospects'.<sup>9</sup>

This author's structural semantic and comparative linguistic analysis of Hyland's text showed that it was almost completely identical (correlation of 0.9) with the text of the CIA paper, *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat. A Research Paper*. This allows one to conclude that Hyland was either the author of the paper, or at least, its literary editor. This, in turn, suggests that the studies on Armenian terrorism in the 1980s were carried out on the initiative and in the interests of the US government and its secret services across the entire world. It was Hyland who in 1991 first argued

7 Alexander, Y. and Myers, A. K. (1982) *Terrorism in Europe*. London: Croom Helm Ltd.; Birand, M. A. (1983) *Lisanda Ermeni Terörü*, Ankara: And Kartposatal ve Yayınları; Feigl, E. A. (1986) *Myth of Terror: Armenian Extremism: Its Causes and Its Historical Context*, Salzburg: Zeitgeschichte; Freilassing; Feigl, E. (1986) *Ein Mythos des Terrors. Armenischer Terrorismus, seine Ursachen und Hintergründe*, Freilassing: Zeitgeschichte; Gurun, K. (1985) *The Armenian File*, New York: St. Martin's Press; Kurz, A. and Mirari, A. (1985) *ASALA: Irrational Terror or Political Tool*, Jerusalem: Jerusalem Post; Rapoport, D. C. (1988) *Inside Terrorist Organizations*, New York: Columbia University Press; Soniel, S. R. (1987) *Armenian terrorism: a menace to the international community*, London: Cyprus Turkish Association; Ternon, Y. (1985) *The Armenian Cause*, New York: Caravan Books.

8 Akdeniz University, Research Center for the Study of Atatürk Reforms and Principles (1985) 'Armenian terrorism: a threat to peace'. Antalya, Turkey; International Terrorism and Drug Connection: Collection of Reports (1984). Ankara: Ankara University Press; Symposium on International Terrorism: Collection of Reports (1984). Ankara: Ankara University Press.

9 Hyland, F. P. (1991) *Armenian terrorism: the past, the present, the prospects*, Boulder: Westview Press.



that the main objective of transnational Armenian terrorism was the Soviet Union and not the Republic of Turkey, as it remained throughout the 1970-1980s. In this regard, Hyland stated that the epicenter of the terrorist activity of Armenian nationalists would be “Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan”, where the Armenian population “united and rebelled in response to the oppression on behalf of the Muslim majority”<sup>10</sup>.

As one can see, in the 1980s, there were four levels of study on Armenian terrorism in the interests of the subsequent adoption by the US leadership of a political decision on its account: operative, administrative, publicistic, and academic.

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Each of these levels of analysis had a specific and immanent purpose. The operational analysis was meant to provide an objective factology of Armenian terrorism to enable subsequent evaluation of its resources and capacity under specific historical conditions. The administrative analysis was meant to assess its resource potential and the potential for its subsequent planning in the interests of the United States and to define the contours of the usage patterns. The publicistic analysis was supposed to provide the so-called feedback to find out the attitude of the international community and the Armenians themselves to these usage patterns. Finally, the academic level was important to ensure that all the results of multi-level and multi-factor analyses were synthesized into a single plan of potential action.

In addition, the active scientific discussions around the issue of Armenian terrorism, accompanied by a highly emotional background, unconsciously served as a cover for applied analytical studies of the ways, means and methods of using the resources and capacity of transnational Armenian terrorism against the Soviet Union, which also perfectly suited the US government and the CIA.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

## Conclusion

Without going too deep into the ideological bias and partisanship of the authors who had been studying those documents, yet at the same time according due respect to their professionalism and competence, it should be emphasized that both texts (the reliability of the contents of which this author has no grounds to question) give a comprehensive description of Armenian terrorism of the 1970s-80s by interpreting it as an ethno-criminal phenomenon with orthodox ideological overtones, rather marginal in its nature and content - though highly effective in terms of its impact on the target audience. Unburdened with allusions about the categories of 'Good' and 'Evil', they considered this quite an autochthonous phenomenon from the perspective of its potential usage as a specific tool to influence the individual "pain points" of international relations in the interests of US foreign policy. Such a purely pragmatic approach had allowed the DoS analysts to persuade representatives of the top US political leadership that Armenian terrorism, apart from being a real international threat to the US interests and its allies in Europe and the South-West Asia, did not belong to the structure of global confrontation between the communist East and the capitalist West because of its autochthony and marginality. As a result, the latter could use it to serve its geostrategic interests. In the historical faith of the Soviet Union and the whole socialist bloc of countries of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, a factor of the 'tamed by the West Armenian terrorism' played a fatal role as Armenian nationalists and terrorists became a key strike force in organizing and deliberate unleashing in the second half of the 1980s of the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagorno-Karabakh war, which essentially put an end to the existence of the USSR and the entire bloc of the Warsaw Pact.